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Since 2000, Russia has continued to pursue closer relations with China. In the West, the 
relationship has been met with skepticism. In general, the narrative of a reluctant partnership 
fraught with mutual mistrust and hidden rivalry has been accepted as a basis for a reasonable 
understanding of Russia-China relations. Nevertheless, Moscow and Beijing have continued to 
develop their relations and to regularly declare that they are doing so in the spirit of trust, mutual 
respect, and friendship. This thesis contributes a rigorous and systematic analysis to the literature 
on Russia-China relations that employs an integrative analytical framework targeting 
dispositional factors of Russian decisionmakers as a source of explanation for Russia’s foreign 
policy towards China from 2000 to 2020. The study finds that, primarily, perceptions of a lack of 
unmanageable conflicts of interests between Russia and China and an absence of harmful 
intentions from China to Russia among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers inhibit 
confrontation and enable cooperation. The thesis also contributes theoretical insight on how a 
great power manages decline by participating in the institutions and projects of a rising power for 
the sake of information access, which strengthens the ability of the declining power to protect its 
interests. The study includes a crowdsourced content analysis of over 42,000 paragraphs that 
were published by 19 prominent Russian institutions of knowledge production on international 
affairs, foreign policy, and security, and mention China at least once. With an additional analysis 
of the connections of the publishing institutions and the authors of the texts to the Russian 
government and military, the thesis identifies dominant views that have likely contributed to the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The state of Russia-China relations has profound implications for global stability. This makes the 
relationship an appealing case for international relations (IR) scholars and analysts. In the 1990s, 
Western literature that emphasized the limits of Sino-Russian partnership gained prominence. As 
the literature continued into the 2000s, claims of a hidden rivalry between the Russian Federation 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) rife with the threat of confrontation and conflict due 
to mutual mistrust and conflicts of interests became widespread and acquired momentum that 
bears considerable weight to this day. Despite these claims, Russia’s relationship with China is 
apparently as good as it has ever been. 
The primary explanandum of the thesis is that there is a dominant perception of an absence of 
threat from China to Russia among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. This perception is 
puzzling for three main reasons. First, for realists, shifts in the balance of power are one of the 
main causes of confrontation, balancing, and conflict among states. Given the rapidity of China’s 
rise, its proximity to Russia, the anarchic international environment, and that Moscow can never 
be certain of Beijing’s intentions, current or future, Russia would be expected by many realists to 
perceive China as a threat. 
Second, it is arguable that the fact that Russia and China are both widely considered balancers 
against US hegemony is not sufficient to prevent a perception of threat. Neither Russia nor China 
wish to have a formal alliance with the other, mainly because Moscow does not want to be 
obligated to side with China in a conflict in the East or South China Seas or over Taiwan, and 
China does not want to be obligated to side with Russia over a conflict that may erupt over 




relationships of each with the US differ significantly. China is dependent on the US market for 
the continuation of its economic growth, which it considers critical for domestic stability and the 
defense of its interests abroad. The same cannot be said of Russia. 
Third, hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory both suggest that shifts in the 
balance of power are dangerous, as they may lead to war. According to the former, a declining 
power has an incentive to initiate a preventive war against a rising power in order to maintain its 
dominant status. According to the latter, a rising power has more of an incentive to initiate war if 
the dominant power is unwilling to accommodate the rising power’s mounting interests. Russia 
has long been overtaken by China in terms of economic power, however, despite China’s relative 
conventional superiority in northeast Asia, Russia may still be considered the dominant military 
power between the two because of its massive nuclear arsenal and conventional superiority in 
Central Asia. As Beijing’s military expenditures have consistently exceeded those of Moscow 
with a growing expenditures gap since 2000, Russia may be considered in relative decline in 
terms of overall military power.1 The debate over whether the rising power or declining power 
has more incentive to initiate conflict is irrelevant to this study. What is important is that there is 
a considerable amount of literature that argues that shifts in the balance of power motivate 
                                                             
1 SIPRI. ‘Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2018) US$ m., 1988-2019’. Available at 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. Accessed 09/07/2020. For other estimates of Russia’s military expenditures, 
please see Erik Andermo and Martin Kragh. ‘Secrecy and Military Expenditures in the Russian Budget’. Post-Soviet 
Affairs 36, no. 4 (2020): 297-322; and Keith Crane et al. ‘Trends in Russia's Armed Forces: An Overview of 
Budgets and Capabilities’. Rand Corporation. 2019. pp. 3-26. Available at 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2573.html. Accessed 10/04/2021. For other estimates of China’s 
military expenditures, please see Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States. ‘Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020’. 01/09/2020. p. 140. Available at 
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-
FINAL.PDF?fbclid=IwAR0P56sTP7J83TN2ebe2QkqHU40D2LjxHv5wuAEdmNhbP3WKa-ZJgC63mko. 




conflict, and in accordance with such literature one would expect a perception among Russian 
foreign policy decisionmakers that China threatens Russia. 
The focus on perceptions of an absence of threat from China to Russia among Russian foreign 
policy decisionmakers is foundational to the approach taken by this thesis to analyze Russia’s 
foreign policy towards China. Since the foreign policy of a state towards another is often 
determined to a large extent by whether the other state is considered a threat, much of the policy 
can be explained by the rationale behind the view of the other as threatening or non-threatening. 
The study does not claim to explain every element of Russia’s foreign policy towards China 
from 2000 to 2020.2 However, it does offer an explanation of the policy during this period, 
specifically with regard to the way it has managed to avoid confrontation and conflict and 
continued to develop cooperation despite the shift in the bilateral balance of power. 
In employing an analytical framework that integrates agency and structure in the interest of 
producing a multilevel multicausal explanation of Russia’s foreign policy towards China, the 
thesis aims to identify the intentions and dispositional factors (perceptions and values) of 
Russian foreign policy decisionmakers and to elaborate the explanation the dispositional factors 
provide with a discussion of structural constraints. The study includes a crowdsourced content 
analysis of 42,445 paragraphs that were published by 19 prominent Russian institutions of 
knowledge production on international affairs, foreign policy, and security, and mention China at 
least once. With an additional analysis of the connections of the publishing institutions and the 
authors of the texts to the Russian government and military, the thesis identifies dominant views 
                                                             




that have likely contributed to the dispositional factors that form the basis of Russia’s foreign 
policy towards China from 2000 to 2020. 
Based on the analysis performed, the explanation of Russia’s foreign policy towards China from 
2000 to 2020 offered by the thesis is as follows. The dominant perception of an absence of threat 
from China to Russia among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers can be explained by the 
view that Russia’s and China’s interests have been at most mutual or complementary and at least 
not in severe or unmanageable conflict. The perception is also attributed to the view that China 
has not had harmful intentions towards Russia and that a good state of relations between the two 
countries is being maintained and continues to develop. 
Regarding its relations with China, the main constraint that Russia’s policy faces in the Russian 
Far East (RFE) and Central Asia (the two areas of focus in the thesis) is China’s economic 
power. Throughout the period of interest, the trade structure of the RFE and China has been 
unbalanced in favor of the PRC: the RFE exports mostly raw materials and China exports mostly 
finished goods. Despite the unfavorability of the trade structure, China’s economy provides vital 
import and export markets for the RFE. The economic dependence of the RFE on China 
constrains Russia’s foreign policy in a way that makes actions that might severely disrupt the 
current economic relationship between the RFE and China at least unattractive and at most 
nonoptional. This constraint, however, has not given rise to a dominant perception among 
Russian foreign policy decisionmakers that China poses a threat to the RFE primarily because 
the unfavorable trade structure is generally not attributed to external actors, including the PRC, 




China’s economic power has also constrained Russia’s foreign policy in Central Asia throughout 
the period of interest. Both Russia and China consider economic development linked to stability, 
and both are interested in a stable Central Asia. While Russia may prefer to be the primary driver 
of economic development in the region, it is simply not capable of doing so. Despite this 
limitation, China’s economic activity in Central Asia is not considered particularly threatening 
by Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. There is a dominant perception that China’s economic 
interests in Central Asia are ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’, and that the competition that 
exists between Russia and China in the region is successfully managed through diplomacy, 
allowing the countries to avoid confrontation and conflict. China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) is generally considered beneficial to Russia, complementary to the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU), and a development that furthers the countries’ shared interest in socio-economic 
stability in Central Asia. 
In this view, China’s economic expansion serves not so much as a loss as a gain for Russia in the 
form of more stability on its southern border. Russia’s policy of hindering the development of 
multilateral economic cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its 
hesitation to lower or remove EAEU tariffs on imported Chinese goods may also be viewed as 
serving a stabilizing function by protecting domestic industry in Central Asia. Russia’s policies 
have a balancing effect that serves the interests of both Russia and China in regional stability and 
are not as much a response to a direct threat from China as they are a response to a potential 
threat in the form of socio-economic upheaval in Central Asia prompted by the failure of 
domestic businesses due to an influx of inexpensive Chinese consumer goods and the growth of 
anti-Chinese sentiments. This perspective of Russia’s economic balancing policies combined 




EAEU-China trade agreement—creates a picture of economic interaction between Russia and 
China in Central Asia characterized less by confrontation and rivalry moving towards conflict 
and more by manageable competition moving with caution towards a higher degree of 
cooperation and coordination in the mutual interest of regional stability. 
In the context of Russia managing its relative decline vis-à-vis China, four factors are considered 
to have likely contributed to the dominant perception among Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers that the rise of China does not pose a threat to Russia. First, despite China’s 
conventional military superiority over Russia in northeast Asia and the countries’ military 
expenditures gap, Russian officials do not perceive China as a challenger to its status as a great 
military power. This is mainly due to Russia’s stable military power relative to that of China in 
Central Asia, China’s recognition of Russia’s ‘privileged’ interests and role as the primary 
security provider in the region, and Russia’s maintenance of a massive nuclear arsenal. 
Second, ideational convergence has contributed to the perception that the rise of China does not 
pose a threat to Russia. The countries have ideationally converged around the fight against the 
‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism and the ‘Shanghai Spirit’, which 
includes mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and 
the pursuit of common development. Russia and China have also ideationally converged around 
the rejection of unipolarity in favor of multipolarity, the foreign policy principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states, and the de-ideologization of their relations in 




Third, Russia, regarding it relations with China, may be seen as engaging in strategic 
retrenchment in the interest of solvency.3 Russian foreign policy decisionmakers likely realize 
that confronting a rising China is beyond Russia’s means, and by retrenching it has an 
opportunity to strengthen in an environment in which it does not have to sacrifice tremendous 
resources for the sake of confrontation or conflict with China. 
And fourth, Russia has managed its decline relative to China by participating in the institutions 
and projects of the PRC, including the SCO, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
and the BRI for the sake of information access. In addition to the leverage Russia gains as a 
participant in the institutions and projects, its participation allows Moscow to better understand 
China’s activities, particularly in Central Asia, and this information strengthens Russia’s ability 
to protect its interests. 
Literature Review 
It has been common among Western scholars and analysts to argue that Russia’s public 
relationship with China, consisting of rapprochement, cooperation, and continuing development, 
is fragile because of mutual mistrust and conflicts of interests. Occasionally, authors suggest that 
it is a facade hiding a rivalry carried out in private. Some claims that Russia perceives China as a 
threat are left unsubstantiated while others are accompanied by citations intending to offer 
supporting evidence. If time is taken to check the sources thoroughly, sometimes evidence is 
found to be wanting. The Future of China-Russia Relations (2010) was selected for this part of 
the review because it was published in the middle of the period of interest and includes the work 
                                                             
3 MacDonald, Paul K., and Joseph M. Parent. Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment. 




of several prominent scholars in the field of Russia-China relations. The following focuses on a 
few citations made by Downs in one of the chapters of the volume. 
Downs argues that between Russia and China there is ‘historically developed mutual mistrust 
and lack of understanding’ and that ‘mistrust between China and Russia has hindered energy 
cooperation between the countries’.4 The former claim was left unsubstantiated, but for the latter 
the scholar cites an entire article by Lo, which contains some contradictions and arguments 
wanting of evidence.5 
Lo posits that, for various reasons, Russians are filled with mistrust, anxiety, and suspicion 
towards China, and makes the seemingly contradictory claim that between Russia and China, 
‘the level of mutual trust is higher than ever’.6 The scholar does not cite any evidence in the 24-
page article, but makes bold claims, including the following. 
‘The re-emergence of a positive bilateral agenda has done little to allay Moscow's anxieties about 
the “China threat”. In its most elemental and primitive form, this fear is embodied in the bogey of a 
“yellow horde” rushing in to fill the “empty spaces” of the Russian Far East … China is 
challenging - discreetly - Russia’s once pre-eminent position. The old strategic arrangements, 
whereby Beijing was happy to leave Moscow the responsibility of managing radical Islamic and 
separatist currents, are unraveling’.7 
In contrast, the analysis performed for this thesis reveals that a positive bilateral agenda has 
likely done much to ‘allay Moscow’s anxieties’, and that the division of labor between the two in 
Central Asia, in which Russia focuses more on security and China more on economic well-being 
                                                             
4 Downs, Erica. ‘Sino-Russian Energy Relations: An Uncertain Courtship’. In James Bellacqua, ed. The Future of 
China-Russia Relations. University Press of Kentucky. 2010. pp. 146, 160. 
5 Lo, Bobo. ‘China and Russia: Common Interests, Contrasting Perceptions’. Insight Turkey 9, no. 2 (2007): 128-
151. 
6 Ibid., p. 136. 




and development, was not unraveling and, despite China’s recent expansion of its security 
presence in Tajikistan (examined in Chapter 7), has not undergone substantial change. 
Lo offers some scenarios for the future of Russia-China relations, one of which the scholar 
claims is ‘favored by some Russian Sinologists’ that are not cited.8 The scenario is that China 
will ‘crack up under the weight of various pressures: political succession; democratization; an 
overheated economy; social inequality and dislocation; uncontrolled population growth’ and as a 
result, Beijing might ‘“compensate” for domestic setbacks with a more aggressive and 
nationalistic foreign policy’, which may involve ‘revisiting’ some issues such as the demarcation 
of the common border, illegal immigration, and ‘strategic accommodation in Central Asia’.9 Lo 
adds that ‘any move by Beijing in this direction would have serious repercussions, to the point 
that armed conflict could not be ruled out’.10 
This thesis shows that views such as these in Russia are marginal. Dominant views among 
Russian experts and officials are far more moderate and include cautious optimism and 
continuous reassessment of Russia’s relationship with China, which, in general, has led to the 
conclusion that the countries’ relations are good and that they continue to develop in a positive 
direction. The study uncovered no evidence to suggest that Russian officials are concerned that 
domestic pressures in China will result in the targeting of Russia with an aggressive policy as 
compensation. 
Lo’s article, which Downs describes as a ‘discussion of the mistrust between China and Russia’, 
is the only source the scholar cites to support the claim that ‘mistrust between China and Russia 
                                                             






has hindered energy cooperation between the countries’.11 Given the questionable foundations of 
Lo’s arguments, it would be reasonable not to take Downs’s claim at face value. 
Downs also posits that ‘Moscow has been reluctant to make binding commitments to construct 
oil and natural gas pipelines to China largely because of concerns that by doing so Russia will be 
directly helping to fuel the rise of a country that poses a serious long-term threat to Russian 
national security’.12 The scholar cites two pages of a chapter written by Yu. The most relevant 
claim Yu makes on these pages is that ‘Russia’s indecision on the pipeline issue reflects its 
mixed perception of China, which is rooted in a muted, but serious, concern about a rising 
China’.13 Yu cites two sources of evidence for this claim. The first is ‘“FMA 8 Dec: Russian, 
Chinese, and Japanese Media Discuss Far Eastern Pipeline,” December 8, 2003, FBIS’.14 A basic 
search of this citation, in whole or in parts, brings no results that lead to the source to which Yu 
refers. The second source Downs cites is an article by a media correspondent with a bachelor’s 
degree in Latin American studies.15 
Downs also claims that ‘many Russians are convinced that [the RFE] will increasingly become a 
Chinese sphere of influence if larger numbers of the hundreds of millions of inhabitants of 
China’s northeast move north in search of additional “living space”’.16 In addition to one of the 
pages of Yu’s article discussed above, the scholar cites three sources. One of the sources makes 
the opposite claim: 
                                                             
11 Downs. ‘Sino-Russian Energy Relations: An Uncertain Courtship’. 2010. p. 172. 
12 Ibid., p. 160. 
13 Yu Bin. ‘China and Russia: Normalizing Their Strategic Partnership’. In David Shambaugh et al. (eds.) Power 
Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics. University of California Press. 2005. p. 239. 
14 Ibid., p. 244. 
15 The New York Times. ‘James Brooke’. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/by/james-brooke. Accessed 
27/06/2020. 




‘Erroneous is the argument that because Russia’s East is so thinly populated and China’s 
neighboring regions are densely populated, Russia risks being overrun by Chinese. All evidence 
from economics says that the natural tendency is for economic activity to concentrate, not disperse. 
People are not like a fluid or a gas: they do not flow to fill a vacuum. The Chinese immigrants in 
Russia — who in general are far fewer than some of the alarmist estimates — follow the laws of 
economics, not physics. They are not attracted to empty spaces in Siberia. They are attracted to 
cities where they find Russians with whom they can trade’.17 
Another source the scholar cites, an article by Ostrovsky published by Financial Times, refers to 
Vasily Mikheev, a Doctor of Economic Sciences and Academician of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, who claims that ‘fear of Chinese migration has increased disproportionately to its 
size’.18 Ostrovsky does not cite a source, but Mikheev has stated similarly elsewhere.19 Another 
part of Ostrovsky’s writing Downs may be referring to is where the scholar states that ‘paranoia 
about migration is stoking up nationalism’ and quotes the Head of the Federal Migration Service 
of the Russian Federation Konstantin Romodanovsky, who stated in 2006 that ‘settlements like 
Chinatowns are unacceptable for Russia and I can assure you we will not have them in Russia’.20 
Elsewhere, the Deputy Head of the Federal Migration Service Vyacheslav Postavnin elaborates 
that the Russian population ‘feel[s] discomfort if the concentration of foreigners in the region 
exceeds 17-20%’, and notes that one of these areas is the RFE.21 Downs does not differentiate 
the concerns of Russian civilians in the RFE and the concerns of the Russian government. As the 
                                                             
17 Caddy, Clifford G. ‘As Russia Looks East: Can It Manage Resources, Space, and People?’ Gaiko Forum. January 
2007. p. 4. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200701.pdf. Accessed 27/06/2020. 
18 Ostrovsky, Arkady. ‘Fears Grow of Chinese Moving into Russian East’. Financial Times. London, UK. 
01/12/2006; and Vasily Mikheev. Profile at the Website of the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations. Available at https://www.imemo.ru/about/persons/department/full?id=9. Accessed 27/06/2020. 
19 See for example Vasily Mikheev. ‘Sibirʹ Kitaĭt͡ sev ne Prelʹshchaet (Siberia Does not Appeal to the Chinese)’. 
Rosbalt. 06/05/2013. Available at https://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2013/05/06/1124338.html. Accessed 27/06/2020. 
20 Ostrovsky. ‘Fears Grow of Chinese Moving into Russian East’. 2006 
21 RCB Politics. ‘FMS: Poseleniĭ Napodobie "Kitaĭskikh Kvartalov" v RF ne Budet (FMS: There Will Be No 
Settlements Like “Chinatowns” in the Russian Federation)’. 16/12/2006. Available at 




scholar’s claim above seems to be framed as one including concerns of the Russian government, 
the relevance of this source is weakened. 
The final source Downs cites for the claim that ‘many Russians are convinced that [the RFE] will 
increasingly become a Chinese sphere of influence’ if the Chinese seek ‘living space’ in the 
north is three pages in a book chapter written by Hill and Gaddy. On one of the pages, the 
authors claim that, in the context of ‘the buildup of Chinese conventional military forces’ and the 
Russian military’s ‘abject decay’, ‘Russian policymakers [are] understandably nervous’.22 Hill 
and Gaddy continue: ‘in many respects, contemporary Russian leaders and analysts are still 
grappling with the security dilemmas that have plagued Russia since the tsarist era’.23 The 
authors do not cite evidence for either of these claims. 
On the other two pages cited by Downs, the most relevant are the assertions that Russia’s anti-
immigration lobby at the time was ‘in the ascendant’, and that most Russian policymakers had 
‘pushed for more restrictions on refugees and immigrants as well as more stringent citizenship 
requirements’.24 Gaddy and Hill cite an article by Heleniak published by the Migration Policy 
Institute. The authors seem to misquote Heleniak. In the article, the author makes the more 
modest claim that ‘the anti-immigration side seems to be ascendant’ and adds that ‘demographic 
projections paint a dire picture that could temper policies to limit new immigrants’.25 Gaddy and 
Hill also cite an interview, the topic of which was immigration, with the leader of the political 
party Yabloko, a marginal, yet legally registered political party in Russia, Grigory Yavlinsky, 
                                                             
22 Gaddy, Clifford G. and Fiona Hill. ‘Russia of the Mind’. In Clifford G. Gaddy and Fiona Hill (eds.) The Siberian 
Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold. Brookings Institution Press. 2003. p. 171. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 181. 
25 Heleniak, Timothy. ‘Migration Dilemmas Haunt Post-Soviet Russia’. Migration Policy Institute. 01/10/2002. 





conducted by Novaya Gazeta.26 China is not mentioned explicitly in the interview, but is alluded 
to. Yavlinsky stated that east of the Urals ‘live three people per square kilometer. Our neighbors 
have 178 people each. And is it not really clear to someone that, abandoning migrants, Russia, 
which is losing 700 thousand people a year, will simply not be able to maintain its sovereignty in 
Siberia and the Far East? So, it is not migrants, but the cessation of migration that seriously 
threatens the national security of our country’.27 In the interview, Yavlinsky explicitly opposes 
anti-immigration measures taken by the government, and when he speaks of immigration, he is 
primarily referring to immigration from CIS states. In referring to the population imbalance 
between Siberia and the RFE and their neighbors, Yavlinsky expresses concern over the 
maintenance of effective sovereignty over the territories. This thesis shows that such concern is 
marginal among Russian experts and officials for various reasons, including a lack of economic 
incentive for the Chinese to immigrate to Siberia and the RFE. It is more expensive to live in 
Russia. The Chinese who enter Russia tend to stay only temporarily to earn money then return to 
China. Additionally, Chinese immigrants potentially face harassment from the police and 
violence from xenophobic sectors of the Russian population. 
In sum, the evidence Downs provides for the claim that ‘many Russians are convinced that the 
[RFE] will increasingly become a Chinese sphere of influence’ if the Chinese seek ‘living space’ 
seems contradictory, ambiguous, and irrelevant, and consists of a marginal view of the threat of 
population imbalance in northeast Asia. 
                                                             
26 Grafova, Lydia. ‘Grigoriĭ I͡Avlinskiĭ: Nashemu Gosudarstvu Li͡ udi ne Nuzhny (Grigory Yavlinsky: Our State Does 
Not Need People)’. Novaya Gazeta. 29/07/2002. Available at 





The inadequate provision of evidence in the literature on Russia-China relations is of course not 
unique to Downs. The selection of the scholar’s work was based on the year of publication and 
the contribution of other prominent scholars in the field to the volume. Laurelle, for example, in 
the context of discussing perceptions of Russia’s security in Asia, writes that ‘anti-Chinese 
discourse within the Russian elites, hitherto reserved for the private sphere, has recently grown in 
number’.28 The scholar cites an online article about 540 words long, in which Larin asks ‘how 
many Chinese migrants are in Russia?’29 Larin cites estimates of the Chinese immigrant 
population in Russia, including those of Gelbras and Prikhodko, who claim that there were at the 
time 150-400 thousand, with a maximum of 500 thousand, contrary to alarmists who claimed 
there were millions.30 The scholar also cites Guilbard, who claimed that there were hidden 
communities of Chinese in Russia and estimated their population at 8 million.31 However, Larin 
explains that ‘neither he nor anyone else has yet provided any evidence of the existence of such 
communities’, and at the end of the piece the author estimates that ‘the number of Chinese 
reached 331 thousand people’.32 
It is arguable that one source may not be sufficient evidence for the claim Laurelle makes that 
‘anti-Chinese discourse within the Russian elites … has recently grown in number’. But more 
importantly, the source the scholar cites does not constitute anti-Chinese discourse. 
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This thesis provides support for some arguments in the field that contradict much of the literature 
claiming the existence of a hidden rivalry. Kaczmarksi argues that ‘the “New Great Game” 
metaphor contributed significantly to a misreading of Russian-Chinese relations in [Central 
Asia]. The global economic crisis triggered the emergence of a new status quo … The new 
configuration has been far from optimal for either Moscow or Beijing but has nevertheless been 
satisfactory enough to remove Central Asia from the list of pressing concerns’.33 
Charap et al. argue that, while there are limits to their partnership, ‘Russia and China have 
avoided any turbulence that might have resulted from this asymmetry through mutual 
accommodation and compromise’.34 The scholars explain that this is due to ‘relationship 
management efforts’, which consist of the devotion of ‘significant effort and political capital’, ‘a 
pragmatic, behind-the-scenes approach to resolving disputes and publicly stress[ing] the positive 
elements in the relationship’.35 Charap et al. claim that, in addition to relationship management 
efforts, the ‘positive dynamic in their relationship is also a natural outgrowth of their shared 
views on the international order’.36 According to the scholars, ‘China has of course seized upon 
the opportunities that Russia’s current situation presents. At the same time, it has been 
accommodating and mindful of Russia’s interests and has refrained from abusing its 
advantageous position’.37 Charap et al. make an example of China’s acceptance of Russia’s 
proposal to declare the intended linking of the EAEU and BRI, noting that ‘China could have 
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tried to implement the BRI in EEU member states on a purely bilateral basis. Instead, Beijing 
agreed to a significant political gesture’.38 
On the question of threat perception regarding China in an analysis of Russian foreign policy 
towards China in the Putin period, Kuhrt explains that ‘Russian armed forces, in common with 
militaries in most countries, are trained to be aware of all hypothetical threats, and still cite China 
as a potential aggressor; what has changed is that this is now more likely to be couched in terms 
of competition for resources and Chinese expansionism into the Russian Far East, than in purely 
military terms’.39 The scholar elaborates, citing general-lieutenant of the Russian military 
Vladimir Ivanovich Ostankov, an analyst working with the General Staff, who wrote that ‘large-
scale conflict cannot be ruled out’.40 Kuhrt also explains that ‘there is a sense that while China 
needs “a reliable rear area” (i.e. Russia) and does not pose a serious threat to Russia, by its 
“sheer weight” in the international system “it is quite capable of suppressing the will of other 
states”’, citing another general-lieutenant, Anatoly Filippovich Klimenko.41 
This thesis follows in the footsteps of Kuhrt by targeting expert analysis in Russia and focusing 
on the knowledge production of those with ties to the Russian government or military. It finds 
that the views conveyed by Ostankov and Klimenko are among those dominant regarding 
Russia’s perception of China. The Russian military does indeed consider any state with 
considerable military power a potential threat. What this study finds in addition is that the 
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dominant view emphasizes that a threat from China is purely hypothetical and that over the 
period of interest China has not given a strong enough reason to cause a perception among 
Russian foreign policy decisionmakers that China has harmful intentions towards Russia. 
Another dominant theme among Russian experts found by the analysis is that China’s interest in 
having Russia as a ‘reliable rear’ that it can count on in the event of a conflict with the US 
contributes to Moscow’s confidence that China does not pose a threat to Russia. 
Kuhrt also quotes Vasily Mikheev, a Doctor of Economic Sciences that has held positions in the 
Russian government who argues that ‘there are no solid anti-Chinese forces [in Russia]. Any 
existing such feeling is limited in scope and marginal, lodged in ultra-nationalism and has no 
serious influence on Russian policy towards China’.42 This thesis supports this claim. It finds 
that, not only is the view in Russia that China directly threatens Russia apparently absent among 
foreign policy decisionmakers, but it is also marginal in the expert community. There also exists 
the view among experts that much of the anti-Chinese sentiment that does exist in Russia 
consists of certain media outlets that exaggerate issues relevant to China in the interest of 
sensationalism and that the sentiment is instrumentalized by politicians in the RFE to pander to 
xenophobic sections of the population and to attempt to justify requests for more funds from the 
federal budget. 
Wishnick points out that ‘discussion of the Sino-Russian partnership in the West is oddly out of 
step with analysis by Russian and Chinese policy experts’ and addresses the question of whether 
Russia is hedging against China in Asia, which is often the focus in Western analysis.43 The 
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question is relevant to this study, as evidence of hedging may suggest a perception among 
Russian foreign policy decisionmakers that China threatens Russia, or, at the very least, a 
perception of a potential threat from China that has prompted preparation in the form of hedging 
for the contingency that the threat becomes direct. 
After a discussion of definitions of hedging, Wishnick argues that, according to Goh’s definition, 
Russia is not hedging against China in Asia. The scholar explains that, for Goh, hedging is ‘a 
form of “indirect balancing”, designed either to preclude potential constraints on one’s freedom 
of action or to create relationships that could be used as leverage in the event of a worsening of 
the security environment’.44 Specifically, Goh defines hedging as ‘a set of strategies aimed at 
avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more 
straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead, they 
cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side [or one 
straightforward policy stance] at the obvious expense of another’.45 Wishnick explains that 
Russia’s behavior does not constitute hedging because 
‘Russia’s partnerships with India and Vietnam originated in the period of decolonization – a time 
when these countries also enjoyed good relations with China. Subsequently, in context of the cold 
war and the Sino-Soviet conflict the Soviet Union sought to boost ties with Vietnam and India to 
counter both the US and Chinese threats. The continuation of these long-standing relationships 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of the Sino-Russian partnership reflects 
enduring bilateral interests such as military and energy cooperation’.46 
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Wishnick adds that, ‘although Russia has not overtly sided with China in its conflicts over East 
China Sea islands or South China Sea issues, as Goh notes, neutrality is not the same as hedging. 
In fact, some recent Russian weapons sales to China have the effect of strengthening Chinese 
positions in these conflict zones’.47 
This assessment is in line with the findings of this study. While Russia is interested in 
diversifying its ties in Asia, this is mostly due to economic interests involving the value of 
diversifying export markets for raw materials for a stronger position in price negotiations with 
China, and the desire for weapons contracts, which keep the defense industry in Russia alive and 
allow it to develop more technology for the Russian military. The analysis offered by this thesis 
suggests that among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers there is a lack of perceived necessity 
to hedge against China in Asia to prepare for the contingency of confrontation or conflict 
because of the dominant view among Russian experts and likely among Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers throughout the period of interest that conflicts of interest between Russia and 
China are not so severe as to be unmanageable and that China does not intend to harm Russia. 
Wishnick explains that similarities in the worldviews of Russian and Chinese officials are ‘an 
important basis for their partnership and, in fact, the growing spheres of policy coordination 
reflect these shared political values’.48 The scholar also points out that, ‘like their Chinese 
counterparts, Russian leaders and officials emphasize the responsibility of states to protect their 
own citizens and reject the liberal vision of a universal responsibility to protect individuals in 
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harm’s way, particularly if perpetrated by their own government’, referring to R2P.49 Wishnick 
explains further in a discussion of common identity between Russia and China that 
‘in speeches and joint statements, Xi Jinping and Putin uphold the political value of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and advocate respect for the development path 
they choose, as well as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference, 
non-use of force, mutually beneficial cooperation, equality, and peaceful coexistence. The values 
that Russia and China share also resonate with the foreign policy principles that each of the two 
states espouses’.50 
This thesis reconfirms such sharing of values and suggests that such common values contribute 
to the absence of unmanageable conflicts of interests between Russia and China, which is found 
to be one of the most plausible contributors to the absence of perceptions of threat from China 
among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 
A review of literature on Russia-China relations would be remiss to exclude Lo’s Axis of 
Convenience (2008). Throughout the book, the scholar acknowledges that there have been 
positive developments in relations between Russia and China. Lo observes that ‘the degree of 
political, normative, and foreign policy convergence is unprecedented’; that ‘Beijing’s approach 
toward sensitive issues in the Russian Far East and Central Asia has been careful and even self-
effacing’; and that Russia-China relations are ‘one of the more convincing examples of positive-
sum international relations today’.51 
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These claims are supported by this thesis. Evidence suggests that the dominant view among 
Russian experts and officials is that, since 2000, and indeed since the late 1980s, Russia-China 
relations have developed in a positive direction and have reached the best state in their history. 
Also, China’s restraint in the RFE and Central Asia and the role sharing in the latter region have 
contributed to a perception of an absence of threat from China. 
However, the aim of Lo’s book was not to advance these claims, but rather to argue that despite 
the apparent good state of Russia-China relations there were several reasons to doubt their 
sustainability. For example, the scholar argues that ‘practical cooperation is hamstrung by 
historical suspicions, cultural prejudices, geopolitical rivalry, and competing priorities’; that ‘the 
Mongol invasion [in the 13th century] implanted the idea of the East as threat in the Russian 
mind’; that ‘the “Shanghai spirit” of positive-sum cooperation is an elaborate ruse’; and that 
‘demographic decline [in the RFE] was less an economic than a political and security issue’, 
explaining that skepticism among ‘elements of the Russian elite’ towards China’s denial of 
having territorial ambitions is ‘founded in the conviction that “nature abhors a vacuum”’.52 
There is insufficient evidence to back the argument that there is a hidden rivalry between Russia 
and China brought on by mutual mistrust, historical suspicions, prejudice, or conflict of interest. 
The idea that the Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus in the 13th century significantly affects Russian 
foreign policy decision making regarding China in the 21st century is especially unreliable. As 
mentioned above, this thesis argues that one of the main reasons why Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers throughout the period of interest have not perceived China as a threat is because 
occasional conflicts of interest between the two countries have not been so severe as to be 
                                                             




unmanageable through ‘relationship management’ techniques including frequent mutual 
consultation at the highest levels of government. Moreover, as explained above, Russia-China 
relations since 2000 have included a process of trust-building including the institutionalization of 
their relations and restraint. 
Lo’s pointing out the demographic imbalance between the RFE and northern Chinese provinces 
and comment that ‘nature abhors a vacuum’ are reminiscent of the sensationalist stories in the 
Russian media in the 1990s. The dominant view among Russian experts and foreign policy 
decisionmakers is that for several reasons, including a lack of economic incentives, there is no 
reason to believe that there is a threat of mass immigration from a stable China. 
This thesis does not find sufficient evidence to suggest that the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ is an ‘elaborate 
ruse’. It would not be accurate to view Russia-China relations as absolutely and continuously 
adhering to its principles. The ‘Shanghai Spirit’ for Russia and China is an ideal aspired to in 
their interactions. There is more evidence to suggest a gradual convergence than divergence 
towards the principles of the concept. 
In a seemingly contradictory turn, Lo argues that ‘China’s rise does not threaten Russia’s 
territorial integrity, political stability, economic prosperity, or civilization’.53 According to the 
scholar, the threat China poses to Russia is marginalization in international affairs due to its 
continuing rise, and that the power disparity between the two will ultimately lead to liberties 
being taken in Beijing to infringe on Russia’s interests.54 
                                                             





This thesis finds that Russia’s marginalization in international affairs due to the rise of China has 
not necessarily led it to perceive a threat from China. The dominant view among Russian experts 
and foreign policy decisionmakers is that such marginalization is due more to internal failings to 
stimulate innovative sectors of the economy to lead it away from heavy reliance on the export of 
raw materials. 
One of the more recent works dedicated entirely to Russia-China relations is Sino-Russian 
Relations in the 21st Century (2019), edited by Bekkevold and Lo. In the introduction of the 
volume, Lo presents arguments similar to those in Axis of Convenience (2008). The scholar 
acknowledges in several ways the good state of Russia-China relations and their continued 
development in a positive direction, then claims that ‘much of the progress in the relationship is 
brittle’, and that the division of labor in Central Asia mentioned above is an ‘artificial 
distinction’.55 Regarding the delineation of roles in Central Asia, Lo additionally posits that ‘the 
long-time “division of labor” between Chinese economic primacy and Russian political 
leadership in Eurasia is being eroded’.56 For this claim, the scholar cites two sources of evidence, 
the first of which is two pages of one of his books. The main argument Lo makes on these pages 
relevant to the division of labor in Central Asia is that Russia’s ‘pressuring’ Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan to join the EAEU ‘is intended to shore up Russian influence’ against China in the 
region.57 No evidence is provided. 
The second source is ‘remarks by Timofei Bordachev and Yang Cheng at a conference on 
“Shaping Eurasia: What Convergence between China’s Silk Road and the Eurasian Union?,” 
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French Institute of International Affairs, Paris, 15 September 2016’.58 A basic search of this 
source does not result in access to Bordachev and Cheng’s ‘remarks’. On the website of the 
French Institute of International Relations, unfortunately, there is no information on the 
conference to which Lo refers.59 The content analyzed by this study includes a considerable 
amount of Bordachev’s work. None of it suggests the scholar believes that the division of labor 
between Russia and China in Central Asia has been ‘eroded’. 
Bekkevold acknowledges that ‘the Sino-Russian partnership has expanded considerably, and is 
stronger than it has ever been. Russia has moved closer to China, a turn in Russian policy that 
China has embraced’.60 The scholar also explains that Russia’s new arms trade deals with China 
supplying some of its most advanced technologies ‘highlight a major shift in Russian thinking … 
based on the premise that China is much more likely to engage in a maritime conflict with the 
United States than it is to embark on a land campaign against Russia’.61 Bekkevold sums up 
Russia-China relations over the last few decades with the following. 
‘Moscow’s diminished threat perception vis-à-vis China owes much to Beijing’s policy of 
reassurance since the 1990s. China has been careful to respect Russia as a great power and give 
Putin face on the international stage. China’s ability to keep Russia onboard despite the growing 
power gap is one of the greatest success stories of Chinese diplomacy. While its growing power 
represents a challenge to Moscow, the Russian leadership believes that engaging with China is 
safer and more profitable than attempting to counterbalance or contain it’.62 
Another area of the literature on Russia-China relations relevant to this study is the debate over 
whether or to what extent the relationship between the two countries may be considered an 
                                                             
58 Ibid., p. 15. 
59 French Institute of International Relations. Debates. Available at https://www.ifri.org/en/debates#. Accessed 
03/07/2020. 
60 Ibid., p. 299. 
61 Ibid., p. 302. 




alliance. A lack of consensus on the subject persists among scholars as divergent positions have 
been taken in recent years. 
For Baev, Russia and China are pseudo-allies and there are several reasons to doubt that their 
relationship will be elevated to an alliance in the foreseeable future.63 According to the scholar, 
in addition to weak economic ties, the difference in the countries’ geopolitical priorities weaken 
the possibility for an alliance. Baev explains that Russia and China are geopolitically oriented in 
opposite directions standing ‘back to back’: Russia faces West to deal with confrontation while 
China focuses on peaceful conflict developments in East Asia and on managing its ‘hugely 
important’ relationship with the US.64 General resistance to US hegemony is not enough and 
methods matter. According to Baev, Russia’s violation of US sovereignty in its interference in 
the 2016 election had a negative effect on Russia-China relations, as Beijing had ‘every reason to 
disagree’ with Russia’s actions.65 Elsewhere, Russia’s propensity to use military means for 
political ends constitutes ‘dangerous revisionism from the position of weakness, which works 
cross‐purpose with China's carefully calculated revisionism from the position of strength’.66 
Baev argues that Russia’s incompetence in managing the Korean crisis and the differences in 
Moscow’s and Beijing’s purposes in managing the crisis have also damaged Russia-China 
relations and negatively affect the prospects of an alliance.67 In sum, Baev views the relationship 
as a fluid rather than stable one that ‘has turned into a mutually irritating duress, in which Beijing 
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seeks to prevent Moscow from spoiling its difficult deal making with Washington, and Moscow 
resents the short leash—and needs to escape from the path of a designated loser’.68 
Blank presents a different view of contemporary Russia-China relations, arguing that the 
countries are de facto allies despite not formally being declared as such.69 In the scholar’s view, 
Russia and China’s alliance ‘derives from long-held and evolving geopolitically and 
ideologically congruent anti-American perspectives’.70 Blank dismisses arguments in the 
literature that Russia’s relationship with China does not constitute an alliance because neither 
want to be restricted by an alliance, they have very different views on major international issues, 
and Russia wants to avoid Chinese encroachment on its great power status, explaining that ‘both 
sides have carefully avoided that predicament while advancing together’.71 In the scholar’s view, 
neither the absence of a formal document nor theories of alliance should suffice to convince 
others that a Sino-Russian alliance does not exist. Blank points out that ‘history abounds with 
informal alliances and strategic understandings’ and argues that the countries’ military exercises 
and cooperation ‘conform to alliance dynamics’.72 The scholar goes a step further, claiming that 
‘the bilateral relationship’s intensiveness, level of trust, depth, and effectiveness make Sino-
Russian ties superior to an alliance’.73 Blank elaborates that the informality of the alliance allows 
for ‘flexibility of maneuver while maximizing opportunities for co-ordinated action and 
manifestations of that flexibility do not negate the reality of an alliance’.74 
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For Blank, the Sino-Russian alliance reveals itself most in the countries’ military relations. After 
a brief summary of the development of military relations between Russia and China beginning in 
1993, the scholar points out that ‘by 2018 high-level security consultations were occurring 20-30 
times a year’ in addition to regional consultations, side-line consultations at meetings of 
international organizations like the SCO, and the creation of new security fora, such as the 
China-Russia Northeast Asia Security Dialogue.75 Blank also points out that 3,600 Chinese 
students have participated in a military student exchange program in Russia over the last two 
decades, emphasizing that China does not have this kind of exchange with any other country and 
arguing that this ‘clearly shows a long-term programme of military interaction and co-ordination 
that will continue into the future’.76 
Further in support of the argument that relations between Russia and China constitute an 
alliance, Blank describes the ways in which the militaries of the two countries have 
technologically and operationally become increasingly intimate. The scholar claims that, 
according to Russian sources, Russia and China plan to merge their global positioning systems 
(GPS), GLONASS and BEIDOU, a move that will have significant military implications.77 
Moreover, the ‘peace mission’ joint military exercises held by Russia and China since 2005 have 
led to greater interoperability and increased intimacy due to the sharing of their respective 
C4ISR.78 According to Blank, the joint missile defense exercises held in 2016 and 2017 marked 
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a ‘new level of trust’ characterized by the sharing of information ‘in sensitive areas like missile 
launch, warning systems, and ballistic missile defense’.79 
Korolev takes a position more towards the center in the debate over whether Russia and China 
are allies. The scholar argues that the relationship has some of the main characteristics of an 
alliance but falls just short of it with only a few minor steps that may be taken in order to reach 
allied relations.80 Korolev first formulates a framework of characteristics of an alliance based on 
the work of various IR scholars and the criteria outlined by the Alliance Treaty Obligations and 
Provisions and the Correlates of War datasets.81 The framework is used in an analysis that aims 
to determine the extent of institutionalization of military relations between Russia and China. 
There are five criteria corresponding to ‘moderate institutionalization’ and three criteria 
corresponding to ‘deep institutionalization’. ‘Moderate institutionalization’ of military relations 
consists of an alliance treaty or agreement, a mechanism of regular consultations, military-
technical cooperation and military personnel exchange, regular military drills, and confidence 
building measures.82 ‘Deep institutionalization’ of military relations consists of an integrated 
military command, joint troops placement and/or military bases exchange, and a common 
defense policy.83 Korolev concludes that the ‘China-Russia military partnership is solid and 
comprehensive … highly institutionalized and shows an upward incremental trend’, and as such, 
it is ‘on the verge of an alliance’.84 The scholar argues that the lack of a formal announcement of 
an alliance ‘does not mean that an “alliance” is not possible or not ready’ and that such an 
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arrangement ‘may be beneficial for both China and Russia at the current time’.85 Korolev also 
carefully emphasizes that, while the development of the countries’ military relations are trending 
towards a military alliance, this does not mean that the trend is not reversible or that the 
establishment of a military alliance is inevitable.86 
The alliance literature currently appearing in the field of Russia-China relations offers valuable 
insight into the quality of the relationship but falls short of providing an answer to the question 
of why Russia is not threatened by the rise of China. Even allied relations do not provide a 
guarantee that China may at some point take advantage of its superior position at the expense of 
Russia’s interests, at least from a realist perspective, which is discussed in the following chapter. 
Therefore, this thesis lies outside of this debate. This is not to say that the conclusions of the 
study have no implications for this area of the literature. The absence of perceptions of threat 
may facilitate Sino-Russian alliance formation or maintenance. But the presence of a dominant 
perception of an absence of threat from China among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers 
should not be considered a sufficient condition for the formation or maintenance of an alliance: 
the fact that a state does not perceive another as a threat does not necessarily mean they will 
become or remain allies. 
Most literature on Russia-China relations does not focus solely on Russia’s apparent (through 
rhetoric and policy) lack of anxiety about the rise of China, but much of it includes relevant 
arguments. One such argument is that Russian decisionmakers’ fear of the rise of China is a 
significant variable affecting the pace (often considered slow) at which economic relations 
between the RFE and China are being developed and Chinese investments and projects are being 
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accepted and implemented in the RFE.87 As chapter 4 shows in its report of relevant results of 
the content analysis, concerns about economic relations between the RFE and China are not 
entirely absent, however they are marginal relative to the view that such relations are essential, 
mutually beneficial, and should be continued in their current state while solutions to problems 
are pursued. The dominant views identified consist of concerns about problems on Russia’s side 
that are hindering cooperation, including the replacement of market mechanisms with top-down 
management; different standards in manufacturing and technology; complicated licensing 
procedures in Russia; high tariffs on Russia’s side; a weak business and investment climate that 
fails to attract investment to sectors of the economy outside of raw materials; the inability to 
create standard living conditions in the RFE; the poor state of cross-border infrastructure; a lack 
of accessible information for Russian exporters and importers; an inadequate number of 
checkpoints and the inefficiency of those that exist; inadequate promotion of tourism; and a 
stifling legislative framework for bilateral cooperation which has consisted of administrative and 
legal barriers impeding foreign entrepreneurial and investment activity in Russia. Therefore, 
rather than apprehension on the Russian side due to wariness towards China’s intentions, the 
economic unattractiveness of the RFE stemming from domestic factors including those listed 
above is argued to be the chief variable affecting the pace of the development of economic 
relations. 
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Although less common in recent years, through most of the period of interest, contributors to 
literature on Russia-China relations would often argue or imply that fear of mass Chinese 
immigration to the RFE influences Russian foreign policy towards China.88 The results of the 
content analysis presented in chapter 5 do not show evidence that perceptions of a demographic 
threat in the form of mass immigration from China to the RFE have been prevalent among 
Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military or Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers in the period of interest. 
Literature that refers to various Chinese interests and the way they would be negatively affected 
by an aggressive policy towards Russia in arguments that China does not pose a direct military 
threat to the RFE is supported by the findings of chapter 5.89 One of the main findings of the 
chapter is that Russia’s security policy in the RFE is significantly affected by the perceived 
socio-economic vulnerability of China in the form of its concentrated urban centers driving 
nearly all of the country’s development progress. The vulnerability contributes (along with a 
perceived lack of harmful intentions) to Moscow’s confidence that it is highly unlikely that 
China would risk military aggression towards the RFE and therefore frees Russia from the 
burden of balancing against China’s superior conventional military power in northeast Asia. 
                                                             
88 For relatively recent examples, see Ilan I. Berman. ‘Russia’s Fraught Demographic Future’. In Enders S. 
Wimbush, and Elizabeth M. Portale, eds. Russia in Decline. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation. 2017. p. 43; 
Bobo Lo. Russia and the New World Disorder. Brookings Institution Press, Chatham House. 2015. p. 149; and 
Niklas Swanström. ‘Sino–Russian Relations at the Start of the New Millennium in Central Asia and Beyond’. 
Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 87 (2014): 484-485. 
89 See for example see Paul N. Schwartz. ‘The Military Dimension in Sino-Russian Relations. In Jo Bekkevold and 
Bobo Lo, eds. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan. 2019. p. 101; Stephen Blank. 
‘Triangularism Old and New: China, Russia, and the United States’. In Jo Bekkevold and Bobo Lo, eds. Sino-
Russian Relations in the 21st Century. 2019. pp. 220-221; and Gilbert Rozman. ‘Sino-Russian Relations: A New 
Era?’ Asia Dialogue. 18/06/2019. Available at https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/06/18/sino-russian-relations-a-new-




It is generally not acknowledged in literature on Russia-China relations that an understanding of 
China’s interests in Central Asia as ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’ exists in Moscow and 
that the understanding is important for explaining Russia’s economic interaction with China in 
the region.90 This is one of the main findings of chapter 6. In Western literature, there are few 
explanations of such interaction that include a dominant perception among Russian foreign 
policy decisionmakers that Russia benefits from the BRI and that the initiative and the EAEU are 
mutually complementary, producing a synergistic effect. This is another main finding of chapter 
6. Finally, the chapter offers support for arguments in the literature that the negative effects of 
economic competition between Russia and China in Central Asia are mitigated by diplomatic 
efforts on both sides consisting of mutual accommodation and compromise and restraint on 
China’s side.91 
Literature on security interaction between Russia and China in Central Asia consists of some 
claims that Moscow is put at ease by Beijing’s respect for Russia’s ‘special interests’ in Central 
Asia demonstrated by its restraint, which are supported by the findings of chapter 7.92 Some 
contributors to the literature have found no severe conflicts of interest between Russia and China 
                                                             
90 For a notable exception see Andrew Kuchins. ‘Russian Perspectives on China: Strategic Ambivalence’. In James 
Bellacqua, ed. The Future of China-Russia Relations. University Press of Kentucky. 2010. p. 43. 
91 See for example Maximilian Hess. ‘Russia and Central Asia: Putin's Most Stable Region?’ Orbis 64, no. 3 (2020): 
421-433; Samuel Charap et al. ‘Russia and China: A New Model of Great-Power Relations’. Survival 59, no. 1 
(2017): 25-27, 33-34; Marcin Kaczmarski. ‘The Asymmetric Partnership? Russia’s Turn to China’. International 
Politics 53, no. 3 (2016): 415-434; and Marcin Kaczmarski. Russia-China Relations in the Post-Crisis International 
Order. Routledge. 2015. pp. 100-101. 
92 See for example Kaczmarski. ‘The Asymmetric Partnership? Russia’s Turn to China’. 2016. pp. 425-426, 431-





in the region in the area of security,93 while others have.94 The work of the former is supported 
by another main conclusion of chapter 7 that among Russian experts with ties to the Russian 
government or military, and likely among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers, is a dominant 
perception that there are little or no significant conflicts of interest regarding security policies in 
Central Asia. One area that has apparently received little attention in the literature is the effect of 
Russian decisionmakers’ perception of China’s need for a ‘reliable’ strategic rear in Central Asia 
on Russia’s security-related policy interaction with China in the region. The results of the 
content analysis indicate that this is a serious consideration when determining how Russia should 
interact with China in Central Asia in the security realm. It is arguable that Russia’s continued 
dominance in the security realm provides comfort in the face of China’s expansion in the region, 
as Moscow maintains a considerable amount of influence that may be used to hinder Chinese 
access in the event of a conflict with the US. 
Contribution to Existing Literature 
This thesis contributes a rigorous and systematic analysis of Russia’s foreign policy towards 
China to the literature on Russia-China relations building on the work of Kuhrt, Wishnick, 
Charap, Drennan, Noël, and Bekkevold. The conclusion of the analysis consists of a multilevel 
multicausal explanation reached by means of identification of intentions and dispositional factors 
of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers and the elaboration of the explanation with a 
                                                             
93 See for example Morena Skalamera. ‘Russia’s lasting influence in Central Asia’. Survival 59, no. 6 (2017): 124-
126, 130; Thomas Ambrosio. ‘The Architecture of Alignment: The Russia–China Relationship and International 
Agreements’. Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 1 (2017): 137; and Marcin Kaczmarski. Russia-China Relations in the 
Post-Crisis International Order. Routledge. 2015. pp. 87, 92-94, 99-101. 
94 See for example Paul Goble. ‘Russian Military Seeking to Counter Growing Chinese Role in Central Asia’. The 
Jamestown Foundation. Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 88 (2020). Available at 
https://jamestown.org/program/russian-military-seeking-to-counter-growing-chinese-role-in-central-asia/. Accessed 
27/02/2021; Bobo Lo. Russia and the New World Disorder. Brookings Institution Press, Chatham House. 2015. pp. 





discussion of structural constraints on Russia’s foreign policy towards China from 2000 to 2020. 
The study also contributes to the literature on managing decline by proposing that one of the 
ways a great power may manage its decline relative to a rising power is by participating in the 
institutions and projects of the rising power in the interest of information access that strengthens 
the ability of the declining power to protect its interests. 
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 explains the theoretical approach and methodology of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 provides information on the Russian institutions that published the texts selected for 
the content analysis and the experts whose work was targeted for analysis. The chapter also 
presents the results of the quantitative aspect of the content analysis, which reveals trends in 
Russian expert thought on China. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the content analysis that are relevant to Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers’ perceptions of the economic relationship between the RFE and China. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the content analysis that are relevant to Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers’ perceptions of the security of the RFE vis-à-vis China. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the content analysis that are relevant to Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers’ perceptions of the economic interaction between Russia and China in Central 
Asia. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the content analysis that are relevant to Russian foreign policy 





Chapter 8 provides a conclusion to the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and Method 
This chapter elaborates the theoretical approach and methodology of the thesis. It explores how 
Russia’s foreign policy towards China may be viewed through lenses of various international 
relations (IR) theories and establishes six hypotheses that explain the dominant perception of an 
absence of threat from China to Russia among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. The 
chapter then explains the project’s use of an integrative analytical framework and content 
analysis to test the hypotheses. 
Informing Analysis with IR Theories 
IR theories come into play at various stages in this study in important ways. First, they were 
integral in the formulation of the primary research question: Why is Russia not threatened by the 
rise of China?1 This question stems from a realist outlook of international relations and the 
context of the relationship between the two states, which includes a drastic shift in the balance of 
power within a few decades that has the potential to result in balancing, confrontation, or 
conflict. Second, IR theories serve as foundations of the hypotheses that are to be tested. Third, 
IR theories have influenced the methodological approach in that the research method was chosen 
based on its suitability to test the hypotheses. What follows is a discussion of possible answers to 
the primary research question borrowed from various schools of thought in IR. Some are argued 
against, some are dismissed as insufficiently testable, and some are advanced to the level of 
hypothesis. 
                                                             
1 This is a simplified version of the research question of this thesis. As explained in the previous chapter, the 
explanandum of the study is that there has been a dominant perception of an absence of threat from China to Russia 





Classical realists from Thucydides to Morgenthau primarily treat threat as a material condition 
brought on by shifts in the balance of power. Thucydides argues that the rise of Athens made war 
with Sparta inevitable,2 while Morgenthau argues that the balance of power or equilibrium of 
states is necessary to maintain stability, and it is in their interest to prevent any one state from 
rising to preeminent power because the ascending state will eventually ‘encroach upon their 
interests and rights, and might ultimately destroy them’.3 
Balance of power theory is also a central tenet of neorealism (or structural realism). Neorealists 
maintain that a state objectively threatens another when it has more material capabilities because 
no state can ever be sure of the intentions of other states.4 Balance of power logic holds that 
states respond to such threats either by building up their own material capabilities, forming 
alliances with other states, or both. This behavior is referred to as balancing. 
Another concept in balance of power theory is bandwagoning, which is when a state aligns with 
the threatening state. According to Schweller, scholars engaged in debate over balancing and 
bandwagoning behavior erroneously treat the concept of bandwagoning as the opposite of 
balancing.5 The scholar argues that bandwagoning is more than just ‘giving in to threats’, and 
that ‘the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted’.6 Schweller 
explains that there are different types of bandwagoning: jackal bandwagoning, piling on, wave of 
                                                             
2 Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. London: Penguin Books. 1972. p. 49. 
3 Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1948. pp. 126-127. 
4 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. p. 113; Grieco, J.M. ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: 
A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’. International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 497-500; and 
John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, London: W.W. Norton. 2001. pp. 3, 45-6. 
5 Schweller, Randall L. ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in’. International Security 19, 
no. 1 (1994): 72-107. 




the future, and the contagion or domino effect.7 As the former two types of bandwagoning refer 
to alignment in war time, the latter two have the most potential to explain Russia’s behavior 
towards China from 2000 to 2020. Wave of the future bandwagoning occurs when states align 
themselves with rising or more powerful states because they believe that they lead the way in a 
sort of inevitable progress. Schweller uses the bandwagoning of smaller states with the Soviet 
Union as an example, pointing out that many of them believed that communism was the way the 
world was heading.8 The contagion or domino effect occurs when an external force ‘touches off 
a chain reaction, fueling the bandwagon at ever-greater speeds’.9 The spread of revolution 
through states in a region in which the countries are closely tied is used as an example.10 
The wave of the future bandwagoning concept may in a sense be applicable to much of Russia’s 
China policy throughout the period of interest. The wave of the future brought on by China, as 
perceived by Russia, is its great contribution to the shift of the center of global wealth and power 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China’s leadership in this shift is attributed to its rapid economic 
growth which has already carried its economy past the US to take first place in GDP in PPP and 
continues to have a significantly higher annual growth average than the US.11 The Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation adopted in 2000 takes note of the Asia-Pacific’s dynamic 
development, and states that developing relations with China is crucial for Russia’s foreign 
policy.12 As the analysis of Russia’s official rhetoric on China from 2000 to 2020 in the 
Appendix shows, high-ranking government officials consistently subscribe to the view that 
                                                             
7 Ibid., pp. 93-99. 
8 Ibid., p. 96.  
9 Ibid., p. 98. 
10 Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
11 PricewaterhouseCoopers. ‘The World in 2050’. February 2017. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/economy/the-
world-in-2050.html. Accessed 07/07/2020. 
12 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. June 28, 2000. Available at 




Russia must strengthen ties with China in order to seize the opportunity to benefit from its rapid 
growth. The main benefit sought after by the policy is the development of the Russian Far East 
(RFE) and Siberia. However, this development has been slow. Infrastructure in the regions 
remains relatively poor and human capital and Chinese investment in the regions remain low 
while China’s primary interest continues to be access to the regions’ natural resources rather than 
cooperating with Russia to develop the regions socio-economically. Although the benefit of 
developing Russia’s eastern territories has not been fully realized, Russia’s efforts to strengthen 
its relations with China for this purpose could be understood as wave of the future 
bandwagoning. However, this does not answer the question of why Russia is not threatened by 
the rise of China. Russia remains vulnerable to China in several ways. Realists may expect 
Russia’s foreign policy to be one of mitigating such vulnerabilities and attempts to balance 
against China’s rise, thus Russia’s China policy in this period may seem anomalous from the 
perspective of balance of power theory. 
Walt, a self-proclaimed neorealist unsatisfied with the explanatory power of balance of power 
theory, sought to modify it. In doing so, the scholar formulated balance of threat theory in 
Origins of Alliances (1987). According to balance of threat theory, a state will not necessarily 
balance against a state that is more powerful or rising in power.13 Instead of focusing solely on 
aggregate material capabilities, Walt incorporates perceptions of intention as a major factor in 
understanding the balancing behavior of states. In short, states feel less of a need to balance 
against powerful states that they perceive as having non-threatening intentions. Walt argues that 
perceptions matter in international relations and balancing behavior, but in doing so the scholar 
opens the black box of the state, thereby attracting both criticism from neorealists and attention 
                                                             




from social constructivists. Because of the scholar’s inclusion of perceptions of intentions in his 
theory he has been called a ‘minimal realist’ and accused of contributing to the theoretical 
degeneration of realism.14 Balance of threat theory maintains that perceptions of threatening 
intentions matter, however, Walt does not venture to explain how perceptions of threat emerge in 
the first place. Therefore, the theory cannot fully explain why Russia is not threatened by the rise 
of China. Nevertheless, balance of threat theory offers an important, albeit vague answer to the 
question: Russia does not perceive China as having harmful intentions towards it. 
Regarding threats to state survival, realist IR scholars have paid most of their attention to 
military threats posed by other states, and Walt is no exception. When there is an absence of 
hostile rhetoric, as is the case in China’s rhetoric on Russia, it is safe to assume that the job of 
determining whether China has harmful intentions mostly lies with the Russian military, 
intelligence services, and research institutes in performing assessments of Chinese military 
capabilities and posturing. Intelligence services would not serve as an effective source of data, 
however the Russian Ministry Defense and other institutions in Russia publish on China 
regularly and provide enough empirical material to carry out a substantial analysis. Therefore, 
this thesis establishes its first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Russian foreign policy decisionmakers do not perceive the rise of China as a 
threat because they believe China has harmless or benign intentions towards Russia. 
Another theory in the school of realism that may help answer the research question of this thesis 
is offense-defense theory. The sizable body of literature on offense-defense balance reaches a 
level of complexity that is not appropriate for discussion here. It is only important to consider the 
                                                             





main proposition of the theory and the role of nuclear weapons. Offense-defense theory holds 
that when defenses have an advantage war is less likely, and when offenses have an advantage 
war is more likely.15 From 2000 to 2020, war between Russia and China remained very unlikely. 
From the perspective of offense-defense theory, one of the main reasons for the period of peace 
between the two states is the effectiveness of defenses and the overwhelming costs of an attack, 
both of which are the result of a strong nuclear deterrent on each side. According to the theory, 
the answer to the question of why Russia is not threatened by the rise of China would be that 
Russian officials believe that China, regardless of its intentions, is deterred by Russia’s nuclear 
forces. Again, publishing institutions in Russia provide a sufficient amount of data for a 
substantial analysis that could determine whether nuclear deterrence is considered a main factor 
in the rationale behind the view that China’s rise does not threaten Russia. Therefore, this thesis 
establishes its second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider nuclear deterrence to be one of 
the main reasons why the rise of China does not threaten Russia. 
Another realist theory worth considering is balance of interests theory. Schweller, like Walt, was 
dissatisfied with the explanatory power of balance of power theory and sought to modify it. The 
scholar argues that, while the distribution of material capabilities matter, state behavior varies 
primarily with state preferences.16 According to balance of interests theory, threat arises from the 
incompatibility of state interests. Although many have considered balance of interests a realist 
theory, the extent to which it should be considered realist is debatable. If the standard by which 
such an extent is judged is the level of coherence with realist core assumptions and causal 
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16 Schweller, Randall L. Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest. New 




mechanisms, balance of interests theory is not realist.17 Regardless of the paradigmatic 
classification of balance of interests, the theory, like balance of threat theory, provides an 
important yet vague answer to the research question of this thesis: Russia is not threatened by the 
rise of China because their interests are non-conflictual. There is a wealth of data in the form of 
texts provided by institutions in Russia that publish the work of experts on international affairs, 
foreign policy, and security that may be used to determine the veracity of this answer. The texts 
may be analyzed to determine whether the compatibility or non-conflictual nature of the interests 
of Russia and China is considered a main factor in the rationale behind the view that China’s rise 
does not threaten Russia. Therefore, this thesis establishes its third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider the compatibility or non-
conflictual nature of the interests of Russia and China to be one of the main reasons why China’s 
rise does not threaten Russia. 
Neoliberalism 
Regarding threats in IR, neoliberals share the same starting point as neorealists: states are self-
interested unitary actors, anarchy forces states into policies of self-help, and threats are mostly an 
objective condition brought on by the balance of power. Neoliberals differ from neorealists on 
the extent to which they believe anarchy, the security dilemma, and the prisoner’s dilemma can 
be attenuated by international institutions or regimes.18 Of interest in this thesis is the neoliberal 
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shape expectations’, and Krasner defines international regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
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relations’. Stephen D. Krasner. International Regimes. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. 1983. p. 2; and.Robert 
O. Keohane. ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics’. In (ed.) Robert O. Keohane. 
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argument that international regimes ‘reduce uncertainty in the external environment’ and that 
governments are ‘better able, with regimes in place, to predict that its counterparts will follow 
predictably cooperative policies’.19 
From a neoliberal perspective, institutions or regimes established between Russia and China 
since the end of the Cold War may be providing Russian decisionmakers with enough confidence 
in the predictability of China’s actions to prevent or assuage concerns about the potential threat 
that China’s rise poses to Russia. An analysis of expert texts in Russia may shed light on the 
effect of institutions and regimes on Russia’s relationship with China and how they are used in 
the rationale behind the view that China’s rise does not threaten Russia. Therefore, this thesis 
establishes its fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider the establishment and 
maintenance of regimes and institutions between Russia and China to be one of the main reasons 
why China’s rise does not threaten Russia. 
Constructivism 
Constructivists maintain that threat arises primarily, if not always, as a result of social processes 
involving non-material factors such as identity, ideas, and norms. The realist logic that the 
anarchic structure of the international system causes self-help policies and renders any state that 
is more powerful an objective threat is challenged by constructivists who argue against the causal 
power of structure. For example, Wendt argues that without Waltz’s assumption that self-help 
follows logically from anarchy, the rest of his theory of international politics cannot predict 
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much about state behavior because the assumption ‘does the decisive explanatory work’.20 
Wendt argues that ‘self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest 
that may exist under anarchy … Concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and 
the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other, and … it is upon this 
cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends’.21 In this 
view, a state is not necessarily threatened by a more powerful state. Instead, threats arise through 
a process of signaling and interpreting, the same process by which identities and interests are 
formed.22 
The importance of identity in threat perception stems from the notion that ‘identities are the basis 
of interests’,23 i.e. ‘interests should be derivable from identity in the sense that an individual’s 
identity implies his interests’.24 These interests define behavior that may or may not be perceived 
by an Other as a threat. The idea that identity subsumes interest makes identity the key variable 
for threat perception. Hopf argues that a constructivist understanding of identity may succeed 
where balance of threat theory failed in explaining how perceptions of threatening intentions are 
formed.25 In Social Construction of International Politics (2002), the scholar shows that, through 
a process of mutual constitution of the Self and Other, identities in Moscow in 1955 and 1999 
were directly related to how other countries were perceived.26 For example, the USSR’s 
acknowledgement of its own deviations from the ideal Soviet model of development at home 
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made Yugoslavia’s deviation more tolerable and less threatening to international socialist 
solidarity and its domestic socialist community.27 Similarly, this acknowledgment of deviance 
and difference at home made India imaginable as a Soviet ally in 1955, a notion unthinkable only 
a year earlier.28 
In the cases above, the relationship between identity and threat perception is that the more one 
perceives an Other as similar to the self (as the level of shared identity increases) the less likely 
that Other will be perceived as a threat, which is the aggregate hypothesis of Rousseau’s 
Construction of Threat Model.29 In analyzing elite American perceptions of China from 1970 to 
2002, the scholar argues that ‘a purely material explanation for threat perception fails because it 
cannot explain the timing of the rapid rise and decline in threat assessment as well as an 
ideational explanation’.30 For example, Rousseau finds that American perceptions of shared 
identity with China fell and threat perception of China rose drastically after the repression of the 
Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, although the material balance of power remained relatively 
stable.31 
Rousseau makes a compelling argument on the relationship between identity and threat 
perception. However, the scholar does not include in his model the concept of ‘closest Other’, 
which is the Other most similar to the Self. According to Hopf, the closest Other may be the 
most threatening Other because it has the most potential to replace the Self.32 The scholar 
explains that ‘similarity can promote discord because disputes over authenticity are possible only 
                                                             
27 Ibid., pp. 106-123. 
28 Ibid., pp. 134-142. 
29 Rousseau, David L. Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and 
Liberalism. Stanford University Press. 2006. 
30 Ibid., p. 169. 
31 Ibid., pp. 164-182. 




with actors that are understood as partly oneSelf’.33 Hopf described China in 1955 as the Soviet 
Union’s closest Other. China was considered by the Soviets to be so similar to the Soviet Union 
that it was part of the Self and ‘Chinese differences from the ideal were the object of closest 
Soviet attention’.34 The following year saw the onset of the Sino-Soviet split. IR literature has 
not yet adequately addressed the negative effects of high levels of perceived similarity on the 
state of inter-state relations. 
Other constructivists have identified differences in ideology35 and the breaking of norms36 as 
linked to threat perception. These approaches have a significant amount of overlap with the 
identity approach as ideological similarity and a similar degree of adherence to norms can 
contribute to an overall sense of shared identity and lower threat perception. 
While the focus of this thesis is on the perceptions of Russian decisionmakers, it is nevertheless 
important to take into consideration mass perceptions of China in Russia. This is because mass 
perceptions or ‘common sense’ to a certain extent constrains elite projects. Drawing on 
Gramsci’s conception of hegemonic ideology, Hopf argues that ‘a common sense that is at odds 
with an elite hegemonic ideology may impose political, that is, selectoral or electoral, costs on an 
elite that ignores it’.37 Although elites in Russia are not as easily held accountable by the public 
as in Western democracies, their projects are also constrained by mass common sense. Hopf et 
al. explain that ‘nondemocratic leaders are still socialized at home and they are unlikely to adopt 
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policies that do not appeal to their selectorates and publics’.38 Available opinion polls show that 
since 2006 the Russian public has consistently rated China as one of Russia’s closest friends 
alongside Belarus and Kazakhstan.39 2006 in particular saw a shift in Russian attitudes on the 
question of which country Russia should be oriented towards strengthening bilateral relations, 
with more favoring China than the US.40 A poll in 2009 shows a low level of perceived threat 
from China, which occupies places similar to Romania and Germany in lists of countries ‘most 
unfriendly’ or ‘hostile’ to Russia.41 However, some ambivalence is also evident in public polls. 
In a poll asking about the accommodation of immigrants, Russians tended to place the Chinese 
near the top of the list of nationalities whose accommodation should be limited in Russia 
alongside natives of the Caucuses and Central Asia.42 In a constructivist view of the interaction 
between mass and elite perceptions, Russian decisionmakers would be less likely to adopt 
policies that conflict with mass opinion, such as unlimited Chinese immigration to Russia, or a 
foreign policy aimed at treating China’s rise as a threat to national security which requires 
balancing.  
As influential as mass perception may be, it is considered by constructivists to be a structural 
variable from which we are not able to deduce predictions about foreign policy outcomes.43 A 
more fruitful constructivist approach to the question of why Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers are not threatened by the rise of China would lie in an investigation of the 
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interaction between shared identity and threat perception. Such an approach does not exclude 
considerations of mass perception, because ‘understandings of the national self are embedded in 
the taken-for-granted desires and understandings in elite and mass common sense’.44 The 
aforementioned content provided by Russian publishing institutions may be analyzed to 
determine whether shared identity is a variable associated with threat perception by measuring 
shifts in perceived similarity and dissimilarity and threat perception. Therefore, this thesis 
establishes its fifth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Russian foreign policy decisionmakers believe that for reasons of shared identity 
the rise of China does not threaten Russia. 
Psychology in IR 
A significant amount of work in the field of psychology has been fruitfully applied in IR. Jervis’s 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976) draws on a wide range of theories 
and experimental findings in psychology to make an invaluable contribution to IR scholarship. 
Jervis acknowledges that the book is limited in a number of ways. The scholar does not claim to 
have formulated a theory of perception. Jervis notes inherent difficulties in obtaining evidence 
when working with perceptions: ‘there is no easy way to determine the accuracy of perceptions. 
It is hard to know what a person’s perceptions were, and even harder to know whether they were 
correct’.45 The scholar mitigates these difficulties in three ways: he uses only cases for which 
there is a lot of evidence and about which historians generally agree; when there are 
disagreements about what happened he brings them to the attention of the reader; and for cases 
that should be considered plausible or hypothetical, minimally, he shows that ‘certain 
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perceptions were held and could have easily been inaccurate’.46 Another limitation is the 
difficulty of establishing causation and generalizing findings in atypical cases. Contrary to the 
constructivists in the previous section, Jervis is not concerned with actors’ interests, which, 
according to constructivists, stem from their identities. The scholar argues that this is because 
interests only rarely explain perceptions and misperceptions, and that ‘knowing what a person’s 
interests are does not tell us how he will see his environment or go about selecting the best route 
to reach his goals’.47 In this way, Jervis disputes the causal link between interests and behavior. 
The scholar uses some misperceptions as examples, such as Chamberlain’s misperception that 
Hitler could be appeased, and argues that it was not in the actor’s interest to perceive his 
environment in a way that caused him to make grave errors.48 
Jervis writes about many psychological processes relevant to decision making, however, the 
following will only focus on those relevant to threat perception. Experimental findings on the 
beliefs of the intentions of others were applied by Jervis to the decision making of statesmen.49 
Nickel found that ‘people will become less angry (and retaliate less) when they believe that their 
partner intended them little harm—no matter how much they were harmed. Conversely, people 
become very angry (and retaliate to a greater extent) when they believe that their partner 
intended them harm—regardless of how much they were harmed’.50  
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The belief that one does not intend to harm can in some cases be attributed to trust. Jervis drew 
on psychological definitions of trust and applied the following understanding of trust to 
international relations: 
‘Trust and trustworthiness should be interpreted similarly. Nation A trusts B in a particular 
situation when it believes that B will not further its own interests at the expense of A, 
usually because A believes that B values the prospects of long-run cooperation between the 
two countries more than it values short-run gains that would accrue by exploiting its 
immediate power over A. If A trusts B, it will allow situations to occur in which B could 
harm it, and indeed, if A wants to demonstrate its trust, it may seek such situations’.51 
Trust can in some cases involve cognitive consistency. People tend towards balanced and 
consistent beliefs because of a need to minimize reality’s complexity and because imbalance and 
inconsistent beliefs cause discomfort and negatively affect memory.52 Regarding the effects of 
preexisting beliefs on the processing of new information, Jervis explains that ‘we ignore 
information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not contradict, our 
beliefs, and deny its validity’ and that ‘when a statesman has developed a certain image of 
another country he will maintain that view in the face of large amounts of discrepant 
information’.53 The scholar argues further that ‘once a new image of another state is established, 
the other’s actions appear very different than they had before’,54 and also points out that ‘many 
psychological experiments indicate that people do not understand the impact that their beliefs 
have on their interpretations of new information’.55 
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The tendency of Russian decisionmakers to have consistent beliefs about China’s non-
threatening intentions could be explained by cognitive dissonance theory. Cognitive dissonance 
is the discomfort people feel when they have inconsistent beliefs, thoughts, values, attitudes, or 
ideas. The theory of cognitive dissonance posits that people seek to reduce dissonance and 
achieve consonance by avoiding information and circumstances that cause dissonance.56  
The concept of ‘anchoring heuristics’ may also shed light on Russia’s perception of China as 
non-threatening. Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that people use to simplify a complex reality 
and make decisions in an uncertain environment. The anchoring heuristic refers to the way 
people tend to process new information in a way that involves comparing it to a past reference 
point.57 According to Stein, with regard to decisionmakers, ‘beliefs serve as a conceptual anchor 
on the processing of new information and the revision of estimates … The implications for threat 
perception are considerable; once an estimate of threat is generated, it anchors subsequent rates 
of revision so that revision is slower and less responsive to diagnostic information. Threat 
perceptions consequently become embedded and resistant to change. So do beliefs that an 
adversary will not attack’.58 
Beliefs are resistant to change, but they are revised or changed under certain circumstances. 
Specifically, change varies with the amount and frequency of inconsistent information and the 
degree of centrality of beliefs: as the amount and frequency of inconsistent information increases 
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it is more likely people will revise or change their beliefs;59 less central beliefs are revised or 
changed first, while central beliefs are more resistant to change.60 As people receive inconsistent 
information, gradual change in belief occurs with the addition of conditions to the validity of the 
belief.61 As the Appendix shows with an analysis of Russia’s official rhetoric on China, 
perceptions of Russian decisionmakers regarding relations with China are consistently positive, 
and from 2000 to 2020 there is an apparent consensus among high-ranking officials involved in 
foreign policy that China does not pose a threat to Russia. 
Drawing on psychological concepts of trust, cognitive consistency, cognitive dissonance, 
anchoring heuristics, and studies on when and how beliefs change, it is arguable that Russian 
decisionmakers’ perceptions of China are anchored by the development of Sino-Soviet and Sino-
Russian relations at the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990s, during which China 
demonstrated its trustworthiness and lack of harmful intentions towards Russia, and that there 
has not been enough inconsistent behavior from China to allow for a significant change in the 
belief that China does not intend to harm Russia. 
However, a problem arises when one considers how the argument can be tested. The method 
primarily used in psychology is experimentation, and without access to high-ranking Russian 
government officials it would be necessary to generalize the findings of an experiment on others 
(most likely undergraduates) to the officials. There is a divide in the field of IR as to whether 
such experimental findings are generalizable in such a way. McDermott outlines three main 
problems for the generalization and theorization based on experimental evidence in IR: first, the 
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subjects of the experiment, who are typically university undergraduates, often differ substantially 
from the people of interest in the study in terms of ‘maturity, experience, background, ego 
involvement and investment, and strategic incentives’; second, lack of external validity can be 
attributed to ‘organizational and bureaucratic constraints and material incentives that shape 
behavior in the real world’; and third, experiments usually last around an hour, while many of the 
processes of interest ‘often evolve over days, months, or even years’.62 Nevertheless, scholars 
who use experiments to help answer questions in political science often point out that, while 
contextual factors matter, all humans share the same brain physiology and fundamental 
psychological processes,63 and that if experiments find information processing biases in the 
laboratory, then it is likely that they occur in other contexts.64 
The arguments on the external validity of experiments in IR on both sides of the divide have 
merit. This study opts not to use an experimental method to test the psychological argument 
above. Although the subjects under investigation share some of the same psychological 
processes with those who would participate in the experiment, here it is simply considered too 
big of a stretch to generalize findings from an experiment on undergraduates to Russian foreign 
policy decisionmakers. 
It may be possible to test part of the psychological argument in a non-experimental way. An 
analysis of the copious amount of data in the form of publications by experts on international 
affairs, foreign policy, and security in Russia may be used to estimate the level of trust, by 
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Jervis’s definition,65 Russia has for China, as well as details of the rationale behind such trust. 
Therefore, this thesis establishes its sixth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Russian foreign policy decisionmakers do not perceive the rise of China as a 
threat because they believe that China ‘values the prospects of long-run cooperation between the 
two countries more than it values short-run gains that would accrue by exploiting its immediate 
power over [Russia]’.66 
Other works in the field of psychology have studied the link between identity and intergroup 
behavior. Experimental evidence suggests that groups have more positive orientations towards 
one another when in-group members place their own group in the same identity category as the 
out-group. Gómez et al. found that Spaniards perceived East European immigrants as less 
threatening when they learned that some of their group members categorized both Spaniards and 
Eastern European immigrants as ‘European’, a superordinate identity that includes both groups.67 
Similarly, Riek et al. found that perceptions of shared identity between black and white students 
reduced intergroup threat: when the shared identity of ‘American’ was made salient, intergroup 
threat between Democrats and Republicans was reduced.68 
This experimental evidence supports the constructivist theory discussed in the previous 
subsection that shared identity or perceptions of similarity reduce perceptions of threat. In this 
view, it could be that shared identities such as ‘members of the SCO’, ‘BRICS’, ‘advocates of 
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multipolarity’, ‘geopolitical rivals of the US’, ‘advocates for a more equitable world order’ and 
‘Eurasian’ contribute to Russian decisionmakers’ sense of shared identity with China and reduce 
their threat perception. The key difference between constructivist and psychological 
understandings of the interaction between shared identity and threat perception is that 
constructivists argue that shared identity and threat perception are mutually constituted, whereas 
the experimental evidence mentioned above suggests that changes in shared identity cause 
changes in threat perception. Despite this difference, the experimental evidence furthers the 
justification of hypothesis 5. 
Managing decline 
Some theories, hypotheses, and concepts related to the behavior of declining powers are relevant 
to the case of Russia’s foreign policy towards China and may contribute to the multilevel 
multicausal explanation offered by this thesis. Such theories, hypotheses, and concepts can be 
found in certain areas of IR literature, including those on retrenchment, status anxiety, preventive 
motivation for war, and power transition. 
MacDonald and Parent’s work on retrenchment offers valuable insights that are taken into 
consideration in the empirical chapters and during the formulation of the conclusions of this 
thesis. The scholars respond to realists who are pessimistic towards the policy of retrenchment 
and claim it is not the preferred path of declining powers for various reasons, including the 
signaling of weakness, which invites predation, and the reputational costs of failing to see 
through commitments abroad. MacDonald and Parent argue that ‘opponents of retrenchment 
exaggerate the importance of credibility in the defense of commitments’; that ‘pessimists 




prestige’; and that ‘critics do not just oversell the hazards of retrenchment; they downplay the 
dangers of preventive war’.69 
The scholars argue that the logic of retrenchment is, like that of a firm that is interested in 
survival, solvency, i.e. ambitions should not exceed means to the point of overstretch and 
unsustainable action.70 According to MacDonald and Parent, it is overstretch through 
maintaining commitments abroad that opens a declining state to predation.71 The scholars 
acknowledge that retrenchment poses some security risks, nevertheless, they argue that ‘the more 
attractive alternative is to seek to reduce foreign policy costs while still defending vital interests 
against potential predators’.72 MacDonald and Parent argue that the policy of retrenchment ‘has 
the advantage of bringing a state’s strategic ambitions in line with its shrinking means while 
providing breathing room for potential reform and revival’.73 
The scholars preempt criticism that points out that leaders do not always adopt rational policies 
as a result of ‘motivated biases and cognitive limitations’ as well as the ambiguity of indicators 
of decline, which may cause ‘wishful thinking and adherence to prior assumptions’.74 Moreover, 
as prospect theory suggests, loss averse policy makers may be willing to take greater risks when 
the state is in decline ‘even if prudence dictates otherwise’.75 MacDonald and Parent argue that 
such critiques are ‘taken too far’.76 They explain that, in general, errors in decision making 
among leaders of declining powers receive disproportionate attention, and that ‘defensible’ 
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decisions are usually made.77 MacDonald and Parent also claim that most decisionmakers of 
great powers are educated and experienced with ‘a potent combination of political savvy and 
common sense’.78 The scholars acknowledge that this does not make them immune to erroneous 
judgement, but their characteristics ‘can prevent the more deluded and rigid from achieving 
positions of authority’.79 Leaders of a declining power are also in a situation of ‘elevated risk of 
policy missteps and setbacks’, which brings ‘strong incentives to shed motivated biases and 
choose pragmatic solutions’.80 Continuing in preemption of the abovementioned critiques, 
MacDonald and Parent claim that, while decisionmakers often operate not only in the interest of 
the state, but also in self-interest, ‘policymakers seek first and foremost to further the national 
interest’, and ‘in practice, there is strong continuity in the national interest, regardless of the 
particular individual or coalition in charge’.81 
Russian experts tend not to refer to Russia’s foreign policy towards China as one of 
retrenchment, but the strategy is apparent in certain areas of the policy. For example, Russia does 
not completely block Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia. One reason for this could be 
that an unmet demand of inexpensive consumer goods from China may contribute to socio-
economic unrest in the region, which would leave Russia little choice but to devote considerably 
more resources than it already does to ensure security in Central Asia. 
Onea focuses on status anxiety among dominant powers encountering rising powers.82 The study 
is relevant to Russia’s foreign policy towards China in that Russia may still be considered 
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militarily dominant in the relationship, at least in certain areas such as Central Asia. Moreover, it 
maintains a massive nuclear arsenal. China may be considered the rising power in this sense, as it 
has outspent Russia on defense every year of the period of interest with a growing expenditure 
gap culminating in figures for 2019 showing Russia’s expenditures at $65 billion and China’s 
expenditures at $261 billion.83 Russia may be considered the dominant yet relatively declining 
military power, but economically it is not dominant and is in relative decline. 
It is important to note that data on the military expenditures of Russia and China, including that 
of SIPRI, are not precise figures but estimates. This is due to a lack of transparency regarding 
certain areas of the expenditures. Because of this, the SIPRI estimates are generally higher than 
the official defense budgets of Russia and China. For example, Russia’s official defense budget 
for 2019 was $43 billion and China’s was $178 billion: $22 billion and $83 billion less than the 
SIPRI estimates mentioned above, respectively.84 Despite the discrepancies between the official 
budgets and estimates of military expenditures provided by SIPRI and others,85 based on 
available data, it can be reasonably argued that China has dedicated more resources to the 
development of its military capabilities and as a result they are growing/strengthening at a faster 
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pace than Russia’s (at least in terms of conventional capabilities, but possibly also in terms of 
nuclear capabilities). Therefore, although Russia’s capabilities are also developing, they may be 
conceived of as being in relative decline as China gradually approaches parity with Russia 
overall. 
Onea’s third criteria for status after military power and economic power is prestige. The scholar 
argues that ‘if a higher-ranked state’s standing in any of these three dimensions is seen as at risk 
due to the competition of a rising state, it will experience status anxiety’.86 However, according 
to Onea, a power experiencing decline in any of the three abovementioned criteria, in certain 
circumstances, may not experience status anxiety: ‘status anxiety will be nil if the state declines 
by comparison to a state that is not seen as a status competitor’.87 The degree of status anxiety 
also depends on the number of criteria in relative decline, e.g. if a state is relatively in military 
decline but not economic decline or in decline in terms of prestige, than this state experiences 
less status anxiety than a state in relative decline in terms of both its military and economic 
power or prestige.88  
It is difficult to measure prestige. Given statements from high-ranking officials, it would be 
reasonable to argue that it is likely that they experience some status anxiety regarding its great 
power status in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) due mostly to the underdevelopment and 
continuing depopulation of the RFE. But, as this study shows, the underdevelopment and 
depopulation of the RFE and its resulting negative effect on Russia’s great power status in the 
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APR is largely not attributed to the activities of other states, including China, but rather to 
domestic problems and the failure of Moscow to effectively address such problems in the RFE. 
In the case of Russia and China, it can be comfortably said that Russia suffers decline as the 
dominant party in one of three of Onea’s criteria: military power. There is not enough evidence 
to suggest that it is likely that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers experience much status 
anxiety with regard to its relative decline in military power vis-à-vis China. Despite China’s 
conventional military superiority over Russia in northeast Asia and the countries’ military 
expenditures gap, the study shows that Russian officials do not perceive China as a challenger to 
its status as a great military power. This is mainly due to Russia’s stable military power relative 
to that of China in Central Asia, China’s recognition of Russia’s ‘privileged’ interests and role as 
the primary security provider in the region, and Russia’s maintenance of a massive nuclear 
arsenal. 
Levy addresses motivation for preventive war among dominant declining powers.89 The scholar 
focuses mainly on military power, arguing that ‘the preventive motivation for war arises from the 
perception that one's military power and potential are declining relative to that of a rising 
adversary, and from the fear of the consequences of that decline’.90 This argument is relevant to 
Russia’s foreign policy towards China because its military power is in relative decline. Levy is 
careful to emphasize that perceptions of military power and of the intentions of the rising power 
matter for the motivation for preventive war, not just objective indicators of power.91 The scholar 
argues that the preventive motivation of declining powers for war is ‘an intervening variable 
between a state's decline in relative military power and potential and a decision for war’, which 
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‘is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for war, but contributes to war in combination 
with other variables and other causal sequences’.92 These other variables include the ‘perception 
of the inevitability, or at least high probability, of a future war’ with the rising power, ‘historical 
antagonisms’, ‘ideological conflicts’, ‘misperceptions, policy makers' orientations towards risk 
and uncertainty, domestic politics’, ‘the policy preferences and political influence of the 
military’, and ‘bureaucratic political considerations, particularly the policy preferences of the 
military and their influence in the policy-making process’.93 
The most relevant of Levy’s variables that contribute to a preventive motivation for war are 
perceptions of harmful intentions, the perception of inevitability or high probability of a war with 
the rising power in the future, and ideological conflicts. This study shows that the dominant 
views among Russian experts and foreign policy decisionmakers contain none of these. 
Historical antagonisms, which Russia and China experienced most recently during the Sino-
Soviet split, have largely subsided mainly due to the de-ideologization of their relations. 
Kupchan et al. published a study in 2001 on peaceful transition of power and change of 
international order.94 Russia as the declining military power may not be considered a hegemon, 
however, the study provides useful insight for an analysis of the bilateral shift of the balance of 
power between Russia and China. The scholars argue that ‘peaceful transition results from 
implicit and explicit negotiation over ideas and identity much more than from adjustments to or 
negotiation of the material balance of power’.95 In the context of a shift in the balance of power, 
ideational convergence between the declining and rising power ‘enables them to resolve, or in 
                                                             
92 Ibid., p. 105. 
93 Ibid., pp. 88, 98, 101, and 104. 
94 Kupchan, Charles, et al. Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order. New York: United 
Nations University Press. 2001. 




some cases renders irrelevant, their contest over material power’.96 Deviating from realism, 
Kupchan et al. argue that ‘perceptions of the character of the polities that wield power, not 
perceptions of the balance of power per se, are the focal point of the inquiry’.97 According to the 
scholars, the mutual formation of benign images of the declining and rising powers is central to 
peaceful transition, and in the study they aim to determine the conditions under which such 
formation happens and allows for the establishment of a ‘mutually acceptable and legitimate’ 
international order.98 
This thesis shows that negotiations of ideas and identity have contributed to the dominant 
perception among Russian experts and foreign policy decisionmakers that the rise of China does 
not pose a threat to Russia. As explained in the previous chapter, their ideational convergence 
has mainly been centered on the fight against the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism, and 
religious extremism and the ‘Shanghai Spirit’, which includes mutual trust, mutual benefit, 
equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and the pursuit of common development. 
Russia and China have also engaged in ideational convergence with the de-ideologization of 
their relations, the rejection of unipolarity in favor of multipolarity, and the promotion of the 
foreign policy principle of non-interference in internal affairs.  
Kupchan et al. describe the mutual formation of benign images as the foundation of their causal 
chain and a necessary condition.99 The scholars argue that the most prominent causal 
mechanisms for the mutual formation of benign images include: the existence of external threats, 
which ‘creates incentives for both parties to find ways of reducing the number of potential 








enemies they face’; ‘the exercise of strategic restraint’, which ‘communicate[s] benign intentions 
and a state's willingness to forgo opportunities for individual gain; ‘the prior existence of an 
emotive affinity and shared identity’, which ‘facilitates the mutual construction of benign 
images’; and finally, the formation of benign images is facilitated by ‘reconciliation and open 
dealing with the past … especially when the parties in question have engaged in direct 
conflict’.100 This thesis provides evidence that a benign image of China has been formed among 
Russian experts and Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. The dominant view includes China’s 
practice of restraint in the interest of maintaining good relations with Russia. Additionally, 
Russia and China have a common adversary or rival, the US, which has likely facilitated the 
formation of a benign image of China. 
According to Kupchan et al. another necessary condition for peaceful power transition is an 
agreement on international order. Such an agreement is formed through negotiation over both 
security and economic issues, including ‘rules for managing security matters: when, in what 
circumstances, and against whom the use of force is justified; through what mechanisms to deal 
with territorial change; what geographic spheres of influence and functional division of labor to 
establish’, and ‘rules and mechanisms that govern international trade and investment’, such as 
‘organizing principles (such as mercantilism versus free trade) and the more discrete rules and 
institutions that govern international business’.101 
This study shows that ideational convergence regarding international order and a negotiation on 
a division of labor in Central Asia has contributed to perceptions of a lack of severe and 
unmanageable conflicts of interest between Russia and China, which has contributed most 
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towards the perception of an absence of threat from China. The countries advocate multipolarity 
and reject interference in internal affairs of sovereign states. They agree that the funding of 
democratizing forces in other states is a violation of the principle of non-interference and that the 
uses of force based on R2P have not been justified. 
Kupchan et al. describes legitimacy as a ‘capstone’ condition that affects the resilience of the 
benign images and agreed-upon international order.102 The scholars stress that the development 
of legitimacy involves agreement not only ‘on hierarchy and a set of core rules on the conduct of 
foreign policy, but also on a set of deeper normative principles. Rather than being based on 
causal assumptions and followed because of their practical appeal, normative principles are 
based on values and followed because of their moral appeal’.103 Kupchan et al. argue that 
legitimacy makes peaceful power transition and a new international order more resilient for three 
reasons: ‘first, legitimacy engenders a shared identity and sense of we-ness’; ‘second, embedding 
order in a legitimating framework makes that order more able to accommodate change’; and 
‘third, legitimacy ensures greater continuity by broadening the social base that supports 
reconciliation and accommodation’.104 This thesis shows that, as explained above, throughout the 
period of interest there has been normative convergence between Russia and China, and that 
Russia-China relations have been highly institutionalized. These factors have contributed to a 
perception of an absence of threat from China among Russian experts and foreign policy 
decisionmakers. 
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An Integrative Analytical Framework and Methodology 
In pursuit of the aim to form a multilevel explanation, this thesis employs an analytical 
framework which integrates agency and structure and spans multiple levels of analysis. As every 
social act, including a foreign policy, is impossible without both agency and structure, such an 
integrative framework is necessary to construct a complete explanation. 
The agency-structure problem is, quite simply put, a long-standing social philosophical 
conundrum over whether humans have free will or their behavior is determined or constrained by 
social or material structures. If both agency and structure always matter in social behavior, how 
do they interact? Is one more prominent than the other during certain social acts? If so, under 
what conditions? Here, it is only necessary to cover the most recent developments in the 
theorization of the relationship between agency and structure leading up to the development of 
the approach borrowed by this thesis. 
Giddens’s structuration theory is a well-known attempt to synthesize agency and structure into a 
duality, rather than a dualism. At the heart of his theory is what the scholar calls the duality of 
structure, explained as follows: 
‘By the duality of structure, I mean the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in 
social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices. 
Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and 
“exists” in the generating moments of this constitution’.105 
Giddens conceptualizes the interaction between agency and structure as a dialectic relationship in 
which both presuppose each other. Archer criticizes structuration theory in pointing out that 
Giddens’s agency and structure are so conflated that the conceptualization of their relationship 
                                                             




makes empirical analysis of their interplay impossible.106 Archer and Taylor both argue that 
because of the extent of conflation of agency and structure in structuration theory Giddens is 
unable to explain the change of each over time.107 In addressing the agency-structure problem, 
Archer formulates a conceptualization of the interaction between agency and structure—
morphogenesis—which disentangles the two to the extent necessary to account for change over 
time. The scholar describes morphogenesis in the following way: 
‘Action of course is ceaseless and essential both to the continuation and further elaboration of 
the system, but subsequent interaction will be different from earlier action because conditioned 
by the structural consequences of that prior action. Hence the morphogenetic perspective is not 
only dualistic but sequential, dealing in endless cycles of structural conditioning/social 
interaction/structural elaboration—thus unravelling the dialectical interplay between structure 
and action’.108 
In tackling the agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis, Carlsnaes formulates an 
analytical framework using Archer’s morphogenesis as a theoretical underpinning. The scholar 
explains his ‘tripartite analytical procedure’ as follows: 
‘this framework in its original, static form would proceed in terms of first giving a description 
of the current reasons for this application, i.e., the choices and preferences explicitly underlying 
this decision. These in turn could then (if more than an “intentional” account is desired) be 
explained causally in terms of the relevant values and perceptions informing the decision-
makers’ intentional behavior in this particular instance … Third, these “dispositional” factors 
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could then in turn be elaborated in terms of “structural” factors constraining … foreign 
policy’.109 
Carlsnaes’s integrative analytical framework consists of three dimensions: intentional, 
dispositional, and structural, which take into account both agency and structure and span levels 
of analysis from the individual to the structural. At the intentional dimension, the thesis analyzes 
the choices and preferences underlying Russia’s China policy, or the reasons for its adoption and 
execution, throughout the period of interest. The best source of such choices, preferences, and 
reasons (hereafter ‘intentional factors’) is Russia’s official rhetoric in the form of official 
documents and statements and speeches given by government officials. 
Arguably, one of the best sources of the intentions of a state is its official rhetoric in the form of 
fundamental official documents and speeches and statements given by government officials. 
Perceptions of high-ranking government officials are some of the most influential on foreign 
policy. The ‘true’ perceptions of government officials are difficult to access. Even if interviews 
were granted, one would still confront the ‘Other Minds’ problem,110 i.e. it would remain unclear 
whether the officials are telling the interviewer what they really think and conveying perceptions 
that truly form the basis of their decisions or are simply reciting well-rehearsed government 
positions with which they do not necessarily completely agree. Perceptions that reveal intentions 
found in official rhetoric can be just as problematic as interviews. It is not clear whether the 
perceptions conveyed in the rhetoric reflect the true perceptions of the officials responsible for 
foreign policy decision making. It is, nevertheless, useful to consider recurring themes in 
Russia’s official rhetoric on China throughout the period because, as Light argues, they can offer 
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valuable insight into influential Russian perceptions.111 Moreover, here, the ‘Other Minds’ 
problem is mitigated in two ways. First, in this thesis, the identification of the intentional factors 
underlying Russia’s China policy is a descriptive exercise that is not meant to have much 
explanatory value. As explained in the previous chapter, the bulk of the explanatory value of the 
thesis is in the identification of the dispositional factors (perceptions and values) on which the 
intentional factors are based. This is done in the following five chapters. Second, the uncertainty 
regarding the veracity of the perceptions and intentional factors identified in Russia’s official 
rhetoric can be mitigated through careful approximation of the extent to which such perceptions 
and intentions are consistent with Russia’s foreign policy actions, which is done in chapters 4-7. 
In accordance with Carlsnaes’s analytical framework, the thesis will identify intentional factors 
underlying Russia’s foreign policy towards China, and then attempt to explain them, and 
therefore the foreign policy, by identifying dispositional factors in chapters 3-7. Finally, the 
explanations are elaborated with the identification of structural constraints on the foreign policy 
in the concluding chapter. 
Intentional factors 
Russia’s official rhetoric on China from 2000 to 2020 is consistently positive and optimistic. It 
largely revolves around four major themes: economic opportunity, regional and global stability, 
shared interests, and the establishment of a more equitable world order. The theme of economic 
opportunity anchors rhetoric on how Russia should behave towards a rapidly rising China. The 
apparent consensus among high-ranking Russian government officials is that Russia should seize 
opportunities presented by China’s economic growth by strengthening ties with China and 
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engaging in joint projects in order to develop the RFE and Siberia. The theme of regional and 
global stability appears frequently in the form of Russia and China’s role in regional 
organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where the countries 
coordinate to fight terrorism, separatism, extremism, and organized crime, and their role in 
global governing bodies such as the UN Security Council where they coordinate to check 
unilateral and destabilizing action. The theme of shared interests is characterized by explanations 
of how the mostly non-conflictual nature of Russia and China’s interests is what makes much of 
the relationship’s healthy development possible and includes signals of intention to continue 
such development. It is also explained that many of these shared interests are natural 
coincidences of their respective national interests, while others required coordination and 
communication to establish. The theme of the establishment of a more equitable world order 
solidifies Russia’s rhetoric with continuous reaffirmation of a shared global vision and signals 
the intention to continue cooperation with China towards the realization of their vision. 
There has been no official rhetoric over the period of interest that has indicated Russia’s 
intention to attempt to contain or balance against the rise of China either alone or in coordination 
with other states. Officials have consistently denied that China poses a threat to Russia over the 
last two decades.112 The detailed analysis of Russia’s official rhetoric on which this summary is 
based can be found in the Appendix. 
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According to the analytical framework, dispositional factors, which include perceptions and 
values, explain intentional factors.113 The process by which dispositional factors of Russian 
foreign policy decisionmakers form or reform upon receiving new information or 
communication is opaque. As discussed in the section on psychology in IR above, studies have 
revealed tendencies in the way humans process new information and under what circumstances 
new information changes or does not change preexisting beliefs. Unfortunately, knowing that 
Russian foreign policy decisionmakers likely share these tendencies does not help us know what 
expert information reaches them or whether or how the information affects the decisionmakers’ 
preexisting dispositional factors. The thesis refers to such effects as contributions to the 
formation of dispositional factors. Direct contributions include those that occur through direct 
communication, e.g. the expert has served as an advisor, has spoken with the official at a meeting 
such as those held by the Valdai Club, the official has read the expert’s work, etc. Indirect 
contributions include those that occur through indirect communication and depend on at least 
one link, e.g. an advisor of the official has communicated with, or read the work of, the expert, 
and incorporates information received in advice given to the official. A contribution to the 
formation of dispositional factors may consist of a change in, or reinforcement of, the official’s 
preexisting dispositional factors. A change occurs when preexisting dispositional factors are 
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affected by views expressed by the expert in a way that makes them more aligned with, or less 
contradictory to, the expert’s view. Reinforcement occurs when the view conveyed by the expert 
validates the official’s preexisting dispositional factors in a new context, e.g. in the wake of a 
recent foreign policy action by China that has implications for Russia’s interests. Whether expert 
views contribute to the dispositional factors of officials by changing them is a matter of 
persuasion. 
Just as there have been studies on how humans process new information, there have been studies 
on persuasion resulting in theories and models attempting to explain how and in what contexts 
humans are persuaded by others. It is worth providing a brief overview in order to enlighten this 
study’s consideration of how the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers 
can be analyzed. 
Social judgement theory holds that the result of an attempt to persuade depends on how the 
recipient of the information assesses the position being supported by the persuader.114 Such 
assessment begins with the determination of whether the position on a certain issue being 
communicated by the persuader is shared or not. The position of the recipient relative to that of 
the persuader is not dichotomous, but rather, it lies on a scale from ‘shared’ to ‘not shared’, 
including neutral non-commitment and degrees on either side, e.g. moderately in favor or 
moderately against. The issue can also be broken down into smaller issues that constitute the 
whole, each of which may be assigned a judgement on the ‘shared – not shared’ scale. The result 
of the effort to persuade someone that does not share the persuader’s position depends not only 
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on the extent to which they are against the position but also on the level of recipient’s ego-
involvement in the issue. Ego-involvement refers to the degree to which the recipient’s position 
on the issue is part of their identity or sense of self. This was measured by degrees of 
involvement or membership in certain groups that are in some way engaged in the issue. Social 
judgement theory predicts that the more divergent the recipient’s position towards the issue from 
the persuader’s and the higher their ego-involvement in the issue the more resistant they are to 
change. It is important to note that ego-involvement and the holding of an extreme position are 
not conflated by the theory.115 A person can hold an extreme position on an issue without that 
position necessarily being strongly connected to their identity, just as a person can hold a 
moderate position on an issue while having a strong connection with the position to their 
identity. 
The summative model formulated by Fishbein posits that a person’s attitude towards an object or 
issue is a function of the strength of their salient beliefs about the object or issue and their 
evaluation of these beliefs represented by the formula Ao = Σbiei.116 Ao represents the attitude 
towards the object, bi represents belief strength, and ei represents the evaluation of the belief. 
The formula may be read as ‘attitude towards the object equals the sum of the product of belief 
strength and evaluation of the belief’. There can be as many beliefs and their evaluations in the 
formula as necessary. For example, if there are three salient beliefs in question, the formula 
would appear as Ao = Σ(b1e1+b2e2+b3e3). The summative model provides a measurement of 
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attitude that can be useful for efforts of persuasion. O’Keefe explains that the model can be used 
for this purpose in three main ways: (1) the evaluation of a belief may be changed, (2) the 
strength of a belief may be changed, and (3) the set of beliefs may be changed.117 The scholar 
explains and provides examples: 
‘a persuader might try to make some existing positive belief even more positively evaluated 
(“Senator Smith is, as you know, respected in the Senate, but you may not realize just how 
desirable that attribute is—it means Senator Smith can be more effective in passing legislation to 
help our state”) or to make some existing negative belief less negatively evaluated (“Sure, Senator 
Smith was only an average student—but then again, being an average student isn’t so bad”) … to 
encourage a more positive attitude, a persuader might try to weaken the strength of an existing 
negative belief (“It’s not likely that Senator Smith accepted bribes, because Senator Smith is 
already very wealthy”) or to enhance the strength of an existing positive belief (“You already know 
it’s true that Senator Smith has worked hard for the people of this state—but you don’t know just 
how true that is”) … the set of salient beliefs might be changed … in two ways. One is to add a 
new belief of the appropriate valence (“You might not realize it, but Senator Smith has been quietly 
working to fix the government’s budget problems”). The other is to change the relative salience of 
existing beliefs (“Have you forgotten that five years ago Senator Smith helped keep XYZ 
Industries from moving out of state?”)’.118 
According to the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) proposed by Petty and Cacioppo, attentive 
recipients of communication intending to persuade undergo cognitive processes to ‘make sense’ 
of it involving reason, a lack of reason, and motivation.119 The model posits that there are two 
main methods of persuasion: one by a central route and another by a peripheral route. The central 
route uses elaborate methods that usually involve more detailed communication over a longer 
period and are most effective in causing long-term change given two conditions: (1) the recipient 
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is motivated to receive and process the information provided by the persuader and (2) is capable 
of understanding the information. Without both conditions being met, the central route is not 
likely to be successful. According to the ELM, if a persuader deems the central route likely to 
fail because one or neither of the conditions are met, they should use the peripheral route which 
uses emotional and superficial messaging that may result in short-term attitude change in the 
recipient but is unlikely to result in long-term change. 
The heuristic-systematic model (HSM) set forth by Chaiken is similar to the ELM in that it posits 
that messages from the persuader are processed by the recipient by two means: systematic 
(similar to the ELM’s central route) and heuristic (similar to the ELM’s peripheral route).120 The 
main differences between the HSM and the ELM is the latter’s elaboration of the recipient’s use 
of heuristics when processing the persuader’s message and the interaction between the heuristic 
and systematic means of processing. When less attention is being paid to the persuader’s 
message due to a lack of motivation or ability to understand, the recipient relies on heuristics, i.e. 
cognitive shortcuts that people use to simplify a complex reality and make decisions in an 
uncertain environment. According to the HSM, as a persuader’s message reaches higher levels of 
elaboration, if the recipients have not already begun to rely solely on heuristic means of 
processing, they may use both systematic and heuristic means of processing either independently 
or interactively. 
A final model warranting discussion here is the unimodel, which challenges the dual-processing 
approach of models like the ELM and HSM, arguing that despite the method of persuasion and 
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processing (peripheral/heuristic or central/systematic), the same evidence is being processed by 
the recipient and therefore it is only necessary to have a singular model of persuasion.121 
Proponents of the model deny the existence of a qualitative difference between the results of 
persuasion that are reached through peripheral/heuristic and central/systematic means, arguing 
that the evidence delivered by persuaders and processed by recipients through both means is 
functionally equivalent. 
Just as psychological studies on how humans process new information help us understand how 
new information is likely processed by Russian foreign policy decisionmakers, theories and 
models of persuasion help us understand the ways and contexts in which expert communication 
may result in a change in the decisionmakers’ dispositional factors regarding China. From a 
methodological standpoint, certain processes must be observable (and, for some, measurable) for 
these theories and models of persuasion to be useful to the present research. First, it would be 
necessary for the content of the communication conveyed by the persuader to the participant to 
be observable. Second, as persuasion implies a change (minor or major) in dispositional factors 
regarding the issue, preexisting dispositional factors would need to be observable in order to 
determine whether persuasion has taken place. Third, if a change in dispositional factors has 
taken place, it would be helpful for the sake of formulating a detailed explanation to observe how 
the persuader’s communication was processed: by peripheral/heuristic or central/systematic 
means, or by a combination of both. Fourth, the level of ego-involvement in the issue should be 
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observable and measurable. And fifth, the salient beliefs and evaluations of those beliefs about 
the issue should be observable and measurable. 
An ideal study using theories and models of persuasion would include subjects who were 
accessible and receiving communication meaning to persuade that is known to the researcher; 
whose preexisting dispositional factors and ego-involvement are made known and measured; 
who would report their dispositional factors (changed or unchanged) after the communication 
was delivered; who would describe how they processed the communication (allowing the 
researcher to determine the extent of peripheral/heuristic or central/systematic processing); and 
who would have no (or very little) reason to lie about their preexisting dispositional factors or 
their changed or unchanged dispositional factors after the communication was delivered. 
Unfortunately, inherent to the study of Russia in IR and Russian foreign policy is a lack of access 
to Russian foreign policy decisionmakers, a lack of reliable information regarding the 
communications they receive and take seriously regarding a certain issue (in the case of this 
study, China), and a lack of information as to how such communication is processed. Moreover, 
even if there were access, there would be concerns about the willingness of the decisionmakers 
to truthfully report their dispositional factors before and after receiving the communication and 
details of the way they processed the communication. Because of these limitations, studies in the 
field tend to rely on what is said in official documents, what is said by decisionmakers in 
statements, press conferences, interviews by the media, etc., anonymous interviews with lower-
level government officials, and analyses of Russia’s foreign policy actions and the international 
structural environment in which they take place. Such studies have yielded many credible 




In addition to analyzing Russia’s official rhetoric, foreign policy actions, and structural 
constraints, this thesis seeks to identify the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers while mitigating problems posed by a lack of access and the abovementioned 
‘Other Minds’ problem. It does so by means of a content analysis of texts written by Russian 
experts on international affairs, foreign policy, and security and published by prominent think 
tanks, journals, and research institutes in Russia. Expert texts as a source of dispositional factors 
were chosen for three main reasons. First, Russian decisionmakers are difficult to access for 
interviews, and even if interviews were granted the answers to questions would likely resemble 
official rhetoric. Second, as explained in chapter 3, the connections between knowledge 
production in Russia on international affairs, foreign policy, and security and the Russian 
government, while not absolute, are nevertheless strong. Several of the publishing institutions 
themselves are directly or indirectly connected to, or even legally owned and operated by, the 
government. Many of the experts who wrote the texts analyzed have held or currently hold 
positions in the government or military or are in close proximity to high-ranking officials. And 
third, experts provide more detailed analysis in their work than officials do in their rhetoric, 
which can lead to deeper insight into the reasons behind Russia’s behavior towards China over 
the period of interest. 
With the advent of reliable crowdsourcing, content analysis in the social sciences may be done at 
scales that were not previously possible. A content analysis may now be done not by two coders 
analyzing hundreds of texts but by hundreds of coders analyzing tens of thousands of texts, 
thereby producing a more complete picture of the social phenomenon in question. 
In this thesis, the role of dispositional factors in Russia’s foreign policy is considered 




and preferences, underlying a foreign policy decision have a teleological relationship with 
foreign policy action.122 In contrast, dispositional factors have a causal relationship with foreign 
policy action because they explain why the decisionmakers have the intentions.123 In this view, 
explaining a foreign policy is not a matter of determining whether dispositional factors had a role 
in decisionmaking or an impact on an outcome because there would be no foreign policy without 
dispositional factors. Rather, it is a matter of identifying the dispositional factors that informed 
the intentions of decisionmakers. 
The dispositional factors that explain the intentions underlying Russia’s foreign policy towards 
China are observable, but, as explained above, in a limited way. In this study, the views of 
Russian experts are analyzed and the dominant views among them regarding issues related to the 
four main foreign policy areas of focus are identified. A view is said to be dominant if it is the 
one found to be held by most experts. 
The question then becomes whether or how the dominant expert views have affected the 
dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. The affect may be observed by 
comparing the dominant views to certain foreign policy decisions or actions. There are two 
possible results (referred to as cases below) when the comparison is made: (1) the policy is 
consistent with the dominant view; and (2) the policy is not consistent with the dominant view. 
For a policy to be considered consistent with a dominant view, at a minimum, there should be no 
logical contradictions between the two. 
For each case, there are four possible scenarios regarding whether the dominant view was 
communicated (directly or indirectly) to the official and whether the official’s dispositional 
                                                             





factors were changed, reinforced, or unchanged by the dominant view: (1) the dominant view 
was successfully communicated, and the official’s dispositional factors changed; (2) the 
dominant view was successfully communicated, and the official’s dispositional factors were 
reinforced; (3) the dominant view was successfully communicated, and the official’s 
dispositional factors were not changed; and (4) the dominant view was not successfully 










Scenario 1 Yes Yes No No 
Scenario 2 Yes No Yes Yes 
Scenario 3 Yes No No Yes 
Scenario 4 No No No Yes 
Figure 1 
In each area of Russia’s foreign policy towards China analyzed in the empirical chapters, the 
case can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty, but the same cannot be said 
regarding the scenario. As explained above, it cannot be directly observed whether a dominant 
expert view was successfully communicated or, in the event that it is successfully 
communicated, whether the official’s dispositional factors were changed or reinforced because of 
a lack of access and the ‘Other Minds’ problem. For this reason, the thesis argues in terms of 
likelihood regarding which scenario has taken place. 
To estimate the likelihood that the dominant view among experts on a given foreign policy area 
has been successfully communicated directly or indirectly to the official, the thesis considers 




based on their connections to the Russian government or military, their qualifications, and the 
government or military connections of the institutions through which they publish. 
It is not entirely necessary for experts to have a doctorate or to have served the Russian 
government to be considered to have views that likely have potential influence over Russia’s 
foreign policy. For instance, Fyodor Lukyanov is considered by the study to be likely to have 
potential influence because of his sheer proximity to decisionmakers, regardless of his lack of a 
doctorate and lack of history of service. In order to address the issue of potential bias due to the 
categorization based on qualifications and history of government or military service, experts who 
were outliers in their category were considered on a case-by-case basis regarding their potential 
influence. 
Potential influence is considered by the study to be positively correlated with the success of 
communication of a view to an official, i.e. the more potential influence the holders of the 
dominant expert view have the more likely the view is successfully communicated, and vice 
versa. If the dominant view is held by experts with a low level of potential influence on average, 
scenario 4 would be deemed most likely. If the dominant view is held by experts with a high 
level of potential influence on average, scenarios 1, 2, and 3 would be deemed more likely than 
scenario 4. 
In the event that scenarios 1, 2, and 3 are all deemed more likely than scenario 4 because of the 
high level of influence of the experts holding the dominant view identified, the estimation of the 
individual likelihoods of scenarios 1, 2, and 3 relative to each other is a matter of judging which 




considered more likely to have taken place than scenario 3. If case 2 is determined, scenario 3 
would be considered more likely than scenarios 1 and 2. 
  Case 1 Case 2 
Scenario 1 Likely Unlikely 
Scenario 2 Likely Unlikely 
Scenario 3 Unlikely Likely 
Figure 2 
At this stage, in the event that case 1 is determined, the next step would be to estimate the 
likelihoods of scenario 1 and scenario 2 relative to each other. This is where the analysis 
approaches the black box. In case 1, the foreign policy in question is consistent with the 
dominant view of the experts. In scenario 1, the communication of the view is successful, and the 
dispositional factors of the official were changed as a result, meaning that the official’s 
dispositional factors prior to receiving the communication were significantly different. In 
scenario 2, the communication is also successful, but the dispositional factors of the official were 
not changed but reinforced, meaning the official’s dispositional factors prior to receiving the 
communication were significantly similar. Without knowing the official’s preexisting 
dispositional factors because of a lack of access and the ‘Other Minds’ problem, an estimation of 
which scenario (1 or 2) is more likely given case 1 is not possible. 
Despite this limitation, inferences can be made from the estimation of the likelihoods of 
scenarios 1 and 2 given case 1. In scenario 1 given case 1, a change in the dispositional factors of 
the official has resulted from the communication of the dominant view making them more 




factors inherent in the dominant view identified are now shared to the point that the policy is 
consistent with the view. Therefore, the dispositional factors inherent in the view would explain 
the policy. In scenario 2 given case 1, the preexisting dispositional factors of the official have 
been reinforced as a result of receiving the communication of the dominant view. This would 
mean that the official already shared the dominant view to a significant extent. Therefore, the 
dispositional factors inherent in the view would explain the policy. 
Each of the four empirical chapters (4 and 5 on the Russian Far East and 6 and 7 on Central 
Asia) includes an analysis of expert views and an estimation of their potential influence. If the 
potential influence of the holders of the dominant views identified is estimated to be low on 
average, the chapter will conclude that scenario 4 is most likely. In the ‘Policy’ sections of each 
of the chapters, which follow the analyses of expert views and estimations of their potential 
influence, Russia’s policy regarding its interaction with China is analyzed. If the potential 
influence of the holders of the dominant views was estimated to be high, then these sections will 
consider whether the policies are consistent with the views and argue that they are or are not. 
Based on the argument, the chapters will conclude that scenarios 1 or 2 are most likely or that 






Given that the analysis targets texts that are published in Russia on a very important subject of 
international affairs, it is important to address the possibility of censorship of such texts. Studies 
have shown that state-controlled media have used methods of framing regarding anti-regime 
protests along the dichotomy of freedom of protest – disorder, and even the manufacturing of 
negative stories on anti-regime protests in the interest of regime survival.124 In Russia, critical 
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journalists may, as Repnikova claims, write about whatever they want and never engage in self-
censorship, yet they face indirect official dissatisfaction in the aftermath of publication through 
‘reprimands from their owners, legal warnings and restrictions, and encounters with unexpected 
violence’.125 
The position this study takes is that the texts analyzed for this thesis consist of genuine 
knowledge production. Four factors justify this position. First, the texts, many of which are 
written by highly qualified experts who have served in the Russian government or military, in 
addressing the implications of China’s rise and specific activities for Russia’s interests there are 
no direct challenges to the survival of the current regime in Moscow. Second, expert knowledge 
in Russia on the topic consists of a wide variety of views, some of which differ greatly from the 
official line, indicating freedom of expression among experts at least on topics that are not 
directly relevant to domestic regime legitimacy or survival. Third, there is demand in the Russian 
government and military for genuine knowledge on complex issues such as Russia’s relationship 
with a rising China. Analysis by highly qualified experts supplements information gathered by 
intelligence agencies and provides knowledge characterized by ingenuity and outside-the-box 
thinking. 
Fourth, there are three main alternatives to the position that the texts consist of genuine 
knowledge production, all of which are less likely. First, the government monitors the 
publications and engages in selective censorship while allowing some views against the 
government line for the purpose of creating the illusion of a genuine debate. Second, the Russian 
government engages in a large-scale secret disinformation operation with all the experts on the 
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government’s payroll. Some views against the government line are allowed or ordered for the 
purpose of creating the illusion of a genuine debate. Third, there is minimal or no direct 
government censorship, but the experts engage in self-censorship publishing analyses with which 
they do not necessarily agree. 
The first alternative is unlikely due to a lack of incentive. The dominant views conveyed in 
expert texts is that over the period of interest China has not posed a threat to Russia. The 
incentive to censor pieces that convey contradictory views would presumably be to prevent the 
West (mainly the US) from knowing that there is widespread concern about the rise of China 
among Russian experts, which would signal uneasiness on Russia’s side of the relationship. The 
US learning of such concern may be motivated to pursue rapprochement with Russia to balance 
against China (which would have to be done by an administration that is willing to make large 
compromises on issues such as sanctions and the missile defense system in Europe). The 
problem with this alternative is that Russia would benefit from improved relations with the US, 
therefore, it would have no reason to want to prevent this. While it is unlikely that Russia would 
engage in relations with the US that would jeopardize its good relations with China, there would 
still be benefits from US attempts for better relations. If anything, there would be incentive to 
conduct a disinformation operation to falsely signal to the US that there is widespread concern 
among experts about the rise of China (with Beijing in the loop). However, not only is such an 
operation highly unrealistic, but it is also unsustainable. 
The second alternative is unlikely because of the sheer scale of expert material produced on 
China, which would require significant resources to produce merely for the purpose of 
disinformation. Additionally, there is a lack of incentive for such an operation for reasons 




The third alternative is unlikely because of a lack of incentive for the experts to produce bogus 
work. It is difficult to believe that the experts, many of whom have doctorates and have served in 
the Russian government or military, are publishing analyses with which they do not agree for no 
reason. 
The identification of dispositional factors and testing of the hypotheses is done by means of a 
content analysis. Texts produced by the international affairs, foreign policy, security expert 
communities in Russia from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2017126 were targeted for analysis. 
Coding of the texts was done using a crowd-sourcing method. Crowd-sourcing is a quick and 
cost-effective way to code content in a transparent and replicable manner,127 and it is being used 
by a growing number of researchers in the Social Sciences.128 Crowd-sourcing operates on the 
principle of the ‘wisdom of crowds’, which has roots in the thought of Aristotle,129 and holds 
simply that the many are smarter than the few. An example traditionally cited comes from an 
event in Plymouth in 1906 when a crowd of about 800 guessed the weight of an ox, and the 
average guess was within 1% of the actual weight while many of the individual guesses were 
significantly erroneous.130 A wealth of empirical evidence suggests that in the realm of data 
creation, expert work can be matched or even improved upon by aggregate judgements of non-
experts.131 
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The content analysis was performed by coders recruited through a crowdsourced data creation 
platform provided by Appen.132 Quality is ensured by requiring coders to pass a quiz before 
being allowed to work, and by hidden ‘test questions’ among real questions once the coder has 
started working. The quiz is made up of five test questions created by the author of the job, and 
randomly selected from the list of test questions. The test questions are indistinguishable from 
the tasks completed by the coders. To create a test question, the author must select a text and 
complete the task by answering the same questions the coders are asked and give a clear 
explanation of why certain answers were given. In addition to the quality control ensured by the 
test questions, the process of their creation allows for a high level of familiarization with the 
content for the author. The coders are only allowed to begin working on the job once they pass 
the quiz by answering at least four out of five of the test questions correctly. Once the coders 
have passed the quiz and begun working, on each page of work consisting of five texts, one text 
is a hidden test question. Coders are only allowed to do as many pages of work as there are test 
questions, as each test question is not given more than once. If the coders do not maintain a 70% 
or higher success rate on the test questions, they are automatically removed from the job. In the 
event the coder answers a test question incorrectly the answers and explanations for the answers 
given by the author are shown. This allows for a ‘training’ feature in addition to the instructions. 
Coders who are removed from the job because of a low success rate on test questions are still 
paid for their work, but their work becomes ‘untrusted’ and is not used in the formulation of the 
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results of the job. The author of the job may also monitor the work in real time and remove 
workers at will. Each paragraph received codes from at least five coders. Only texts that received 
codes with a 0.7 confidence score or higher were included in the results. Confidence scores 
indicate the level of agreement between coders and are weighted by the coders ‘trust scores’ (rate 
of success on test questions).133 
The analysis tested all six of the hypotheses. The following is the set of questions and answer 
options given to coders for every paragraph. 
Is there a perception that China either threatens or does not threaten Russia? 
- Perception that China threatens Russia 
o What type of threat? 
 Military 
 Economic and/or trade 
 Environmental 
 Demographic (population size, growth of population, migration, etc.) 
 Development projects and/or investments 
 Cultural (religion, race, history, customs, language, values, etc.) 
 Ideological 
 Legal (domestic or international) 
 Goals, interests 
 Regime type (democratic, authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of 
power, single-party rule, etc.) 
 Other (please type) 
o Which statement best explains why, according to the text, China threatens Russia? 
 China has harmful intentions towards Russia 
 China is not deterred by Russia’s military power (including nuclear 
weapons) 
 Russia and China have conflicting interests 
 China is not interested in long-term cooperation with Russia and it 
exploits its power over Russia for short-term gains 
 China’s economic power and/or trade practices threaten Russia 
 Russia and China have conflicting views, beliefs, ideas, or norms 
 Russia and China identify as members of opposing groups or blocs 
 China is not willing to stand with Russia to oppose the West 
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 Institutions are insufficient to constrain China’s behavior and/or make it 
more predictable 
 There is uncontrolled immigration from China 
 Because Russia and China have different regime types (democratic, 
authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of power, single-party rule, 
etc.), it is more likely that it will harm Russia 
 None of the above 
- Perception that China does not threaten Russia 
o What type of reasons are given for why China does not threaten Russia? 
 Military 
 Economic and/or trade 
 Environmental 
 Demographic (population size, growth of population, migration, etc.) 
 Development projects and/or investments 
 Cultural (religion, race, history, customs, language, values, etc.) 
 Ideological 
 Legal (domestic or international) 
 Goals, interests 
 Regime type (democratic, authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of 
power, single-party rule, etc.) 
 Other (please type) 
o Which statement best explains why, according to the text, China does not threaten 
Russia? 
 China does not have harmful intentions towards Russia 
 China is deterred by Russia’s military power (including nuclear weapons) 
 China and Russia have compatible or non-conflictual interests 
 China is interested in long term cooperation with Russia, and actions that 
threaten or harm Russia would hinder such cooperation 
 China’s economic power and/or trade practices present an opportunity, not 
a threat 
 Russia and China have similar views, beliefs, ideas, or norms 
 Russia and China identify as members of the same group or bloc 
 Russia and China stand together to oppose the West 
 Institutions constrain China’s behavior and / or make it more predictable 
 Immigration from China is controlled 
 Because Russia and China have similar regime types (democratic, 
authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of power, single-party rule, 
etc.), it is less likely that it will harm Russia 
 None of the above 
- No 
o What about China is discussed or analyzed? 
 Military 





 Demography (population size, growth of population, migration, etc.) 
 Development projects and/or investments 
 Culture (religion, race, history, customs, language, values, etc.) 
 Ideology 
 Law (domestic or international) 
 Goals, interests 
 Regime type (democratic, authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of 
power, single-party rule, etc.) 
 Other (please type) 
Is there a perception in the text that China and Russia are similar or dissimilar? 
 A perception that China and Russia are similar 
o What type of similarity? 
 Military 
 Economic and/or trade 
 Environmental 
 Demographic (population size, growth of population, migration, etc.) 
 Developmental and/or trade 
 Cultural (religion, race, history, customs, language, values, etc.) 
 Ideological 
 Legal (domestic or international) 
 Goals, interests 
 Regime type (democratic, authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of 
power, single-party rule, etc.) 
 Other (please type) 
 A perception that China and Russia are dissimilar 
o What type of dissimilarity? 
 Military 
 Economic and/or trade 
 Environmental 
 Demographic (population size, growth of population, migration, etc.) 
 Developmental and/or investments 
 Cultural (religion, race, history, customs, language, values, etc.) 
 Ideological 
 Legal (domestic or international) 
 Goals, interests 
 Regime type (democratic, authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of 




 Other (please type) 
 Both 
o What type of similarity? 
 Military 
 Economic and/or trade 
 Environmental 
 Demographic (population size, growth of population, migration, etc.) 
 Developmental and/or investments 
 Cultural (religion, race, history, customs, language, values, etc.) 
 Ideological 
 Legal (domestic or international) 
 Goals, interests 
 Regime type (democratic, authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of 
power, single-party rule, etc.) 
 Other (please type) 
o What type of dissimilarity? 
 Military 
 Economic and/or trade 
 Environmental 
 Demographic (population size, growth of population, migration, etc.) 
 Developmental and/or investments 
 Cultural (religion, race, history, customs, language, values, etc.) 
 Ideological 
 Legal (domestic or international) 
 Goals, interests 
 Regime type (democratic, authoritarian, ‘strong leader’, centralization of 
power, single-party rule, etc.) 
 Other (please type) 
 No 
All six of the hypotheses are tested by the lines of questioning that follow the identification of a 
perception in the text that China either threatens or does not threaten Russia. Because of the 
complexity of the notion of shared identity, hypothesis 5 is tested with an additional line of 




texts.134 After specifying the type of threat posed by China or the reasons why China does not 
pose a threat, coders are asked to select a sentence that best describes why China threatens or 
does not threaten Russia. The answer options for the question of why, according to the text, 
China threatens Russia have opposite answer options for the question of why, according to the 
text, China does not threaten Russia. A significant difference in the number of selections of 
answer options across each of the pairs of answers would provide evidence of certain 
dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers and allow for the confirmation or 
rejection of the hypotheses. For example, if, out of all the codes that classify texts as either 
indicating that China threatens Russia because they have conflicting interests or that China does 
not threaten Russia because they have compatible or non-conflictual interests, the latter receives 
80% of the total codes received between the two, this would be considered evidence in favor of 
confirmation of hypothesis 3.135 
It may be helpful to clarify which of the pairs of answer options are given with the intention of 
testing the other hypotheses. The answer options meant to test hypothesis 1,136 which concerns 
perceptions of intentions, are ‘China has harmful intentions towards Russia’ and ‘China does not 
have harmful intentions towards Russia’; hypothesis 2,137 which concerns nuclear deterrence: 
’China is not deterred by Russia’s nuclear weapons’ and ‘China is deterred by Russia’s nuclear 
weapons’; hypothesis 4,138 which concerns institutions: ‘Institutions are insufficient to constrain 
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China’s behavior and/or make it more predictable’ and ‘Institutions constrain China’s behavior 
and / or make it more predictable’; hypothesis 5,139 which has two pairs of answer options and 
concerns shared identity: ‘Russia and China have conflicting views, beliefs, ideas, or norms’ and 
‘Russia and China have similar views, beliefs, ideas, or norms’ and ‘Russia and China identify as 
members of opposing groups or blocs’ and ‘Russia and China identify as members of the same 
group or bloc’; and hypothesis 6,140 which concerns trust: ‘China is not interested in long-term 
cooperation with Russia and it exploits its power over Russia for short-term gains’ and ‘China is 
interested in long term cooperation with Russia, and actions that threaten or harm Russia would 
hinder such cooperation’. 
The additional line of questioning on perceptions of similarity or dissimilarity between Russia 
and China results in coding that can be tested for significant correlation between shifts in such 
perceptions and shifts in threat perception over time. If hypothesis 5 is to be confirmed, we 
should see threat perception decrease as perceptions of similarity (or shared identity) increase, 
and vice versa, and perceptions of the absence of threat decrease as perceptions of dissimilarity 
increase, and vice versa. The coding is meant to shed light on other dispositional factors by 
revealing the intensity of focus on, and attitudes towards, (1) immigration from China, (2) 
regime type of China, and (3) China’s relationship with the West, particularly China’s 
willingness to oppose Western hegemony alongside Russia. 
The qualitative aspect of the content analysis (the results of which are presented in chapters 4-7) 
targets texts containing paragraphs that received codes indicating the presence of a perception of 
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because they believe that China ‘values the prospects of long-run cooperation between the two countries more than 




threat or a perception of an absence of threat from China and is extended to include texts 
published from 2018 to early 2020.  
Expert views are categorized based on the likelihood that they have reached and directly or 
indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers. The thesis argues in terms of likelihood because, as explained above, direct 
observation of the dispositional factors on which decisions of Russian officials are based is not 
possible because of a lack of access and the ‘Other Minds’ problem. Based on the qualifications 
of the experts, their connections to the Russian government or military, and the connections of 
the institutions through which they publish, their views are categorized in one of four levels: 
likely to have influence, not unlikely to have influence, not likely to have influence, and unlikely 
to have influence. It is understandable that the pairs of terms ‘likely’ and ‘not unlikely’, and ‘not 
likely’ and ‘unlikely’, may be considered synonyms. These should be considered mere labels for 
levels of likely influence. To avoid semantic confusion, the levels should be considered to have 
the following values of likelihood: ‘Likely’ – 75%-99%, ‘not unlikely’ – 50%-74%, ‘not likely’ 
– 25%-49%, and ‘unlikely’ – 0%-24%. Due to space considerations, views that are deemed not 
likely or unlikely to have influence are not discussed, as scenario 4 has been deemed most likely. 
Some views are considered to have an unclear level of potential influence and are therefore 
excluded. For example, since the affiliations of Dmitri Trenin and Alexander Gabuev with 
Western organizations may cause bias towards their work, it has been excluded due to a lack of 
confidence in its categorization. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explores understandings of threat perception in broad schools of thought in IR, IR 




theories of balance of threat, balance of interests, and offence-defense balance, neoliberal theory 
on the effects of regimes and institutions on state behavior, constructivist theory on the 
interaction between shared identity and threat perception, and a politico-psychological notion of 
trust between states. The chapter also elaborates the project’s integrative analytical framework 
and research methodology. The framework, originally formulated by Carlsnaes, consists of three 
dimensions: intentional, dispositional, and structural. It is explained that, at the intentional 
dimension, the thesis provides a detailed analysis of Russia’s official rhetoric on China in the 
Appendix and provides a summary of the findings of the analysis in this chapter. Most of the 
explanatory work of the study is done at the dispositional dimension, where the perceptions and 
values that informed the intentions behind a foreign policy are analyzed. At this stage, a large 
number of texts produced by Russia’s international affairs, foreign policy, and security expert 
communities are analyzed using a crowd-sourcing method. A qualitative analysis of the texts 
guided by the quantitative results of the content analysis is also undertaken. Finally, to elaborate 
the explanation formulated based on dispositional factors uncovered by the content analysis, the 
thesis takes into consideration structural constraints in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Institutions, Experts, and Quantitative Results 
This chapter has three main objectives: first, to provide information on the institutions, the 
publications of which were selected for the content analysis performed for this thesis; second, to 
provide information on the experts whose work was targeted for the qualitative aspect of the 
content analysis; and third, to present the quantitative results of the content analysis. The 
information on the institutions and experts includes estimates of their potential influence on 
Russia’s foreign policy towards China, i.e. the likelihood that certain views they publish 
contribute to the formation of the dispositional factors (perceptions and values) of Russian 
foreign policy decisionmakers. This is done by categorizing the institutions based on whether 
they were founded, are funded, and are led in full, in part, directly, or indirectly by the Russian 
government or military. The experts are categorized based on their qualifications and proximity 
to the Russian government or military. This chapter functions as an information base that is 
referred to in the following four empirical chapters. It also contributes to the explanation of 
Russia’s foreign policy towards China over the period of interest by identifying trends in Russian 
expert thought revealed by the quantitative aspect of the content analysis. 
Institutions 
‘Institutions’ is a hypernym used by this thesis to refer to the entities that published the materials 
selected for the content analysis. They include think tanks, research centers, journals, 
newspapers, and radio talk shows. As explained in chapter 2, this section provides information 
on each institution in order to approximate the amount of potential influence it may have over 
Russian foreign policy towards China. It does so by evaluating the proximity of each to the 




include whether it was founded in full, in part, directly, or indirectly by the government or 
military, the proximity of the Heads of the institutions, the editorial boards, and members to the 
government or the military, and whether they are funded in full, in part, directly, or indirectly by 
the government or military. The criteria for determining whether an institution is led by the state 
include the legal status of the institution (e.g. a Federal State Budgetary Institution is legally run 
by the state), and whether the Heads of the editorial boards of the institutions have held or hold a 
position in the Russian government or military. Figure 1 shows the categorization of the 
institutions as a result of the evaluation. The check mark indicates that the institution was 
founded, is funded, or is led by the Russian government or military, and the Xs indicate vice 
versa. The curved arrow indicates that the institution was either partially or indirectly founded, is 
funded, or is led by the Russian government or military. The question marks indicate insufficient 






Figure 2 categorizes the institutions based on the extent of their connections to the Russian 
government or military. It does so by grouping together those institutions which have the same 







The graph above shows that the largest group of the institutions, 42%, are those that have three 
connections to the state, i.e. they were founded, are funded, and are led in full, in part, directly or 
indirectly by the Russian government or military. It is especially noteworthy that 74% of the 
institutions have at least one of these significant connections with the government or military. 
It might be appropriate here to explain the decision to categorize some institutions as 
government- or military-led, even though they are not legally Federal State Budgetary 
Institutions. For example, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is categorized as an 
institution led by the government because of the sheer number of currently serving high-ranking 
government officials who were appointed to the board of trustees of the institution and are 
responsible for its management. Think tanks tend to be different in Russia than those in, for 
example, the US, where think tanks, especially in Washington, ‘function as a consistent source 
for talented administrators and congressional staff members and as a haven for personnel 
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under which they served failed to be reelected’.1 In Russia, it is very common for an official to 
simultaneously serve the government or military and serve on the board of trustees or editorial 
board of a think tank or journal. 
The evaluation begins with the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP). According to 
the Council, its legal status is a non-governmental public association and it was founded in 1992 
by ‘a group of well-known and influential politicians, heads of business associations, prominent 
entrepreneurs, public and government figures, representatives of power ministries, the military-
industrial complex, science and the media’.2 The mission of the Council is ‘to facilitate the 
development and implementation of strategic concepts for the development of Russia, its foreign 
and defense policies, and the establishment of the Russian state and civil society in the country’.3 
Regarding its relationship with the government, it is explained that the Council 
‘carries out its activities in close cooperation with a number of parliamentary and government 
bodies: the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Committees of the State Duma of the 
Russian Federation and the Federation Council for International Affairs, and for defense; other 
power ministries and departments; with academic institutes and leading analytical centers in Russia 
and abroad’.4 
Despite its close connection with the government, it emphasizes its independence and 
objectivity, claiming that the Council’s work is guided by principles including ‘non-partisanship, 
freedom of opinion and independence of assessments’, and ‘a balanced and objective approach to 
                                                             
1 McGann, James G. The Fifth Estate: Think Tanks, Public Policy, and Governance. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 2016. Citing Lee Michael Katz. ‘American Think Tanks - Their Influence Is on the Rise’. Carnegie 
Reporter 5, no. 2 (2009): 13; and Richard N. Haass. ‘Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s 
Perspective’. U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7, no. 3 (2002): 7. 







issues of national strategy’.5 According to the CFDP, it is funded ‘through sponsorship 
contributions, grants, donations from individuals and non-governmental organizations’.6 
According to Barbashin and Graef, the CFDP only receives ‘symbolic and intellectual state 
sponsorship’ and ‘does not receive financial support from the state but survives on private and 
commercial donations’.7 However, based on the Council’s description of its sources of funding, 
it is not clear whether some of the contributions and grants are from the state.  
Karaganov and Lukyanov serve as Honorary Chairman of the Presidium and Chairman of the 
Presidium, respectively. Lukyanov has also served as President of CFDP and is also currently a 
member of the Bureau of the Council. It is explained in the next section that, although Lukyanov 
has not held a position in the Russian government or military, he may be considered in relatively 
close proximity to the state. It is noteworthy that Vladimir Ryzhkov, an expert who has engaged 
in oppositional political activity, has also served as President of CFDP and is currently a member 
of the Bureau of the Council. Members of the Council include several current or former high-
ranking government officials with a relatively high level of potential influence such as Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov, Former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of Russia to China and Former First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov, 
Former Army General, Minister of the Interior, and Deputy Chairman of the Government 
Anatoly Kulikov, Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Government Office Sergei Prikhodko, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko, 
Chairman of the Board of the Military-Industrial Commission Dmitri Rogozin, Director of the 
                                                             
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Barbashin, Anton, and Alexander Graef. ‘Thinking Foreign Policy in Russia: Think Tanks and Grand Narratives’. 
Atlantic Council. 12/11/2019. Available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-




Department of Foreign Policy Planning Oleg Stepanov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee 
on Foreign Affairs Leonid Slutsky, and Advisor to the President Sergei Glaziev. 
Although the CFDP is not legally a governmental institution, it is categorized by this thesis as 
being led by the state because of the Honorary Chairman of the Presidium Karaganov’s history 
of service and continued proximity to the state and the membership of many high-ranking 
government officials. 
The legal status of the RIAC is a non-profit partnership. According to the Council, its aim is to 
‘strengthen peace, friendship and harmony between peoples, the prevention of international 
conflicts and crisis management’ and to ‘contribute to Russia's prosperity through integration 
into the global world’.8 The Council was established on 2 February 2010 by order of President 
Putin document no. 59-rp ‘On the establishment of the non-profit partnership “Russian Council 
on Foreign Affairs”’.9 The founders of the RIAC include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Education and Science.10 Its mission statement describes the Council as ‘a link 
between the state, the expert community, business and civil society in solving foreign policy 
problems’.11 
Regarding the funding of the RIAC, the charter states that the property of the Council is formed 
by ‘membership fees; voluntary property contributions and donations from members … targeted 
budget financing; income from entrepreneurial activities provided for in the Charter; and other 
                                                             
8 Russian International Affairs Council. General Information; and Russian International Affairs Council. RIAC 
Mission. Available at https://russiancouncil.ru/about/. Accessed 14/05/2020. 
9 Russian International Affairs Council. Charter. Available at https://russiancouncil.ru/about/regulations/. Accessed 
14/05/2020. 
10 Ibid. 




sources of property formation of a non-profit organization not prohibited by law’.12 Section 4.5 
states that the RIAC ‘is entitled to attract … additional financial resources of legal entities and 
individuals’, and section 5 states that the founders of the Council, including the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science, have the right to ‘make property 
contributions’.13 Rusprofile reports the RIAC’s ‘received funds’ in categories including entrance 
fees, membership fees, earmarked contributions, voluntary contributions and donations, profit 
from the entrepreneurial activity of the organization, and other.14 Received funds in the ‘other’ 
category is consistently above 80% of the total received funds since 2012, and reaches as high as 
95% and 92% in 2012 and 2013, respectively.15 It was reported by DW that the RIAC received 
subsidies in 2014 and 2017 in the amount of 100.42 million rubles and 81.41, respectively.16 
These amounts match the amounts reported for these years under the category ‘other’ for these 
years.17 The RIAC reported to the Russian Ministry of Justice that, of the funds it ‘received from 
the federal budget, budgets of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, budgets of 
municipalities’, it spent 98,474,310 rubles in 2014 and 82,740,710 rubles in 2017.18 According to 
Barbashin and Graef, the ‘RIAC is primarily financed by the state budget via the Foreign 
Ministry’, and that ‘in the first three years of operation from 2012 to 2014, almost all its 
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spending—more than 95 percent—came from the state budget, including the federal, regional, 
and municipal levels’.19 Open source information corroborates this claim. 
Several former or current high-ranking Russian government officials are affiliated with the 
RIAC, all of whom may be considered among those with the most potential influence on Russia’s 
foreign policy towards China. Former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has been President of the 
Council since 2011. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration and Press Secretary Dmitri 
Peskov, Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov, and Fyodor Lukyanov serve in the Bureau of 
the RIAC. The Board of Trustees of the Council includes Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Government Office Sergei Prikhodko, and Assistant to 
the President of the Russian Federation Andrei Fursenko. Members of the RIAC include Former 
Presidential Advisor Sergei Karaganov, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Army General and Former Head of the Main Intelligence 
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia Valentin Korabelnikov, Former 
Army General, Minister of the Interior, Deputy Chairman of the Government Anatoly Kulikov, 
Assistant to the President Yuri Ushakov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Leonid Slutsky, former assistant to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the State Duma 
of the Federal Assembly Sergei Luzyanin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
Russia to China and Former First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov, and many other 
ambassadors. 
                                                             





The Valdai Discussion Club is a think tank that holds meetings and conferences for Russian 
experts and officials and publishes work on international affairs. It was established in 2004 and 
expanded by the Valdai Club Foundation starting in 2011. The Foundation was founded by the 
CFDP, the RIAC, the Higher School of Economics (HSE), and Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations (MGIMO). These founders took over full responsibility of the Valdai 
Discussion Club in 2014. President Putin attends a session of a meeting of the Club every year to 
discuss various topics of international affairs and often to have an informal meeting with Valdai 
Discussion Club members. 
Regarding the funding of the Valdai Discussion Club, no government funding has been reported 
to the Russian Ministry of Justice.20 However, two of the four founders of the Valdai Club 
Foundation (which is responsible for the management of the Valdai Discussion Club), the RIAC 
and the HSE, receive government funding, and another, MGIMO, is a part of, and directly 
subordinate to, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.21 For this reason, the Valdai Discussion 
Club is categorized by this thesis as receiving government funding, although it should be noted 
that this funding is indirect. 
In addition to President Putin’s annual participation in sessions and informal meetings at Valdai 
Discussion Club events, such events have been attended by other high-ranking government 
officials such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Former 
                                                             
20 Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. ‘O Dei͡ atelʹnosti Nekommercheskikh Organizat͡ siĭ (On the Activities 
of Non-Profit Organizations)’. Available at http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOReports.aspx?request_type=nko. Accessed 
14/05/2020; for pdfs of the reports see http://unro.minjust.ru/Reports/77303301.pdf and 
http://unro.minjust.ru/Reports/90791301.pdf. 
21 For an example of an order for the subsidization of the Higher School of Economics see Russian Government. ‘O 
Raspredelenii v 2015 Godu Subsidiĭ Vedushchim Universitetam Rossii v T͡Seli͡ akh Povyshenii͡ a Ikh 
Konkurentosposobnosti Sredi Vedushchikh Mirovykh Nauchno-Obrazovatelʹnykh T͡Sentrov (On the Distribution in 
2015 of Subsidies to Leading Universities in Russia in Order to Increase Their Competitiveness among the World's 





Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, Former Presidential Advisor Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Igor Morgulov, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Mikhail Bogdanov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko, 
Russia in Global Politics describes itself as ‘a socio-political journal about international relations 
and foreign policy’.22 Fyodor Lukyanov has been Editor-in-Chief of the journal since it was 
founded by the CFDP, the RIAC, and the HSE in 2002. Former Presidential Advisor Sergei 
Karaganov serves as Chairman of the Editorial Board, and member of the Scientific Council of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Nikonov and Lev 
Belousov serve as Deputy Chairmen. Members of the Editorial Board of the journal include 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly on International Affairs 
Konstantin Kosachev, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Deputy Chairman of 
the Committee of the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly on International Affairs 
Vladimir Lukin, Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Government Office Sergei Prikhodko, 
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the State Duma Leonid Slutsky, and Assistant 
to the President Yuri Ushakov. 
The Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISS) is a think tank established by decree of 
President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 and its legal status is a Federal State Scientific Budgetary 
Institution (FSBI). According to Federal Law of 12.01.1996, No. 7-FZ About Non-Profit 
Organizations Section 92 Articles 1 and 3, an FSBI is ‘a non-profit organization created by the 
Russian Federation, a constituent entity of the Russian Federation or a municipality to carry out 
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work, provide services in order to ensure the implementation of the powers stipulated by the 
legislation of the Russian Federation of state authorities (state bodies) or local authorities’, and 
that ‘state (municipal) tasks for a budgetary institution … are formed and approved by the 
relevant body that exercises the functions and powers of the founder’, which is, in this case, the 
President of Russia. 23 Importantly, Section 92 Article 3 states that ‘a budget institution is not 
entitled to refuse to perform a state (municipal) task’.24 Regarding funding, Section 92 Article 6 
states that ‘financial support for the fulfillment of the state (municipal) tasks by the budget 
institution is carried out in the form of subsidies from the budgets of the budget system of the 
Russian Federation’.25 According to the Charter of the Institute, it is financed by the federal 
government, funds generated by its activities, and donations from individuals and legal entities.26 
According to RISS, its task is ‘to provide information to the Administration of the President of 
the Russian Federation, the Council of the Federation and the State Duma, the Security Council, 
the Government apparatus, ministries and departments’ in the form of ‘expert assessments, 
recommendations, prepares information and analytical materials’.27 RISS employs 11 Doctors of 
Science and 45 Candidates of Science and, since 2017, has been directed by Former Director of 
the Foreign Intelligence Service Mikhail Fradkov.28 Fradkov succeeded a Lieutenant General of 
the Foreign Intelligence Service, Leonid Reshetnikov, who served as Director of the Institute 
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from 2009 to 2017. Fradkov is a Candidate of Economic Sciences and Reshetnikov is a 
Candidate of Historical Sciences. Both were appointed to the Directorship of RISS by 
presidential decree.  
The Bulletin of MGIMO is a journal published by the Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations (MGIMO), which is a university that is a part of, and directly subordinate to, the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As reported by the Russian Agency of International 
Information (RIA Novosti) and shared on the website of MGIMO, ‘more than two-thirds of the 
employees of the Russian diplomatic service graduated from MGIMO’.29 Foreign Minister 
Lavrov himself is a graduate of MGIMO and he often gives speeches to students at the 
university.  
MGIMO’s legal status is a Federal State Autonomous Educational Institute. According to 
Federal Law of 03.11.2006 No. 174-FZ About Autonomous Institutions Chapter 1 Section 2 
Article 1, ‘an autonomous institution is recognized as a non-profit organization created by the 
Russian Federation, a constituent entity of the Russian Federation or a municipality for the 
performance of work, the provision of services for the exercise of the powers of state authorities 
provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation, the powers of local authorities’.30 
Chapter 1 Section 2 Article 3.23 states that ‘control over the activities of autonomous institutions 
is carried out … by federal state bodies, carrying out the functions and powers of the founders of 
autonomous institutions created on the basis of federal property’.31 Chapter 1 Section 4 Article 
                                                             
29 Russian Agency of International Information. ‘Izvestnye vVypuskniki MGIMO. Spravka (Famous MGIMO 
Graduates)’. 14/10/2009. Available at https://ria.ru/20091014/188792258.html. Accessed 15/05/2020. 
30 Federal Law of the Russian Federation. ‘Federalʹnyĭ Zakon ot 03.11.2006 g. no. 174-FZ Ob Avtonomnykh 
Uchrezhdenii͡ akh (Federal Law of 03.11.2006 No. 174-FZ About Autonomous Institutions)’. 03/11/2006. Chapter 1 
Article 2.1. Available at http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/24526/page/1. Accessed 18/05/2020. 




2.1 states that ‘an autonomous institution is not entitled to refuse to perform a state (municipal) 
task’.32 Regarding funding, Section 4 Article 4 states that ‘the financial support of the activities 
… is carried out in the form of subsidies from the budgets of the budget system of the Russian 
Federation and other sources not prohibited by federal laws’.33 According to the Charter of 
MGIMO, the university is financed by the government and by funds generated through its 
activities.34 
The Bulletin of MGIMO was established in 2008 and it pursues three main goals: the ‘publication 
of original studies on international relations’; ‘the development of the Russian school of the 
study of international relations’; and ‘the development of international scientific dialogue and 
communication’.35 According to MGIMO, the Russian school of the study of international 
relations ‘emphasizes the value of pluralism of cultures, civilizations, identities, as well as ways 
to study, understand and manage international relations’.36 
National Defense is a journal founded in 2006 by Former Chairman of the Public Council at the 
Ministry of Defense and reserve Colonel of the Russian Air Force Igor Korotchenko. The journal 
is ‘aimed at representatives of the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation, 
employees of power ministries and departments, special services, the military-diplomatic corps, 
as well as the senior staff of enterprises and organizations of the military-industrial complex, 
banking, insurance and financial structures serving the defense industry and military-technical 
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cooperation’.37 National Defense claims to be ‘the general/official information partner of the 
largest arms and military equipment exhibitions held in Russia and the CIS countries’.38 
Korotchenko has been the Editor-in-Chief of the journal since its creation in 2006. In 2003, he 
left Nezavisimaya Gazeta in protest of the newspaper’s ‘anti-state information policy’ and 
became Editor-in-Chief of the Military-Industrial Courier, another publication selected for the 
content analysis, a position he held until 2009.39 
The Journal National Defense is funded in several ways including subscriptions and providing 
services including the design, layout, and production of printing products, souvenirs, public 
relations services, research and analytics, photography, and design and web development. 
Rusprofile lists the customers, for which the journal has executed state contracts in the category 
of ‘government procurement’.40 Two of the largest customers in this category are the Public Joint 
Stock Company ‘Machine-Building Plant Named After M.I. Kalinin, G. Yekaterinburg’ (PJSC 
Mzik), and the Joint Stock Company ‘Scientific Research Institute of Instrumentation Named 
After V.V. Tikhomirov’ (JSC NIIP). The journal National Defense conducted advertisement 
campaigns for each of them. The journal has executed state contracts with a total of 17 entities. 
PJSP Mzik was founded by the Ministry of State Property Management of Sverdlovsk Region 
and it is listed as a ‘mixed Russian property with federal ownership’.41 Its primary occupation is 
the manufacturing of weapons and ammunition and has been party to 4641 state contracts as a 
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customer and supplier.42 It has also been a recipient of a subsidy from the Russian Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education in the amount of 200 million rubles.43 
JSC NIIP was founded by the Ministry of Property Relations of the Russian Federation and its 
shareholders include Almaz-Antey (AA) with 57% and JSC Concern Radioelectronic 
Technologies (KRET) with 43%.44 AA was established by presidential decree in 2002 and its 
mission is to ‘meet the needs of the state in armament and military equipment of air defense 
(aerospace) defense in the interests of the country's defense capability and increasing the volume 
of foreign trade’.45 KRET was founded by, and remains part of, the State Corporation Rostec.46 
Military Thought is a military-theoretical journal published by the Russian Ministry of Defense. 
It is the oldest of its type in Russia with a history dating back to 1858. In 1975, it was awarded 
the Order of the Red star ‘for the great contribution to the information support of the 
development of domestic military science, construction and the use of the Armed Forces’.47 The 
journal’s target audience consists of ‘high-ranking and senior command staff of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation, specialists of research institutions of the Ministry of Defense 
of Russia, faculty and officer-listeners of military academies, universities and institutes, heads of 
enterprises of the defense industry’.48 
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Since 2004, Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel Sergei Rodikov has been the Editor-in-
Chief of Military Thought. Members of the Editorial Board of the journal include officials at the 
highest ranks of the Russian military and government, such as Head of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces and Hero of the Russian Federation Valery Gerasimov, Commander-in-Chief of 
the Ground Forces and Army General Oleg Salyukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace 
Forces and Hero of the Russian Federation Sergei Surovkin, Commander of the Airborne Forces 
and Hero of the Russian Federation Andrei Serdyukov, Chairman of the Defense Committee of 
the State Duma and Hero of the Russian Federation Vladimir Shamanov, First Deputy Minister 
of Defense Ruslan Tsalikov, Deputy Minister of Defense and Hero of the Russian Federation 
Dmitri Bulgakov, and Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov.49 
The Military-Industrial Courier is a weekly newspaper that released its first issue in 2003. The 
founder and publisher of the newspaper is General Director of the Joint Stock Company 
‘Sotsium-A’ (JSC SA) Ruslan Ashurbeyli.50 The JSC SA owns two companies that design and 
manufacture parts for aircraft: the Joint Stock Company ‘Design Bureau-1’ (JSC DB1) and Joint 
Stock Company ‘Arzamass Instrument-Making Plant Named After P.I. Plandin’ (JSC AIMP).51 
Combined, the two companies have executed or are executing 191 government contracts worth 
863,190,329 rubles.52 Ruslan Ashurbeyli is the son of Igor Ashurbeyli: Founder of the JSC SA, 
the ‘author of the idea’ of creating the Military-Industrial Courier, and the Scientific Director of 
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the JSC DB1 until 2016.53 Igor Ashurbeyli led the modification and development of the anti-
aircraft systems S-300 Favorit and S-400 Triumph, respectively.54 Igor Ashurbeyli is also 
responsible for the concept of the unified anti-aircraft system of the fifth generation of Russian 
anti-aircraft systems and under his leadership the main components of the system, including the 
S-500, Vityaz, and Morpheus were developed.55 
Strategy of Russia is a journal that was created in 2004 by the Foundation ‘Unity in the Name of 
Russia’. Member of the Scientific Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation and Doctor of Historical Sciences Vyacheslav Nikonov is the Editor-in-Chief of the 
journal. He has also been the president of the Foundation ‘Unity in the Name of Russia’ since it 
was established in 2003. The Editorial Council of the journal includes First Deputy Chairman of 
the State Duma of the Federal Assembly Alexander Zhukov, Chairman of the Federation Council 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Candidate of Law Konstantin Kosachev, Member or the 
Scientific Council at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Doctor of Political Sciences Yuri 
Pivovarov, Deputy Chairman of the Commission of the Presidium of the General Council of the 
United Russia Party on International Activities and Candidate of Law Vladimir Pligin, Former 
Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs and Candidate of Historical Sciences 
Alexei Pushkov, and Member of the Board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and 
Doctor of Political Sciences Anatoly Torkunov. 
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The Foundation ‘Unity in the Name of Russia’ was founded and is owned by Moscow State 
University (MSU), Moscow State Legal University (MSLU), The Institute of Scientific 
Information on Social Sciences (INION), the Foundation ‘Russian Socio-Political Center’ 
(ROSS), The Non-Profit Foundation ‘Politics’, and the Foundation ‘Development of Business 
Cooperation and Entrepreneurship (RDSP). The first three of these six founders and owners are 
Federal State Budgetary Educational Institutions of the Russian Federation, which means, as 
explained above, they receive state subsidies, carry out tasks assigned by the state, and are not 
entitled to refuse a task assigned by the state. ROSS was established by presidential decree in 
1991 and in 1995 it was changed into a federal foundation.56 
International Life is a journal on international affairs, founded by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, with a history dating back to 1922. Foreign Minister Lavrov serves as Chairman of the 
Editorial Board.57 Members of the Editorial Board include several high-ranking government 
officials, including Former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Director General of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Sergei Vyazalov, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Sergei Ryabkov, and Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Andrei Denisov, 
Vladimir Lukin, Alexei Meshkov, Alexei Fedotov, and Alexander Yakovenko.58 The legal status 
of the Editorial Board of the journal International Life is an FSBI, and as such it receives 
subsidies from the Russian government, carries out its tasks, and does not have the right to refuse 
such tasks. 
The Izborsky Club was founded in 2012 in the city of Izborsk. According to the Club, it was 
‘initiated by well-known politicians, thinkers and public figures of a state-patriotic orientation’, 
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and their ‘ideological direction … can be described as social conservatism, a synthesis into a 
single ideological platform of the various views of Russian statesmen (from socialists and Soviet 
patriots to monarchists and Orthodox conservatives)’.59 The stated goals of the Izborsky Club 
include the ‘creation and submission to the government and society of Russia of analytical 
reports aimed at forming an updated patriotically oriented state policy in all spheres of national 
life’, ‘the formation of a new agenda in Russian media, the conquest of information niches 
objectively arising in connection with the ideological and moral decline of the liberal 
community’, and to contribute ‘to the formation of a powerful political and ideological coalition 
of patriots-statesmen, the imperial front, opposing the manipulations carried out in Russian 
politics by foreign centers of influence and the “fifth column” from the inside of the country’.60 
The Izborsky Club was founded by Alexander Prokhanov, Alexander Nagorny, and Vitaly 
Averyanov, none of whom have or had apparent connections with the Russian government or 
military. Notable permanent members of the Club include Former Presidential Advisor Sergei 
Glaziev, Mikhail Delyagin, Alexander Dugin, and Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov. 
International Processes, founded in 2002 by the Scientific and Educational Forum on 
International Relations (NOFMO), claims to be the first Russian journal of international relations 
theory.61 NOFMO is a Non-Profit Partnership founded by Doctors of Political Sciences Tatyana 
Shakleina, Andrei Vinogradov, and Alexei Bogaturov. Since 2012, Candidate of Historical 
Sciences Andrei Baykov has served as Editor-in-Chief of International Processes. He has no 
apparent connections with the Russian government or military. All of the members of the 
Editorial Board have doctorates, and only three out of 20 have held a position in the Russian 
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government: Valery Tishkov, Nikolai Kosolapov, and Alexei Voskresensky.62 The primary focus 
of the journal is ‘on the theoretical understanding of the world as a whole, international trends 
and the planetary political environment, the world integrity in which our country is immersed 
and with which it develops’, and its task is ‘to understand what is happening with the world as a 
whole, and only from this point of view look at Russia, assess the measure of conformity or 
inconsistency of its policy with global trends’.63 
Red Star is a newspaper run by an editorial publishing center under the Russian Ministry of 
Defense. Its legal status is an FSBI, which means it receives subsidies from the Russian 
government, carries out its tasks, and does not have the right to refuse such tasks.64 The Red Star 
was established by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in 1923. Doctor of 
Philosophical Sciences and Colonel of the Russian Military Nikolai Efimov has been the Editor-
in-Chief of the newspaper since 1998. According to the Charter of the Red Star, the objective of 
the newspaper is ‘to ensure the implementation of the powers of the Ministry of Defense 
provided by the legislation of the Russian Federation in the editorial-publishing sphere’.65 In 
addition to subsidies, the Red Star is funded by income-producing activities, including not only 
publishing various materials such as books, brochures, atlases etc., but also through advertising 
and photography.66 
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The Independent Military Review is a part of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and is devoted to topics 
relevant to military affairs, security, and defense. The legal status of Nezavisimaya Gazeta is a 
Public Organization but has increasingly become more state controlled. The owner and Editor-
in-Chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta is Konstantin Remchukov, former Deputy in the State Duma 
and presently serving as Chairman of the Public Chamber of the City of Moscow. 
Security Issues is a journal that has been published since 2012 by NB-Media (previously Nota 
Bene). Until 2014, the journal was called National Security, with the ISSN: 2306-0417.67 
Candidate of Political Sciences Vasily Ivanovich Danilenko is the founder of both NB-Media 
and the journal Security Issues.68 Since 2011, his son, Doctor of Law Denis Vasilyevich 
Danilenko, has been co-founder of NB-Media. The institution’s legal status is a Society with 
Limited Liability. It has offices in Moscow, Bratislava, and Vienna.69 
Arsenal and Military Council are both segments of the radio show Echo of Moscow, the focus of 
which are topics relevant to military affairs, security, and defense. The legal status of the radio 
show is a closed joint stock company. It was founded by the Moscow City Council of People’s 
Deputies, the Radio Association, Ogonyok magazine, and the journalism faculty of Moscow 
State University, and its first broadcast was in 1990.70 Gazprom-Media owns a majority share of 
Echo of Moscow, and over 50% of the shares of Gazprom are owned by the state.71 In 2014, 
                                                             
67 NB-Media. Security Questions. Available at https://e-notabene.ru/nb/. Accessed 20/05/2020. 
68 NB-Media. Imprint of the Online Publication Security Issues. Available at https://e-
notabene.ru/nb/contents_2012_1.html. Accessed 20/05/2020;  
69 NB-Media. Contacts. Available at https://e-notabene.ru/page_4.html. Accessed 20/05/2020. 
70 Echo of Moscow. About – History. Available at https://echo.msk.ru/about/history/misc.html. Accessed 
20/05/2020. 
71 Gazprom. Stocks. Available at https://www.gazprom.ru/investors/stock/. Accessed 20/05/2020; and Gazprom-
Media. Our Business – Radio – Echo of Moscow. Available at http://www.gazprom-




Ekaterina Pavlova succeeded Yuri Fedutinov as General Director of the radio show.72 Alexei 
Venedikov has been Editor-in-Chief of Echo of Moscow since 1998. Neither Pavlova nor 
Fedutinov have apparent connections with the Russian government or military. Despite being 
owned by Gazprom-Media, Echo of Moscow has a reputation for frequently expressing 
oppositional views.73 
Arsenal of the Fatherland is an informational analytical journal published since 2012 and 
focused on ‘the military-political situation in the world, the activities of the Armed Forces of 
Russia, the achievements of the military-industrial complex, the state arms program, the state 
defense order, military-technical cooperation, armament and military equipment, military and 
military-technical aspects of history’.74 It was founded by Viktor Murakhovsky and Anton 
Chernov. Murakhovsky is the Editor-in-Chief of the journal and also a member of the Expert 
Council under the Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation. 
Chernov is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Arsenal of the Fatherland and has no apparent 
connections with the Russian government or military. The legal status of the journal is a society 
with limited liability and apparently it does not receive funding from the Russian government. 
Experts 
As explained in the previous chapter, in this study, the potential influence of an expert is 
generally based on their connections to the Russian government or military, their qualifications, 
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and the government or military connections of the institutions through which they publish. The 
previous section provided information on the publishing institutions. This section investigates the 
experts who authored the texts selected for the qualitative aspect of the content analysis (the 
results of which are presented in the following four chapters) with the primary aim of 
determining whether the experts have held a position in the Russian government or military and 
whether they have a doctorate using open sources. Table 1 provides the information gathered.75 








Deputy of the State Duma of the 
Federal Assembly, Deputy 
Chairman of the State Duma 
Defense Committee 




First Deputy Chief of the General 




Member of the Expert Council 
under the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 
Candidate of Historical 



















Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the 2nd class 





Dmitrieva, Alla Borisova None 




Member of the Scientific Council 
under the Minister of Foreign 
Doctor of Economic 
Sciences 
                                                             
75 Some of the experts have held several government or military positions. In the interest of efficient use of space, up 
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Affairs, Member of the Scientific 










Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary  





Frolova, Ivette Yurievna None None 
Gavrilov, Viktor 
Alexandrovich 
Colonel of the Armed Forces 
Candidate of Psychological 
Sciences 
Glaziev, Sergei Yureevich Advisor to the President 









Member of the Expert Council 
under the Chairman of the 
Federation Council of the Federal 
Assembly 




















Candidate of Political 
Sciences 
Ivanov, Igor Sergeevich 
Foreign Minister, Secretary of the 
Security Council 









Advisor to the President 















Candidate of Historical 
Sciences 
Kashin, Vasily Borisovich None 




































Deputy Chairman of the 
Federation Council 














Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed 
Forces 







Member of the Expert Council of 





Colonel of the Armed Forces 







First Secretary of the USSR 
Embassy in Yugoslavia 




Member of expert councils under 
the Ministry of Development of 
the Far East, Chairman of the 
Public Chamber of the Primorsky 
Territory 









Member of the Scientific and 
Expert Council under the 
Federation Council 
Doctor of Political Sciences, 




Member of Expert Councils of 
Specialized Committees of the 
State Duma and the Federation 
Council 







None Doctor of Political Sciences 
Lisovolik, Yaroslav 
Dmitrievich 
Advisor to the Executive Director 
of the Russian Federation at the 
IMF 




Worked at the USSR Embassy in 
the PRC 







Assistant to the Deputy 
Chairman of the International 
Affairs Committee of the State 
Duma 









Head of the Department for 
International and Regional 
Cooperation 












Colonel General of the Armed 
Forces, First Deputy Chairman and 
Member of the Federation Council 
Committee on Defense and 
Security 
Doctor of Political Sciences 
Matveev, Vladimir 
Alexandrovich 
Advisor to the Office of the 
Committee on Federation Affairs 
and Regional Policy of the State 
Duma 




Worked at the USSR Embassy in 
Vietnam 




President of the Republic of 
Sakha, State Counselor of the 




Member of the Scientific Council 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation 




Member of the Expert Council of 
the Analytical Center for the 
Government, Member of the 
Scientific and Expert Council of 
the CSTO 












Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary 








Assistant Member of the Council 
of the Federation of the Federal 
Assembly 
Doctor of Political Sciences 
Popov, Dmitri Sergeevich None Candidate of Legal Sciences 
Portyakov, Vladimir 
Yakovlevich 
Member of the Trade 
Representation of the Soviet 
Union in the PRC, worked at the 
USSR Embassy in the PRC 




Assistant to the President, 






Candidate of Geological 
and Mineralogical Sciences 
Reshetnikov, Leonid 
Petrovich 
Lieutenant General of the SVR 




Director of the Russian office of 
the International Center for 
Defense Information (later 
renamed the World Security 
Institute) 









First Deputy Prime Minister of the 
Government and Secretary of the 
Security Council 
Doctor of Political Sciences 
Shvetsov, Alexander 
Nikolaevich 










Director of the Department of 
Project Support in the Asia-Pacific 
Region of the Ministry of 
Economic Development, Director 
of the Department of Multilateral 
Economic Cooperation and 
Special Projects 









Performed analytical tasks 
commissioned by the 
Administration of the President, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 





the Office of the Security Council, 
and the Federal Space Agency 
Suslov, Dmitri 
Vyacheslavovich 
Advisor to state authorities on US 
policy and US-Russian relations, 













Member of the Scientific Council 
under the Security Council, 
Member of the Scientific Council 
under the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 









Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary 












Major General of the Armed 
Forces 




None Doctor of Political Sciences 
Vishnevsky, Anatoly 
Grigoryevich 
Member of the Scientific Council 
of the Security Council 














Consultant of the Russia Office of 
the World Bank 









Third Secretary of the Russian 











Figure 3 shows the distribution of experts based on whether they have served in the Russian 
government or military and whether they have a doctorate. 
 
Figure 3 
The two largest categories of experts are those who have held a position in the Russian 
government or military and have a doctorate (39) and those who have a doctorate but have not 
held a position in the government or military (40). The former category is generally considered 
the most influential based on the experts’ qualifications and relative proximity to the Russian 
government or military. However, the potential influence of the experts in this group varies. As 
explained in the previous chapter, in order to address the issue of potential bias due to the 
categorization based on qualifications and history of government or military service, experts who 
are outliers in their category were considered on a case-by-case basis regarding their potential 
influence. For example, Sergei Karaganov, a Doctor of Historical Sciences who has served in 
many positions in the Russian government, including as foreign policy advisor to the president 




















been affiliated with the Russian government in some form since 1991 and currently serves as a 
member of the Scientific Advisory Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a member of the 
Advisory Committee of the Security Council, a member of the Council for the Development of 
Civil Society and Human Rights under the President of Russia, and a member of the Council for 
Investment Cooperation and Integration Interaction with Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States at the Ministry for Economic Development.76 Karaganov has received several 
awards from the Russian government, including the Order of Friendship in 2017, an Honorary 
Badge of the Russian Federation Government Prize in the field of Mass Media in 2016, a 
Certificate of Honor of the President of the Russian Federation in 2015, the official gratitude of 
the President of the Russian Federation in 2012, 2008, 2002, 1997, and 1996, and the official 
gratitude of the Government of the Russian Federation in 2012.77 
Other examples of experts in the category with a relatively high level of potential influence are 
Igor Ivanov, Sergei Luzyanin, and Sergei Glaziev. Ivanov is a Doctor of Historical Sciences and 
has held several government positions including Foreign Minister of Russia from 1999 to 2004 
and Secretary of the Security Council of Russia from 2004 to 2007. As mentioned in the 
previous section, Ivanov has been the President of the RIAC since 2011. He has received a 
number of awards from the state, including ‘Hero of the Russian Federation’ and the ‘Order of 
Merit for the Fatherland’ II, III, and IV degrees. Luzyanin is a Doctor of Historical Sciences who 
currently serves as a permanent member of the Scientific Council of the Security Council of the 
Russian Federation.78 In 2011, he received two medals from the Russian government ‘for merits 
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77 Ibid. 
78 Luzyanin, Sergei. Profile at the website of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of the Far East. Available at 




in ensuring national security’ and ‘for the development of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization [SCO]’.79 In 2014 he received another medal and a badge ‘for the development of 
international energy topics, active participation and preparation of the XII International Forum of 
the Fuel and Energy Complex of Russia’ and ‘for research and support of compatriots’.80 Glaziev 
is a Doctor of Economic Sciences and since 1991 has held several positions in the Russian 
government as well as a position in the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). From 2004 
to 2007, Glaziev was a member of the State Duma of the Fourth Convocation. Since 2008, he has 
served as Deputy Secretary General of EurAsEC, and since 2009 as Executive Secretary of the 
Commission of the Customs Union of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and 
the Russian Federation. From 2012 to 2019, Glaziev served as a presidential advisor. 
The largest category of experts, exceeding the category of experts who have served in the 
Russian government or military and have a doctorate by one, are those who have doctorates but 
have not served the in government or military. It should be noted that included in this group are 
experts who work at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which is 
officially part of the Russian Foreign Ministry. In this category, levels of potential influence also 
vary depending on how closely the experts are associated with those who hold or have held 
government or military positions and the extent of the connections of the institutions for which 
they work. For example, Timofey Bordachev is a Candidate of Political Sciences who works at 
the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) as an Associate Professor, 
Director of the Program ‘International Relations: European and Asian Studies’, and an academic 
supervisor. Bordachev is also a Program Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, the conferences 






and meetings of which are attended by high-ranking government officials including President 
Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Former 
President Dmitri Medvedev, Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko, 
Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, Former Head of the Presidential 
Administration Sergei Ivanov, First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, and Mayor of 
Moscow Sergei Sobyanin. Bordachev regularly attends meetings and conferences of the Valdai 
Discussion Club and writes articles and reports that are published by the institution. He also 
works with experts that have held government positions. For example, Bordachev works with 
Karaganov on a series of reports on Russia’s ‘turn to the east’ and the Eurasian vector of Russian 
foreign policy.81 
There are others in the category who may be considered to have more potential influence through 
their connections with people who have held high-ranking government positions. For example, 
former Foreign Minister Ivanov edits a series of reports published by the RIAC, in which Andrei 
Karneev, Candidate of Historical Sciences, is regularly listed as a part of the collective of 
authors.82 Another noteworthy expert in this category is Sergei Afontsev. The expert is a Doctor 
                                                             
81 Karaganov et al. ‘Vperëd k Velikomu Okeanu – 6: Li͡ udi, Istorii͡ a, Ideologii͡ a, Obrazovanie. Putʹ k Sebe (Forward 
to the Great Ocean – 6: People, History, Ideology, Education. The Path the Self)’. Valdai Discussion Club. 
September 2018. Available at https://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/21545/. Accessed 08/05/2020; Sergei Karaganov et al. 
‘K Velikomu Okeanu – 5: Ot Povorota na Vostok k Bolʹshoĭ Evrazii (To the Great Ocean – 5: From the Turn to the 
East to Greater Eurasia)’. Valdai Discussion Club. September 2017. Available at 
https://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/17048/. Accessed 10/03/2020; and Sergei Karaganov et al. ‘K Velikomu Okeanu 4: 
Povorot na Vostok Predvaritelʹnye Itogi i Novye Zadachi (To the Great Ocean – 4: Turn to the East. Preliminary 
Results and New Tasks)’. Valdai Discussion Club. Moscow. May 2016. Available at 
https://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/12395/. Accessed 19/03/2020. 
82 Ivanov, Igor (ed.), et al. ‘Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskiĭ Dialog: Model’ 2019 (Russian-Chinese Dialogue: Model 2019)’. 
Russian International Affairs Council. 28/05/2019. Available at 
https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/publications/rossiysko-kitayskiy-dialog-model-2019/. Accessed 10/05/2020; Igor 
Ivanov Ivanov (ed.), et al. ‘Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskiĭ Dialog: Model’ 2018 (Russian-Chinese Dialogue: Model 2018)’. 
Russian International Affairs Council. 30/05/2018. Available at 
https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/publications/rossiysko-kitayskiy-dialog-model-2018/. Accessed 10/05/2020; Igor 
Ivanov (ed.), et al. ‘Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskiĭ Dialog: Model’ 2017 (Russian-Chinese Dialogue: Model 2017)’. Russian 
International Affairs Council. 28/05/2017. Available at https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/publications/rossiysko-




of Economic Sciences and a professor in the Department of World Political Processes at 
MGIMO, Head of the Department of Economic Theory in the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS), and an advisor to 
Round Table of Industrialists of Russia and the EU. Afontsev is a laureate of two prizes, one ‘for 
the best work on the world economy’ and another titled ‘The Best Economists of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences’.83 Afontsev has also worked with Bordachev and Fyodor Lukyanov.84 
Unlike those discussed above, Lukyanov has neither held a position in the Russian government 
or military, nor does he have a doctorate. It should be noted that Lukyanov has been placed in 
this category despite his military service for two years just after finishing high school. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the expert is among those who have a relatively high level of 
potential influence on Russia’s foreign policy towards China in this category because of his sheer 
proximity to high-ranking government officials, including President Putin, Foreign Minister 
Lavrov, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor 
Morgulov, Former Presidential Advisor Karaganov, Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal 
Assembly, Permanent Member of the Security Council, and Former First Deputy Head of the 
Administration of the President Volodin, Former Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of 
International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense Evgeny Buzhinsky, and others.85 
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83 Afontsev, Sergei. Profile at the Website of the Russian International Affairs Council. Available at 
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84 Bordachev, Timofey, et al. ‘Zagli͡ anutʹ v Buduschee: St͡ senarii Dli͡ a Azii i Rossii v Azii do 2037 Goda (A Look 
into the Future: Scenarios for Asia and Russia in Asia until 2037)’. Valdai Discussion Club. 27/11/2017. Available 
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Lukyanov is a journalist with a bachelor’s degree in philology from Moscow State University. 
Despite his lack of formal education in political science, the expert is commonly labelled a 
political scientist and is considered by many to be well versed in international affairs. Lukyanov 
holds the position of ‘Research Professor’ at the HSE in the Faculty of World Economy and 
International Affairs. He received the ‘Public Thought Award’ in 2014 and was a finalist of the 
‘Politprosvet Prize’ that same year.86 In 2018, Lukyanov received formal gratitude from the 
Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the HSE.87 Since 2002, he has been the 
chief editor of the journal Russia in Global Politics and since 2012, he has served as Chairman of 
the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP). Lukyanov is also a 
Director of the Research, Development and Support Fund at the Valdai Discussion Club. 
Among those in the category of experts who do not have a history of government service or a 
doctorate, Igor Denisov and Yuri Kulintsev are considered to have a relatively high level 
potential influence because of their work under the leadership of Luzyanin in the writing of a 
series on Russia-China relations published by the RIAC.88 Anastasia Pyatachkova, Ilya Stepanov, 
and Anna Sokolova are also considered to have a relatively high level of potential influence in 
this category. They are all listed by the HSE as experts with ‘high professional potential’ and all 
except Sokolova have received official acknowledgement from the Center for Comprehensive 
European and International Studies in the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs.89 
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Sokolova and Pyatachkova have also worked under the leadership of Karaganov on a report in 
the Valdai series on Russia’s turn to the east and the Eurasian vector of Russian foreign policy.90 
Quantitative Results 
The content analysis targeted texts published from 2000 to 2018, however, the publishing 
institutions were established at different times, several after 2000. Also, some institutions publish 
more material more frequently than others. Therefore, data availability and volume vary. Figure 
4 shows the period covered by each of the publications analyzed, the total amount of paragraphs 
of each publication analyzed, and the percentage of the texts of each publication analyzed 
relative to the whole. As explained in chapter 2, ten of the institutions selected for the content 
analysis are oriented towards analysis of international affairs and foreign policy, and nine focus 
more on issues relevant to military affairs, security, and defense. 
                                                             






Figure 5 shows that the most frequently appearing topic of discussion regarding China among 
Russian experts who publish through these institutions is ‘economy/trade’. 
Publication 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Number and Perceptange of 
Paragraphs (Total: 42,445)






Valdai Discussion Club 908 (2.1%)
Russia in Global Politics 6497 (15.3%)
RISI - Problems of 
National Strategy
3408 (8%)
Bulliten of MGIMO 2374 (5.6%)
National Defense 1893 (4.5%)
Military Thought 647 (1.5%)
Military-Industrial Courier 3836 (9%)
Strategy of Russia 2435 (5.7%)
International Life 4769 (11.2%)
Izborsky Club 1482 (3.5%)
International Processes 2315 (5.5%)




Issues of Security 185 (0.4%)
Echo of Moscow - Military 
Council
202 (0.5)
Echo of Moscow - Arsenal 199 (0.5%






Figure 6 shows that, in the 10 publications that focus on international affairs and foreign policy, 
‘economy/trade’ is by far the most frequently discussed topic regarding China, as it is the focus 
of 69% of the paragraphs analyzed. Focus on economics and trade among Russian experts is 
understandable considering China’s outstanding economic growth throughout the period and 
Russia’s interest in taking lessons from China’s economic experience and in finding ways for 





Topic of Paragraphs in All Publications - Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2017 ( Aggregate 
Codes with 0.7+ Confidence Score)






The results of the content analysis show that explicit and definitive claims by Russian experts 
that China does or does not pose a threat to Russia are rare. Out of 211,905 trusted codes, 2,179 
indicate the presence of a perception of a threat from China to Russia, and 2,326 indicate the 
presence of a perception of the absence of threat from China. The data also show that 
‘economic/trade’ is the most frequently appearing type of perception of threat or absence of 
threat in the texts analyzed, just exceeding the frequency of that of the ‘military’ type. The 
qualitative aspect of the content analysis, the results of which are presented in the following four 
chapters, reveals that some experts acknowledge a potential or hypothetical military threat from 
China. Paragraphs that contain such acknowledgements received codes indicating the presence of 
a perception of threat from some of the coders. A deeper examination of the work of the experts 
that acknowledge a hypothetical threat from China reveals that most of them argue that there is 






Topic of Paragraphs in International Affairs and Foreign Policy Publications -
Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2017 (Aggregate Codes with 0.7+ Confidence Score)






When coders identified perceptions of an absence of threat or perceptions of threat from China to 
Russia in the texts analyzed, they were asked to select from a list of options a sentence that best 
describes why, according to the text, China either threatens or does not threaten Russia. Figure 8 
shows the number of times each sentence was chosen to describe the reasons for perceptions of 
an absence of threat as inferred from the text. The sentences have been condensed to their main 
points in the graph.91 
                                                             









Perceptions of Threat and Absence of Threat in All Publications by Type -
Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2017 (Individual Codes with 0.7+ Trust Score)






By far the most frequently selected sentences describing why, according to the text, there is a 
perception of an absence of threat from China indicate non-conflicting interests and a lack of 
harmful intentions as reasons. It is noteworthy that ‘authoritarian solidarity’ as a cause of 
absence of threat is not supported by the results. Joint opposition to West and a non-threatening 
regime type were among the least frequently selected reasons for why China does not threaten 
Russia according to the texts.  
Figure 9 shows the number of times each sentence was chosen to describe the reasons for 
perceptions of threat as inferred from the text. The sentences have been condensed to their main 
points in the graph.92 
                                                             








Reasons for Perceptions of Absence of Threat from China - Jan. 2000 - Dec. 






The most frequently selected reasons why, according to the texts, China threatens Russia are 
harmful intentions, conflicting interests, and economic threat. The insignificant difference 
between the assignment of perceptions of an absence of threat as attributed to the absence of 
harmful intentions and conflicts of interests and the assignment of perceptions of threat as 
attributed to the presence of harmful intentions and conflicts of interests are one of a number of 
reasons that warrant the qualitative aspect of the content analysis carried out in the following 
four chapters. The qualitative analysis shows that perceptions of harmful intentions from China 
and severe and unmanageable conflicts of interests between Russia and China are marginal. 
The third most frequently selected reason for perceptions of threat identified in the texts is that 
China threatens Russia with its economic power or trade practices. What the qualitative aspect of 












Reasons for Perceptions of Threat from China - Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2017 




Beijing’s using such power or practices to impose its will on Russia, but rather to Moscow’s 
failure to stimulate innovative sectors of the economy to the extent necessary to develop away 
from dependence on the export of raw materials. 
The fourth most frequently selected reason for the perception of threat identified in a given text 
is that Russia’s military power does not deter China. The qualitative aspect of the content 
analysis finds that such texts mainly refer to China’s conventional superiority over the Russian 
Far East (RFE). The view that China will eventually use this advantage and that there is little 
Russia can do in response is held by Alexander Khramchikhin. The qualitative analysis focused 
on the RFE and carried out in the following two chapters finds that this view is marginal in the 
Russian expert community. 
The data also show the change of perceptions over time. The rest of this section calculates the 
correlation coefficients between perceptions of threat and absence of threat and perceptions of 
similarity and dissimilarity in general and between specific types of such variables. The analysis 
uses Pearson’s r to calculate the correlation coefficients. r ranges from -1 to 1; -1 being a perfect 
negative correlation and 1 being a perfect positive correlation. In accordance with Evans’ 
interpretation of r, absolute values are understood in the following way.93 0.00-0.19: very weak, 
0.2-0.39: weak, 0.4-0.59: moderate, 0.6-0.79: strong, 0.8-1: very strong. Relationships that show 
an absolute correlation coefficient of 0.6 and are positively or negatively correlated as 
theoretically expected are considered by this thesis to support hypothesis 5. 
The data were used to test the social constructivist and psychological understanding of the 
relationship between shared identity and threat perception with regard to Russian expert 
                                                             





perceptions of China throughout the period. As explained in chapter 2, a social constructivist and 
psychological understanding of the relationship between the two variables suggests that threat 
perception and shared identity are negatively correlated, i.e. as perceptions of shared identity 
increase perceptions of threat decrease and vice versa. It also suggests that perceptions of shared 
identity and perceptions of an absence of threat are positively correlated. Theoretically, one 
would find at least moderate correlations between the variables with absolute values of 0.4 or 
greater. 
Figure 10 shows the change of Russian expert perceptions of similarity of Russia and China and 
perceptions that China poses a threat to Russia from 2000 to 2018. Social constructivists and 
psychologists who adhere to the understanding of the correlation between variables of shared 
identity and threat perception described above would expect a negative correlation. However, the 
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Figure 11 shows the change of perceptions of similarity and absence of threat over time. A 
positive correlation between the variables would be expected. The data show a positive 
correlation, but it is weak with an r value of 0.3609. 
 
Figure 11 
Figure 12 shows the change of perceptions of dissimilarity and threat over time. A positive 
correlation would be expected. The data show that the variables are only weakly positively 
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Figure 13 shows the change of perceptions of dissimilarity and absence of threat over time. A 
negative correlation would be expected. However, the data show a moderate positive correlation 
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The data also allow for the testing of the social constructivist and psychological understanding of 
the relationship between specific types of perceptions of shared identity and threat. As a 
reminder to the reader, this understanding consists of the notion that as the sense of shared 
identity and perception of threat are negatively correlated, and the sense of shared identity and 
perception of an absence of threat are positively correlated, i.e. the more one perceives an Other 
as similar to the Self, the less it perceives the Other as a threat, and the more one perceives an 
Other as dissimilar to the Self, the more it perceives the Other as a threat. 
Figure 5 shows that the most salient topics among Russian experts regarding China are 
‘economy/trade’ and ‘military’. The data created by the content analysis allow for the calculation 
of the strength of correlation between the variables of economic similarity/dissimilarity, 
economic threat/absence of threat, military similarity/dissimilarity, and military threat/absence of 
threat. 
A negative correlation between perceptions of economic similarity and threat would be expected. 
However, the data show a strong positive correlation between the variables with an r value of 
0.607. A positive correlation between perceptions of economic similarity and absence of threat 
would be expected. The data show a moderate positive correlation between the variables with an 
r value of 0.5116. A positive correlation between perceptions of economic dissimilarity and 
threat over time would be expected. The data show a moderate positive correlation with an r 
value of 0.5314. A negative correlation between perceptions of economic dissimilarity and 
absence of threat would be expected. However, the data show a moderate positive correlation 




A negative correlation between perceptions of military similarity and threat would be expected. 
The data show a very weak correlation with an r value of -0.0169. A positive correlation between 
perceptions of military similarity and absence of threat would be expected. The data show a 
weak positive correlation with an r value of 0.2921. A positive correlation between perceptions 
of military dissimilarity and threat would be expected. The data show a weak negative 
correlation with an r value of -0.2265. A negative correlation between perceptions of military 
dissimilarity and absence of threat would be expected. However, the data show a weak positive 
correlation with an r value of 0.2062. 
There are data created by the content analysis on types of perceptions of similarity/dissimilarity 
and threat/absence of threat that are relevant to topics that are not as salient as economy/trade or 
military affairs but may be worth exploring for positive or negative correlations between 
variables of shared identity and threat perception, such as regime type and goals/interests. 
A negative correlation between perceptions of regime type similarity and threat would be 
expected. However, the data show a very weak negative correlation with an r value of -0.0232. A 
positive correlation between perceptions of regime type similarity and absence of threat would 
be expected. The data show a very weak positive correlation with an r value of 0.1212. A 
positive correlation between perceptions of regime type dissimilarity and threat would be 
expected. The data show a weak positive correlation with an r value of 0.3655. A negative 
correlation between perceptions of regime type dissimilarity and absence of threat would be 
expected. However, the data show a strong positive correlation with an r value of 0.7585. 
A negative correlation between perceptions of similarity of goals/interests and threat would be 




positive correlation between perceptions of similarity of goals/interests and absence of threat 
would be expected. The data show a very weak correlation with an r value of 0.1759. A positive 
correlation between perceptions of dissimilarity of goals/interests and threat would be expected. 
The data show a weak positive correlation with an r score of 0.3235. A negative correlation 
between perceptions of dissimilarity of goals/interests and absence of threat would be expected. 
However, the data show a moderate positive correlation with an r value of 0.4214. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the results of the calculation of correlation coefficients for the 
pairs of variables. The data show that none of the pairs of variables are correlated as expected in 
accordance with a social constructivist and psychological understanding of the relationship 
between shared identity and threat perception with an r value of 0.6 or higher. ‘No+’ indicates 
that, between the pair of variables, not only were theoretically based expectations not met, but 
also a correlation contrary to expectations with an absolute r value greater than 0.6 was 
calculated. Two such correlations were found and are bolded in the table. Therefore, the data 
offer no support for hypothesis 5. 
Variable pairs r Was expectation met? 
Similarity - Threat 0.158 No 
Similarity - Absence of threat 0.3609 No 
Dissimilarity - Threat 0.2462 No 
Dissimilarity - Absence of threat 0.5459 No+ 
Economic similarity - Threat 0.607 No+ 
Economic similarity - Absence of Threat 0.5116 No 
Economic dissimilarity - Threat 0.5314 No 
Economic dissimilarity - Absence of threat 0.4794 No 
Military similarity - Threat -0.0169 No 
Military similarity - Absence of threat 0.2921 No 
Military dissimilarity - Threat -0.2265 No 
Military dissimilarity - Absence of threat 0.2062 No 




Regime type similarity - Absence of threat 0.1212 No 
Regime type dissimilarity - Threat 0.3655 No 
Regime type dissimilarity - Absence of threat 0.7585 No+ 
Goals and interests similarity - Threat -0.0666 No 
Goals and interests similarity - Absence of threat 0.1759 No 
Goals and interests dissimilarity - Threat 0.3235 No 
Goals and interests dissimilarity - Absence of threat 0.4214 No+ 
Table 2 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides information on the institutions, the publications of which were selected for 
the content analysis of this thesis, and the experts whose work was selected for the qualitative 
aspect of the content analysis. The chapter includes estimates of the institutions’ and experts’ 
potential influence on Russia’s foreign policy based on certain factors. For the institutions, these 
factors include whether they were founded, are funded, or are led directly, indirectly, in full, or 
in part by the Russian government or military. For the experts, these factors include whether they 
have held or hold a position in the Russian government or military and whether they have a 
doctorate. The chapter also presents the quantitative results of the content analysis. 
The chapter finds that, in general, the institutions and experts engaged in knowledge production 
in Russia on international affairs, foreign policy, and security are significantly connected to the 
state. 74% of the institutions investigated are directly or indirectly connected to the government 
or military in at least one way. 48% of the experts investigated hold or have held a position in the 
Russian government or military. 
The quantitative results of the content analysis show that Russian experts rarely directly address 




topics among the experts by far are ‘economy/trade’ and ‘military’ and that these are also the 
most frequently identified types of perceptions of threat or absence of threat. The correlation 
coefficients calculated for 20 pairs of variables of shared identity and threat perception (overall 
and specific types) do not offer support for hypothesis 5, which is based on a social constructivist 
and psychological understanding of the interaction between shared identity and threat perception. 
Out of the 20 correlation coefficients calculated, none met theoretically based expectations. 
Moreover, two coefficients indicate a strong positive correlation when a negative correlation was 
expected.  
While the data presented above reveal trends in expert thought on China and ultimately make an 
important contribution to the explanation offered by this thesis, they alone do not provide a full 
picture of dominant expert views among Russian experts regarding Russia’s relationship with 
China. Each of the 42,445 coded paragraphs has a unit ID that allows it to be quickly recovered 
along with information on its source. In the following four chapters, texts that contain paragraphs 
that received codes that indicate a perception of threat or absence of threat from China to Russia 
are targeted for analysis. 
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Chapter 4: Economic Relations between the RFE and 
China 
The development of the Russian Far East (RFE) occupies an important place in Russia’s foreign 
policy. Developing economies in East Asia, primarily that of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), are contributing to a shift in the center of global wealth and power from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific. Observing this, Russia pursues development of the RFE so that it may seize the 
opportunities that come with being a major participant in the activities of the Asia-Pacific region 
(APR). China inevitably becomes a major factor in this undertaking. This chapter contributes to 
the explanation of Russia’s foreign policy towards China offered by this thesis by analyzing the 
policy through the prism of Russia’s efforts to develop its easternmost territories so that it may 
be acknowledged as a great power in the APR and reap the benefits of maintaining such a status. 
It begins with a section on the idea of great power identity as understood in Western IR 
scholarship and by Russian officials and experts. The section aims to clarify Russia’s efforts to 
develop the RFE as not only a pursuit of material benefits, but also as a matter of maintaining the 
identity of a great power, which is one of the main features of its foreign policy. 
The second section reports the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis, 
specifically those relevant to economic relations between the RFE and China. The results provide 
details on the rationale behind the dominant views of Russian experts regarding the existence or 
absence of threat from China regarding such relations. The report of the results in this chapter 
focuses on perceptions of economic threat from China to the RFE and perceptions of an absence 
of such a threat. While there is a lack of consensus on the question of whether China poses an 




experts includes an acknowledgement of problems, risks, and vulnerability in the region’s trade 
and economic cooperation with China as well as the opinion that economic activity between the 
two should not only continue but should be consciously developed along with a focus on finding 
solutions to the problems. When it is acknowledged that a threat exists for the economy of the 
RFE to remain primarily an exporter of raw materials with low prospects for development, the 
threat is largely attributed to domestic problems hindering the region’s economic development, 
not to China or other states. Prevailing knowledge produced by Russian experts on the topic 
indicates that China’s trade practices towards Russia do not pose a direct threat, and that if there 
is a threat of the RFE becoming a ‘raw materials appendage’ of China, then it is posed by 
ongoing detrimental economic and demographic trends and legal processes in the RFE and the 
failure of Moscow to stimulate and guide the economy of the RFE towards development and 
diversification of exports. 
The final section discusses Russia’s policies regarding economic relations between the RFE and 
China in an effort to determine the extent to which such policies are consistent with the dominant 
views identified in the second section of the chapter. It finds that Russia’s policy of continuing 
economic cooperation with China in the form of authorizing Chinese investments in projects in 
the RFE in which the PRC controls large if not majority stakes, and the policy of selling or 
leasing land totaling about 16% of cultivated land in the RFE to China for agricultural purposes 
are more consistent with the view that the rise of China does not have threatening economic 
implications for the RFE than the view that it does. Since the former view is identified as 
dominant among Russian experts with a high level of potential influence, the chapter concludes 
that that scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section in 




The ‘Pacific Century’ and Russia’s Great Power Status 
One of the main developments affecting Russia’s foreign policy towards China is the shift of 
global wealth and power from the Atlantic to the Pacific, which prompts some to refer to the 21st 
century as the ‘Pacific Century’. Since China’s ‘reform and opening’ in the late 1970s and early 
1980s it has experienced a strikingly high rate of economic growth, leading it to overtake the US 
to become the largest economy in terms of GDP PPP. Other powerful and/or rapidly growing 
economies in the region include Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the 
Philippines. The economies of North America and Western Europe, in general, have experienced 
less impressive economic growth rates. Due to geographical proximity to Russia’s Asian 
territories, the economies of the APR present opportunities for Russia to substantiate and 
maintain its great power role in the international arena. Unfortunately, due to the RFE’s stagnant 
economy, poor infrastructure, and relatively low level of human capital, Russia remains in many 
ways on the periphery of important developments in the region. 
While the shift in the global center of wealth and power from the Atlantic to the Pacific may be 
considered one of the overarching developments shaping Russia-China relations, two events 
made the further development of economic relations with China more important for Russia: the 
2008-2009 global financial crisis and the 2014 Ukraine crisis. A rise in global oil prices from 
2001 to 2008 largely drove Russia’s economic resurgence, and during that time Russia-China 
energy relations lacked an impetus for substantial development. In 2008, such an impetus came 
in the form of a fall in global oil prices, a decrease in energy demand in Europe, and Russia’s 
economic woes due to the global financial crisis.1 
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In 2009 and 2012 Russia announced a ‘pivot’ to Asia, which was accelerated in 2014 due to the 
sanctions and isolation policy implemented against Russia by the West in response to Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and involvement in the conflict in the Donbass. The 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis and the 2014 Ukraine crisis, which are widely perceived as events that have 
brought Russia and China closer together, should be considered in the context of the US 
‘rebalance’ to Asia under Obama in late 2011 and another fall in global oil prices in 2014.2 As 
the US rebalanced to Asia, US-Russia relations were deteriorating after a peak in the ‘reset’ for 
various reasons, including the continuing development of NATO missile defense systems in 
Europe, disagreements over how to respond to the conflict in Syria, and the Magnitsky Act. The 
fall in oil prices in 2014 only compounded the economic ramifications of the sanctions and 
isolation policy that was implemented by the West and renewed the importance of developing 
energy relations with China. This resulted in more agreements with China in the energy sphere, 
including the May 2014 agreement to construct the Power of Siberia pipeline to China. In this 
context, the section focuses on the idea in Russia that the development of the RFE and Russia’s 
participation in the activities of the APR are important for its national security, its status as a 
great power, and its overall well-being. As explained above, the following section addresses the 
issue of perceptions of threat regarding the economic relationship between the RFE and China 
that may have been prompted by such an expansion in energy and other raw materials trade with 
the PRC in response to these key events and seeks to determine whether a perception of threat or 
absence of threat is dominant among potentially influential Russian experts. 
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One of the main aims of Russia’s foreign policy under Putin has been the restoration or 
maintenance of Russia’s great power status. Moscow has become increasingly assertive in its 
pursuit of this aim and has shown willingness to use military force in its ‘near abroad’ (i.e. post-
Soviet states) and neighborhood, intervening in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and Syria in 
2015. The sanctions and isolation policy from the West served to make the effort to strengthen 
ties in the APR more important for the maintenance of its great power status. 
At this point it is important to clarify what is generally meant by ‘great power’ in the field of IR 
and in the perspectives of Russian officials and experts. There is no consensus in the field of IR 
on what criteria must be met for a state to be a great power. In general, definitions lie on a 
spectrum ranging from those that claim that material capabilities such as military power and 
latent power (e.g. economic power and population) matter most, to those who argue that material 
capabilities matter little, as it only matters what meanings are assigned to those capabilities. 
According to the latter, intersubjective and ideational factors are most important, i.e. great 
powers are only great powers when others agree they are. Realists (especially neorealists) tend to 
be on the material side of the spectrum. For example, Mearsheimer defines ‘great power’ simply 
as a state that can ‘put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful 
state in the world’ and has ‘a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it’.3 
Schweller’s definition is also based solely on material factors. The scholar divides great powers 
into two tiers which he calls poles and lesser great powers. According to Schweller, ‘to qualify as 
a pole a state must have greater than half the military capability of the most powerful state in the 
system’.4 Lesser great powers ‘possess a considerable amount of military strength’ and ‘exert 
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significant influence on the global and regional balances of power’, however, ‘they cannot 
sustain themselves against threatening polar powers exclusively by their own resources of 
military personnel and material’.5 
Levy may be considered somewhere near the center of the above-mentioned spectrum of 
definitions. With his definition he aims to ‘minimize rather than eliminate subjectivity’.6 
According to Levy: 
‘A Great Power is . . . a state that plays a major role in international politics with respect to 
security-related issues. The Great Powers can be differentiated from other states by their military 
power, their interests, their behavior in general and interactions with other Powers, other Powers’ 
perception of them, and some formal criteria’.7 
Levy emphasizes that several intangible factors in the state and its military including, but not 
limited to, prestige, morale, and the perceptions of other states matter in determining which 
states are great powers.8 
On the side of the spectrum opposite of those who define great power in purely objective and 
material terms are those who define the status mostly, if not completely, within intersubjective 
and ideational parameters. Volgy et al. may be considered near this side of the spectrum with 
their focus on states being attributed great power status. The scholars acknowledge that a state 
may be a great power in accordance with some objective measurements of material capabilities, 
but they separate this practice of distinction from being perceived by other states as a great 
power and thus being attributed the status.9 Warranting this distinction is the observation that ‘it 
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is … plausible that some states will be attributed major power status when no longer warranted 
(a halo effect); may be denied status while manifesting capacity and willingness to act as one 
(the lag effect); or may be overattributed status on the potential to become a major power 
(latency effect)’.10 
In Russia, there is also a lack of consensus on the meaning of great power. In analyzing the 
literature of Russian scholars and experts of international relations, one finds that most of them 
consider Russia a great power that may have lost the status in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Soviet Union and for the duration of the 1990s but has regained great power status under Putin. 
In general, great power status is defined by both objective and subjective factors, including 
military and economic power, skillful diplomacy, recognition by other states as being a great 
power, and possessing determining influence over international affairs. Shakleina, offers the 
following definition: 
‘The modern “great power” is a state that maintains a very high (or absolute) degree of 
independence in conducting domestic and foreign policies, not only ensuring national interests, but 
also exerting a significant (to a varying degree, even decisive) influence on world and regional 
policies and the policies of individual countries (world-regulating activities), and having all or a 
significant part of the traditional parameters of a “great power” (territory, population, natural 
resources, military potential, economic potential, intellectual and cultural potential, scientific and 
technical, sometimes the information potential stands out separately). [It also maintains] 
[i]ndependence in the conduct of a foreign policy of a world-regulating nature [and] implies the 
presence of the will and historical experience, tradition and culture of participation in world politics 
as a decisive and/or active player’.11 
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11 Shakleina, Tatyana. ‘Rossii͡ a i SSHA v Polit͡ sentrichnom Mire (Russia and the USA in a Polycentric World)’. 
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Shakleina acknowledges that even this long definition, ‘like any other definition, cannot claim to 
be exhaustive’.12 
Sergei Karaganov, a Doctor of Historical Sciences who has held several positions in universities, 
research centers, and the Russian government (including foreign policy advisor to the president 
from 2001 to 2013), has not put forward a formal definition of great power, but in his writings, 
he shares his view on the question of whether Russia is a great power and what great power-ness 
means for Russia’s elites and people. According to Karaganov, the criteria for having great 
power status include material and non-material factors, such as military power and culture, both 
of which Russia developed with its move to Europe under Peter the Great in the early 18th 
century.13 The expert posits that ‘the move to Europe has allowed [Russia] to modernize the 
country and create one of the greatest cultures in the world, which is largely a European culture. 
Thanks to this movement, we have become a great power, including militarily’.14 Another 
criterion for Karaganov seems to be the conquest and mastering of a large amount of territory. 
According to him, without Siberia, Russia would certainly not have become a great power.15 On 
what great power-ness means for the Russian people, Karaganov claims that being a great power 
has been a part of Russia’s national identity for the last 300 years,16 that great power-ness is a 
                                                             
12 Ibid. 
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with Vitaly Tseplyaev, ‘Argumenti i Fakty’. 21/12/2018. Available at https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-
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15 Karaganov, Sergei. ‘Sergeĭ Karaganov Rasskazal o Roli Rossii v Obrazovanii Evrazii (Sergei Karaganov Spoke 
about the Role of Russia in the Formation of Eurasia)’. Invterview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 10/01/2019. Available 
at https://rg.ru/2019/10/01/sergej-karaganov-rasskazal-o-roli-rossii-v-obrazovanii-evrazii.html. Accessed 
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16 Karaganov, Sergei. ‘Odnobokai͡ a Derzhava (One-Sided Power)’. Russia in Global Politics. 04/12/2013. Available 




‘traditional value’ of Russia,17 that being a great power is in the genes of the Russian people,18 
and that ‘[Russia’s] elite cannot be otherwise, and most of the people, too’.19 
Other Russian officials have also offered some definitions of great power and shared thoughts on 
Russia’s status. For example, Former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov said that ‘a sign of a 
great power is when your country is needed, they want to deal with it. Russia is a great power 
precisely because many problems in the international arena cannot be resolved without it’.20 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov quotes Russian Philosopher Ivan Ilyin regarding Russia’s great 
power status: ‘great power is determined not by the size of the territory and not by the number of 
inhabitants, but by the ability of the people and their government to take on the burden of great 
international tasks and creatively cope with these tasks. A great power is one that, asserting its 
being, its interest, … brings a creative, organizing, legal idea to the whole host of peoples, to the 
entire “concert” of nations and powers’.21 
President Vladimir Putin gives mixed signals about Russia’s great power status. There are 
instances when he refers to Russia as a great power, for example when he claimed that Russia is 
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Weekly, No. 51. 12/21/2005. Available at https://aif.ru/archive/1646961. Accessed 29/11/2019. 
21 Lavrov, Sergei. ‘Istoricheskai͡ a Perspektiva Vneshnĭ Politiki Rossii (The Historical Perspective of Russian Foreign 
Policy’. Russia in Global Politics. 03/03/2016. Available at https://globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Istoricheskaya-




the only great power that reduces its military spending,22 however, later that same day he said 
that Russia ‘[does] not aspire to the status of a great power, since elements of influence on other 
countries are laid down in this concept, as the USSR did. You cannot force other nations to live 
according to your own patterns’.23 Another instance when Putin referred to Russia as a great 
power was when he explained that Russia can maintain its great power status on the condition 
that it makes the innovative component of Russia’s economy the main driver for its 
development.24 There are also mixed messages in official documents. One of the differences 
between Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept released in 2008 and the previous one released in 2000 
is that Russia is no longer referred to as a great power. What can explain this variation? 
Regarding Putin’s use of the term, it could be that he believes Russia is a great power in certain 
ways, and in others it is not, and he has not explicitly clarified what he means when he refers to 
Russia as a great power. In answering a question related to arms expenditure he referred to 
Russia as a great power. This may mean he regards Russia as a great military power. While 
speaking about development, Putin referred to Russia as a great power. This might mean that to 
his mind Russia is currently a great economic power, but, as he emphasized, Russia must 
innovate to maintain this status. On the criterion of influencing other countries, Putin denies that 
Russia is a great power or strives for such a status. Not only do some of Putin’s statements 
contradict themselves, but other high-ranking government officials have different ideas about 
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Russia’s great power status and whether Russia strives for or maintains it, and whether it should 
do so. 
Another explanation could be that Putin knows his audience and speaks accordingly. 
Reshetnikov explains that, on the one hand, when Putin speaks about foreign policy, he almost 
never calls Russia a great power, and when he does, it is when he refers to Russia in a list along 
with other great powers.25 Also, when Putin is speaking to an audience that likely includes a 
considerable amount of foreigners, he frequently rejects the title of great power for Russia, as he 
did in the example above when he emphasized that Russia does not strive to impose its ways on 
others.26 On the other hand, when Putin is clearly speaking to a mainly domestic audience, he 
readily labels Russia a great power. Reshetnikov describes this use of ‘great power’ as officials’ 
use of the vernacular, and he claims that Russian officials ‘perfectly realize that it makes no 
sense to call Russia a Great Power in a foreign policy context, for it would be meaningless 
without recognition and would attract scrutiny Russia is unprepared to withstand’.27  
Despite Putin’s mixed signals, under his administration Russia has continually sought to 
maintain or improve its economic and military power, its ability to project power and influence, 
and its recognition as an indispensable provider of international security that effectively 
addresses global challenges. All of this provides evidence that substantiates claims by Western 
and Russian experts and officials, including Putin’s former foreign policy advisor Sergei 
Karaganov, that Russia strives to be a great power. 
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As mentioned above, for Russia, its great power status in the APR largely depends on whether it 
will be able to develop the RFE into a power base from which it will be able to project its 
influence in the region. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has acknowledged that in order 
for Russia to join integrative processes in the APR it will need to develop the economies of the 
RFE.28 In order to continually reproduce its great power identity, Russia maintains material 
prerequisites for great power status and behaves as a great power by undertaking efforts to have a 
certain amount of projectable power. Moscow’s projectable power remains deficient in the APR. 
Russia’s interests as a great power drive it to strengthen its role in the region, but this cannot be 
done without substantial development of the RFE. This view is common among those in the 
Russian government as well as among Russian experts. For example, a collective of six experts 
in an article published by the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISS) in 2013 agreed with 
Alexander Panov, quoting him in an article he wrote earlier that year: ‘the effectiveness of 
Russian policy in the east will mainly depend on how decisive and rational the actions for the 
economic, social, cultural and scientific development of Siberia and the Far East will be. Only 
the rise of the Far Eastern regions of the Russian Federation in combination with consistent, 
focused diplomatic activity in the APR can create the conditions for approval of Russia as a 
recognized great Pacific power’.29 
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Moscow needs foreign investment and labor to develop the economies of the RFE, and China has 
presented itself as the only investor capable of providing the large sums needed.30 Despite 
concerns about overdependence and the threat of becoming a ‘raw materials appendage’ of 
China, Russia continues efforts to strengthen economic ties with China. This is where Moscow 
runs into trouble with its potential overdependence on Beijing for the development of the RFE. 
Russia’s far eastern territories need China’s investment for development in order to become a 
base from which Russia can achieve and maintain great power status in the APR. However, 
overdependence on China could undermine its sovereignty, thereby denying it great power 
status. Therefore, paradoxically, the most promising way to develop the RFE and maintain great 
power status could potentially lead to the loss of the status. 
Trade and Economic Cooperation between the RFE and China 
In 2018, the Deloitte Commonwealth of Independent States Research Center based in Moscow 
released a report of economic indicators for the region.31 There are several statistics in the report 
that are noteworthy for the purpose of this section to provide a clear picture of the economic 
climate of the RFE in order contextualize Russia’s interaction with China in the region. The 
RFE’s Gross Regional Product (GRP) makes up about 5.5% of the Gross Domestic Product of 
Russia and for 2017 this figure was just under 4 billion rubles. This, at the time, was about £52 
million. 
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The RFE consists of 11 federal subjects in the easternmost territories of the Russian Federation. 
It is important to keep in mind that the relative contributions of the federal subjects to the GRP of 
the RFE and the structure of the economy of each federal subject vary. According to the Deloitte 
report, mining and transport and communications made up 41% of the region’s GRP (28% and 
13% respectively) in 2016. However, if you look at the subjects of the region individually, most 
of the mining is done in northern subjects of the RFE that do not border China: Sakhalin, 
Chukotka, Magadan, and Yakutia (Republic of Sakha), each of whose individual GRPs consist of 
anywhere from 39% to 54% mining.32 The main contributing sector of the local economies of the 
subjects of the RFE bordering China (those four which are the main focus of this chapter) is 
transport and communications (from 16% to 24% of the local GRP).33 
The level of dependence on China of the subjects of the RFE also varies, with bordering subjects 
having a higher level of dependence and general economic interconnectedness with China than 
the others. This chapter focuses on four of the southeastern-most subjects that border China: 
Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, and Amur Oblast. In the interest 
of simplifying the text, hereafter, the chapter will refer to these subjects as ‘the RFE’ or ‘the 
region’. 
This section examines the RFE’s trade relationship and economic cooperation with China, 
paying particular attention to the analyses of Russian experts, which often focus on economic 
complementarity, the region’s high level of economic dependence on China, and concern in 
Russia over the structural imbalance of trade between the RFE and China. 
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Before moving on to a discussion of expert views in Russia on economic relations between the 
RFE and China, it might be helpful for the formation of a clear picture of such relations to 
understand just how dependent on China the region is. The RFE is much more closely tied to the 
Chinese economy than it is with the European part of Russia west of the Ural Mountains. This 
has been the result of the region’s adaptation for survival after the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991. In Soviet times, transport costs for goods being exchanged across the vast expanses 
between the European core of Russia and the peripheral eastern territories were covered by the 
state. Alexandrova explains that, with the dissolution of the USSR, the state no longer covered 
such transport costs, and generally had no economic policy for the RFE, leaving it to adjust to 
market conditions with practically no regulations.34 With the liberalization of foreign trade, the 
RFE quickly turned to neighboring countries for markets for the export of their goods as well as 
a source of imports of consumer products, machinery, and food.35 China remains by far the most 
important import market for the RFE. From January 2013 to November 2018, just under 45% of 
the region’s imports were from China.36 The second largest import market in this period was 
Japan accounting for 12.2% of imports.37 This level of dependence is a cause for concern in 
Russia not only locally but also at the federal level. The RFE’s trade relations with China are 
unbalanced, not only structurally (RFE exports mostly raw material while China exports mostly 
finished products), but also quantitatively (China is now Russia’s most important trading partner, 
while Russia is only 12th on the list of China’s top trading partners). 
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A nonoptimal yet essential relationship 
In Russia, there are competing views on trade between the RFE and China, ranging from the 
view that the region’s trade with China is almost completely mutually beneficial and in the 
national interest of Russia, to the view that the RFE is moving towards, or already is in, a 
colonial-like relationship with China, in which the RFE exports mainly raw materials to China, 
and China then exports to the RFE finished or processed goods. The former view includes the 
optimistic belief that the region’s economy has the potential to eventually develop into one that 
is far less dependent on the export of raw materials and is based on innovative technology and 
services. The latter view includes doubt that the RFE will be able to break out of such a trade 
relationship and that the region will become, or remain, a ‘raw materials appendage’ of China. 
The content analysis performed for this thesis reveals that most Russian expert views on the 
topic are concentrated in the middle of the spectrum. Cautious optimism is expressed along with 
acknowledgements of certain problems in Russia’s trade relationship with China. There is not a 
tendency for alarmism, but rather there are warnings that if such problems are not addressed, 
Russia will remain in an unfavorable position in its relations with China and in the APR. That 
said, some expert views are noticeably more optimistic or more pessimistic. 
The section now moves on to present the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis. 
Please refer to information provided on the institutions and experts in chapter 3 regarding 




Views likely to have influence 
Lukin argues that economic cooperation with China is necessary for the development of the 
RFE, explicitly so in an article published by International Life.38 The expert also claims that 
China wants a stable and economically developed Russia so that it may be an independent center 
of power that serves as a counterbalance to the West, and that stability on the border with Russia 
is important for its development, which is a national priority.39 Lukin carefully points out that 
relations are not without competition or conflicts of interest. The expert acknowledges 
competition between the countries for foreign investment and that China is primarily interested 
in the supply of raw materials from Russia and its export market for products while Russia is 
interested in diversifying its exports to China to include engineering products and technologies.40 
In an opinion piece published by Strategy of Russia, Lukin again acknowledges a difference of 
interests between Russia and China in the form of the PRC’s interest in Russia’s raw materials 
and Russia’s interest in ‘common projects related to technology and investment’.41 In another 
article, the expert does not explicitly state that China does not pose an economic threat to Russia, 
but he argues that integration of the economies of Russia and China would ‘create mutual, not 
one-sided dependence’, which would discourage an aggravation of their relations.42 
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Bordachev and Barabanov argue in an article published by Russia in Global Politics that if the 
border with China were closed, the Transbaikalia and the Amur region would ‘quickly fall into 
decay’.43 The experts describe the interaction of Russian far easterners and their businesses with 
the Chinese as ‘the most important growth point and significant engine of social development, a 
kind of gateway to the global world’.44 Bordachev and Barabanov argue that cutting ties between 
the far eastern cities and those across the border would lead to lower federal authority over the 
region, adding that this ‘is what will be the first step towards separatism’.45 In the article, the 
experts reiterate the main argument of a piece they wrote for the Valdai Discussion Club, the 
editor-in-chief of which was Sergei Karaganov, that ‘the development of Siberia and the Far East 
is impossible without ties with China’.46 
Larin provides a local perspective of relations between the borderlands of the RFE and northern 
Chinese provinces in an article published by International Processes. The expert paints a picture 
of how vital the Chinese are for those on the border in the RFE by pointing out that China is a 
source of labor not only for jobs that Russians do not want, but also for jobs that Russians lack 
the knowledge to perform.47 Larin’s findings also include the Chinese neighbors’ providing 
‘livelihoods’ for Russians that involve ‘tourism, service, wholesale and retail (including shuttle) 
trade’.48 The expert describes China for residents of the RFE as ‘a window to the world, a place 
of rest and entertainment’, and claims that it does not take an expert to understand that 
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‘proximity to China is an important factor in maintaining the economic and social stability of this 
vast region’.49 
Kosachev and Nikonov argue in an article published by Strategy of Russia that large-scale 
consumption of Russia’s raw materials by East Asian countries is beneficial to Russia and they 
encourage the exploration of oil fields that may be connected to the planned oil pipeline (phase 
one completed in 2009, phase two completed in 2012) that now delivers to China and other 
countries in the region.50 
In a paper published by a collective of experts at the Russian International Affairs Council 
(RIAC), the editor-in-chief of which is Former Foreign Minister of Russia and current President 
of the RIAC Igor Ivanov, after acknowledging that ‘there are widespread fears of becoming a raw 
materials appendage of China’, it is argued that, despite some problems in Russia’s trade 
relations with China, Russia ‘should not be afraid of expanding the export of resources’ to the 
PRC.51 The reasons the experts give are that the process is ‘largely regulated’ or can be 
regulated; that Russia’s monetary policy may include the use of ‘raw material rents’ to stimulate 
the economy and maintain economic stability, which will be ‘useful for the socio-economic 
development’ of Russia; that China is not only interested in raw materials, but is also interested 
in importing equipment; and that China has the capital to, and interest in, making large-scale 
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investments in Russia.52 Ivanov (ed.) et al. point out that the abundance of natural resources in 
the RFE and the lack of them in China is not the only thing that makes their economies 
compatible. There are a range of economic complementarities that experts claim make China ‘the 
best partner for the Russian Far East and Siberia’.53 These complementarities include: 
‘heavy industry, high-tech industries and mining in Russia; agriculture, light industry and the 
presence of excess labor in China; a significant amount of foreign exchange reserves in China, 
Hong Kong, the Chinese diaspora, Taiwan and Singapore and the needs of the Far East and Siberia 
in investment capital; the proximity of northeast China in terms of technological development to 
the production base of the Russian Far East; China’s geographical proximity and necessary 
infrastructure for the rapid development of trade and economic relations with the Russian Far 
East’.54 
Ivanov (ed.) et al. acknowledge that there are problems with Russia’s trade relations with China, 
including ‘the unsatisfactory structure of bilateral trade for Russia, low investment and 
production-cooperative activity, disagreements over the use of Chinese labor … [and] the 
gradual transfer of our countries to different weight categories’.55 The experts also express 
concern about the ‘extremely small’ level of economic interdependence, and that ‘Russian-
Chinese trade and economic relations are still noticeably lagging behind the Russian-Chinese 
political and strategic dialogue in terms of pace and level and scale of their development’.56 After 
acknowledging such problems, the experts emphasize that ‘the total share of unresolved issues 
should be assessed against the background of significant positive achievements’.57 The scale of 
recent agreements was indeed significant, as Moscow had spurred its efforts to strengthen 
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cooperation with China after sanctions were implemented on Russia by the West because of the 
Ukraine crisis. No detailed proposals were given by the experts as to how Russia should solve 
the problems. However, Ivanov (ed.) et al. did express their opinion on the use of Chinese labor 
in Russia, writing that the ‘efficient organization of attracting Chinese labor to work in Russia 
will bring considerable benefits to both Russia and China’.58 
In 2016, the RIAC released another paper written by a collective of experts. Ivanov was again the 
editor. In the texts on Russia’s trade relations with China, there is a tendency to focus on the 
identification and description of problems and proposed measures to be taken in order to improve 
economic cooperation. However, there is no language suggesting in any way that China poses a 
threat by intending to ensure that the RFE becomes or remains its ‘raw materials appendage’. In 
the paper, once again it is acknowledged that the growing asymmetry in the size of the 
economies of the two countries is a problem.59 It is also pointed out that there is a ‘continuing 
gap between the level of political interaction (the “top floor” of cooperation) and the scale of 
economic cooperation and the intensity of contacts at the level of ordinary citizens (“Lower 
floor” of cooperation)’.60 There was a sharp decline in trade between Russia and China from 
almost $100 billion in 2014 to about $68 billion in 2015. According to the experts, problems 
hindering the growth of bilateral trade between Russia and China include: the increase in China’s 
domestic steel production, which reduced its demand for ferrous and non-ferrous metals from 
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Russia; and the fact that Russian exports to China are ‘largely dependent on the volume of oil 
supplies and its prices’ combined with a fall in global oil prices in 2014.61 
Ivanov (ed.) et al. address the problem of Russia’s dependence on the export of mineral fuel, oil, 
and oil products to China, which, according to them, hinders the development of their economic 
cooperation. The experts explain that ‘it is necessary to move from strategic areas to 
comprehensive cooperation, from cooperation in the field of energy and minerals to export-
import of agricultural products, processing industries, high-tech industries, services, etc.’.62 The 
experts propose to revise the ‘model’ of Russian-Chinese cooperation, which for a long time had 
been ‘based on the interaction of state trade and economic structures, large-scale projects and 
enterprises’.63 It is claimed in the paper that ‘local cooperation is inefficient due to the 
replacement of market mechanisms by administrative management’.64 Part of the way the model 
of Russian-Chinese economic cooperation should be revised, according to the experts, is to add 
‘market mechanisms’ and strengthen their importance among small- and medium-sized 
businesses at the local level in order to stimulate cooperation.65 Other measures Ivanov (ed.) et 
al. argue should be taken in order to facilitate the development of economic cooperation between 
the two countries include: lowering Russia’s import and export duties; unify standards in 
manufacturing and high technology; relax and simplify Russia’s licensing procedures (examples 
are made of the strict and complex licensing procedures for the construction and fishing 
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industries); and to create a joint-information platform to make it easier for each side to learn 
about one another.66 
In 2017, 2018, and 2019 the RIAC published similar papers on Russia-China relations edited by 
Ivanov. Regarding economic cooperation and trade relations, most of the problems identified in 
the 2015 and 2016 papers remain. There is still imbalance between the high level of political and 
strategic cooperation and the low level of economic cooperation.67 Small- and medium-sized 
businesses in Russia and China still lack quality information about operating in each other’s 
countries, and strong administrative barriers remain.68 Investment cooperation still has not 
reached a satisfactory level, and high tariffs continue to hinder economic cooperation.69 
Regarding China’s investment in Russia, 68% goes into raw materials projects.70 This, however, 
is not considered by the experts as an effort by China to ensure that the RFE becomes or remains 
a ‘raw materials appendage’, but rather they acknowledge Russia’s weak business and 
investment climate,71 and write that Russia must attract investment to other sectors of the 
economy,72 thereby attributing the lack of diversity in investment to internal factors. Russian 
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experts also call out high tariffs, particularly on the Russian side,73 as a hinderance to the 
development of economic cooperation with China, and therefore, the development of the RFE. 
In a similar vein, Panov stated at a roundtable discussion, the transcript of which was published 
by International Life, that the ‘danger’ for the RFE is not imposed by external forces, but rather 
by Russia itself, in that it is ‘not able to create decent living conditions for our citizens in the Far 
East’, which has caused the trend of depopulation of the RFE.74 The expert stresses the 
importance of a development program implemented by the government that creates conditions of 
life, healthcare, education, and culture that attract Russians and ‘compatriots’ from former Soviet 
republics.75 
There are experts who focus more on problems associated with the RFE’s trade and economic 
cooperation with China than those above, offer warnings, and sometimes recommend bolstering 
soft balancing measures against China such as the diversification of export markets for raw 
materials. 
Dynkin and Pantin do not explicitly call China’s trade with, and economic activity in, the RFE a 
threat, however they do warn against excessive economic dependence on China. They argue in 
an article published by Russia in Global Politics that such dependence ‘is fraught with the 
degradation of many enterprises and industries, as well as the loss of the ability to make strategic 
decisions in the sphere of economics and politics’.76 
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Greenberg does not explicitly write that China poses an economic threat but recognizes 
unfavorable conditions in Russia’s economic relationship with China. The expert writes in an 
article published by International Life that ‘Siberia and the Far East are gradually turning into a 
raw materials appendage of the Chinese economy’ and claims that ‘Russia will feel the political 
and geopolitical consequences of these processes in the near future’.77 Greenberg also points out 
the imbalance in the countries’ relationship, calling Russia China’s ‘youngest partner’, a position 
that has been imposed to due to China’s ‘far superior’ economic power.78 The expert also 
acknowledges significant achievements in the development of Sino-Russian relations, making 
the partnership ‘seem to be a model of stability, predictability, and mutual respect’.79 Greenberg 
acknowledges the paradoxical relationship between the RFE and China, writing that ‘China's 
strong economic growth stimulates demand for Russian energy and minerals, which will 
contribute to the development of the productive forces of Siberia and the Far East. But at the 
same time there is a danger that the whole region will turn into a raw materials appendage of 
China’.80 The solution the expert offers is for the state to bolster development in the RFE, 
specifically in the form of a ‘stimulation of high-tech production and nanotechnology’.81 
Given that Lukin, Bordachev, Barabanov, Larin, Kosachev, Nikonov, Ivanov, Panov, Dynkin, 
Pantin, and Greenberg all have doctorates, that all but two have held positions in the Russian 
government, and that all but one of the institutions that published their work above are either 
FSBIs or have connections with the government, it is reasonable to argue that it is likely that the 
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views the experts convey in the articles referenced above have directly or indirectly contributed 
to the formation of the dispositional factors (perceptions and values) of decisionmakers regarding 
Russia’s foreign policy towards China. 
It is important to point out once again that the relatively dissenting views published by experts 
with influential positions and/or strong qualifications, such as Dynkin, Pantin, and Greenburg 
indicate that experts in Russia are free to express views that are not compatible with the official 
line. 
In sum, the dominant view among experts in this section is that while the RFE’s economic 
relations with China have problems causing an unbalanced trade structure in favor of China, the 
status quo should be maintained while problems are addressed by Moscow. This conclusion is 
drawn mainly because of the indispensability China’s import and export markets for the RFE. 
Included in this dominant view is that the actual or potential status of the RFE as a ‘raw materials 
appendage’ of China is not attributed to external actors, including the PRC, but rather to 
domestic factors. 
The main way that this dominant view is reflected in the quantitative results presented in the 
previous chapter is that, when coders indicated the presence of an absence of threat in the text 
and were then asked to select the sentence that best explains why, according to the text, China 
does not threaten Russia, the second most frequently chosen sentence indicated that it was 
because of a lack of harmful intentions from China. 
In the context of managing decline, regarding the unfavorable trade structure between the RFE 
and China, the dominant view identified in this section is related to the retrenchment literature 




declining states is to behave in the interest of solvency when interacting with a rising power, i.e. 
it refrains from pursuing ambitions that exceed means to the point of overstretch, unsustainable 
action, and increased vulnerability. In the scenario that Moscow forcibly cuts or drastically 
reduces economic ties between the RFE and China out of fear of the region becoming China’s 
‘raw materials appendage’, the amount of resources required to meet the needs of the raw 
materials industry in the RFE and the demand of the population for affordable finished goods in 
the interest of maintaining socio-economic stability would be prohibitively large. In this view, 
the advocacy for maintaining the status quo while addressing problems is understandable. 
Views not unlikely to have influence 
There are other experts that also claim that trade, even in its current structure, is not only 
beneficial for the RFE, but necessary for its development. For example, Glazova et al. wrote an 
article published by the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISS), in which they express their 
view that the development of the RFE since the fall of the Soviet Union has depended to a large 
extent on trade and economic cooperation with China and will continue to do so.82 But this 
dependence on the PRC for the economic development of the RFE is not framed in the context of 
an exploitative relationship. The experts write that ‘cooperation in the oil and gas sphere is 
mutually beneficial and long-term, since it allows both countries to solve a number of pressing 
problems: the Chinese side is to ensure the safety of hydrocarbon supply channels, the Russian 
side to diversify the export of its resources’.83 
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Glazova et al. identify specific problems in trade relations between Russia and China that hinder 
the growth of economic cooperation, such as the ‘underdevelopment of cross-border 
infrastructure, low investment activity, poor information support for Russian exporters and 
importers, and difficulties encountered by Russian entrepreneurs seeking to enter the Chinese 
market’.84 The solutions the experts propose do not indicate a perception of threat posed by 
Chinese trade practices, but rather they suggest the facilitation of trade in the interest of growth. 
For example, they stress that infrastructure and communications need to be improved. 
Specifically, Glazova et al. see it necessary ‘to solve the question of building a bridge across the 
Amur [completed in 2019], improve rail and air links between the two countries, modernize 
transport infrastructure, create additional checkpoints and increase their efficiency, promote 
tourism, and improve the legislative framework for bilateral cooperation’.85 In this context, 
issues in the economic relationship between the RFE and China are not framed as ‘threats’, but 
rather as ‘problems’ that hinder the expansion and development of trade and economic 
cooperation between the two countries. 
Finally, Glazova et al. seem to be aligned with the concept of ‘catching the Chinese wind in the 
sails’ of the Russian economy with their claim that ‘active trade and economic cooperation with 
[China] and increasing the investment attractiveness of the Russian economy for Chinese 
business can serve as an additional opportunity to expand our country's presence in the Asia-
Pacific region’.86 
Another in favor of facilitating the growth of economic interaction between Russia and China 
despite current problems is Andrei Ivanov. In an article published by the Bulletin of MGIMO, the 
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expert argues for the removal of administrative and legal obstacles hindering foreign 
entrepreneurial and investment activity in Russia and posits that claims by ‘the media and some 
politicians’ of the existence of a Chinese threat to Russian sovereignty encumber mutually 
beneficial Chinese business in Russia.87 
Writing about the problem of China’s enormous demand for resources, Kuznechevsky argues 
that the PRC will not attempt to solve the problem at Russia’s expense.88 According to the 
expert, China will seek to secure access to the resources of Russia’s eastern territories, but only 
through cooperation. Kuznechevsky frames this argument in the context of the US’ pressure on 
China and the possibility of confrontation or conflict between the two, explaining that ‘Russia is 
a deep rear for China, and it only needs one thing: so that it does not take the side of the main 
enemy’.89 
Despite their lack service in the Russian government or military, given the qualifications of 
Glazova et al., Gubin, Kuznechevsky, and Ivanov and that the views they conveyed in the 
articles referenced above were all published by FSBIs, it is reasonable to argue that it is not 
unlikely that their views have directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the 
dispositional factors of decisionmakers regarding Russia’s foreign policy towards China. 
Gubin, in an article published by RISS, differentiates economic and political sovereignty and 
argues that, while political sovereignty in the RFE is stable, the Russian leadership perceives a 
threat from China in the form of the undermining of economic sovereignty in the region ‘due 
primarily to the raw materials orientation of exports and increasing dependence on China while 
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reducing its interest in projects that meet the objectives of the development of our territory’.90 
The expert also posits that the lack of effective and equal cooperation with China in the RFE is 
due to the desire of the Russian government to avoid excessive economic dependence on China 
and the PRC’s disinterest in investing in projects in the RFE that would compete with its own 
development initiatives in its northeastern territories.91 
The results of the analysis show that while a perception of threat emanating from the economic 
relations of the RFE and China exists among Russian experts, it is marginal relative to expert 
views that consist of perceptions of an absence of threat. The dominant view among experts 
identified is that while the RFE’s economic relations with China have problems causing an 
unbalanced trade structure in favor of China, the status quo should be maintained while problems 
are addressed because of the indispensability of China’s import and export markets for the RFE 
and the benefits they offer for the development of the region. 
Policy 
It is important now to consider the extent to which Russia’s policy actions regarding the 
economic relationship between the RFE and China are consistent with the dominant view 
identified in the previous sections. Since the view held by potentially influential experts consists 
of the notion that, despite the existence of some problems, trade and economic cooperation 
between the RFE and China are mutually beneficial and should continue while the problems are 
addressed, and that the unfavorable trade balance between the two is attributed to domestic 
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factors rather than to China, we could expect policy to reflect this by consisting of continued 
cooperation. 
Cooperation has continued in ways that would be unlikely if a serious threat to the RFE from 
China was perceived among Russian decisionmakers. Several cooperative agreements have been 
reached over the period of interest. It is worth referring to some of the more recent forms of 
cooperation in which large Chinese investments in the RFE were authorized. In August 2018, 
President Putin ratified an agreement allowing for the joint development of the Klyuchevskoye 
gold deposit in the Trans-Baikal territory in which China will acquire at least 60% and not more 
than 70% of Zapadnaya-Klyuchi Mine JSC.92 In December 2018, a deal was reached for China’s 
funding of the construction of an enrichment plant for a coal mining company in southern 
Yakutia at a cost of 3.5 billion rubles.93 In May 2019, an agreement was made for the 
gasification of the city of Bratsk using $1 billion of Chinese money.94 It is said that the 
development will improve the ecological situation of the city, and it is acknowledged that China 
also stands to benefit by using the new infrastructure for gas delivery to China. In December 
2019, China opened a line of credit to Gazprom for 3.4 billion euros over 15 years for the 
production of the Amur Gas Processing Plant.95 In February 2020, an agreement was reached for 
the joint development of a methanol plant near Nakhodka for which China will provide $1.7 
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billion.96 The policy of allowing such investments in the RFE is more consistent with the 
dominant view identified in this chapter than it is with the view that China poses an economic 
threat to the RFE by intentionally subordinating it to the role of a ‘raw materials appendage’ of 
China. 
Another example of a policy that is consistent with the dominant view identified in this chapter is 
that of selling or leasing land in the RFE to China for agricultural purposes. According to the 
BBC’s Russia service, in 2019, firms with Chinese capital owned or were leasing at least 
350,000 hectares of land in the RFE.97 
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Of all the cultivated land in the Far Eastern regions bordering China, at least 16% is owned or 
leased by firms with Chinese capital. The shares of the total cultivated land are greatest in 






It is unlikely that such ownership and leasing of Russian land by China would be authorized if 
there were serious concerns about the implications of China’s rise and demand for resources for 
the vast, resource-rich, and sparsely populated RFE. Andrei Vinogradov, Head of the Center for 
Political Research and Forecasts at the Institute for the Far East considers the seemingly 
marginal view that by selling or leasing land in the RFE to China Russia ultimately risks 
sovereignty over the region to be ‘far-fetched’.98 In the expert’s view, the practice consists of 
‘purely economic ties, in which [he] see[s] nothing terrible’.99 According to Evgeny Nardorshin, 
Chief Economist at PF Capital and former Advisor to the Minister of Economic Development of 
the Russian Federation stresses that as long as local people and businesses receive benefits then 
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the economic benefits will outweigh any geopolitical disadvantages.100 In response to a question 
about the possibility of China’s annexation of Russian territory after leases end, Konstantin 
Ilkovsky, then Governor of Zabaikalsky Krai, claimed there was no basis for such a 
conversation.101 Vitaly Mankevich, President of the Russian-Asian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs, argues that ‘the problem is not that the Chinese come to Russia en masse to work 
and cultivate the land’, but that ‘about a quarter of all arable land is not cultivated in the Russian 
Federation’.102 In his view ‘the fact that entrepreneurs from China are engaged in crops is only a 
plus’.103 
It is also important to consider the dominant expert view identified in the chapter in the context 
of relevant convictions communicated through fundamental official documents of the Russian 
Federation. It has been made clear in such documents that Russia considers its economic 
development to be a matter of national security.104 According to Russia’s 2015 National Security 
Strategy, ‘developing international business contacts, attracting foreign investments and 
technologies, implementing joint projects is a means to countering threats in the economic 
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sphere’.105 Naturally, regarding potential partners in the development of international business 
contacts, investments, and joint projects, Russia would be less likely to engage in such 
interactions with states and other entities if they were perceived to be willing and capable of 
exploiting such engagements for gain at the significant expense of Russian interests. Russia’s 
2009 National Security Strategy states that ‘the sustainable development of the Russian 
Federation is facilitated by an active foreign policy, whose efforts are focused on finding 
agreement and coinciding interests with other states on the basis of a system of bilateral and 
multilateral mutually beneficial partnerships’.106 The principle of finding ‘coinciding interests’ 
with such partners is meant to ensure the mitigation of the risk of such exploitation occurring. 
State-private partnership is also considered a means to solve problems of economic development 
in Russia.107 The state’s side of such partnership has included active engagement with the 
Chinese to rectify the problem of stagnant development of the RFE as evidenced by the planning 
and implementation of many joint projects in the RFE.108 In sum, it is reasonable to argue that 
the stated intentions and perceptions conveyed in official documents are consistent with the 
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dominant view of experts identified in this chapter and with Russia’s relevant foreign policy 
actions. 
The ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 outlines a framework for analysis that has been 
followed in this chapter.109 Based on the finding that the dominant expert view regarding 
economic relations between the RFE and China is held by experts with a high level of potential 
influence on average, the chapter concludes that it is likely that the view has been successfully 
communicated directly or indirectly to foreign policy decisionmakers. This is case 1 in the 
framework. Given case 1, scenarios 1 or 2 are more likely than scenarios 3 and 4.110 This means 
that it is likely that once the dominant view was successfully communicated to the officials, the 
dispositional factors (perceptions and values) of the officials either changed to become more 
aligned with, or less contradictory to, the dominant view (scenario 1), or the officials’ preexisting 
dispositional factors were reinforced by the dominant view (scenario 2). In both scenarios, the 
dispositional factors that inform the dominant view are likely shared to the point that policy is 
consistent with the view (in scenario 1, they are shared after the communication, and in scenario 
2, they are shared before and after the communication). Therefore, the dispositional factors 
inherent in the view would explain the policies. Such factors include the perception that the 
RFE’s economic relationship with China is mutually beneficial; the perception that the 
unfavorable trade structure is due mostly to internal problems; the value of the economic 
development of the RFE; the perception that economic cooperation with China presents 
opportunities for the development of the RFE; and the perception that the problems associated 
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with the economic relations of the RFE and China are not so severe as to justify discontinuing 
economic cooperation with China. 
Conclusion 
The first section of the chapter provides regional and ideational context to Russia’s interaction 
with China in the RFE. One of the main features of Russia’s foreign policy is the pursuit or 
maintenance of great power status. An analysis of the idea of great power-ness in Russia among 
experts and officials reveals that its meaning consists of more than economic and military power: 
a country must also be attributed the status by others. The center of global wealth and power has 
been shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In order to maintain recognition as a great power 
globally, Russia must develop the RFE so that it may serve as a base from which it can project 
power and influence and be acknowledged by other states as occupying an important role in 
regional processes of the APR, including economic integration and security dynamics. China 
inevitably becomes a major factor in this undertaking. 
The second section reports the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis that was 
performed for this thesis, specifically those relevant to the economic relations of the RFE and 
China. The section concludes that the dominant view among Russian experts with ties to the 
Russian government or military is that, while there are problems with the structure of the RFE’s 
trade relations with China that make the region’s exports dependent on raw materials, economic 
relations between the RFE and China are mutually beneficial, and there are ways that Russia and 
China can address the problems so that the development of economic cooperation with China 
and the development of the RFE can be facilitated. Included in this dominant view is that the 
actual or potential status of the RFE as a ‘raw materials appendage’ of China is not attributed to 




hypothesis 1 in that, in this view, Beijing does not intend to harm Russia or its interests by 
ensuring that the economy of the RFE becomes or remains a ‘raw materials appendage’ of 
China.111 
The final section discusses Russia’s policy regarding economic relations between the RFE and 
China in an effort to determine the extent to which such policy is consistent with the dominant 
expert view identified in the second section of the chapter. There are two main policies that 
demonstrate a lack of a perception of a serious threat from the rise of China to the RFE: the 
policy of authorizing Chinese investments in projects in the RFE in which the PRC controls large 
if not majority stakes; and the policy of selling or leasing land in the RFE to China for 
agricultural purposes. If the dominant perception among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers 
included the view that by allowing China to make large investments with controlling stakes and 
by leasing or selling land to China Russia risks losing effective sovereignty over parts of the 
RFE, then it is unlikely that such policies would be adopted. Therefore, the section argues that 
Russia’s policies have a high degree of consistency with the dominant view held by potentially 
influential experts identified in the second section. Based on this argument, the chapter 
concludes that scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section 
in chapter 2 are most likely. 
The findings of the chapter are at odds with those contributors to Western literature on Russia-
China relations who identify Russian decisionmakers’ fear of the rise of China as a significant 
variable affecting the pace (often considered slow) at which economic relations between the RFE 
and China are being developed and Chinese investments and projects are being accepted and 
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implemented in the RFE.112 As the chapter shows, concerns are not entirely absent, however they 
are marginal relative to the view that economic relations between the RFE and China are 
essential, mutually beneficial, and should be continued in their current state while solutions to 
problems are pursued. Included in the dominant view are concerns about several domestic factors 
hindering the development of cooperation, such as complicated licensing procedures in Russia; 
high tariffs on Russia’s side; a weak business and investment climate that fails to attract 
investment to sectors of the economy outside of raw materials; the inability to create standard 
living conditions in the RFE; the poor state of cross-border infrastructure; a lack of accessible 
information for Russian exporters and importers; an inadequate number of border checkpoints 
and the inefficiency of those that exist; an inadequate promotion of tourism; and a stifling 
legislative framework for bilateral cooperation which has consisted of administrative and legal 
barriers impeding foreign entrepreneurial and investment activity in Russia.113 Rather than 
apprehension on the Russian side, hinderance caused by domestic factors is argued to be the 
main variable affecting the pace of the development of economic relations. 
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Chapter 5: Security in the RFE: China’s ‘Demographic 
Pressure’ and Military Potential 
The previous chapter addressed the economic security of the Russian Far East (RFE), 
specifically regarding its economic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as 
perceived by Russian experts. This chapter focuses on two other types of security in the region 
frequently discussed in the Russian expert community: demographic and military. The two main 
sections of this chapter report the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis relevant 
to perceptions of demographic and military threat, respectively. The analysis of both 
demographic and military security in the RFE in the same chapter is justified given the potential 
for these two issues to be connected. If immigration from China to the RFE led to the 
outnumbering of Russians in the region and the Chinese population continues to grow, this could 
lead to social unrest and racial conflict. In the conflict scenario, China may feel obliged to 
intervene to protect the ethnic Chinese in the region, which could prompt concerns over Russia’s 
effective sovereignty over the region and spiral into military confrontation or conflict. It should 
be noted that, as shown below, the view that such a scenario is likely or inevitable is marginal in 
Russia. 
The first section finds that the prevailing view on the question of a Chinese demographic threat 
to the RFE is that it does not exist, and that claims that it does consist mainly of exaggerations by 
the media and nationalist forces and serve as an instrument of officials in the RFE in attempts to 
justify requests for larger portions of the federal budget. Aside from simple assertions of an 
absence of threat and claims of exaggeration or bias among those who say the threat exists, 




exist. It is unclear whether this is because those who claim that there is no such threat have no 
reasons to substantiate their claim or because, for them, the absence of a threat of mass 
immigration from China is self-evident. Larin, a prominent Russian historian in the RFE, offers 
concrete reasoning for his assertion of an absence of a Chinese demographic threat, which 
includes lack of economic incentive and uncomfortable realities of Chinese people living in the 
RFE consisting of harassment and beatings.1 Kamynin offers similar reasoning.2 
The second section finds that the dominant view among experts in Russia is that China does not 
pose a direct military threat to Russia. On this question, it is more common but still rare for 
Russian experts to give reasons behind their claim of an absence of a military threat. Four 
mutually non-exclusive themes on which such reasons hinge are identified: (1) the socio-
economic fragility or vulnerability of the PRC, (2) China’s interests, (3) the cost of aggression 
against Russia (which is strongly related to the first two themes), and (4) the idea that a military 
threat may exist from China, but it is only hypothetical or potential, not direct. 
The final section examines Russia’s policies relevant to the security of the RFE vis-à-vis China 
with the aim of determining the extent to which they are consistent with the dominant views of 
experts identified by the content analysis. The section concludes that Russia’s policies are 
consistent with the dominant view that the rise of China does not threaten the security of the RFE 
in two main ways. First, Russia continues to abide by the 1996-1997 agreements on the 
demilitarization of the border with China, which allows for only a limited number of defensive 
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Processes 8, no. 1 (2010): 127. Available at http://intertrends.ru/system/Doc/ArticlePdf/849/Larin-22.pdf. Accessed 
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deployments. Second, Russia continues to develop cross-border transit infrastructure that would 
facilitate a land invasion from China, including bridges across the Amur River and solutions to 
the break of gauge problem at the overland railway border crossings Grodekovo-Suifenhe, 
Makhalino-Hunchun, and Zabaikalsk-Manzhouli. The Grodekovo-Suifenhe and Makhalino-
Hunchun railway crossings are being adapted to accommodate the railway gauge used in China 
(1435mm) as a part of Russia’s plan to develop the Primorye-1 and Primorye-2 International 
Transport Corridors, which will allow for China’s seamless access to the Russian ports of 
Zarubino, Posyet, Vladivostok, and Nakhodka. The Zabaikalsk station is currently undergoing 
large-scale reconstruction that includes the installation of a new narrow-gauge sorting system, 
which will allow for much faster transitions from China’s gauge to Russia’s gauge (1520mm). 
These policies are more consistent with the view that China does not pose a military threat to the 
RFE than the view that it does. Since the policies are consistent with the dominant view of 
potentially influential Russian experts, the chapter concludes that scenarios 1 or 2 in the 
framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 are most likely. 
Demographics of the RFE and China’s Bordering Provinces 
This section examines perspectives among experts in Russia on the demographic security of the 
RFE in relation to China. It focuses on views on the vulnerability of the region and the potential 
to lose effective sovereignty over the territory by means of mass immigration from China. Views 
of Russian experts and officials on the topic vary, but again, as is the case of such views on the 
topic of China’s effect on the development of the economy of the RFE, most views on ‘hard 
security’ questions regarding Russia’s easternmost territories are moderate and avoid alarmism. 




provinces, the dominant view among experts in Russia is that there is no threat of mass 
immigration. 
In Soviet times, the RFE experienced the largest rate of population growth in the country due to 
both natural growth and migration flows.3 From 1926 to 1991 the population of the RFE grew by 
a factor of 5.1.4 During that period, the region also experienced processes of industrialization and 
urbanization. The population peaked in 1991 at just over 8 million, which was about 5.4% of the 
total population.5 By 2018, because of increased mortality rates, decreased fertility rates, lower 
standard of living and economic opportunity, and migration outflows, the population of the RFE 
fell to about 6.17 million, which is about 5.5% of the total population.6 Figures for 2019 show a 
population of about 8.19 million in the RFE, but this growth is mainly due to the moving of 
Zabaikalski Krai and the Republic of Buryatia from the Siberian Federal District to the Far 
Eastern Federal District.7 Without Zabaikalski Krai and the Republic of Buryatia, the population 
of the RFE in 2019 was about 6.14 million, showing that population decline in the RFE 
continues.8 
To put the demographic situation of the region further into perspective, we must consider how 
sparse the population is. The Federal District of the Far East of the Russian Federation accounts 
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4 Ibid., Table 1. 
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for about 36% of the country’s territory. At a population of 6.14 million in a landmass measuring 
at about 6.17 million km/sq., the population density of the region is about one person per km/sq.9 
As most of the population is concentrated in cities in the south of the region, the combined 
population of the four territories of the RFE bordering China and focused on in this section have 
a higher concentration of about 5.1. per km/sq.10 Over the last few decades the portion of the 
population of the RFE that live in cities has remained stable at around 75%.11 Many of the largest 
cities in the region, such as Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshensk are located near the 
border with China. 
Sharing a border in the south are the Chinese provinces Heilongjiang and Jilin, which combined 
make up a territory that is about 9.5 times smaller than the RFE. However, these two provinces 
have a combined population of 65.77 million, which is more than 10 times greater than the 
population of the RFE and about 15 times greater than the population of the four federal subjects 
of the RFE focused on in this chapter that border China. The average population density of the 
combined territory of Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces is about 226 per km/sq. Since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, there have been fears in Russia that mass immigration from 
China into the RFE and Siberia was either taking place or that there was great potential for it. 
This alarmism peaked in the mid-1990s, mostly consisting of sensationalist stories in the media, 
but also included local politicians in the RFE pandering to xenophobic sections of the 
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populations of the federal subjects, and defense analysts trying to get a larger portion of the 
defense budget for the Far Eastern Military District. 
The section now moves on to present the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis. 
Please refer to information provided on the institutions and experts in chapter 3 regarding 
potential influence through government or military connections and qualifications. 
On the possibility of mass immigration from China 
There is a marginal view that, for various reasons, including China’s lack of resources and large 
population and the fact that Russia is resource rich and its far eastern territories are sparsely 
populated, mass immigration from China to the RFE and Siberia, state-sponsored or otherwise, is 
not only possible, but inevitable. Before moving on to the analysis of expert views that are more 
likely to have influence on Russia’s foreign policy, it is useful to address this view for two 
reasons. First, it demonstrates that some in Russia publish views that contradict the government 
line regularly. Second, some potentially influential experts respond directly to the main 
proponent of these views, Alexander Khramchikhin. The content analysis did not find a credible 
analyst that shared Khramchikhin’s level of alarmism and concern. 
On the question of a demographic threat facing the RFE from China, Khramchikin focuses 
mostly on material factors such as population density and lack of resources to argue that Chinese 
demographic expansion is inevitable. One of the main points the expert makes to support his 
arguments is that China is ‘overloaded’. For example, in 2008, Khramchikhin claimed that ‘the 
country's population is now at least 1.5 times higher than the optimal one in terms of the load on 
nature and infrastructure’.12 It is unclear what standard the expert uses for ‘optimal’ population 
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size for the ‘load’ on nature and infrastructure. Khramchikhin does not elaborate or refer to any 
environmental or development studies to substantiate his claim. In the same article, the expert 
writes that China’s expansion into Russia, ‘presumably, will be primarily economic and 
demographic in nature’, however, ‘direct military aggression cannot be ruled out’.13 
Another claim Khramchikhin often makes is that there are not enough resources in the world, let 
alone in China, to meet the demands of the Chinese population.14 The expert argues that, because 
China’s economy is production-based rather than service-based, as it is in the West, China needs 
more resources. Khramchikhin explains that ‘if the PRC reaches the level of per capita 
consumption of food, electricity, oil, etc., at least comparable to the Western one, it alone will 
not have enough resources of the whole planet’.15 The expert claims that the PRC must maintain 
high growth rates of its production-based economy in order to prevent social upheaval, and that it 
will go to extreme lengths, including expansion (peaceful or forceful) in order to do so.16 
Khramchikhin has not held a position in the Russian government or military, and he does not 
have a doctorate. The expert has a bachelor’s degree in physics and no formal training in the 
study of international relations, political science, or any other social science. Khramchikhin is the 
Deputy Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, which is a closed joint-stock 
company. Given the expert’s lack of qualifications and Russia’s continued policy of 
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development of cooperation with China and the lack of military buildup in the RFE, which 
suggests that his views were either not considered or considered and rejected, it is reasonable to 
argue that Khramchikhin likely has a low level of potential influence over Russia’s foreign 
policy towards China. 
Views likely to have influence 
Several Russian experts on international relations and security and on the specific topic of 
Russia-China relations disagree with Khramchikhin. Most who write on the likelihood of 
Chinese expansion (peaceful or forceful) into Russia do not address Khramchikhin directly, but 
some do. For example, Kozlov responds to Khramchikhin’s flurry of alarmist articles in the 
Independent Military Review in the following way: 
‘Khramchikhin’s views on China’s incredible global expansion … cause rejection not only among 
us, but also among some other experts … These views are excessively cardinal, unambiguous, and 
radical … China has opportunities for various types of expansion. However, intentions, not to 
mention practical actions, cannot be said at the moment … It is simply not correct and untrue to say 
that China threatens all of humanity and that this threat is the greatest in its entire existence’.17 
From early in the period examined in this thesis (2000 to 2020), the content analysis reveals 
views on the demographic disparity between the RFE and neighboring Chinese provinces and 
Chinese immigration to Russia that are much more moderate than Khramchikhin’s. 
Occasionally, some arguments encouraging regulated Chinese immigration are put forward. For 
example, in a paper published by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), Leksin et 
al. argue that the only way to stem the decline of the population of the RFE and correct its age 
                                                             
17 Kozlov, Stanislav. ‘EvroPRO – Pro i Kontra (Euro ABM – Pros and Cons)’. Independent Military Review. 




and gender structure is through immigration, particularly from China.18 In the experts’ view, 
immigration should be ‘publicly welcomed’ but requires ‘special regulation … taking into 
account the interests of specific regions’ so that the RFE does not become ‘a zone of ethnic, and 
in the future, social and political confrontation’.19 Regarding Chinese immigration into the RFE, 
Leksin et al. claim that the danger perceived is locally ‘used for populist purposes and to 
blackmail the federal government’, and that the number of Chinese immigrants in the RFE was 
‘greatly exaggerated’ by regional and central media.20 The experts point out that while the media 
reported that there were about 2 million Chinese immigrants in the region, according to 
‘estimates by both Moscow and local experts’ the figure amounted to 200-300 thousand.21 
Several experts in Russia corroborate the abovementioned claim of fearmongering with regard to 
Chinese immigration by the media and nationalist forces. For example, Karaganov wrote in an 
article published by Russia in Global Politics that claims that ‘quiet Chinese expansion’ is taking 
place in Russia are ‘deliberately biased’, and that ‘there are not millions of Chinese in Russia, 
but 200-300 thousand, and they make a tangible contribution to the Russian economy’.22 The 
expert acknowledges that there is a potential for danger in the region in future, but argues that it 
can be avoided with ‘a sensible policy with respect to Siberia and the Far East, and by foreign 
policy’, adding that ‘China and the Chinese need to be purposefully made long-term allies 
interested in the development and prosperity of Russia’.23 According to Karaganov, in another 
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article published by Russia in Global Politics, China is not pursuing demographic expansion in 
Russia at all, and points out that there are more Chinese in Germany and there were more in the 
former Russian empire.24 
In an article published by Strategy of Russia, Kosachev and Nikonov, while acknowledging that 
the problem of depopulation of the RFE is ‘one of the most acute for the Russian state’, claim 
that ‘the scale of the problem of Chinese migration to Russia is exaggerated by a number of 
nationalist forces for political purposes’, and point out that in the RFE ‘from China there are 
fewer people than Koreans or immigrants from the Caucasus region’.25 Career diplomat and, at 
the time, Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation, Sergei Prikhodko, wrote that, 
although Russia is not entirely free of Chinese immigration problems, ‘one should not exaggerate 
their scale, as the domestic media often do’.26  
Larin, in an article published by International Processes, argues that there was a complete 
absence of a demographic threat from China. The scholar explains that there are ‘many objective 
reasons’ for why this is so: 
‘First, the niche for applying Chinese labor is very limited here. Today there is trade (how many 
traders do you need to serve 6.5 million residents of the Far East?), the service sector (the same 
question), construction (where there is great competition from Russians and North Koreans), 
vegetable growing (where they have to compete with products grown by local Koreans and in 
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China itself). Consequently, millions and even hundreds of thousands of Chinese simply have 
nothing to do here. At the same time, the niche is shrinking’.27 
Larin explains further that since it is more expensive in Russia, it is preferable to the Chinese, if 
they do come to Russia, to earn their money then move back to China.28 Also, the Chinese are 
‘uncomfortable’ in Russia for reasons including frequent document checks, extortion, insults, 
and beatings.29 According to the expert, the idea of there being millions of Chinese immigrants 
in Russia is ‘a myth for some and a boogeyman to squeeze out budget funds for others’.30 
In line with Larin’s argument regarding incentives for immigration, Kamynin argues in an article 
published by International Life that Chinese immigrants come to Russia to earn money doing 
work that Russian locals are ‘not ready to do’, then return to China ‘preferring to invest it in 
business at home, where they are much more comfortable…’.31 
Claims of an absence of a threat from China in the form of mass immigration can be found 
throughout the period of interest by relatively credible sources. In an interview with Red Star, 
Manilov said at the time there was no threat of mass Chinese immigration into the RFE, 
however, the expert added that Russia should not dismiss the challenge posed by the ‘physical 
development’ of the region by Chinese immigrants.32 Efremenko, in an article published by 
Russia in Global Politics, argues that the threat of Chinese settlement in the RFE a ‘paper tiger’ 
and sees a much larger threat in the continuing dependence of the structure of Russia’s trade on 
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commodities.33 In agreement with the dominant view among Russian experts on the potential 
demographic threat from China, Chechevishnikov wrote in an article published by International 
Processes that ‘nearly a quarter-century of experience living without an iron curtain on the 
border with China showed the phobias of the 1990s to be illusory’, and that ‘in recent years the 
local Russian population has begun to see the Chinese people primarily as a useful complement 
to their daily routine’.34 
Given Manilov’s strong connections with the Russian government and military, the attention he 
has received from the government and military as evidenced by his awards, and the strong 
connections of the newspaper, Red Star, that published the transcript of the interview with 
Manilov referenced above, it is reasonable to argue that it is likely that his views have directly or 
indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors (perceptions and values) of 
Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. Despite Efremenko’s lack of service to the Russian 
government or military, given his qualifications, the attention he has received from the Russian 
government as evidenced by his award, his service to the FSBI Institute of Scientific Information 
on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION), and that Russia in Global 
Politics, the institution that published his article referenced above, has connections with the 
government, it is reasonable to argue that it is likely that his views have directly or indirectly 
contributed to the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers.  
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Given the qualifications and service to the Russian government or military of Kozlov, Leksin et 
al., Karaganov, Kosachev, Nikonov, Prikhodko, Larin, Kamynin, Manilov, Efremenko, and 
Chechevishnikov, the attention several of them received from the government or military as 
evidenced by their awards, and that the views they convey in the articles referenced above were 
published by FSBIs or institutions with connections to the Russian government (except 
Independent Military Review and International Processes), it is reasonable to argue that it is 
likely that the experts’ views have directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the 
dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. This finding contradicts an 
argument often found in Western literature on Russian foreign policy towards China that fear in 
Russia of mass immigration from China to the RFE negatively affects the development of the 
countries’ relations.35 
Demographic pressure and gravity 
A marginal view on the potential for a demographic threat from China to the RFE includes 
concepts of ‘demographic pressure’ and ‘demographic gravity’. For example, Vishnevsky, in the 
context of recognition of the region’s sparse population and rich natural resources, recognizes 
‘demographic pressure from the overpopulated south’.36 In this view, the demographic disparity 
between the RFE and neighboring Chinese provinces is producing a sort of natural migration 
force. Given Vishnevsky’s highly regarded status as a reputable scholar, it is interesting that he 
holds such a marginal view. The expert does not estimate the likelihood of mass immigration 
from China into the RFE. As a Doctor of Economic Sciences, Vishnevsky likely realizes the lack 
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of economic incentives for mass immigration from a stable China. The scholar published the 
article in 2003, and frequently writes in terms of centuries, referring to demographic and 
migration trends in the 19th and 20th centuries providing estimations and positing likely trends for 
the 21st century. Perhaps the ‘demographic pressure’ to which the Vishnevsky refers has mostly 
long-term rather than short- or even medium-term implications. 
In the same vein, differentiating military threat and demographic threat from China, Fedotov 
writes that ‘if we talk about such far-fetchedness as the threat to us from China, then this is not 
the threat of its aircraft and tanks, but the threat of the laws of demographic and geo-economic 
gravity’.37 
In sum, the results of the content analysis show a relatively stable and low level of perceptions of 
a demographic security threat from China to the RFE throughout the period of interest. 
Perceptions of an actual or potential demographic threat from China exist but are marginal. A 
reading of the texts guided by the results of the content analysis has revealed that the perception 
that there is an absence of a demographic security threat is dominant among Russian experts. 
This dominant perception of an absence of a demographic security threat from China contributes 
to an explanation given by this thesis as to why Russia under the Putin administration has not 
pursued a hard-balancing policy against China in the borderlands and has continued efforts to 
strengthen cooperation with China for the development of the RFE. 
Despite these marginal and likely long-term oriented concerns about the demographic ‘pressure’ 
or ‘gravity’ experienced due to the population imbalance between the RFE and bordering 
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Chinese provinces, the dominant view among Russian experts identified by analysis is that there 
is no demographic threat from China. The main reason given is a simple lack of (mainly 
economic) incentive for large-scale immigration from a stable China to the RFE. The was no 
view among Russian experts identified that China threatened the RFE with mass immigration 
prompted by incentives created by Beijing. 
Chinese Military Potential and the Vulnerability of the RFE 
Along with China’s spectacular economic growth over the last few decades came the 
strengthening and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Included in China’s 
military capabilities is a considerable potential for land operations launched from provinces in 
Northeast China. Despite a widespread doubt that Russia would be able to repel a Chinese 
invasion of the RFE without the use of nuclear weapons, the Russian military has not undertaken 
a significant buildup of forces along its border with China. This section first provides an 
overview of the balance of conventional military power between the forces of the RFE and China 
and discusses the implications of the balance for Russia’s national security. The section then 
examines expert perceptions of Russia’s and China’s relative military capabilities, whether it is 
necessary for Russia to balance against Chinese military capabilities in northeast Asia, and the 
potential for a military threat from China to the RFE. 
From the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the late 1990s, the balance of military power 
between Russia and China in northeast Asia shifted drastically in favor of China, so much so that 




without reinforcements from western regions of Russia.38 Both Western and Russian analysts 
have pointed out that, in practice, effective use of such reinforcements from the west is unlikely 
because of the vast distance and vulnerability of the main ground line of communication, the 
trans-Siberian railway, which runs along Russia’s southern border.39 Throughout the 2000s and 
2010s, Russian conventional forces continued to lag behind Chinese forces even as reforms and 
modernization took place, and by the end of the 2010s, Russian forces remained conventionally 
inferior to those of the PLA in the region.40 
The qualitative aspect of the content analysis reveals that the dominant perception among 
Russian experts is that, while China’s military capabilities are strengthening at an impressive 
rate, and that it is doubtful that Russia would be able to repel a Chinese invasion of the RFE by 
conventional military means, it is not necessary to balance against China’s growing military 
power. This is because China throughout the period of interest has not been perceived as having 
the intention to commit military aggression against Russia, as such action would be too costly 
and contrary to its interests for various reasons explained below. The section discusses the 
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marginal view that China poses a military threat to Russia before turning to an analysis of the 
prevailing view among experts that it does not. 
The most persistent among those that hold the marginal view that China threatens Russia 
militarily, that Russia should build up its military forces on the Chinese border, and that China 
will inevitably expand into the RFE, if not by demographic and economic means then by military 
means, is Khramchikhin. One of the ways the expert attempts to substantiate the argument that 
China is a military threat to Russia is by denying that agreements delineating the border between 
Russia and China since the fall of the Soviet Union and the PRC’s lack of official territorial 
claims against Russia mean that China has no territorial claims against Russia. Khramchikhin 
claims that the ‘official historiography of the PRC continues to interpret Russian-Chinese 
relations as a constant aggression of our country against China’ and explains that ‘if the claims 
against us were really removed, then history books and scientific works would not drive the 
attitude of Russia as an “invader” into the heads of the Chinese’.41 The expert posits that China’s 
official historiography on Russia has not changed since that of Maoist China in the 60s, and that, 
despite the border agreements between Russia and the PRC and lack of official territorial claims, 
China may ‘at any moment’ reinstate the territorial claims and that the Chinese people are 
morally prepared for this because of the propagandistic historiography.42 
Khramchikhin also claims there is a connection between the Chinese concept of ‘strategic 
borders and living space’ and an attempt by the PRC to preemptively justify offensive military 
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action against other states.43 The expert’s interpretation of the concept includes the notion that 
boundaries only indicate the extent to which a state can ‘effectively protect its interests’ with 
‘real power’.44 To Khramchikhin, this means that ‘the “strategic boundaries of the living space” 
must move as the “integrated power of the state grows”’.45 Khramchikhin then argues that it is 
obvious that the only direction of expansion that makes sense for China is the RFE, Siberia, and 
Khazakstan. In the expert’s view, this is because southeast Asia is densely populated and lacks 
natural resources, and India is also densely populated as well being separated from China by the 
Himalayan mountains.46 
Another part of Khramchikhin’s argument that China poses a military threat to Russia was 
discussed in the previous section in the context of a demographic threat. It is the notion that 
China will go to extreme lengths to avoid a slowing of economic growth because it could lead to 
social discontent and maybe even chaos and civil war. According to the expert, the rate of 
economic growth required to keep the Chinese public content puts unendurable strain on the 
country’s environment and infrastructure.47 The only solution, seemingly to him, is expansion, 
preferably by peaceful means (demographic and economic), and if not, then by of force. 
Therefore, in Khramchikhin’s view, the source of China’s military threat to Russia lies in 
China’s domestic socio-economic problems. The expert explains that such problems could 
become so severe that the ruling class of the PRC may consider a military attack to be the ‘lesser 
                                                             
43 Ibid.; and Alexander Khramchikhin. ‘Ugrozy XXI Veka (Threats of the 21st Century)’. National Defense. 
08/08/2011. Available at http://www.oborona.ru/includes/periodics/geopolitics/2011/0808/14297051/detail.shtml. 
Accessed 08/11/2019; Alexander Khramchikhin. ‘Kitaĭskai͡ a Ėkspansii͡ a Neizbezhna (Chinese Expansion is 




46 Khramchikhin. ‘The Threat That Will Not Resolve Itself’. 2008. 




evil’ compared to domestic upheaval.48 Khramchikhin argues that ‘the fact that China will not be 
able to survive without expansion is determined by the laws of nature and economy, and not by 
any particular Chinese aggressiveness’.49 One of the expert’s more extreme claims is that ‘the 
very high unemployment among young people and the “shortage of brides” make their own high 
losses during the hostilities not only permissible, but even desirable for the military-political 
leadership of [China]’.50 
Regarding the ground forces of Russia and China, Khramchikhin claims that those of two of the 
seven military districts of the PRC are stronger than the ground forces of the entire Russian 
military.51 Moreover, only about a quarter of Russia’s ground forces are in Transbaikalia and the 
RFE, and it would take 10 weeks under ideal conditions to transfer just one brigade from western 
Russia’.52 The expert also points out that the means by which Russian forces would be 
transferred from the west to the east is by the Trans-Siberian Railway, the eastern section of 
which runs along the border with China, therefore, in the event of a war with China, this line of 
communication may easily be cut.53 Khramchikhin posits that Chinese military capabilities are 
so superior relative to Russia’s in the region that, with the use of the WS-2D (a multiple rocket 
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launcher system), China can instantly and suddenly destroy all of the military forces of Russia’s 
Far Eastern Military District, except for those in Buryatia.54 In the expert’s view, relying solely 
on nuclear deterrence against China is ‘extremely dangerous’.55 Moreover, in the event of a 
Chinese invasion and Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in defense, ‘China has a completely 
adequate nuclear response’.56 Regarding the effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear deterrent against 
China, Khramchikhin makes the following point in an attempt to substantiate his argument: 
Chinese forces can withstand nuclear strikes in the borderlands, and it is not clear that Russia 
would launch a massive nuclear attack on the cities of southeastern China for fear of retaliation 
on cities in the European part of Russia, which China does not want to capture.57 Therefore, the 
leadership of the PRC may come to the conclusion that Chinese forces can capture the RFE 
without fear of intolerable retaliation from Russia.58 
Finally, for Khramchikhin, China’s buildup of strategic oil reserves should raise suspicions in 
Russia.59 The expert argues that it does not make sense for the PRC to have such oil reserves, 
(which are typically for purposes of war, and in China’s case, reserved for the event of a war 
with the US and the blocking of oil supplies from Africa and the Middle East) because China is 
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building oil pipelines from Russia and Central Asia that the US would ‘certainly’ not be able to 
disrupt in a war.60 
On the possibility of Chinese expansion by force 
As explained above, Khramchikhin’s view on whether China has posed as a military threat to 
Russia over the period of interest is a marginal one in Russia’s expert community. This section 
now moves on to an investigation of the dominant view, which is more moderate, avoiding both 
excessive optimism and alarmism. It begins by examining some texts from the content analysis 
that respond directly to Khramchikhin’s writings. 
Views likely to have influence 
Kumachev and Kazennov argue in 2010 that, while there are weaknesses in Russia’s military 
relative to China’s capabilities in northeast Asia, it is necessary to also consider ‘intentions’ and 
‘limiting and constraining factors’ when determining whether the PRC poses a national security 
threat to Russia.61 The experts posit that, ‘paradoxically’, the disparity between the general 
forces of Russia and China in itself deters China from attack.62 Since Russia’s conventional 
forces in the RFE would be immediately overrun, there would inevitably be a ‘quick and 
spasmodic “vertical escalation”’ to the level of nuclear war.63 Kumachev and Kazennov explain 
that 
‘the main role for [China’s] existence is played by the highly organized, over-urban segment of the 
territorial structure, in which, to a certain degree, the whole modern potential of China is 
concentrated … Such a nodal-hierarchical structure of the economy and management is 
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characterized by the presence of key, critical points, which makes it extremely vulnerable, with a 
sharply reduced threshold of unacceptable damage. And in a hypothetical conflict with Russia, the 
PRC loses almost all of the things for which, in fact, the development of the Chinese nation is 
being carried out at this historical stage. Therefore, a forceful policy towards a state that possesses 
powerful … means of nuclear missile deterrence is doomed to failure’.64 
This paragraph contains one of the main points of disagreement between these experts and 
Khramchikhin. Kumachev and Kazennov imply that it is unlikely that the PRC would risk 
massive retaliation on its urban centers by invading the RFE, whereas Khramchikhin argues that 
China may decide at any point that Moscow would not risk attacking large cities in China in 
response to an invasion of the RFE out of fear of nuclear retaliation on cities in the European part 
of Russia. 
Kumachev and Kazennov argue that, in addition to the enormous risk the PRC would take by 
invading the RFE, China is inclined to solve its geopolitical problems in a way so as not arouse 
fear of its growing power and suspicions of aggressiveness.65 According to the experts, Russia is 
appreciated as a ‘reliable rear’ at the highest levels of the PRC in the context of China’s pursuit 
of its ultimate aim to ensure the realization of its economic interests by expanding its security 
perimeter.66 Kumachev and Kazennov also claim that China is much more focused on the issues 
of reuniting with Taiwan and its rivalry with the US, which includes the missile defense system 
that the PRC perceives as being not as much intended for North Korea as it is for China.67 The 
experts offer an opinion regarding China’s intentions towards Russia: the PRC ‘absolutely 
sincerely does not intend to implement its long-term plans in relation to Russia with the help of 
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military force, but hopes for a deep complex interaction’, which includes China ‘sucking [natural 
resources] through a straw’.68 To Kumachev and Kazennov, there is no military threat from 
China. However, there is a threat of peaceful expansion, and whether such expansion occurs 
depends a lot on Russia itself regarding how effectively it can address the RFE’s demographic 
and economic problems. In the view of the experts, the worst-case scenario involves a sort of 
‘huaqiaoization’ of parts of the RFE, but without any formal challenges to Russia’s sovereignty 
over the territory.69 
Finally, Kumachev and Kazennov address the US factor in the question of whether China poses a 
military threat to Russia. The experts point out that the US would not want China to gain control 
over Russia’s eastern territories, and in their view ‘the United States objectively should be 
almost the first to defend Russia's territorial integrity in Asia’.70 Moreover, China ‘is interested 
in the Russian Federation as the most important element of regional and global strategic balance, 
and therefore it is unlikely that it will “destroy” the existing balance of forces with its own 
hands’.71 
Kozlov, in responding directly to an article by Khramchikhin in which he claims that the US 
European missile defense system does not threaten Russia, argues that Khramchikhin made a 
number of mistakes in his analysis.72 The expert addresses an argument by Khramchikhin that 
‘China, unlike Iran, actually threatens humanity, and this is perhaps the biggest threat to 
humanity in its entire existence’, and the assertion that Russia should join the US against China 
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rather than vice versa.73 First, the retired lieutenant colonel and Doctor of Physics and 
Mathematics puts forth a detailed argument that the American missile defense system in Europe 
may very well threaten Russia, and concludes that Khramchikhin’s argument is ‘at least 
premature and unreasonable’.74 Regarding Khramchikhin’s views on Chinese expansion, Kozlov 
argues that, while it is ‘necessary to take into account the possibility of inappropriate behavior of 
China in the future’, ‘it does not make sense to predict [italics added] the situation around China 
for the near future, especially the distant future, since such a multifactorial task relates to 
probability theories and mathematical statistics with many unknown inputs’.75 
Former President of the Republic of Sakha, Nikolaev, argues for a strong military presence in the 
RFE, but only to balance against a potential or hypothetical threat from China. In 2010, Nikolaev 
wrote that ‘the current state of affairs on our borders with Japan and China, of course, hardly 
threatens Russia in the near future with any serious, let alone armed conflict’, however, in his 
view, while there is little chance of an armed conflict in the near future, there is still the 
possibility that at some point the PRC may make official territorial claims against Russia, and 
because of this, Moscow should ensure that the balance of power between the two countries in 
the region is strengthened in favor of Russia.76 
It should be noted that, as a statesmen of a federal subject of the RFE, Nikolaev may have been 
acting the interest of the local population to attract as much money as possible from the federal 
military budget for the RFE by conveying the view that China is a potential or hypothetical 
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threat, and that Russia should be prepared for the contingency that it becomes a direct threat 
without necessarily believing that it is likely that such a situation will occur. 
A specific example of why China does not pose a military threat to Russia is offered by Arbatov, 
who wrote in an article published by Russia in Global Politics that it was ‘difficult to imagine’ 
that within the following 10-15 years China would pose a military threat to Russia because their 
relations are developing very successfully, and China needs Russian military equipment and 
production licenses.77 For Arbatov, if there were a conflict of interests in the future, it would be 
because ‘factors and trends’ in the RFE that would ‘create prerequisites for a conflict of 
interest’.78 
Reshetnikov, in an interview with Red Star, said that claims of a threat from China are not 
justified.79 The expert explains that the military threat from China is only potential, and that at 
the moment an attack on Russia and the seizure of resources in the RFE would be far too costly 
for two main reasons: the attack would deprive China of a ‘solid rear’ and a ‘reliable partner’; 
and it is doubtful that China would be able to take on the colossal task of developing, or 
‘absorbing’, as he put it, the resources of the region, as it would take ‘enormous resources, strain 
of all forces, and therefore time’.80 
Karaganov argues that the use of military force and the threat of its use has gradually been losing 
its significance.81 The expert explains that: 
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‘The changed political culture and structure of the economy makes it economically pointless to 
seize territories and the people living on them. It is not possible to keep them under control. The 
population cannot be exploited to their advantage … In the era of truly mass communications, 
which impede (though not cancel) the targeted manipulation of information, the moral and political 
cost of using military force rises, especially when it comes to its large-scale and long-term use. It is 
to a certain extent delegated. If before war, to paraphrase Clausewitz’s formula imposed on his 
teeth, was a normal continuation of politics, now, after two world wars and the advent of nuclear 
weapons, the use of military force is more often regarded as a political failure’.82 
Karaganov explains that the delegitimization and the limited efficacy of the use of military force 
is largely due to mass communications and the risk of escalation to nuclear war and argues that 
Russia will not be threatened by any large-scale military threat in the foreseeable future, 
including from China. The expert explains that claims by experts that a large-scale military threat 
to Russia exists are by those representing ‘the remnants of the financially and intellectually 
drained academic part of the Soviet military-industrial complex’ who stoke fears in an effort to 
get more money from the Ministry of Defense.83 In the expert’s view, regarding the RFE, the 
threat facing the region is not a military one, but rather a sort of ‘Finlandization’ that could result 
from the region’s inadequate ‘pace and quality of … internal development’.84 According to 
Karaganov, Russia’s military strengthening and modernization is not a response to any large-
scale threat, but rather an effort to improve and maintain Russia’s ‘international positioning’ and 
to ‘compensate for the relative weakness in other factors of strength - economic, technological, 
ideological and psychological’.85 The expert writes that the time has come to ‘get rid of the 








remnants of the “yellow threat” myth’, and called on readers ‘to know Asian history and your 
place in it’.86 
Given the qualifications of Kumachev, Kazennov, Arbatov, Reshetnikov, and Karaganov and the 
fact that most of them have served the Russian government or military, it is reasonable to argue 
that it is likely that the views the experts convey in the articles referenced above have directly or 
indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers. 
The dominant view among Russian experts identified in this section on the question of whether 
China poses a military threat to the RFE is that there has been no such threat throughout the 
period of interest. The main reason for the absence of a military threat, according to the experts, 
is that forceful expansion into the RFE is harmful to Chinese interests. The cost of aggression 
against Russia and the implications of a large-scale conflict for China’s fragile socio-economic 
state make the option unattractive. China’s policy is perceived as being aimed at ensuring good 
relations with Russia in order to maintain a reliable strategic rear for the contingency of a 
conflict with the US. The idea of a military threat from China is occasionally addressed in the 
Russian expert community, but it is almost always framed as a purely hypothetical threat. 
Underlying this dominant view is the perception that China’s leadership is rational when 
considering possible uses of its military power against Russia. This perception of China’s 
rationality is interesting, given that the PRC attacked Soviet troops at the border in 1969 despite 
the inferiority of its forces. The texts do not go into the level of depth required to explain the 
basis of the experts’ perception of China’s rationality in recent decades. When considering 
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possible reasons why the experts perceive China as rational regarding this issue, it is necessary to 
think outside of ‘objective’ mutual interests and cost-benefit analysis, since in these areas 
rationality is presupposed. One of the main causes of the Sino-Soviet split, the peak of which 
was the border clashes, was ideological differences between the communist parties of the Soviet 
Union and Maoist China. Beginning in the late 1980s, Russia-China relations were de-
ideologized and a more pragmatic basis for the relations was established. It could be that, for 
these experts who perceive China as rational, the absence of ideological conflict is a necessary 
condition for the PRC to conduct a rational policy towards Russia. Indeed, as referenced in the 
official rhetoric analysis in the Appendix, Russian Ambassador to the PRC Sergei Razov said in 
a speech in 2009 that the successful development of Russia-China relations was only possible 
with the de-ideologization of their relations.87 Ambassador Andrei Denisov explained in 2017 
that ‘[the Soviet Union and China] had allied relations in the 50s. They were then based on 
ideological identity and bloc solidarity. It did not lead to anything good. Our current alliance is 
de-ideologized. This means that it is entirely based on mutual interests’.88 
This is not to say that the development of Russia-China relations over the last two decades has 
not been based on ideas. One of the arguments this thesis makes is that ideational convergence 
may have contributed to the avoidance of confrontation. Such convergence is based on the fight 
against the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism in Central Asia, the 
‘Shanghai Spirit’, which includes mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for 
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cultural diversity, and pursuit of common development, the rejection of unipolarity in favor of 
multipolarity, and the promotion of certain principles of international law such as non-
interference in internal affairs. In this view, when there is an absence of ideological conflict and 
ideas that are considered fundamental by both sides are shared, China’s actions towards Russia 
may be perceived as rational. 
The quantitative results presented in chapter 4 show that after coders indicated the presence of a 
perception of an absence of threat in the text analyzed, in response to the follow up request to 
select a sentence that best describes why, according to the text, China does not pose a threat to 
Russia, the sentence indicating a sufficient military deterrent (including nuclear weapons) was 
only the fifth most frequently selected after ‘none of the above’. The dominant view identified is 
reflected in the quantitative finding that the two most frequently selected sentences describing 
the reason for a given perception of an absence of threat from China indicated a lack of conflict 
of interest with, and harmful intentions from, China. 
Policy 
Russia’s security policy behavior has tended to be more consistent with the view that the rise of 
China does not pose a security threat to the RFE than the view that it does in two main ways: 
continued compliance with the border arms reduction agreement signed in 1996-1997 and the 
development of cross-border transport infrastructure. 
In accordance with the arms reduction agreement, Russia and China have reduced their armed 
forces on the border, including ground forces, border troops, air forces, and air defense, and the 
number of the forces’ primary weapons within 100 kilometers of the border to a minimum level 




and conducts inspections of the armed forces of each side at the border once a year to ensure that 
they remain at the agreed level. This agreement continues to be observed by Russia despite the 
acknowledgement of experts (discussed above) that China’s conventional capabilities in 
northeast Asia exceed those of Russia. 
Reform of the Russian military starting in late 2008 (mainly in response to the uncovering of 
flaws during the war with Georgia) involved changes to the forces in the RFE but did not 
significantly affect the balance of power with China in northeast Asia.89 Initially, the changes 
may have even left the far eastern forces less capable of defending the large territory.90 While the 
Vostok 2010 and 2014 exercises may have been signals to China, there have been no substantial 
increases to the ground forces stationed in the RFE throughout the 2010s, and while the exercises 
demonstrated Russia’s ability to deploy reinforcements to the region in a peaceful context, it 
remains unlikely that such deployments could be replicated in war, and even if they could, it is 
not likely they would significantly affect the result of an invasion by the PLA.91  
Without the bolstering of conventional forces in the RFE, the Vostok 2010 and 2014 exercises 
would be more accurately interpreted as signals to a potential or hypothetical threat rather than to 
a direct threat from China, which is consistent with one of the main findings of this chapter. 
Russia apparently deemed it unnecessary to send another such signal with Vostok 2018, as China 
was invited to participate in the exercise. This provided an opportunity not only for the militaries 
to improve interoperability, but also for China to gain experience operating in the terrain of the 
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RFE and to learn lessons from the Russian military’s combat experience in Syria. Consequently, 
it is likely that the exercise contributed to the building of trust between the militaries as several 
other Russia-China military exercises likely have. If the dominant perceptions among Russian 
officials of the implications of China’s rise on Russia’s security interests included a serious 
concern about the probability of a military incursion into the RFE by the PLA, then it would be 
reasonable to expect a buildup of conventional forces in the RFE in an effort to reach parity with 
China’s forces. Additionally, the PLA would not have been invited to participate in Vostok 2018. 
There also may have been changes in Russia’s willingness to comply with the 1996-1997 border 
arms reduction agreement ranging from the suspension of inspections to a full withdrawal from 
the agreement. 
In the extreme scenario that China invades the RFE, bridges across the Amur River would prove 
valuable for the swift transport of forces. If dominant perceptions included a serious concern 
about the probability of such an event, it is doubtful the Russian decisionmakers would support 
the construction of bridges connecting the countries. In 2013, an agreement on the construction 
of the Nizheleninskoye-Tongjiang bridge was signed, and construction was completed in 2019. 
In 2014 a declaration of intent to begin construction on the Blagoveshchensk-Heihe bridge was 
made and in 2019 construction was completed. 
Another infrastructure development that reflects a lack of a perception of threat of a Chinese 
military invasion of the RFE is the adaptation of some Russian railways to include a ‘Chinese 
gauge’. Russian railways use the 1520mm gauge whereas the Chinese use the international 
standard gauge of 1435mm. At a ‘break of gauge’ (where one gauge standard meets another) the 
most common practices are to either load the freight and/or passengers of the trains on one gauge 




gauge, both of which take a considerable amount of time. The inclusion of the 1435mm gauge 
allows for near seamless cross-border railway transportation, which has significant security 
implications. 
There are currently four railway crossings at the Russian and Chinese border—Zabaikalsk-
Manzhouli, Grodekovo-Suifenhe, Nizheleninskoye-Tongjiang, and Makhalino-Hunchun—the 
first two of which still have a break of gauge. The Nizheleninskoye-Tongjiang was designed to 
accommodate both the 1520mm and 1435mm gauges, allowing trains from China to enter Russia 
without having to stop for mechanical reasons. The Grodekovo-Suifenhe and Makhalino-
Hunchun railway crossings are being adapted to accommodate both gauges as a part of Russia’s 
plan to develop the Primorye-1 and Primorye-2 International Transport Corridors, which will 
allow for China’s quicker access to the Russian ports of Zarubino, Posyet, Vladivostok, and 
Nakhodka for the export of its goods.92 The Zabaikalsk station is undergoing large-scale 
reconstruction that began in 2012. The reconstruction includes the installation of a new narrow-
gauge sorting system, which will allow for much faster transitions from one gauge to another.93 
Continued compliance with the arms reduction agreement on the border, the lack of a Russian 
military buildup to counter China’s conventional superiority, and the development of 
infrastructure that facilitates border crossings are more consistent with the dominant expert view 
identified in this chapter that China does not pose a military threat to the RFE than the view that 
                                                             
92 Vesti Primorye. ‘Zheleznui͡ u Dorogu po Ktaĭskomu Standartu Sobirai͡ utsi͡ a Postroitʹ v Primorʹe (A Railway 
According to the Chinese Standard is Going to Be Built in Primorye)’. 13/10/2018. Available at 
https://vestiprim.ru/news/ptrnews/69068-zheleznuyu-dorogu-po-kitayskomu-standartu-sobirayutsya-postroit-v-
primore.html. Accessed 27/12/2020; and Olga Dobrolyubova. ‘Grodekovo Perekhodit na Kitaĭskui͡ u Kolei͡ u 
(Grodekovo Switches to the Chinese Track). ZR Press. 29/11/2019. Available at 
https://zrpress.ru/business/primorje_29.11.2019_96574_grodekovo-perekhodit-na-kitajskuju-koleju.html. Accessed 
27/12/2020. 
93 Bamstroymekhanizatsiya. ‘Rekonstrukt͡ sii͡ a Sortirovochnoĭ Sistemy Stant͡ siĭ Zabaĭkalʹsk (Reconstruction of the 
Sorting System of Zabaikalsk Station)’. 10/04/2018. Available at http://bsmuk.ru/press-




China currently or is likely at some point in the near- or medium-term to pose such a threat. 
Relevant perceptions conveyed in fundamental official documents (e.g. national security 
strategies, foreign policy concepts, etc.) are also consistent with the former view. This is because 
China is referenced neither directly nor indirectly (e.g. with the term ‘some countries’ in a 
certain geographical location) in such documents as a threat to national security with regard to 
the RFE. In contrast, there are clear expressions of concern over military encroachment on 
Russia’s western borders and over continuing threats in the form of terrorism, drug trafficking, 
and organized crime.94 
The ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 outlines a framework for analysis that has been 
followed in this chapter.95 Based on the finding that the dominant expert view regarding Russia’s 
security policies in the RFE relevant to China are held by experts with a high level of potential 
influence on average, the chapter concludes that it is likely that the view has been successfully 
communicated directly or indirectly to foreign policy decisionmakers. This is case 1 in the 
framework. Given case 1, scenarios 1 or 2 are more likely than scenarios 3 and 4.96 This means 
that it is likely that once the dominant view was successfully communicated to the officials, the 
                                                             
94 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’. 
01/12/2016. Articles 14-17, 33, 35, 55, 64, 70, 92, and 97. Available at 
https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248. 
Accessed 20/04/2021; Government of the Russian Federation. ‘O Strategii Nat͡ sionalʹnoĭ Bezopasnosti Rossiĭskoĭ 
Federat͡ sii (On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation)’. Articles 22, 43, 44, 47, 90. 31/12/2015. 
Available at https://www.mchs.gov.ru/dokumenty/ukazy-prezidenta-rf/2933. Accessed 17/04/2021; and Government 
of the Russian Federation. ‘O Strategii Nat͡ sionalʹnoĭ Bezopasnosti Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡ sii do 2020 Goda (On the 
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020)’. 12/05/2009. Articles 10, 17, 37, 38, 40, and 41. 
Available at https://76.mchs.gov.ru/deyatelnost/napravleniya-deyatelnosti/grazhdanskaya-zashchita/organizaciya-
meropriyatiy-grazhdanskoy-oborony/normativno-pravovye-akty/federalnye-zakony/ukaz-prezidenta-rf-ot-12-maya-
2009-g-n-537-o-strategii-nacionalnoy-bezopasnosti-rossiyskoy-federacii-do-2020-goda. Accessed 17/04/2021. 
95 pp. 80-86. 
96 Scenario 3 would be considered most likely if the dominant expert views were held by those with a high level of 
potential influence on average and Russia’s policies were not consistent with the views. Scenario 4 would be 





dispositional factors (perceptions and values) of the officials either changed to become more 
aligned with, or less contradictory to, the dominant view (scenario 1), or the officials’ preexisting 
dispositional factors were reinforced by the dominant view (scenario 2). In both scenarios, 
dispositional factors that inform the dominant views are likely shared to the point that policy is 
consistent with the views (in scenario 1, they are shared after the communication, and in scenario 
2, they are shared before and after the communication). Therefore, the dispositional factors 
inherent in the views would explain the policies. Such factors include the perception that China 
would not commit an aggressive act on the RFE if such an act would be harmful to its interests; 
and the perception that an aggressive act from China on the RFE would be against China’s 
interests. 
Conclusion 
This chapter approaches the research question of the thesis with an examination of the 
perceptions of Russian experts on the demographic and military security of the RFE vis-à-vis 
China. The first section begins by examining expert texts that focus on the demographic 
imbalance between the RFE and neighboring Chinese provinces and include discussions on the 
implications of such imbalance from a security perspective. The section reveals that the 
dominant view among experts throughout the period of interest is that there is no threat of mass 
immigration from China. For reasons that remain unclear, the experts rarely explain why there is 
an absence of such a threat. This may be because they view the lack of an immigration threat 
from China as self-evident. This explanation seems more likely than the alternative that they 
have no reasons for their beliefs. Larin, in a rare instance of presenting an argument supporting 
the view that there is no threat of mass immigration from China to the RFE, explains that there is 




region, and that it is not uncommon for those who do to experience harassment and beatings.97 
Kamynin offers similar reasoning.98 The question of which hypothesis this finding may support 
depends on the nature of the threat of mass immigration from China to the RFE. If the threat of 
mass immigration to the RFE is thought to be due to incentives created by Beijing, then the 
findings support hypothesis 1 because the perception of an absence of threat stems from China’s 
lack of harmful intentions towards Russia.99 If the threat of mass immigration is thought to be 
due to the interests of Chinese immigrants without an incentive created by Beijing, and the 
interests of the immigrants are included in the definition of ‘China’s interests’, then the finding 
supports hypothesis 3 because the perception of an absence of threat stems from the non-
conflictual nature of the interests of Russia and China.100 
The second section analyzes texts that address the question of whether China poses a military 
threat to the RFE. The content analysis finds that the dominant view among Russian experts is 
that, although there is significant disparity in conventional military power in favor of China in 
northeast Asia, there is no direct military threat. Reasons for this conclusion hinge on four 
themes identified in the experts’ arguments: (1) the socio-economic fragility or vulnerability of 
the PRC, (2) China’s interests, (3) the cost of aggression against Russia (which is strongly 
related to the first two themes), and (4) the idea that a military threat may exist from China, but it 
is only hypothetical or potential, not direct. This finding supports hypothesis 1 in that, in this 
view, Beijing does not intend to harm Russia by means of military aggression.101 The finding 
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supports hypothesis 2 in that it consists of the notion that China would not risk military 
aggression against the RFE because of its socio-economic vulnerability in the form of its 
concentrated urban centers driving nearly all of the country’s development progress.102 Finally, 
the finding supports hypothesis 3 in that, as it is not in China’s interest to forcefully expand into 
the RFE, the interests of the countries in this sense are non-conflictual.103 
The final section examines Russia’s policies relevant to the security of the RFE vis-à-vis China 
with the aim of determining the extent to which they are consistent with the dominant views of 
experts identified by the content analysis. Three main policies indicate the lack of a perception of 
threat from the rise of China among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. First, Russian forces 
on the Chinese border have remained at a minimum level and the Chinese have been allowed to 
inspect such forces annually in accordance with the 1996-1997 agreements on the 
demilitarization of the border. Second, despite the PLA’s conventional superiority over the 
Russian military in northeast Asia since the 1990s, Russia has not built up its forces in the region 
in response. Third, Russia has been making improvements to cross-border transit infrastructure 
that allow for quicker and easier access to the RFE in the form of bridges over the Amur River 
(Nizheleninskoye-Tongjiang and Blagoveshchensk-Heihe), the addition of 1435mm railway 
gauges (Grodekovo-Suifenhe and Makhalino-Hunchun), and the installation of a new narrow-
gauge sorting system that will allow for quicker transition from the 1435mm gauge to the 
Russian 1520mm gauge (Zabaikalsk-Manzhouli). It is unlikely that such policies would be 
authorized and implemented if there were a dominant perception among Russian foreign policy 
                                                             
102 The hypothesis states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider nuclear deterrence to be one of the 
main reasons why the rise of China does not threaten Russia. 
103 The hypothesis states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider the compatibility or non-conflictual 




decisionmakers of a military threat from a rising China. Given that the dominant views held by 
potentially influential experts identified in the chapter are consistent with the policies, the 
chapter concludes that scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ 
section in chapter 2 are most likely. 
In relation to other arguments in Western literature on Russia-China relations, the findings of this 
chapter are partly contradictory and partly supportive. It has become less common in recent years 
to argue or imply that fear of mass immigration from China to the RFE significantly influences 
Russian foreign policy towards China, but such work is found throughout most of the period of 
interest.104 The results of the analysis presented in this chapter do not provide evidence that 
perceptions of a demographic threat in the form of mass immigration from China to the RFE are 
prevalent among Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military or Russian 
foreign policy decisionmakers. 
Literature that refers to various Chinese interests and the way they would be negatively affected 
by an aggressive policy towards Russia in arguments that China does not pose a direct military 
threat to the RFE is supported by the findings of this chapter.105 One main finding of the chapter 
that is not commonly found in Western literature on Russia-China relations is that Russia’s 
security policy in the RFE is significantly affected by the perceived socio-economic vulnerability 
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of China in the form of its concentrated urban centers driving nearly all of the country’s 
development progress. The vulnerability contributes (along with a perceived lack of harmful 
intentions) to Moscow’s confidence that it is highly unlikely that China would risk military 
aggression towards the RFE, and therefore frees Russia from the burden of balancing against 
China’s superior conventional military power in northeast Asia. 
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Chapter 6: Economic Interaction in Central Asia 
This chapter contributes to this thesis by addressing an area of significant economic interests of 
Russia that has been directly affected by the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). The economic importance of Central Asia for Russia is evidenced by Moscow’s bilateral 
efforts for economic engagement as well as its multilateral economic integrative efforts that have 
resulted in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Russia’s economic interests in Central Asia 
mainly consist of access to, and transport of, the region’s energy resources. Central Asian 
countries also provide export markets for Russian goods and a source of inexpensive labor. 
China is interested in access to Central Asia’s energy resources and export markets for Chinese 
goods. Additionally, Beijing is interested in the region’s participation in its Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), an ambitious plan to revitalize and modernize the overland and maritime Silk 
Roads connecting China to Europe. The overland route traverses Central Asia, hence Beijing’s 
efforts to reach agreements with countries of the region on infrastructure development projects. 
China also views the economic development of the region as a preventive measure against social 
unrest and instability which would have the potential to spread into Xinjiang province (Uygur 
Autonomous Region). 
Since both Russia and China have vital economic interests in the region, it has been considered a 
hotspot for potential rivalry or even conflict between them. The aim of this chapter is to explain 
why economic tensions between Russia and China have not risen to the point conflict, focusing 
on the views of Russian experts on the implications of China’s economic expansion in Central 




because of the likelihood that some have contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors 
(perceptions and values) of Russian decisionmakers: factors on which Russian foreign policy 
towards China in the region has been based. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, Russia’s economic interaction with China in the region is 
contextualized with a brief overview of the foreign policies of Russia and China towards Central 
Asia since 1991. The chapter then turns to the results of the content analysis of Russian expert 
perceptions. The results are presented in two sections: one on perceptions of the more general 
subject of China’s economic activity, interests, and economic interaction with Russia in Central 
Asia; and another on perceptions of the more specific and recent subject of China’s BRI, its 
implications for Russia’s interests in Central Asia, and its interaction with the EAEU. 
The first of these sections reveals two dominant trends in Russian expert thought on China’s 
economic activity, interests, and economic interaction with Russia in Central Asia: first, China’s 
economic interests in Central Asia are ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’; and second, 
economic competition between Russia and China exists, but it is limited and manageable. The 
section also identifies some skepticism and cautious optimism among experts regarding China’s 
economic activity in Central Asia. 
The second section reveals two dominant trends in Russian expert thought on China’s BRI, its 
implications for Russia’s interests in Central Asia, and its interaction with the EAEU: first, the 
BRI and its linking with the EAEU is beneficial to Russia; and second, the BRI and EAEU are 
compatible initiatives, and their linking will lead to mutual enhancing effects or synergy. The 
section also identifies some skepticism and cautious optimism among Russian experts regarding 




chapter then reports the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis relevant to the 
perceptions of China’s establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The 
analysis finds a dominant view of benefits and an absence of loss, which are indicative of 
positive-sum thinking among Russian experts with connections to the Russian government or 
military, and likely among foreign policy decisionmakers. It also finds that the AIIB is widely 
viewed not only as a challenge to ‘traditional’ Western-led international financial institutions, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also as a source of 
division between the US and its most important allies. 
The final section discusses Russia’s policies in Central Asia relevant to its economic interaction 
with China in the region. It is argued that Russia’s blocking of the development of multilateral 
economic cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and protectionist 
measures against Chinese imports to the EAEU do not necessarily indicate a perception of threat 
from China’s economic expansion in Central Asia. The section offers the following 
interpretation of these policies, which is consistent with the dominant expert views found in this 
chapter and to two other main policies in the region: the linking of the EAEU and BRI beginning 
in 2015 and the 2018 EAEU-China trade agreement. A lack of protectionism and unchecked 
Chinese economic activity in Central Asia could be destabilizing because of resulting growth in 
anti-Chinese sentiments and the failure of domestic businesses that cannot compete with Chinese 
goods. However, a complete lack of Chinese economic activity, including economic cooperation 
with Central Asian countries, could also be destabilizing because of resulting economic 
stagnation and insufficient access to affordable consumer goods. It is also acknowledged in 
Russia that China’s economic expansion in Central Asia in the form of investments and 




Russia and China to be important for maintaining stability in the region. Stability in Central Asia 
is a primary and mutual interest of Russia and China, and both understand the risks of growing 
anti-Chinese sentiments and a lack of economic development. In this context, Russia’s economic 
balancing policies combined with the linking of the EAEU and BRI beginning in 2015 and the 
2018 EAEU-China trade agreement creates a picture of economic interaction between Russia and 
China in Central Asia characterized not by confrontation and rivalry moving towards conflict but 
rather by manageable competition moving with caution towards a higher degree of cooperation 
and coordination in the mutual interest of regional stability. Such policies are consistent with the 
dominant views of potentially influential experts identified. Therefore, the chapter concludes that 
scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 are 
most likely. 
Context 
The period of interest of this thesis is 2000 to 2020. However, it is necessary to provide context 
to Russia’s foreign policy towards China in Central Asia with a brief overview of the role of 
Central Asia in the foreign policies of Russia and China since the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. Russian foreign policy from 1991 to the mid-1990s can be understood as almost entirely 
univector, focusing the vast majority of efforts on continued rapprochement and integration with 
the West. There was also a popular view in Russia that Central Asia was for too long a burden 
for Russia: a backwater. In addition to the prioritization of the West and a lack of interest in 
Central Asia, the Russian government was constrained by efforts for state survival. Domestic 
conditions were largely chaotic due to economic ‘shock therapy’, a fall in living standards, the 
rise of criminal organizations, the 1993 constitutional crisis and the shelling of the Russian 




disillusioned with the West for reasons including the perceived failure of the Western model of 
liberal democracy and free market economy in Russia; inadequate support from the West in 
transitioning to such a model; unwillingness of the West to treat Russia as an equal partner; 
accusations of human rights violations in Chechnya; failure to swiftly attain membership in 
GATT and later the WTO; NATO’s eastward expansion, etc. With the arrival of the ‘Eurasianist’ 
Evgeny Primakov to the office of Foreign Minister in 1996 came renewed interest in Central 
Asia. However, Russia lacked the ability to restore its lost economic presence and influence in 
the region. 
Since 2000, under President Putin the Russian government worked to bring Russian oil and gas 
companies to heel. With the increased influence of the government over the companies, Russia 
gradually regained the ability to pursue its economic interests in Central Asia, which were 
centered on the region’s natural resources. Russian oil and gas companies were increasingly used 
strategically to secure Russian interests rather than pursuing only their own interests according to 
market principles. Through these companies, Russia was willing to pay a higher price for Central 
Asian oil and gas and work to maintain a monopoly over energy transit routes from the region. 
Meanwhile, China began its economic expansion into Central Asia, mostly through bilateral ties 
at first, almost immediately after the countries of the region gained independence from the Soviet 
Union. Like Russia, China was interested in Central Asia’s energy resources. They have been 
viewed as a means to diversify its energy imports away from sources which had import routes to 
China through the Malacca Strait. Dependence on energy passing through the Strait is a strategic 
liability for China because, in the event of a conflict with the US, the US Navy could block this 
supply of energy by occupying the Strait. China is also interested in accessing Central Asian 




economic development of the region for stabilizing purposes and in infrastructure development 
projects as a part of the BRI, which aims to better connect China to the markets of Europe. 
According to some analysts in Russia and the West, because both Russia and China have major 
economic interests in the region, there is a lot of potential for a clash of interests, which could 
result in conflict. Despite such analysis, Russia and China have so far been able to avoid the 
level of rivalry and tension in the region expected. This section now turns to Russian expert 
perspectives on the topic of China’s economic activity in Central Asia and its economic 
interaction with Russia in the region in an effort to explain why this is the case. Please refer to 
information provided on the institutions and experts in chapter 3 regarding potential influence 
through government or military connections and qualifications. 
Economic Activity, Interests, and Interaction in Central Asia 
Natural interests 
One theme that has been identified by the content analysis of Russian expert publications is the 
framing of China’s economic activity in Central Asia in a way that makes it more acceptable to 
Russia. This is done by describing such activity as ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’, and 
by contextualizing China’s foreign policy towards Central Asia in broader global tendencies, 
most of which hinge on Chinese-US rivalry, US containment policy towards China, and strategic 
preparation for the contingency of conflict with US. 
The trend in Russian expert thought that China’s economic interests and activity in Central Asia 
can be seen as ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’ does not always include an explicit 
statement that such interests and activity can be seen as such. Included in the trend identified by 




point to domestic and foreign forces as motivators for such activity, including rivalry and 
potential conflict with the US, the need for development in Xinjiang for both economic and 
security purposes, and Russia’s integration efforts in the region. 
Views likely to have influence 
Guzenkova and Vinogradov et al. explain in a report published by Russian Institute of Strategic 
Studies (RISS) that China’s prioritization of Central Asia in its foreign policy towards the post-
Soviet space is ‘logical’, not only because of the natural resources, the access to which would 
reduce its dependence on vulnerable sea routes, but also because of geographical proximity, 
historical ties, and common regional problems.1 Moreover, the experts explain that Central Asia 
‘is attractive to the PRC from the point of view of testing various strategic schemes of foreign 
policy, since the system of regional relations is still in its infancy and China has the opportunity 
to actively influence this process, competing not only with Russia, but also with the USA, which 
is also actively affirming its presence in the region’.2 
In an article published by Russia in Global Politics, Vorobyov identifies the economic sphere in 
Central Asia as one in which competition between Russia and China may occur and claims that 
such competition is ‘inevitable and natural’.3 Karataeva, in an article published by RISS, 
dedicates some space to China’s development of transit routes as a part of its BRI and its 
implications.4 The expert identifies the potential threat posed by the US to China’s oversea 
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transport routes as one of the main reasons China began exploring ways to construct land routes 
to Europe.5 Karataeva points out that one of the main aims of China’s BRI, which is part of its 
‘going outside’ strategy, is to improve production capacity in western provinces of China, 
especially Xinjiang, so that the production capacity of China as a whole is distributed more 
evenly across the country.6 The importance of the development of transit in Xinjiang both 
domestically and across the border to Central Asia stems from the fact that 80% of China’s 
exports to the region consists of products made in Xinjiang.7 In an article published by the 
Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Igor Ivanov (ed.) et al. claim that China’s attempts 
to establish the SCO Development Fund, the SCO Development Bank, and an SCO free trade 
zone are seen by the Russian side as stemming from China’s ‘natural desire’ to advance its 
interests using its economic advantages.8 
Given the qualifications of Guzenkova, Vinogradov, Vorobyov, Karataeva, Luzyanin, Petrovsky, 
Kortunov, Karneev, and Denisov and the fact that they have all served in the Russian 
government or worked at an FSBI, it is reasonable to argue that it is likely that the views the 
experts convey in the articles referenced above have directly or indirectly contributed to the 
formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 
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Views not unlikely to have influence 
Regarding Chinese economic interests and activity in the region, Frolova explains in an article 
published by National Defense that China is interested in establishing secure access to natural 
resources that are transported over land in order to diversify away from sources that are either 
situationally unstable (the expert makes an example of Iran, China’s third most important 
supplier of oil at the time) or have vulnerable sea routes to China.9 Frolova points out that China 
is also interested in Central Asia as a resource transit space from the Caspian region and 
eventually from the Persian Gulf, therefore, it is ‘obvious that in the future, the PRC will only 
increase cooperation with the republics of the region in order to increase oil and gas imports with 
the parallel implementation of infrastructure and transport projects in this area’.10 Regarding 
China’s investment in transport infrastructure in Central Asia, the expert writes that its interest in 
such investment is ‘understandable’, given the need of the region’s oil and gas industry for such 
infrastructure as well as the need for the improvement of the rate of China’s exportation of goods 
to the Middle East and Europe.11 
Frolova also identifies specific interests of China in individual Central Asian countries, noting 
that efforts to establish strong bilateral ties have been the PRC’s focus since it failed to create a 
free trade zone including the region.12 The expert identifies China’s interests in individual 
Central Asian countries in the following way: 
‘The main attention of the PRC is now focused on the oil and gas sectors of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, as well as the nuclear industry of Kazakhstan … In the field of transport, Beijing 
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focuses on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and in the field of water resources, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan are coming to the fore’.13 
Frolova explains that China’s interest in establishing free trade zones, including in Central Asia, 
is a response to the strengthening of protectionism worldwide.14 While China was not successful 
in creating a free trade area for the whole of Central Asia, the expert points out that such areas 
were successfully created in the border areas of Irkeshtam and Torugart, Kyrgyzstan and Karasu-
Kulma, Tajikistan.15 
Frolova argues in an article published by RISS that security interests are prioritized over 
economic interests in China’s foreign policy towards Central Asia, but they are tightly 
interconnected.16 In the expert’s view, cooperation with Central Asian countries is in China’s 
national interest because it allows for the creation of favorable conditions for the economic 
development of northwest China.17 The development of northwest China, primarily Xinjiang, is 
important for domestic security as well as for growing consumer demand for Chinese products.18 
The PRC also aims to create favorable conditions in Central Asia for growth in demand for 
Chinese goods, services, and capital.19 Frolova points out that, from the perspective of China’s 
total trade with Central Asian countries, which amounts to less than 1%, the region is 
insignificant, but from the perspective of Xinjiang’s trade with Central Asia, which amounts to 
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about 70% of its trade, the region is very important.20 According to the expert, China is also 
interested in access to Central Asia’s natural resources not only to meet the needs of its growing 
economy, but also to reduce its dependency on resources that are imported through vulnerable 
sea routes.21 
In another article, Frolova explains that China considers economic development and the 
improvement of quality of life as one of the main ways to promote stability and weaken 
separatism, and that the BRI can achieve such an aim and contribute to national security.22 
According to the expert, other aims of the BRI include: ‘expanding China’s authority in 
international affairs and strengthening its economic influence in Asia’; ‘to balance the 
containment policy of China by the United States and its allies in the region’ that ‘can have a 
serious negative impact on China’; and ‘to reduce its dependence on transport routes passing 
through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca’.23 
Frolova neither has a doctorate nor has she held a position in the Russian government or military. 
The expert is a specialist in socio-political commentary and has an MA in Journalism.24 Frolova 
has been engaged in ‘scientific work’ at RISS since 1998, focusing on Russia-China relations and 
China’s economic and foreign policies.25 Despite the lack of a doctorate or history with the 
government or military, given that Frolova has been at RISS (an FSBI) for a considerable amount 
of time and frequently publishes views through it, it is reasonable to argue that it is not unlikely 
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that the expert’s views have directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the 
dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 
This trend in the dominant view of China’s economic activity and interests in Central Asia shows 
a level of understanding that likely would not have been reached if China had been engaging the 
region over the period of interest with disregard to Russian sensitivities (the following chapter 
discusses China’s respect for Russia’s ‘special’ or ‘privileged’ interests in the region). Goodwill 
and accommodation of Russia’s interests in Central Asia have likely been enabling factors for 
the view that China’s interests in the region are ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’. Such a 
view is closely related to perceptions of an absence of unmanageable conflicts of interest and 
harmful intentions from China. These perceptions were the most frequently identified in the 
quantitative aspect of the content analysis regarding reasons for perceptions of an absence of 
threat in the texts analyzed. In the context of managing decline, these perceptions have also been 
important for the formation of a benign image of China, which is one of the most important 
factors in peaceful power transition between declining and rising powers. 
Limited and mitigated competition 
Another recurring theme is the view among Russia experts that, while both Russia and China 
both have major economic interests in Central Asia that may occasionally be contradictory and 
cause some competition, the threat of a clash between the two countries in the region should not 
be exaggerated, as they are able to mitigate the negative effects of competition through dialogue 
at the highest levels of government and institutional mechanisms developed by the SCO. Major 
clashes of interests are also avoided with the help of Beijing’s restraint in Central Asia due to its 
prioritization of maintaining good relations with Moscow and strict adherence to foreign policy 




Views likely to have influence 
In an article published by Strategy of Russia, Luzyanin acknowledges that there are some 
‘discrepancies’ between the interests of Russia and China in Central Asia, however, this does not 
justify expectations for rivalry between the two in the region.26 The expert explains that SCO 
mechanisms ‘mitigate these contradictions, helping to adapt Russian and Chinese interests to the 
needs of infrastructural and socio-economic development in the Shanghai organization zone’.27 
In an article published by Strategy of Russia, Lukyanov compares the newly elected President of 
Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, to a bachelorette who is the target of courting by 
great powers. The expert does not give the sense that he views the Central Asian country as part 
of Russia’s sphere of privileged interests—that Russia is entitled to Turkmenistan—but rather he 
views it as an area of competition in which ‘Russia will need a very serious game’.28 As for the 
interaction of Russia and China in Central Asia in general, Lukyanov views the countries as 
economic competitors in a competition that ‘has not yet manifested itself, since China is 
behaving quite restrained, and does not want to annoy Moscow’.29 
In a RISS report cited above, Guzenkova and Vinogradov et al. write the following regarding 
perceptions of China’s presence in the post-Soviet space. 
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‘China, to a great extent, succeeded in evoking sympathy and reducing wariness regarding its 
presence in the post-Soviet countries through the strict implementation of the fundamental 
principle of foreign policy - the principle of non-interference in internal affairs … Chinese 
diplomacy firmly promises its partners to respect the principles of mutual respect, recognition of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, equality, and mutual benefit and 
peaceful coexistence. Everyone, even the smallest state has a chance to be called a best friend or a 
good partner, which is tied to a great state with bonds of inseparable friendship. The Confucian 
tradition of respectful politeness towards the partner and a declaration of respect for the choice of 
their social system by the peoples and the path of development open many doors that in other cases 
could have remained closed’.30 
Russia in Global Politics published some materials used by the Valdai Discussion Club for a 
report prepared by a research team led by Karaganov under the project management of 
Bordachev.31 Regarding central Eurasia, the team claims that the interests of Russia and China 
‘geographically’ overlap, that there are no major contradictions, and that none of those 
contradictions being discussed are ‘objective or insurmountable’.32 Karaganov et al. explain that  
‘from the point of view of the states that participate in regional cooperation (primarily Russia, 
China, Kazakhstan), Central Eurasia is a territory of cooperation and harmony, and not competition 
of development models or areas of economic orientation. To create conditions for their own growth 
and prosperity, all parties are ready to seek mutually acceptable compromises and take into account 
each other's interests in any areas of cooperation’.33 
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In an article published by RISS, Gubin addresses China’s BRI and its implications for Russia and 
its interests.34 The expert notes that while Western analysts have argued that a clash of interests 
between Russia and China in Central Asia is inevitable, ‘there are no signs of serious discord’.35 
Gubin claims that Russia and China have mutually accommodated each other’s interests in the 
region, with Russia being privileged in the political sphere while China is privileged in the 
economic sphere.36 
In a workbook published by the RIAC, Luzyanin et al. argue that while there are competing 
interests between the two countries in the energy sphere of Central Asia, such competition is not 
hostile because Europe remains the main importer of Russian oil and gas.37 The experts point out 
that there are several areas in which there is no conflict of interest between Russia and China, 
including labor migration, arms supply, transport infrastructure, and mechanical engineering.38 
Luzyanin et al. describe China’s activity in Central Asia as being guided by both its own 
interests as well as ‘the relevance of cooperation’ between Russia and China in the region.39 
According to the experts, the implementation of the BRI will not lead to rivalry and a clash of 
interests, but rather it will allow for further development of Russia and China’s partnership in 
Central Asia.40 The experts prefer to call the EAEU and BRI ‘asymmetric’ rather than 
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contradictory, and they call for the creation of institutions to overcome the asymmetries and 
facilitate cooperation.41  
Given the qualifications of Luzyanin, Lukyanov, Guzenkova, Vinogradov, Karaganov, 
Bordachev, Gubin, Zvyagelskaya, and Kazantsev, that most of them have held positions in the 
Russian government, and that the views they convey in the articles referenced above were 
published by an FSBI and institutions with connections to the Russian government, it is 
reasonable to argue that it is likely that the experts’ views have directly or indirectly contributed 
to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 
This trend in the dominant view of China’s economic activity, interests, and interaction with 
Russia in Central Asia consisting of the perception of a lack of unmanageable conflicts of 
interests is one of the most important factors contributing to the formation of the perception 
among Russian experts and foreign policy decisionmakers that China does not pose a threat to 
Russia. This qualitative finding is reflected in the quantitative results presented in chapter 3. A 
commitment to mutual consultation (a principle of the ‘Shanghai Spirit’) and a commitment to 
the solution of conflicts through frequent dialogue have likely contributed to the formation of the 
perception of a lack of unmanageable conflicts of interest. 
If you can’t beat them, join them 
Lukin has frequently expressed the view that Russia’s refusal to participate in multilateral 
economic cooperation efforts led by China with the intention of slowing China’s economic 
expansion in the region does not work and is contrary to Russia’s interests. 
                                                             




Views likely to have influence 
In an article published by International Life, Lukin analyzes the SCO and Russia’s chairmanship 
of the organization from 2008 to 2009.42 Regarding economic activity in the region, the expert 
points out that in the eight years of the organization’s existence, the SCO has not implemented 
plans for a single multilateral project of economic cooperation, except for two roads, the 
construction of which began before the creation of the SCO. Lukin then explains the points of 
view of China and Russia regarding economic cooperation in the SCO. According to the expert, 
China is ‘seriously disappointed’ in the lack of multilateral economic cooperation in the 
organization and points to the contradiction of Russia’s passivity and lack of interest in such 
cooperation in the SCO and the existence of such cooperation within the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC).43 
Lukin then addresses two main concerns held by the Russian supporters of limiting multilateral 
economic cooperation in the SCO: the high cost of proposed economic projects and China’s 
infringing on Russian interests. The expert questions the first concern by specifying the amount 
of money Russia contributes annually to other international organizations, such as the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the 
Eurasian Economic Bank, and the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the individual sums of 
which are each greater than the entire SCO budget. Lukin then asks whether these organizations 
are so important that Russia cannot come up with adequate resources for the SCO. The expert 
challenges the validity of the second concern with three main points. First, Russia and China are 
equal members of the SCO, as they contribute the same amount to the annual budget and the 
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organization only adopts decisions by consensus. Second, China’s expansion of economic 
influence in Central Asia is already happening despite Russia’s lack of economic cooperation in 
the SCO. Lukin adds that this unwillingness to cooperate occasionally leads to unnecessary 
competition, and that ‘active cooperation with China in Central Asia in the economic field will 
create an opportunity for a coordinated policy and mutual consideration of interests’.44 Third, 
Lukin claims that the view that China is attempting to plunder Central Asia at the expense of 
Russia’s interests is false. The expert supports this claim by arguing that China is primarily 
interested in stability and development in Central Asia, and that China is not as interested in 
trade because of its small scale, pointing out that China’s trade with all of Central Asia and 
Russia amounted to just 3.3% of its total trade. 
In addition to the effort to debunk the concerns of Russian supporters of limiting economic 
cooperation with China within the SCO, Lukin posits that the lack of such cooperation will lead 
to the strengthening of the economic presence of the West in the region, especially the EU and its 
member states. The expert also argues that, ironically, a lack of economic cooperation with 
China in the SCO will lead to what Russian supporters of limiting economic cooperation fear: an 
expansion of Chinese economic influence in Central Asia at the expense of Russian interests. 
While Lukin argues against limiting multilateral economic cooperation in the SCO, he implies 
that such cooperation should proceed with caution by acknowledging that China often 
exaggerates the stabilizing effects of trade and development, and expresses the view that China 
needs to ‘clarify the social and political dangers to which the hasty opening of the markets of 
Central Asian states can lead to’.45 In sum, Lukin argues that China’s economic influence is 






going to expand in Central Asia whether Russia engages in multilateral economic cooperation in 
the region or not. With Russia’s participation in such cooperation, it will at least be possible to 
coordinate interests, avoid unnecessary competition, and strengthen Russia and China’s 
economic presence in Central Asia relative to that of the West. 
In an article published by Strategy of Russia, Lukin reiterates his claim that ignoring China’s 
efforts for multilateral economic cooperation in the SCO will not stop China’s strengthening of 
its role in the SCO at the expense of the interests of the other member states and makes an 
example of China’s unilateral allocation of $10 billion for SCO trade development.46 
In an article published by Russia in Global Politics, Lukin claims that ‘Beijing recognizes 
traditional Russian interests in the region, and Moscow welcomes the stabilizing Chinese 
economic presence’.47 The expert acknowledges that ‘a number of Russian ministries believe 
that if the [SCO] bank is created, then China, with greater financial capabilities, will dominate it, 
and Russian interests are more likely to actively use the Eurasian Development Bank created 
within the EurAsEC, in which the Russian share significantly exceeds the shares of other 
participants’.48 Lukin writes that this position ‘seems shortsighted’, arguing, as he has elsewhere, 
that China already has the ability to unilaterally dominate the region economically regardless of 
whether the SCO bank is created, and that if Russia allows for the creation of the bank and 
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participates in it, projects in Russia could be funded and Russia would be able to influence 
China’s participation in the bank.49 
In the Bulletin of MGIMO, the results of the 2010 SCO forum reported by Lukin were published. 
The expert was the head of the delegation of seven Russian experts sent to the forum. Lukin 
reported that at the forum ‘most participants agreed that economic cooperation within the 
framework of the SCO is not sufficiently effective, and at the multilateral level, it is practically 
not conducted at all’.50 Chinese participants characteristically advocated spurring economic 
cooperation within the SCO.51 Lukin, in a speech he gave at the forum, pointed out that 
proposals for the creation of the SCO Development Fund and anti-crisis fund are rejected by the 
governments of some of the member states despite Russian experts’ arguments that such 
rejection is groundless and harmful.52 The report makes conclusions and recommendations that 
the SCO needs to follow if it is to develop into a real organization and avoid becoming ‘another 
club for discussion by regional leaders’.53 One of these recommendations is to develop 
multilateral economic cooperation, which was being blocked by Russia’s economic ministries. 
The report calls such blocking ‘shortsighted’ and ‘extremely harmful’, and argues that it 
‘undermines Russian influence in the region’ and ‘will soon lead to the loss by Russia of a 
significant number of economic positions in Central Asia due to the growing influence of China 
and the EU’.54 Lukin also repeats his argument that China has the power to economically 
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dominate Central Asia unilaterally, and that multilateral economic cooperation within the SCO at 
least gives Russia the opportunity to coordinate its interests with those of China.55 
Lukin’s arguments are relevant to Russia’s management of its decline relative to China. 
Throughout the period of interest, Russia has joined Chinese institutions and projects active in 
Central Asia, including the SCO, the AIIB, and the BRI. Lukin stresses repeatedly that China’s 
economic expansion will happen with or without Russia’s participation, and that Beijing will 
deal with Central Asian countries bilaterally if necessary, which would leave Moscow relatively 
uninformed. In addition to the logic of having influence with a seat at the table, the idea that 
Russia may be better able to defend its interests from within China’s institutions and projects 
because of easier access to information on China’s activity in Central Asia has likely contributed 
to reasoning behind the decision to participate. This case forms an empirical basis for the 
contribution of theoretical insight this thesis makes to the literature on managing decline. Such 
insight consists of the notion that, in some cases, powers in decline may be motivated to 
participate in the institutions and projects of rising powers in order to gain access to information 
that would allow them to more easily defend their interests. 
Skepticism and cautious optimism 
The trends in Russian expert thought on China in Central Asia identified above are essentially 
cautiously optimistic or forgiving. However, the content analysis also revealed some skepticism 
among Russian experts regarding the implications of China’s economic activity in the region for 
Russian interests. 





Views likely to have influence 
In a report published by the Valdai Discussion Club, Bordachev et al. observe that China’s 
intention seems to be to strengthen the economic dependence of Russia and Central Asia on 
China to the extent that, in the event of a crisis, they would have no choice but to remain loyal to 
the PRC.56 The experts predict that China will more assertively pursue its economic interests in 
Central Asia while worrying less about Moscow’s reaction.57 At the same time, ‘China will 
generally try to avoid major frictions with Russia in the region’.58 
In another report published by the Valdai Discussion Club, regarding economic integration 
between the EAEU and the SCO, Bordachev et al. point out that some are concerned that 
advanced forms of integration, including a free trade zone, would not be good for the EAEU, as 
their finished goods would be uncompetitive compared to inexpensive Chinese goods.59 
Nonetheless, the experts argue that ‘China and Russia should continue negotiations on a free 
trade agreement between China and the EAEU’.60 
Given the qualifications of Bordachev, Lukyanov, Stapran, Toloraya, Kashin, Afontsev, and 
Lukin and that most of them have held positions in the Russian government, it is reasonable to 
argue that it is likely that the views the experts convey in the articles referenced above have 
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directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign 
policy decisionmakers. 
Views not unlikely to have influence 
In a National Defense article cited above, Frolova argues that ‘the influence and presence of 
China in the Central Asian region will only increase. At the same time, China, as the experience 
of its interaction with Central Asian countries in recent decades has shown, will put its own 
interests in the foreground, which at some point may conflict with Russia's interests in the 
region’. 61 According to Frolova, the greatest economic and trade contradiction between the 
interests of Russia and China in Central Asia that may occur would be ‘in the oil and gas sector, 
in particular, access to the region’s energy resources and directions of their transportation, 
development of shelf resources of the Caspian Sea, and the laying of new oil and gas 
pipelines’.62 
In an article published by RISS cited above, Frolova raises concerns about the trade structure 
between China and countries of Central Asia.63 Much like its trade relationship with the Russian 
Far East (RFE), which was analyzed in chapter 4, China’s trade relationship with Central Asia 
consists of mostly raw materials exported to China from Central Asia and finished goods 
exported to Central Asia from China.64 To Frolova, this represents an ‘unfavorable trend’ in the 
economic development of Central Asia, as local manufacturing and even agriculture are being 
displaced because of the low prices of Chinese products, resulting in a ‘stagnation of production’ 
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in the region.65 In addition to this unfavorable trend, Frolova notes that countries of Central Asia 
are increasingly dependent on Chinese credit in the form of loans, the conditions of which 
include the participation of Chinese companies in projects, which are carried out mainly in 
China’s interests.66 This has also led to debt dependence and its economic and political 
consequences.67 Finally, Frolova argues that neither Russia nor the countries of Central Asia will 
be able to stop Chinese economic expansion in the region, and because of that, ‘the states of 
Central Asia and Russia need to find the intersection points of mutual interests and learn to use 
the Chinese presence for their own socio-economic development’.68 
As explained above, despite Frolova’s lack of a doctorate and history with the government or 
military, given that the expert has been at RISS (an FSBI) since 1998 and that she publishes her 
views through it, it is reasonable to argue that it is not unlikely that her views have directly or 
indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers. 
The BRI and Its Linking with the EAEU 
The benefits 
Regarding China’s BRI and its linking with the EAEU, two dominant trends in Russian expert 
thought are that the initiative and mutual efforts to increase its cooperation with the EAEU are 
beneficial for Russia and the Union. The section now moves on to present the results of the 
qualitative aspect of the content analysis. Please refer to information provided on the institutions 
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and experts in chapter 3 regarding potential influence through government or military 
connections and qualifications. 
Views likely to have influence 
In an article published by International Life, Lukin provides an analysis of Russia’s idea of 
Eurasian integration, China’s BRI, the compatibility of the two, and the potential for their 
interaction under the auspices of the SCO.69 According to the expert, China does not consider 
Russia’s Eurasian integration project a hinderance for its BRI, but rather ‘useful’.70 In Lukin’s 
view, Russia also seems to ‘appreciate’ China’s BRI.71 According to the expert, the BRI could be 
a ‘catalyst for multilateral economic cooperation’, which he has been advocating for years, going 
so far as to say that blocking such cooperation is harmful for Russia. Lukin identifies two main 
challenges for China’s BRI: continued security concerns within China, primarily Xinjiang, and 
the contradiction between China’s drive for advancing cooperation with neighboring countries 
and the intensification of territorial disputes with some of them, which causes concern in some of 
its neighbors.72 
In a workbook published by the RIAC, Luzyanin et al. focus on the BRI and how it fits in Eurasia 
with the rest of its initiatives, organizations, and integration projects.73 In chapter 3 of the 
workbook, Smirnova argues that it is in Russia’s interest to participate in China’s BRI, as it is the 
only way to fully understand the initiative and it will allow Russia to find common ground with 
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China.74 The expert also notes that Central Asian countries will try to attract investment from 
Russia as a way of reducing dependence on China.75 
In a publication cited earlier in this chapter, Karaganov et al. argue that it is necessary for Russia 
to participate in China’s BRI for the following reasons: the initiative has the potential to 
influence Russia’s regional leadership role as well as its broader position in global affairs; it will 
stimulate the development of Russia’s economy; and Chinese investment will lead to more 
socio-economic stability in Central Asia, which will strengthen the EAEU.76 It is also noted that 
the EAEU provides a valuable route for the transit of Chinese goods, as it provides a unified 
customs area that borders both China and the EU market.77 
The RIAC published a report written by Lisovolik et al. on the results of the conference titled 
‘Russia and China: Towards a New Quality of Bilateral Relations’, which was held on 30 and 31 
May 2016 and attended by Russian and Chinese officials and experts.78 According to the experts, 
China’s BRI is ‘fully consistent’ with the interests of the EAEU because the initiative’s 
development of transport corridors and infrastructure ‘would create additional incentives for the 
implementation of multilateral projects and integration in the Eurasian space, and the 
development of integration and unification of economic regulation, trade, and investment 
regimes would ensure greater efficiency of the EAEU in mediating trade and investment flows 
between the East and the West’.79 The experts advocate the linking of the EAEU and the BRI, 
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and suggest that the complementarity of the initiatives ‘can be enhanced by liberalization of trade 
and greater coordination of economic policy, the formation of alliances in the field of investment 
cooperation, the development of cross-border trade, and the creation of industrial parks’, all of 
which would ‘reduce the costs of doing business in the region, increase the predictability of 
economic policies, and improve the investment climate’.80 Lisovolik et al. argue that the linking 
of the EAEU and the BRI will also bring benefits in the form of enhanced positions of EAEU 
countries in their interactions with the EU and greater opportunities for economic integration and 
cooperation between the EAEU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).81 
Regarding bilateral economic ties between Russia and China, Lisovolik et al. write that the 
linking of the EAEU and the BRI may lead to quicker development of the less developed regions 
of the two countries (the RFE and western provinces of China) with the use of ‘specialized tools, 
including cross-border cooperation and the creation of free economic zones’.82 Moreover, the 
BRI’s development of transport infrastructure would also strengthen the economic connections 
between the more developed parts of Russia and China (European Russia and eastern China).83 
However, according to Lisovolik et al., full liberalization of trade between Russia and China in 
the form of a free trade zone is not the best way to maximize the potential for bilateral economic 
cooperation or to ‘build balanced economic interaction’.84 
In an article published by RISS, Karataeva dedicates some space to China’s development of 
transit routes as a part of its BRI and the project’s implications.85 According to the expert, China 
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is right in believing that ‘the development of transport links will ultimately contribute to the 
deepening of mutually beneficial economic integration of the countries of the region’, and she 
expects that since a lot of the transit infrastructure projects are being implemented in EAEU 
countries, the BRI presents for Russia and China ‘a deep potential for ensuring a unified 
transport policy and the successful implementation of joint transport projects’ and ‘additional 
opportunities for finding points of interaction’.86 
An article written by Karaganov and published by Russia in Global Politics addresses a wide 
range of issues in international affairs.87 According to the expert, the linking of the EAEU and 
the BRI in 2015 was a wise decision by Moscow and Beijing to ‘[convert] the potential of 
contradictions into a resource of cooperation’.88 However, Karaganov points out that, while the 
linking of the EAEU and the BRI presents significant opportunities for the economic 
development of Eurasia, concrete measures need to be taken through ‘systematic bureaucratic 
efforts’, which had virtually not yet been made.89 
In an article published by RISS, Gubin addresses China’s BRI and its implications for Russia and 
its interests.90 The expert acknowledges both contradictions between the EAEU and the BRI and 
potential benefits for Russia. Regarding the contradictions, Gubin merely states that they exist, 
and does not elaborate.91 As mentioned above, the expert argues that while Western analysts 
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have argued that a clash of interests between Russia and China in Central Asia is inevitable, 
‘there are no signs of serious discord’.92 Gubin also argues that Russia’s participation in the BRI 
would be beneficial to all participants for two reasons: the profitability of investment in their 
economies and their potential as a large investor.93 
In an article cited above, Bordachev et al. are optimistic about China’s intentions with the BRI 
and the benefits that the initiative will bring, not just for China, but also for the entire world.94 
According to the experts, ‘China is ready to work with these countries on a voluntary, equal and 
mutually beneficial basis, to jointly build a mutually beneficial cooperation network within the 
framework of the [BRI], in order to achieve practical progress, mutual learning, openness and 
innovation, and inclusion of all interested parties in the process of interaction and global 
development’.95 
In an article published by RISS, Kokarev et al. analyze China’s foreign policy in Asia and its 
implications for Russia’s interests.96 Regarding the linking of the EAEU and the BRI, the experts 
see a challenge as well as an opportunity. According to Kokarev et al., the linking of the 
initiatives presents the opportunity for Russia ‘to improve forms of economic interaction with 
partners in the EAEU, as well as with China’.97 
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Regarding the BRI, its implications for Russia, and its linking with the EAEU, Ivanov (ed.) et al. 
claim in a report published by the RIAC that the initiative presents an opportunity for Russia to 
strengthen its transit role to the point of becoming a ‘transit leader’ with respect to routes from 
Asia to Europe as well as improve ties between Russia and China in social, educational, and 
scientific spheres.98 The experts name the linking of the EAEU and the BRI as a ‘priority area of 
cooperation’ between Russia and China.99 They also emphasize that the matter being addressed 
is not how Russia and the rest of the EAEU will join the BRI or become a part of it, but rather 
how the EAEU and the BRI will integrate as equal entities.100 
According to Ivanov (ed.) et al., in a report published by the RIAC, it is in China’s interest that 
integration within the EAEU continues and strengthens, as evidenced by its provision of $10 
billion to VEB.RF for EAEU integration efforts.101 Moreover, the infrastructure projects that 
China is implementing in EAEU member states as a part of its BRI are beneficial to the Union’s 
integration.102 
Given the qualifications of Lukin, Smirnova, Karaganov et al., Lisovolik, Timofeev, Karataeva, 
Gubin, Bordachev et al., Kokarev, Luzyanin, Kortunov, Karneev, Petrovsky, and Kashin, that 
most of them have served in the Russian government, and that the views they convey in the 
articles referenced above were published by FSBIs and institutions with connections to the 
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Russian government, it is reasonable to argue that it is likely that the experts’ views have directly 
or indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers. 
The dominant view discussed above that China’s BRI not only does not harm Russia’s interest, 
but, on the contrary, presents Russia with opportunities for benefits contributes to the perception 
among Russian experts and Russian foreign policy decisionmakers that there are no 
unmanageable conflicts of interest between Russia and China, which in turn contributes to the 
perception of an absence of threat from China. The results of the quantitative aspect of the 
content analysis reflect this dominant view by showing that two of the most frequently given 
reasons for why there was a perception of an absence of threat from China in the texts analyzed 
are a lack of harmful intentions and a lack of conflicts of interest. 
In the context of managing decline, China’s accommodation of Russia’s interests by agreeing to 
link the BRI with the EAEU has likely contributed to a peaceful (mostly economic) power 
transition in Central Asia and Moscow’s acceptance of China’s growing role in the region. 
Negotiation over international order is an important factor in power transition. As discussed in 
the following chapter, part of this negotiation in the case of Russia and China in Central Asia has 
been a largely successful establishment of a division of labor in the region wherein Russia 
focuses mostly on security and political issues while China focuses on economic and 
development issues. 
Complementarity and synergy 
Another theme identified by the content analysis, which may be considered a theme within the 




the Union, is the view that the initiatives do not contradict each other, but rather, they are 
complementary, feeding off each other in a way that produces a synergetic effect causing both to 
enhance the other. 
Views likely to have influence 
In an article published by the Izborsky Club, Glaziev argues that the EAEU and BRI are 
‘organically combined’, and that their linking can have a ‘synergistic effect’, by which each 
compliment and strengthen the other.103 The expert explains that the EAEU is fundamentally 
different, in that the Union is a ‘common market for goods, services, capital and labor’, while the 
‘BRI is a set of regional investment projects’ that ‘does not pretend to form either a common 
market, a single economic space, or even a free trade zone’.104 According to Glaziev, the 
initiatives may benefit each other if the BRI implements investment projects ‘for the 
development of transcontinental transport infrastructure - railways, highways and aviation 
corridors’ and if the EAEU offers ‘a simplified and facilitated customs regime for customs 
clearance of investment goods transported across the Russian-Chinese border’.105 
In a publication cited above, Karaganov et al. point out that Russia and China have proven 
capable of undertaking large joint efforts for positive-sum gains.106 Much like Glaziev, 
Karaganov et al. argue that the cooperation between the EAEU and BRI can produce ‘synergy’, 
as they complement and strengthen each other: ‘the EAEU will create the legal conditions for 
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creating transport and logistics infrastructure and joint development, and the [BRI] will give it a 
tremendous trade and investment impetus’.107 
In an article published by Russia in Global Politics, Karaganov writes that a future situation in 
Central Asia, in which Russia is the supplier of security and stability and China is the supplier of 
investments and resources, can be beneficial to everyone.108  
The Valdai Discussion Club published a report by Barabanov et al., in which a wide range of 
topics are addressed, including Russia and China’s interaction in Central Asia.109 Regarding the 
complementarity of capabilities, the experts claim that as China’s investment in BRI projects in 
Central Asia grows so will security vulnerabilities, and suggest that Russia is the only country 
capable of providing the necessary security services.110 
In a report published by the RIAC, Ivanov (ed.) et al. describe Russia’s prioritization of security 
issues and China’s prioritization of economic issues as a ‘distribution of roles’ that are 
strategically complementary and will ‘contribute to the stable development of the SCO for the 
medium and long term, as well as to the Organization as a whole as one of the pillars of the 
emerging world order’.111  
                                                             
107 Ibid. 
108 Karaganov, Sergei. ‘Kontury Peremen: Mirovye Tendensii-2015 i Rossiĭskai͡ a Politika (Outlines of Change: 
World Trends 2015 and Russian Politics)’. Russia in Global Politics. 06/03/2016. Available at 
https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/kontury-peremen/. Accessed 06/03/2020. 
109 Barabanov, Oleg, et al. ‘Voĭna i Mir XXI Veka: Mezhdunarodnai͡ a Stabil'nost’ i Balans Novogo Tipa (War and 
Peace of the 21st Century: International Stability and a New Type of Balance)’. Valdai Discussion Club. 
21/01/2016. Available at https://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/10673/. Accessed 05/02/2020. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ivanov, Igor (ed.), et al. ‘Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskiĭ Dialog: Modelʹ 2016 (Russian-Chinese Dialogue: Model 2016)’. 
Russian International Affairs Council. 30/05/2016. p. 36. Available at 




In an article published by International Life, Petrovsky argues that the linking of the EAEU and 
the BRI can be done ‘organically’ in a way in which each initiative enhances the other, and that 
such linking ‘opens up opportunities for the sustainable economic development of Eurasia’.112 
In an article cited above, Bordachev et al. express their view that Russia and China have different 
and complementary roles in mind for each other.113 According to the experts, ‘from the point of 
view of Russia, the ideal role of China in the EAEU is the role of an investor helping the 
development of the region. From the perspective of China, Russia's ideal role is to help eliminate 
economic barriers in Eurasia and maintain order in the sphere of defense and security’.114 
Regarding the linking of the EAEU and the BRI, Bordachev et al. recognize the complementarity 
between the two initiatives, writing that ‘while the EAEU forms the legal foundation for creating 
transport and logistics infrastructure and joint development, the Silk Road Economic Belt should 
give integration plans a huge trade and investment impetus’.115 
In a report published by the Valdai Discussion Club, Karaganov et al. observe that, in contrast to 
the rivalry between Russia and China in Central Asia predicted by some, the countries are 
forming a ‘strategic partnership’ in the region, in which they play complementary roles: ‘Russia 
is responsible more for security, and China for welfare’.116 Bordachev is listed as a co-author of 
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the report. Among those who are recognized as having contributed to the situational analysis of 
the report include Barabanov, Lukin, and Lukyanov.117  
In an article published by International Life, Sayamov analyzes the BRI and draws optimistic 
conclusions about its implications, including that ‘it will grow out of lively and comprehensive 
equal cooperation and mutually beneficial cooperation of neighboring countries and regions, 
generating a synergistic effect of development’, and that ‘it opens up unique opportunities for 
Eurasia and the whole world for the development of economic and political cooperation in the 
interests of sustainable development, peace and the formation of a new, more reliable and fair 
world structure’.118 
Given the qualifications of Glaziev, Karaganov et al., Lukyanov, Barabanov, Suslov, Sushentsov, 
Luzyanin, Petrovsky, and Sayamov, that most have served in the Russian government, and that 
the views the experts convey in the articles referenced above were published by an FSBI and 
institutions with strong ties to the Russian government (except for the Izborsky Club), it is 
reasonable to argue that it is likely that the experts’ views have directly or indirectly contributed 
to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 
This subsection identifies a dominant view among potentially influential Russian experts that the 
BRI and the EAEU enhance each other, contributing to the argument that Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers have likely perceived China as not having harmful intentions towards Russia and 
have not perceived unmanageable conflicts of interests between the two countries in this sphere 
of their relations. The dominant expert view identified in this subsection, like that of the previous 
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one, is reflected in quantitative results of the content analysis, which show that two of the most 
frequently given reasons for why there was a perception of an absence of threat from China in 
the texts analyzed were a lack of harmful intentions and a lack of conflicts of interests. 
Skepticism and cautious optimism 
The two trends found by the content analysis on Russian expert thought on China’s BRI and its 
linking with the EAEU reported above focus mostly on the benefits of the Chinese initiative for 
Russia and the EAEU, the complementarity of the BRI and the EAEU, and the ‘synergy’ the 
initiatives may produce. However, the content analysis also found some negative views, 
skepticism, and cautious optimism, although not as much as those reported in the previous 
section on Russian expert thought on China’s economic activity, interests, and interaction with 
Russia in Central Asia in general. 
In the first chapter of an RIAC workbook cited above, Luzyanin argues that an analysis of the 
prospects for cooperative interaction between the EAEU, SCO, and BRI begin with an 
acknowledgement of two points: first, Russia and China have different interests regarding the 
rate of integration and transport routes; second, the prospect of cooperation or linking of the 
Union and the initiative is unclear.119 The expert posits that it would be in Russia’s interest to 
pursue rapprochement first between the states of the EAEU, then between the SCO and BRI.120 
In chapter 2 of the workbook, Matveev, regarding the EAEU and BRI, writes that there are 
‘emerging contradictions’ between Russia and China that have not yet reached the official level, 
and agrees with Luzyanin in that, in his view, it is not yet clear how the projects could 
                                                             
119 Luzyanin et al. ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Model 2014-2015’. 2015. p. 7.  




cooperate.121 The expert portrays Russia’s attitude towards the BRI in a less than positive light 
by writing that ‘Russia cannot escape from the hidden (for now) call of Chinese integration 
and/or impede the development of the Chinese initiative [the BRI]’.122 Matveev suggests that 
Russia, under the conditions of the time, should focus on intraregional cooperation in the 
manufacturing industry apparently as a response to China’s competitive advantage in the 
industry, although the expert does not explicitly say so.123 Regarding the competition between 
transport routes promoted by Russia and China, in this case the Trans-Siberian Railway and the 
China—Central Asia—Europe Highway, Matveev writes that Russia should prioritize the 
former, ‘given the growing competition from Chinese roads’.124 The expert argues that it is 
necessary to ‘smooth out’ contradictions in Central Asia, to create a roadmap for the 
establishment of multilateral economic cooperation within the SCO, and to create ‘mechanisms 
for interaction’ between the EAEU and the SCO, but he does not venture to make suggestions as 
to how this should be done.125 Matveev notes that there are also contradictions between Russia 
and China in the energy sphere, but in a more optimistic tone the expert points out that, since 
these contradictions have not yet resulted in ‘real clashes’, it seems that the power of the 
strategic partnership of Russia and China is sufficient to resolve disputes that might arise.126 
In an article cited above, regarding the EAEU and the BRI, Ivanov (ed.) et al. write that ‘the 
achievement of a complete consensus on all projects is not possible’, but this ‘does not mean the 
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abolition of joint work’.127 For Ivanov (ed.) et al., it is obvious that the BRI does not aim to 
undermine the SCO or the EAEU.128 
In an article published by Russia in Global Politics, Larin addresses several topics relevant to the 
geopolitical situation in eastern Eurasia.129 In the expert’s view, the EAEU and the BRI are 
competing integration projects and the BRI is more attractive because of its prospects and 
China’s financial resources.130 Nevertheless, according to Larin, the linking of the initiatives was 
‘a logical result of their recognition not only of common economic and political interests, but 
also of responsibility for the fate of the continent’.131 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a regional multilateral development bank 
that was officially launched in 2013 with intended capital of $100 billion and began operations in 
2016. Despite it being a regional bank focused on development in Asia, the AIIB has allowed 
non-Asian countries to become founders and members, including the UK, France, and Germany. 
Russia is the third largest shareholder in the bank after China and India. 
This section reports the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis relevant to 
Russian expert views of the AIIB that were categorized as being likely to have influence and not 
unlikely to have influence based on the experts’ connections with the Russian government or 
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military, their qualifications, and whether their views were published by institutions with 
connections to the Russian government or military. 
The benefits 
Russian experts generally perceive the AIIB similarly to the BRI. This is likely because one of 
the main objectives of the bank is to fund BRI projects. For example, immediately after writing 
about the ‘huge opportunities’ provided by the linking of the EAEU and BRI, Karaganov et al. 
add that there was mutual readiness in the EAEU and China for the development of cooperation 
involving the AIIB.132 Vorobyov argues that the SCO also ‘receives new useful opportunities’ 
from the AIIB.133 Ivanov (ed.) et al. argue that it is because of the strong resources in the form of 
the AIIB that the BRI ‘can become an important systemic factor in the development of joint 
Russian-Chinese projects in the energy, transport, and construction spheres, the production of 
machinery and equipment, and high technologies’.134 According to Voronkov, the establishment 
of the AIIB and Russia’s joining the bank is a concrete step towards ‘strengthening bilateral and 
multilateral relations between developing countries and providing mutual political and economic 
support’, which is ‘of great importance’.135 
Glaziev continues the theme of complementarity observed in this section on the BRI and its 
linking with the EAEU, but with specific reference to the role of the AIIB. The expert considers 
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both the EAEU and the AIIB to be integration projects, but emphasizes their differences, 
explaining that ‘the EAEU is a supranational regulatory body that ensures the functioning of a 
single economic space’ while the AIIB is a ‘development institution’.136 Glaziev argues that 
‘their joint application opens up additional opportunities to realize the integration potential of 
each of these projects’, and provides examples of potential results of such joint application, 
including a ‘single airspace’ and ‘new air corridors with the transition to aircraft of their own 
development and manufacture’, ‘the opening of inland waterways with the construction and use 
of vessels of their own production’, and ‘the construction of transcontinental transport corridors 
with the development of its own base of railway and road engineering’.137 Bordachev likewise 
sees a lack of severe conflicts of interest. The expert argues that organizations such as the SCO 
and the AIIB are ‘overlapping but not competing’ and that ‘the Eurasian Economic Union, if it 
can be made a real working tool for promoting the priorities of the participating countries, will 
take its rightful place in this overall picture’.138 
In the views of Luzyanin et al., since the AIIB and similar institutions will be implementing joint 
projects of Russia and China in Russia and Central Asia, attracting these institutions ‘should be 
one of the important tasks of Russian diplomacy’.139 Bordachev (ed.) et al. see much potential 
benefit from the AIIB as well, and argue that Russia should take advantage of the financial 
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capabilities of the bank.140 The experts explain that the AIIB ‘could provide financing and credit 
guarantees for cross-border transactions, infrastructure construction and other priority projects 
for the EAEU region’, and point out that ‘unlike infrastructure and resource cooperation, which 
takes a long time to establish, financial cooperation can be established easily and quickly enough 
to deepen trade, communication networks and infrastructure’.141 
According to Petrovsky, it is ‘extremely important’ for Russia to participate in the AIIB, 
specifically for ‘the advanced socio-economic development of Eastern Siberia and the Far East 
and the revitalization of integration processes within the EAEU’.142 Svedentsov points out that 
the AIIB is regionally focused, prioritizing infrastructure projects in Asia, and that the charter of 
the bank considers Russia an Asian state.143 According to the expert, this stated prioritization has 
been confirmed in practice by the AIIB’s choosing of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Tajikistan as the 
sites of its first three projects.144 This presents a valuable opportunity for the development of 
Russia’s eastern territories. Additionally, Svedentsov argues that the AIIB’s participation in 
development projects in the RFE will include oversight that will ‘provide additional guarantees 
to prevent misappropriation of funds’.145 In a similar vein, Karaganov argues that ‘to transform 
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Siberia and the Far East’ it is necessary for Russia to actively participate in the AIIB and to 
promote the regions’ agenda within the institution.146 Zaitsev argues that it is not only desirable 
but necessary for Russia to turn to alternative development institutions such as the AIIB since 
being shunned by ‘global donor forums’.147 
Claims among Russian experts that the AIIB or the proportion of Russia’s shares in the bank 
relative to China’s represent a direct threat to Russian interests are virtually absent in the texts 
analyzed. This is not counterintuitive, as it seems that it would follow logically that if the BRI 
benefits Russia (a dominant view among Russian experts identified above), then an institution 
with a primary motive to fund the initiative would also be viewed as beneficial, or at least non-
threatening. 
With regard to Russia’s ambitions, Bordachev explains that, while ‘Russia can and wants to offer 
the world a new concept of joint development and regulation of international relations, it ‘does 
not have the material resources to effectively promote its ideas’.148 The expert claims that ‘even 
the United States cannot initiate projects on the scale of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank’.149 Leksyutina argues that the AIIB as well as other efforts undertaken by Beijing ‘create 
public goods to fill gaps in the existing global economic governance system’, and that China 
does so ‘without claiming to dominate, dictate or impose its norms and values on other 
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countries’.150 In this view, the establishment of the AIIB, its activities, and China’s position as 
the largest shareholder are not necessarily losses for Russia to China, as Russia never had the 
ability to lead such an enterprise. In sum, with regard to the AIIB, the dominant view of benefits 
and an absence of loss are indicative of positive-sum thinking among Russian experts with 
connections to the Russian government or military, and likely among foreign policy 
decisionmakers. 
A challenge to Western financial institutions and cohesion 
Another main trend in Russian expert thought on the AIIB is the view that the bank represents a 
challenge from China to ‘traditional’ Western-led international financial institutions, such as the 
Bretton Woods Institutions: the World Bank and the IMF. It is also very commonly expressed 
that the establishment of the AIIB has contributed to a fracturing of the West. This refers mainly 
to the failed US campaign to dissuade its allies to join the bank. All of America’s major allies 
ended up joining the bank, except for Japan, which leads another of the AIIB’s main 
competitors: the Asian Development Bank (ADB). These are dominant views among Russian 
experts with connections to the Russian government or military regarding the AIIB, but they are 
not without variation. 
There are those that view the AIIB as a direct challenge to the global financial institutions 
established by the West after WWII. For example, Savchanko views China’s establishment of 
the AIIB as a result of the US’ refusal fully accommodate China in such institutions.151 
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According to the expert, the US expected that the reforms proposed by developing countries 
would strengthen their positions and weaken the influence of the US.152 Likewise, Mazyrin 
considers the AIIB to be a direct challenge from Beijing to the World Bank dominated by the US 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) dominated by Japan.153 According to Tkachenko, 
China views the IMF as an ‘instrument of American policy’ and established the AIIB in 
response.154 Tsyrendorzhiev and Kuroedov view the establishment of the AIIB as a response to 
the US’ reluctance to allow the strengthening of the positions of non-Western powers in global 
financial institutions. The experts additionally argue that 
‘the development of the system of international relations can be expected in the next decade and 
in the medium term under the influence of a balance between two antagonistic trends. On the 
one hand, the desire of the ruling circles of the United States to ensure their own dominance in 
the system of international relations with the support of the system of economic and military-
political organizations and agreements, and on the other hand - the conscious desire of a number 
of major powers of the Non-Western World, such as Russia, China, India, Iran, etc., to form a 
more just new world order and rejecting the “exceptionality” of the only center of power’.155 
Kovalev argues that China’s establishment of the AIIB was ‘the result of a fundamental 
divergence of positions and the inability to engage in a balance-by-balance dialogue with the 
IMF’.156 The expert considers the establishment of the bank to be ‘an indicator of the desire to 
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move away from the globalization paradigm to the regional and national sphere’.157 Suslov views 
the AIIB and other alternative financial institutions as ‘positioned as direct competitors to the 
IMF, the World Bank and the Japan-controlled Asian Development Bank’.158 According to the 
expert, with the establishment of alternative institutions and mechanisms, China ‘seeks to create 
an order around itself in the region [Asia-Pacific] in which Washington has no place’ and, at the 
global level, ‘demands a greater role in economic governance’.159 Voronkov argues that it is 
important for opponents of Western financial structures to establish alternative institutions ‘on 
the basis of the sovereign equality of the participating states’, and that the establishment of the 
AIIB is a step in this direction.160 
In Karataev’s view, the refusal of the West to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions led to the 
establishment of the AIIB, and considers this alternative international financial institution and 
others like it to be ‘the only opportunity to bring changes to the activities of such important 
elements of the global financial architecture as international financial institutions’.161 The expert 
observes that the appearance of alternatives has created ‘an arena of confrontation between the 
ideologies of financial organizations of the old and new types’, and argues that ‘the main 
advantage of the AIIB … is the absence of requirements for borrowing states to change their 
                                                             
157 Ibid. 
158 Suslov, Dmitri. ‘Regionalizat͡ sii͡ a i Хaos vo Vsaimozavisimom Mire: Globalʹnyĭ Kontekst k Nachalu 2016 Goda 
(Regionalization and Chaos in an Interdependent World: A Global Context at the Beginning of 2016)’. Valdai 
Discussion Club. Valdai Notes 3, no. 43 (2016): 11. Available at https://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/22151/. Accessed 
25/03/2021. 
159 Ibid., p. 4. 
160 Voronkov, Lev. ‘Vlii͡ anie Kont͡ sept͡ sii Odnopoli͡ arnogo Mira na Sistemy Evropeĭskoĭ i Mezhdunarodnoĭ 
Bezopasnosti (The Influence of the Concept of a Unipolar World on Systems of European and international 
Security)’. International Life. 2016. pp. 148-149. Available at 
https://interaffairs.ru/virtualread/ia_rus/112016/files/assets/downloads/publication.pdf. Accessed 25/03/2021. 
161 Karataev, Sergei. ‘Novyĭ Mirovoĭ Finansovyĭ Pori͡ adok Po-Kitaĭski (The New World Financial Order in 





national economic policy’.162 According to Karataev, this ‘innovation’ leads to a more fair and 
equitable global management system.163 
Other experts view the AIIB as more of an informal or indirect challenge to Western-led 
financial institutions. Prokofev et al. argue that while the AIIB is not a formal competitor of the 
IMF, ‘as its main objective is to finance infrastructure projects, it clearly undermines the system 
of dominance of the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions’.164 Frolova sees the establishment of 
the AIIB as less of a direct challenge to the existing Western-led international financial order and 
more of a reflection of ‘China's desire to reduce the infrastructure shortage in Asia, while making 
strategic decisions on its own without resorting to traditional international financial organizations 
that see Beijing as part of the American world’.165 According to the expert, the challenge came in 
response to the policy of the US to deter China. This is manifested as ‘the release of Chinese 
ambitions from the regional to the global level in international cooperation and to Beijing's 
introduction of new ambitious ideas to reform the world economic system’.166 
Lisovolik views the AIIB as an alternative to Western-led international financial institutions, but 
not necessarily as a direct challenge. The expert argues that the AIIB provides ‘alternative 
financing mechanisms for infrastructure development in terms of credit conditions, regional 
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coverage and representation’ and ‘appears to be a critical step towards building a more balanced 
and sustainable global economy’.167 
In the views of Prokofev et al., the establishment of the AIIB is a reaction to the ‘inefficiency’ of 
current international financial institutions and the particular type of globalization occurring.168 
The experts point out that Beijing has been making efforts to explain its approach to international 
economic development and promote a ‘new concept of globalization’.169 The concept includes a 
new model of relations between peoples on an inter-party level, i.e. a form of interaction in 
which ‘the political parties of the world could jointly promote common interests while 
maintaining their own differences’.170 
According to Petrovsky, China’s establishment of the AIIB was due to its decision, made after 
many years of protest against underrepresentation, to wait no longer for the approval of reforms 
of the Western-led international financial institutions. In the expert’s view, the bank’s 
establishment is part of Beijing’s way of beginning to ‘redraw world financial relations’.171 
Kokarev et al. point out that in establishing the AIIB, Beijing has not explicitly stated that it has 
done so in order to create a competitive alternative to the World Bank, and that, in accordance 
with articles 1 and 35 of the Charter of the AIIB, cooperation has been established not only with 
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the World Bank but also with the ADA and other traditional financial institutions.172 That being 
said, the experts also concede that the AIIB undermines the US dominated global financial 
system.173 Kokarev et al. also claim that ‘the AIIB will become the guarantor of the gradual 
internationalization of the yuan’ and contribute to the erosion of the central role of the dollar in 
the global market.174 
The final main view identified by the content analysis is that the establishment of the AIIB has 
contributed to division in the West. Prokofev et al. observe a ‘lack of cohesion’ in the West 
regarding China’s efforts in general, and point out the ‘bewilderment’ of many Western states at 
the refusal of the US to reform quotas and votes within the IMF to reflect China’s economic 
weight, followed by their ignoring America’s urging against joining the AIIB.175 Karataev 
recounts the dissuasion campaign launched by the US in an effort to prevent its allies from 
joining the AIIB, which, according to the expert, claimed an ‘inability of Asian countries to 
ensure the functioning of a modern development bank, the openness and efficiency of its 
activities, as well as adherence to the implementation of international social and environmental 
standards for potential projects’.176 In Prokofev’s view, by joining the AIIB, countries of the EU 
have shown their desire to not only diversify its international economic relations, but also to 
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‘weaken American influence’.177 While discussing the establishment of the AIIB, Trush notes 
that the heterogeneity of EU countries due to its eastern expansion has been exploited by China. 
The expert explains that ‘China's investment and foreign trade attractiveness, its free financial 
resources and undoubtedly strong foreign policy reputation’ have attracted a number Central and 
Eastern European states and allowed for China’s advancement into the European market.178 
While the implications of the division caused by China with its establishment of the AIIB among 
Western allies for Russia is not directly discussed by the experts, it is reasonable to expect that 
the siding of major US allies such as the UK, France, and Germany with China would be 
perceived by Russian experts and foreign policy decision makers as having positive implications 
for Russia. First, Western solidarity in general threatens Russia with the potential for collective 
action, e.g. in the form of sanctions. Second, China’s attracting major wealthy US allies to its 
side may be viewed as beneficial to a certain degree by extension, i.e. a successful development 
for China, Russia’s main partner in foreign and economic affairs, has potential to yield benefits 
at home. 
Policy 
It is more difficult to determine the extent to which Russia’s foreign policy actions in Central 
Asia are consistent with the dominant views identified in this chapter than in the previous two 
chapters on the RFE because, despite Russia’s considerable political influence in the region, the 
countries of Central Asia may engage with China bilaterally in ways that are not always in 
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Russia’s best interest. It is not uncommon among Western analysts to consider Russia’s blocking 
of the development of multilateral economic cooperation under the auspices of the SCO and its 
hesitation to lower or remove tariffs or trade barriers for goods imported from China to the 
countries of the EAEU to be signs that China’s economic expansion in Central Asia threatens 
Russian interests. However, the content analysis shows that this might not necessarily be true. A 
number of implications of China’s increasing economic activity in Central Asia for Russia’s 
interests in the region are too complex to fit entirely either in a ‘threatening’ or ‘not threatening’ 
category. 
It is important to consider the protectionism of the Central Asian countries of the EAEU and 
SCO driven by Russia in the context of the mutual interest of Russia and China in the socio-
economic stability of Central Asia. On the one hand, the protectionist measures ensure that the 
importation of inexpensive Chinese goods does not reach the extent that it puts important 
domestic industries out of business, potentially causing instability. On the other hand, the 
demand for affordable consumer goods must also be met to a certain extent in the interest of 
maintaining socio-economic stability, and here China is grateful for the export markets. Russian 
experts and officials also acknowledge that China’s economic expansion in Central Asia in the 
form of investments and infrastructure development projects contribute to economic 
development, which is considered by Russia and China to be important for maintaining stability 
in the region. 
While Russia likely prefers to be the main driver of economic development in Central Asia, the 
reality is that it simply lacks the ability to do so. In this sense, China is achieving gains in Central 
Asia but not necessarily at the expense of Russian interests. As long as there is the balance 




China’s economic activity in the region in the form of socio-economic stability and development 
on its southern border. In its fundamental official documents, Russia makes it clear that it views 
stability and security as linked to economic development, and in such documents and other 
official rhetoric it refers to its partnership with China as one that is important for regional 
stability.179 Some economic competition between Russia and China does exist in Central Asia. 
However, as explained above, the dominant perceptions identified by the content analysis 
include the view that competition between neighboring great powers is natural, and that the 
economic competition between Russia and China in the region is not so severe as to be 
unmanageable due to the countries’ continuing development of cooperation and China’s restraint 
out of a recognition of Russia’s ‘privileged’ interests. Major policy trends in Central Asia, 
including the linking of the EAEU and BRI beginning in 2015 and the EAEU-China trade 
agreement reached in 2018, and official rhetoric are consistent with this dominant view and 
indicate less a move towards confrontation or conflict due to perceptions of threat and more the 
development of cooperation facilitated by perceptions of positive-sum outcomes and frequent 
mutual accommodations of interests. If zero-sum thinking with regard to economic activity in 
Central Asia were dominant among Russian officials, and as a result China’s BRI and bilateral 
economic advances in the region were perceived to be more threatening to Russia’s interests, the 
agreement for the linking of the EAEU and the BRI and the EAEU-China trade deal may not 
                                                             
179 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’. 
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have been reached. Such agreements would have been even less likely if not for the shared 
perception among Russian and Chinese leaders that economic development increases stability. 
The ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 outlines a framework for analysis that has been 
followed in this chapter.180 Based on the finding that the dominant expert view regarding 
Russia’s economic interaction with China in Central Asia is held by experts with a high level of 
potential influence on average, the chapter concludes that it is likely that the view has been 
successfully communicated directly or indirectly to foreign policy decisionmakers. This is case 1 
in the framework. Given case 1, scenarios 1 or 2 are more likely than scenarios 3 and 4.181 This 
means that it is likely that once the dominant view was successfully communicated to the 
officials, the dispositional factors (perceptions and values) of the officials either changed to 
become more aligned with, or less contradictory to, the dominant view (scenario 1), or the 
officials’ preexisting dispositional factors were reinforced by the dominant view (scenario 2). In 
both scenarios, dispositional factors that inform the dominant views are likely shared to the point 
that policy is consistent with the views (in scenario 1, they are shared after the communication, 
and in scenario 2, they are shared before and after the communication). Therefore, the 
dispositional factors inherent in the views would explain the policies. Such factors include the 
value of protecting Russia’s economic interests in Central Asia; the perception that China’s 
economic interests in Central Asia are ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’; the perception 
that conflicts of economic interest between Russia and China in Central Asia are not so severe as 
to be unmanageable through diplomatic efforts; the perception that the BRI and the EAEU are 
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compatible; and the perception that the BRI is beneficial to Russia and the EAEU countries of 
Central Asia. 
Conclusion 
This chapter reports the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis of Russian expert 
views on China’s economic activity in Central Asia from 2000 to 2020 and its implications for 
Russian interests. It does so with the intention of contributing to the broader aim of this thesis to 
provide an explanation for Russia’s foreign policy behavior towards China in the context of a 
drastic shift in the balance of power between the two countries due to the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the rise of China. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section analyzes 
Russian expert views on China’s economic activity in Central Asia in general, and the second 
focuses on the more specific issue of China’s BRI, its linking with the EAEU, and its 
implications for Russia’s interests in Central Asia and the development of the EAEU. 
The first section identifies two main trends in Russian expert thought. The first is that China’s 
economic interests in Central Asia are ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’ because of certain 
global developments or processes, most of which are related to China’s rivalry with the US. 
While uncommon, the claim that Russia mostly views China’s economic expansion in Central 
Asia as a natural outgrowth of its power does exist in Western literature on the subject and is 
supported by the findings of this chapter.182 
The second trend consists of an acknowledgement of economic competition between Russia and 
China in Central Asia along with an argument that such competition should not be perceived as 
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being out of control and a threat to Russia-China relations. This is because the negative effects of 
the competition are mitigated by processes at both the bilateral level and multilateral level within 
the SCO. This finding contradicts much of what is found in Western literature on the subject. 
However, some in the West have recognized that these ‘relationship management efforts’, which 
include ‘mutual accommodation and compromise’ have allowed Russia and China to avoid 
significantly harmful discord in Central Asia.183 
The second section identifies two main trends in Russian expert views of China’s BRI and its 
linking with the EAEU. First, the BRI is beneficial for both Russia and the rest of the EAEU 
members for various reasons. Second, the BRI and the EAEU are complementary and have a 
synergetic effect on one another. The section also reports the results of the qualitative aspect of 
the content analysis relevant to perceptions of China’s establishment of the AIIB. The analysis 
finds a dominant view of benefits and an absence of loss for Russia, which are indicative of 
positive-sum thinking among Russian experts with connections to the Russian government or 
military and likely among foreign policy decisionmakers. It also finds that the AIIB is widely 
viewed as a challenge to ‘traditional’ Western-led international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank and the IMF. The bank’s establishment is also viewed as considerably divisive for 
the West, as it prompted a US campaign to dissuade its allies from joining the AIIB, which 
largely failed as such countries as the UK, France, and Germany became shareholders in the 
bank. These findings support hypothesis 3 in that they provide evidence of dominant perceptions 
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among Russian experts, and likely decisionmakers, that the interests that drive China’s BRI and 
AIIB do not conflict with Russia’s interests to the point of causing perceptions of threat.184 
The final section discusses Russia’s policies in Central Asia relevant to its economic interaction 
with China in the region. For some Western analysts, Russia’s policy of hindering the 
development of multilateral economic cooperation under the auspices of the SCO and its 
hesitation to lower or remove tariffs or trade barriers for goods imported from China to the 
countries of the EAEU are signs that Russia is threatened by China’s economic expansion in 
Central Asia.185 The section argues that this is not necessarily the case and proposes considering 
such policies in the context of Russia and China’s mutual interest in stability in the region. 
From the perspective of both sides, economic development in Central Asia serves a stabilizing 
function, and this has primarily been driven by China over the period of interest. While Russia 
may prefer to be the primary driver of economic development in the region, it is simply not 
capable of doing so. In this sense, China’s economic expansion serves not so much as a loss as a 
gain in the form of more stability on Russia’s southern border. Russia’s policy of hindering the 
development of multilateral economic cooperation in the SCO and its hesitation to lower or 
remove EAEU tariffs on imported Chinese goods may also be viewed as serving a stabilizing 
function by protecting domestic industry in Central Asia. As shown by the content analysis, 
economic competition between Russia and China in Central Asia is acknowledged by experts but 
                                                             
184 The hypothesis states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider the compatibility or non-conflictual 
nature of the interests of Russia and China to be one of the main reasons why China’s rise does not threaten Russia. 
185 See for example Alexander Cooley. ‘Tending the Eurasian Garden: Russia, China and the Dynamics of Regional 
Integration and Order’. In Jo Bekkevold, and Bobo Lo, eds. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 2019. pp. 113-139; Stephen Blank. ‘Triangularism Old and New: China, Russia, and the United States’. 
In Bekkevold, and Lo, eds. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century. 2019. p. 222; Morena Skalamera. ‘Russia’s 
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is also viewed as being not so severe as to be unmanageable through processes developed at the 
bilateral level and multilateral level within the SCO. In this context, Russia’s policies have a 
balancing effect that serves the interests of both Russia and China in regional stability and are 
not as much a response to a direct threat from China as they are a response to a potential threat in 
the form of socio-economic upheaval in Central Asia prompted by the failure of domestic 
businesses due to an influx of inexpensive Chinese consumer goods and the growth of anti-
Chinese sentiments. Given that the dominant views of potentially influential experts identified in 
the chapter are consistent with Russia’s policies, the chapter concludes that scenarios 1 or 2 in 
the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 are most likely. 
This perspective of Russia’s economic balancing policies combined with two other main 
policies—the linking of the EAEU and BRI beginning in 2015 and the 2018 EAEU-China trade 
agreement—creates a picture of economic interaction between Russia and China in Central Asia 
characterized less by confrontation and rivalry moving towards conflict and more by manageable 
competition moving with caution towards a higher degree of cooperation and coordination in the 
mutual interest of regional stability. 
It is generally not acknowledged in Western literature on Russia-China relations that an 
understanding of China’s interests in Central Asia as ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’ 
exists in Moscow and that the understanding is important for explaining Russia’s economic 
interaction with China in the region.186 Explanations of such interaction that include a dominant 
perception among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers that Russia benefits from the BRI and 
that the initiative and the EAEU are mutually complementary, producing a synergistic effect, are 
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uncommon in Western literature. The chapter offers support for arguments that the negative 
effects of economic competition between Russia and China in Central Asia are mitigated by 
diplomatic efforts on both sides consisting of mutual accommodation and compromise and 
restraint on China’s side.187 
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Chapter 7: Security Interaction in Central Asia 
One of the most important aspects of Russia’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is their interaction regarding the security of Central Asia. Both are interested in a peaceful 
and developing ‘back yard’, and, in order to achieve and maintain stability, Russia and China 
often cooperate against threats of terrorism, separatism, and organized crime. Because this is 
such an important area of the countries’ relationship, it deserves careful analysis in the process of 
achieving the aim of this thesis, which is to provide a thorough explanation of Russia’s foreign 
policy towards China from 2000 to 2020 in the context of the drastic shift in the balance of 
power between the two as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union and China’s rise.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it contextualizes Russia’s security interaction with China 
in Central Asia with a brief overview of Russia’s and China’s security presence and interests in 
the region since the early 1990s. The chapter then presents the results of the content analysis of 
Russian expert views on China’s security-related activity and interaction with Russia in Central 
Asia. Three dominant trends are identified. First, Russian experts tend to claim that there is no 
serious clash of interests between Russia and China in Central Asia. They acknowledge that 
there are some minor conflicts of interest, but they argue that such conflicts are easily 
manageable at the bilateral and multilateral levels because of the good state of Russia’s 
relationship with China. Second, there is a tendency in the Russian expert community to view 
China’s security-related interests and activities in Central Asia through the lens of China’s 
rivalry with the US. In this context, for China, Central Asia is a ‘reliable rear’ that can serve as a 
relatively safe theater of operations and a less vulnerable source of natural resources in the event 




China genuinely respects Russia’s ‘special’ or ‘privileged’ interests in Central Asia and behaves 
in the region accordingly. The maintenance of good relations with Russia is a top priority for 
China, and because of this, Beijing usually opts not to implement certain policies in Central Asia 
if there is a chance that they will cause a severe negative reaction from Moscow. 
Then, the chapter reports some other noteworthy views found by the content analysis. Russian 
experts have analyzed the strengthening of China’s ‘soft power’ in Central Asia and discuss its 
implications for Russian interests in the region. Such analysis tends to be nuanced and objective 
while the discussions of implications occasionally include either positive or negative views 
towards China’s soft power initiatives in Central Asia. The section ends with a discussion on 
some other negative views on China’s security-related activity in the region found by the content 
analysis. 
Finally, the chapter discusses Russia’s security policies in Central Asia, China’s expanded 
security role in Tajikistan in recent years, Russia’s response to this development, and the 
implications of the development for Russia’s interests in Central Asia in the views of Russian 
experts. The section finds that there is nothing in Russia’s response (neither in its official rhetoric 
nor its policy actions) that indicates that China’s increased security role on the Tajik-Afghan 
border threatens Russian interests, and that the dominant view of Russian experts with ties to the 
Russian government or military holds that China’s actions are logical and do not contradict 
Russian interests. Since the dominant expert views regarding China’s security presence in 
Central Asia identified are consistent with Russia’s security policies in the region, the chapter 
concludes that scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section 





As explained in the previous chapter, Russia’s foreign policy was virtually univector in the early 
1990s, focusing on continued rapprochement and integration with the West. The combination of 
the univectorness of Russia’s foreign policy, the popular view that Central Asia had been a 
burden for Russia, and the demands of the chaotic domestic environment resulted in neglect of 
Central Asia. However, serious issues that had implications for the national security of Russia 
began to appear shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, which made Central Asia difficult to 
ignore. One of the earliest of such issues to appear was the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan on 
5 May 1992, in which Russian forces eventually intervened. The security of Tajikistan’s border 
with Afghanistan was one of the main imperatives that drove the decision to intervene. Russia 
was also concerned about the burgeoning of radical Islam in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan in 
the early 1990s. The perceived need for security engagement soon after the fall of the Soviet 
Union is evidenced by the signing of Russia, Armenia and four Central Asia states (and later 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus) of the Collective Security Treaty on 15 May 1992. Since 
2002, the treaty has served as the basis for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 
of which the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan are still 
members alongside Russia. The need for a security presence in the region also grew as a result of 
Western expansion in Central Asia, one form of which was the accession of all five of the former 
Soviet republics of the region to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1994. 
In 1996, with the arrival of Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov came a strengthened view of the 
need for a more proactive policy in Central Asia. However, as explained in the previous chapter, 
this did not eliminate the constraints on Russia’s ability to implement such a policy in the region. 




established in 1996 and consisted of Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. The 
primary aim was to demarcate and demilitarize the borders between the member states. The 
Shanghai Five gradually took on more security tasks and became the foundation on which the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001. Russia also managed to 
reach an agreement with Tajikistan in April 1999 on basing rights in the country. 
Since 2000, a resurgent Russia under President Putin continued strengthening its security 
presence and mechanisms in Central Asia. With the help of rising oil prices, Russia’s GDP grew, 
and with it its military expenditure (doubled from 1999 to 2005)1 and ability to effectively 
address security issues in Central Asia. However, the geopolitical and strategic landscape of the 
region changed drastically after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the aftermath of the attacks, 
Moscow moved quickly to assure the US that it had Russia’s support in the coming War on 
Terror. As US-Russian relations began to deteriorate in the mid-2000s, security cooperation 
between Russia and China in Central Asia was strengthening. 
Russia and China cooperate on security issues in Central Asia, but the extent to which each 
directly contributes to the maintenance of security in the region is not equal. Russia has a much 
larger security presence than China in the region, and the PRC generally seems to accept this for 
two main reasons: first, China recognizes the region as a sphere of Russia’s ‘privileged’ 
interests; and second, China has remained wary (although decreasingly so) of having a military 
presence abroad. Nevertheless, the PRC participates with Russia in multilateral security 
structures in the region, including the SCO Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) and SCO 
Peace Mission military exercises. China has also expanded its security presence in Tajikistan in 
                                                             
1 SIPRI. ‘Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2018) US$ m., 1988-2019’. Available at 




recent years, which may have implications for Russian perceptions of the ‘division of labor’ in 
Central Asia. 
Dominant Trends in Russian Expert Thought 
Clash? What clash? 
One trend in Russian expert thought identified by the content analysis is the claim that Russia’s 
and China’s interests in Central Asia are not in serious conflict. In this view, the security 
interests of the two countries in the region are mostly aligned or complementary, and because of 
this they are able to establish security-related cooperation and most of the time avoid 
competition. It is often acknowledged that occasionally there are interests that are not perfectly 
aligned, but these contradictions are not so strong as to cause open rivalry and hostility between 
Russia and China. In this perspective, claims that there is a major conflict of interest between 
Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia that will inevitably lead to a clash between the two are 
exaggerated, unsubstantiated, and misinformed. 
The section now moves on to present the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis. 
Please refer to information provided on the institutions and experts in chapter 3 regarding 
potential influence through government or military connections and qualifications. 
Views likely to have influence 
In a Red Star interview, the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation, Colonel General Yuri Baluevsky argues that the view often found in the 
media that a clash between Russia and China is imminent is ‘a deep misconception’ and that the 




he describes as good and neighborly.2 Baluevsky explains that it is not out of fear that the 
Russian military should act in the interest of maintaining good relations with China, but rather 
because Russia and China have common goals that can be reached through cooperation of all 
types, including within the framework of the SCO.3 The expert also expresses his belief that as 
the SCO gains strength it will create ‘a zone of peace and stability’.4 
In an article published by International Life, Lukin argues that China’s interests in the region are 
‘mainly not economic, but strategic in nature, not in terms of establishing control, but of 
eliminating the threats of instability and terrorism that emanate from it for China itself’.5 In 
2014, the expert reiterates this argument.6  
In an article published by the Bulletin of MGIMO, Lukin analyzes the SCO and Russia’s interests 
in Central Asia.7 Regarding China’s activity in the region in general, the expert claims that 
‘Russia welcomes the stabilizing Chinese economic presence’.8 In an article published by Russia 
in Global Politics, Lukin repeats this claim, but points out that there are some in Russia who 
worry about China’s growing influence in the region, and adds that ‘India’s entry from this point 
of view is welcome’.9 
                                                             
2 Baluevsky, Yuri. ‘Takim My Vidim Buduschee Armii (So We See the Future of the Army)’. Interview with Red 
Star. 25/10/2003. Available at http://old.redstar.ru/2003/10/25_10/1_02.html. Accessed 13/03/2020. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Lukin, Alexander. ‘SHOS: Itogi Rossiĭskogo Predsedatelʹstva (SCO: Results of Russia’s Chairmanship)’. 
International Life. 2009. Available at https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/31. Accessed 24/02/2020. 
6 Lukin, Alexander. ‘Idei͡ a «Ėkonomicheskogo Poi͡ asa SHelkovogo Puti» i Evraziĭskai͡ a Integrat͡ sii͡ a (The Idea of the 
Silk Road Economic Belt and Eurasian Integration)’. International Life. 2014. Available at 
https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/1101. Accessed 01/03/2020. 
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Afganistane (The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russian Interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan)’. 
Bulletin of MGIMO 5, no. 20 (2011). 
8 Ibid., p. 43. 
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In another article analyzing the SCO and Russia’s interests in Central Asia, Lukin argues that 
Russia’s interests in Central Asia are not in conflict neither with the interests of the countries of 
the region nor with those of China or the US.10 In the expert’s view, ‘all sorts of ideas of 
“chessboards” and “great games” based on the inevitability of a tough fight by external players 
here either create a wish for reality or are brought to life by a poor knowledge of reality and a 
desire to gain popularity with catchy slogans’.11 According to Lukin, not only do the interests of 
Russia, China, and the US not contradict each other, but they are aligned in that they all want to 
maintain political stability and secularism in Central Asian countries and their governments, and 
they want economic development in the region, as it ‘can only become the basis of political 
stability’.12 
In an article published by the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISS), Guzenkova and 
Vinogradov et al. analyze China’s foreign policy towards the post-Soviet space.13 The experts 
claim that, despite China’s active policy in Central Asia, ‘many Russian Sinologists still do not 
see serious risks in China’s policy in the post-Soviet space, including for Russia’.14 
In an article published by Russia in Global Politics, Vorobyov denies that Central Asia is ‘a field 
of rivalry’ for Russia and China.15 According to the expert, this view ‘eliminates the importance 
of the states of the region as independent players’ and it ‘is a manifestation of an unrealistic 
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Afghanistan’. Bulletin of MGIMO 5, no. 20 (2011).  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Guzenkova, Tamara and Andrei Vinogradov et al. ‘Strany SNG i Baltii v Globalʹnoĭ Politike Kitai͡ a (CIS and 
Baltic Countries in China’s Global Policy)’. Russian Institute of Strategic Studies. Problems of National Strategy 1, 
no. 10 (2012): 7-56. Available at https://riss.ru/images/pdf/journal/2012/1/04_%20.pdf. Accessed 27/02/2020. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Vorobyov, Vitaly. ‘SHOS Kak Rastushchiĭ Vlastelʹin Хartlenda (The SCO as a Growing Ruler of the Heartland)’. 
Russia in Global Politics. 19/02/2012. Available at https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/shos-kak-rastushhij-vlastelin-




approach in theory and myopia in practice’ that is ‘promoting the alarmist thesis about Russian-
Chinese relations as a whole as an inescapable confrontation’.16 Vorobyov acknowledges that 
there is ‘of course’ competition between Russia and China in the region due to ‘the deep 
historical proximity of the two countries and Central Asia’ and ‘their position in the modern 
globalizing world’, and if it were otherwise it would be strange.17 The expert argues that the 
motive for the SCO is not a conflict of interests, but rather ‘the coincidence of views on the 
importance of such factors as predictability and the peaceful development of the overall situation 
in Central Asia, awareness of the explosiveness of the occurrence of splits and dividing lines 
there, in terms of readable goals of their own policies for the long term’.18 Vorobyov describes 
the SCO as a product of Russia and China’s ‘new type of relations’ and describes the 
organization as ‘one of the significant and visible elements that embody today the Russian-
Chinese strategic trust partnership’.19 The expert argues that the view that Russia and China are 
battling for hegemony in Central Asia is biased and does not map onto the reality of what is 
happening in the SCO, adding that ‘the constructively oriented ideology, dubbed the “Shanghai 
Spirit”, does not allow undivided domination of one state, regardless of its parameters’.20 
In another article published by Russia in Global Politics, Vorobyov again analyzes Russia and 
China’s interaction in Central Asia.21 In Vorobyov’s view, in the SCO, ‘signs of antagonism are 
imperceptible’ between Russia and China and that ‘in cultural terms, the region is and will be 
distinctive in relation to both powers, and therefore one should hardly expect a Russian-Chinese 






21 Vorobyov, Vitaly. ‘Summa Skhodi͡ ashchikhsi͡ a Interesov (Sum of Converging Interests)’. Russia in Global 





confrontation in this area’.22 However, the expert points out that there are two areas where 
Russia and China may compete—economics and soft power—the former of which is ‘inevitable 
and natural’.23 According to Vorobyov, Russia and China’s ‘strategic trust partnership’ provides 
a basis for hope that the two countries will ‘get along with each other’ in Central Asia and avoid 
competition for hegemony.24 
In a report published by the Valdai Discussion Club, Koldunova and Kundu claim that China’s 
‘good-neighborliness diplomacy’ provided secular governments in Central Asia the support they 
needed to stave off radical Islam.25 Regarding the SCO, they claim that ‘many experts agree’ that 
within the organization Russia and China have struck a ‘balance of interests’ in which Russia 
handles multilateral political cooperation and security while China handles economic 
cooperation.26 
In a report published by Russia in Global Politics, Karaganov et al. claim that Russia and China 
have no majorly conflicting interests in Central Asia.27 In the experts’ view, US policy forces 
Russia and China closer together and pushes these and other countries in Central Eurasia in the 
direction of security cooperation.28 At the same time, there are some who believe that Eurasia is 
an area of rivalry between Russia and China, and this prompts efforts from ‘external forces’ to 
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‘drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing’.29 However, Karaganov et al. argue that ‘none of 
the contradictions discussed in political and scientific circles are objective or insurmountable’.30 
In another report published by the Valdai Discussion Club, Karaganov et al. argue that potential 
instability in Central Asia ‘has already led to the choice of a model of cooperation rather than 
competition’ and that such instability ‘represents a kind of ideal overall challenge, the answer to 
which is possible only through a rational game with a positive amount’.31 
In an article published by Valdai Discussion Club, Bordachev analyzes Russia and China’s 
interaction in Central Asia.32 The expert reiterates the argument above that the region’s potential 
for destabilization is an ‘ideal common challenge’ for Russia and China, which can only be 
solved ‘through a rational game with a positive amount’.33 Bordachev acknowledges that there 
are those who think the appropriate response to Russia’s declining influence and China’s 
strengthening influence in Central Asia is to cooperate with the US in the region. The expert 
writes that such a view ‘may be aimed at undermining confidence between Moscow and 
Beijing’.34 Bordachev is confident that, due to ‘objective factors’, it is likely that Russia and 
China will choose to cooperate in Central Asia, and that efforts to stabilize this region can be 
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uniting for Russia and China in a common global context’.35 The expert explains that the 
obstacles Russia and China face for cooperation in Central Asia are mostly subjective.36  
In an article published by the Valdai Discussion Club, Bordachev et al. analyze the activities of 
Russia, China and the US in Central Asia.37 Regarding Russia and China’s interaction in Central 
Asia, the experts argue that the common interest of the two countries in maintaining stability in 
the region can cause such interaction to be one based on cooperation rather than competition.38 
Bordachev et al. repeat the argument that ‘the potential instability in Central Eurasia is a kind of 
“perfect common challenge”, the solution of which is possible only through a rational game with 
a positive sum’.39 The experts explain that, in the event of instability, Russia and China ‘will not 
be able to channel the problem in the direction of another player and, thus, will be forced to 
cooperate “on the spot”’.40 According to Bordachev et al., another reason why Russia and China 
are likely to choose cooperation over competition in Central Asia is that both countries prefer to 
ensure stability by supporting the current regimes in the region, unlike the EU for example, 
which prefers the transformation of its neighbors though its Neighborhood Policy initiative.41 
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Bordachev, speaking at a discussion session held by the Valdai Discussion Club claimed that the 
interests of Russia and China in Central Asia do not contradict each other in the fields of 
security, labor migration, or energy.42 
Related to the view that the security-related interests of Russia and China in Central Asia are not 
in serious conflict and will not lead to a clash is the observation that Beijing strictly adheres to 
certain principles of diplomacy and foreign policy, such as non-interference in internal affairs, 
while acting in the region. This principled approach constrains China’s options for unilateral 
actions in Central Asia that may lead to a major conflict of interest with Russia. 
Guzenkova and Vinogradov et al. explain that China has put post-Soviet countries, including 
those of Central Asia, at ease with its foreign policy, which is strictly guided by the principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs.43 In contrast to Western foreign policy, Chinese foreign 
policy does not aim to compel others to adopt ‘civilizational-block standards’ through 
agreements to reform and does not include lecturing others on moral values such as human rights 
or freedom of speech.44 According to Guzenkova and Vinogradov et al., the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs is a credo of the PRC’s diplomatic and expert community.45 
In an article cited above, Vorobyov explains that principles of ‘non-interference in internal 
affairs, respect for peoples’ choices of social system and methods of development, equality and 
mutual benefit, solving problems by political means, and promoting good neighborliness’ is a 
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‘pivotal point of the Chinese partnership strategy’ in Central Asia.46 The expert claims that in 
Central Asian countries, in the context of being abandoned by Moscow, ‘the ruling circles saw 
that China was not turning away and was not seizing the moment to instructively intervene, but, 
on the contrary, was extending a hand, if not in friendship, then help’.47 
In an article published by the Valdai Discussion Club, Bordachev observes that China truly 
behaves in accordance with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.48 In a report also 
published by the Valdai Discussion Club, Bordachev et al. address the possibility of forceful 
continental expansion by China in Central Asia.49 According to the experts, such expansion 
would not be rational for four reasons: first, China would face resistance from powerful players, 
including Russia and India; second, the region does not have enough resources to satisfy China’s 
needs; third, the markets of Central Asian countries are ‘negligible’; and fourth, ‘lasting 
domination’ would be very costly.50 Bordachev et al. explain further that China strives primarily 
to be a great maritime power with global interests, and that ‘the priority of the Pacific direction 
in relation to the continental derives from the scale of the Chinese economy’.51 Moreover, the 
experts argue that China’s economy, because of its size, cannot be sated by the resources of any 
one region.52 In this view, China cannot risk sacrificing positions in other regions of the world 
for a firmer hold on any one region through force, including Central Asia. 
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In an opinion piece published by the Valdai Discussion Club, Barabanov addresses the issues of 
‘zero-sum game’ perceptions among major powers in Central Asia.53 The expert observes that in 
expert communities around the world, including the US, there is ‘a kind of jealousy’ over 
Russia’s close relations with China that occasionally leads to the view that Moscow is losing its 
ability to implement its foreign policy towards others independently because it is under too 
strong an influence from Beijing.54 For Barabanov, such a conclusion seems to have an 
underlying ‘zero-sum’ logic of ‘either you are with us, or you are with them’.55 The expert 
observes that in the US one can find opinions that, given the rapprochement between Russia and 
China, the US should attempt to improve relations with Moscow because it is China that is the 
long-term adversary of the US, not Russia.56 
While acknowledging that overcoming such ‘jealousy and doubts’ is difficult in practice, 
Barabanov argues that ‘it is clear that in the 21st century there can be no zero-sum game and 
partnership with one country does not automatically terminate partnership with another (or even 
hostility)’.57 The expert points out that it is one of the main objectives of the SCO to overcome 
zero-sum thinking in the relations of the countries of Eurasia in order to produce a ‘synergy of 
various initiatives and transform it into a much larger unity of Eurasia as a whole, which will 
enhance both the economic and political benefits of each of the players’.58 Barabanov claims that 
the zero-sum thinking of ‘you are either with us, or you are with them’ has been overcome in the 
past, using the example of the USSR’s ‘quite trusting and constructive’ relationships with several 
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countries that participated in the non-alignment movement during the Cold War.59 The expert 
argues that you can see the same zero-sum logic with the ‘new non-alignment movement’ that 
forces countries to choose between the US, China, and the non-aligned. 
Another way in which the security interests of Russia and China in Central Asia are viewed as 
complementary, or at least non-conflicting, by Russian experts is the idea that the economic 
development of the region driven by China has a stabilizing effect, which is in the security 
interests of all parties. For example, in an article published by RISS, Frolova explains that one of 
the intentions of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is to ensure stability in Xinjiang through 
economic development and rising living standards.60 
In a workbook on cooperation between Russia and China in Central Asia published by RIAC, 
Sergei Luzyanin et al. claim that China’s BRI and its linking with the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) ‘can become the most important tool for solving growing security problems’.61 
Luzyanin et al. explain that this is because the ‘dynamic economic development’ that the 
initiatives would bring can ‘reduce the risks of destabilization’ in Central Asia.62 Put another 
way, ‘progressive socio-economic development is one of the best forms of preventing the growth 
of activity of extremists and terrorists’: it is ‘a recipe for political stability’.63 
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A significant number of Russian experts explicitly claim that Russia and China share an interest 
in preventing the strengthening of the presence of a third power in Central Asia. This can be seen 
as having a unifying effect that contributes to preventing a major clash of interests between 
Russia and China in the region. For example, according to Luzyanin et al., Russia and China are 
not only interested in preventing instability in Central Asia on the bordering areas of their own 
countries and the spread of terrorist activity and radical Islam from the region to their territories, 
but also in preventing the rise of a ‘third force’ in the region.64 The experts explain that China 
views Central Asia as a ‘reliable rear’ to have as it implements its Asia-Pacific policy, while for 
Russia the region consists of CSTO allies or neutral areas, which are useful for balancing against 
NATO.65 According to Bordachev et al., ‘Russia and China are equally interested in the 
withdrawal of foreign military bases from the territory of the countries of Eurasia, with their 
constant geopolitical and economic intrigues’.66 Bordachev et al. do not name the US, but it is 
reasonable to assume that the withdrawal of US military bases from Central Asia is included in 
this interest. This common strategic interest in Central Asia as a reliable rear contributes to an 
understanding among experts that Russia’s and China’s security-related interests in the region 
are more aligned than conflictual, and therefore, a clash between the two is less likely than 
cooperation. 
Given the qualifications of Baluevsky, Lukin, Guzenkova, Vinogradov, Vorobyov, Stapran, 
Toloraya, Koldunova, Karaganov, Bordachev, Barabanov, Frolova, and Luzyanin, Zvyagelskaya, 
Kazantsev, and Kuzmina, that most of them have served in the Russian government or military, 
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and that the views they convey in the articles referenced above were published by FSBIs and 
institutions with connections to the Russian government, it is reasonable to argue that it is likely 
that their views have directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional 
factors (perceptions and values) of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 
The dominant view identified in this section is that the security interests of Russia and China in 
Central Asia are non-conflictual or shared. The coincidence of interests contributes to the general 
perception that between the two countries there is a lack of unmanageable conflicts of interests, 
which in turn contributes to the formation of the perception of an absence of threat from China 
among Russian experts and foreign policy decisionmakers. The quantitative aspect of the content 
analysis shows that a lack of conflict of interests between Russia and China is one of the most 
frequently identified reasons for perceptions of an absence of threat from China in the texts 
analyzed. 
A ‘reliable rear’ 
The second major trend in Russian expert thought on Russia and China’s interaction in Central 
Asia identified by the content analysis is the view that Beijing avoids serious conflict with 
Moscow over the region because the area is strategically important as a ‘reliable rear’ in the 
context of its rivalry and potential conflict with the US. Central Asia is important for China not 
only as a relatively secure area of operations in the context of such a conflict, but also as a source 
of natural resources that may be more securely transported over land. This supply would be 
critical in a conflict with the US, as most of China’s current supply routes are by water and 




Views likely to have influence 
Vorobyov claims that China views the region as a strategically important ‘deep rear’ that is 
valuable in its heightening struggle with the US.67 In an RIAC workbook cited above, Bordachev 
et al. explain that China views Central Asia as a ‘reliable rear’ to have as it implements its Asia-
Pacific policy, while for Russia the region consists of CSTO allies or neutral areas, which are 
useful for balancing against NATO.68 
Despite the fact that among the experts of the work referenced above only Vorobyov has held a 
position in the Russian government, given the qualifications of Bordachev, Zvyagelskaya, 
Kazantsev, and Kuzmina, that the work referenced above was published by institutions with 
connections to the Russian government, and that Bordachev may be considered being in close 
proximity to the government, it is reasonable to argue that it is likely that the experts’ views have 
directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign 
policy decisionmakers. 
Views not unlikely to have influence 
In an article published by International Processes, Mamonov claims that China’s foreign policy 
towards Central Asia is constrained by its prioritization of keeping a reliable rear to its north and 
northwest and in ensuring that Russia remains neutral with regarding to its efforts to secure 
energy supplies from the region.69 
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In an article published by National Defense, Frolova analyzes China’s interests and activity in 
Central Asia.70 According to the expert, China’s interests in the region include: maintaining 
social and political stability in Xinjiang, a province whose ‘problems and development 
prospects’ serve as a lens through which China views Central Asia; providing itself a ‘strategic 
rear’; transit to Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucuses; export markets for Chinese goods; 
and energy resources.71 China’s energy interests in Central Asia are prompted by instability in 
regions that supply its energy resources through the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca.72 In an 
article published by RISS, Frolova reiterates that China is interested in gaining access to energy 
resources in Central Asia in order to reduce its dependence on sources from which they import 
energy via vulnerable sea transit routes.73 The expert also points out that China’s construction of 
transport infrastructure in the region is important for the mobility of its armed forces in case a 
deployment to Central Asia or the Middle East is necessary.74 
Mamonov has a doctorate, however, the expert has not held a position in the Russian government 
or Military. He is the Director of the Center Institute for International Studies and a Senior 
Researcher in the Center for International Economics Studies at MGIMO.75 Despite the expert’s 
lack of service to the Russian government or military and that the views he conveyed in the 
article above were published by an institution that does not have apparent connections to the 
government, given his qualifications and employment at the Federal State Autonomous 
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Educational Institute MGIMO, it is reasonable to argue that it is not unlikely that his views have 
directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign 
policy decisionmakers. Despite Frolova’s lack of a doctorate and history with the government or 
military, given that she has been at the FSBI RISS since 1998 and she publishes her views 
through it, it is reasonable to argue that it is not unlikely that her views have directly or indirectly 
contributed to the formation of the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers. 
There is a trend in expert views regarding security interaction between Russia and China in 
Central Asia identified in this section that China considers the region to be a strategic rear that is 
to be relied upon in the event of a conflict with the US. In this view, Beijing is careful not to 
come into conflict with Moscow in Central Asia to an extent that would compromise the region’s 
strategic value. Throughout the period of interest, Russian experts and, likely, foreign policy 
decisionmakers have come to this conclusion by continuous reassessment of China’s geopolitical 
and geostrategic position in the context of its rivalry with the US. Such a conclusion provides 
Moscow with confidence that China does not have harmful intentions towards Russia and that 
Beijing will avoid unmanageable conflicts of interest with Russia in Central Asia. The 
quantitative aspect of the content analysis shows that a lack of conflicts of interest between 
Russia and China is one of the most frequently identified reasons for perceptions of an absence 
of threat from China in the texts analyzed. 
Respecting Russia’s special interests 
The third trend in Russian expert thought on China’s security-related activities and interaction 
with Russia in Central Asia identified by the content analysis is the observation that Beijing 




advances in Central Asia when the two interests come into conflict. Such behavior also stems 
from China’s ‘respect’ for or ‘recognition’ of Russia’s interests in the region, which are 
considered special due to traditional, cultural, and historical ties. 
Views likely to have influence 
There are various reasons why staying on Russia’s good side by treading carefully in Central 
Asia is important for China’s global foreign policy, but in the views of some Russian experts it is 
also important for its regional foreign policy. For example, in an article published by Russia in 
Global Politics, Chernyavsky claims that, with regard to Central Asia, ‘Chinese diplomacy is 
based on the recognition of the traditional political and economic interests of its northern 
neighbor in the region and its leading role in the field of regional security’.76 According to the 
expert, China’s ‘offensive line’ in Central Asia is ‘dictated’ by its need to cooperate with Russia 
and countries in the region to defeat Uighur separatism.77 In this view, Beijing does not want to 
risk damaging relations with Moscow by acting unilaterally in Central Asia not only for the sake 
of maintaining good relations, but also because China needs Russia’s help in tackling its own 
security problem in Xinjiang. Chernyavsky also points out that cooperation between Russia and 
China in Central Asia can play a role in deterring unwanted US action in the region.78 
In an article published by RISS, Lukin disputes the claim that China intends, by unilateral means, 
to become more influential in Central Asia.79 The expert also points out that while China is 
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disappointed in Russia’s failure to live up to its proclaimed ‘main role’ in the region, it still 
recognizes this role.80 
In an article cited above, Guzenkova and Vinogradov et al. explain that, while China recognizes 
Russia’s leadership in the post-Soviet space and implements a principled foreign policy in the 
area, this does not mean it does not have geopolitical interests there, that it considers the whole 
area to be one of exclusive Russian interests, or that it does not pursue an independent foreign 
policy in the region.81  
In an article published by the Independent Military Observer, Gavrilov claims that ‘Beijing is 
pursuing a friendly and coordinated policy towards Moscow’ and that in Central Asia, China, ‘to 
the maximum extent possible for it, is observing Russia's national interests’.82 
In a report cited above, Bordachev et al. claim that China is making a serious effort to take into 
account Russian interests in Central Asia, and that, as long as China’s political influence does 
not become as strong as its economic influence, they do not see a reason to expect a negative 
reaction from Russia.83 
Given the qualifications of Chernyavsky, Lukin, Guzenkova and Vinogradov et al., Gavrilov, 
and Bordachev, the fact that a significant number of them have served in the Russian government 
or military, and that the views they conveyed in the articles referenced above were published by 
an FSBI and institutions with connections to the Russian government, it is reasonable to argue 
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that it is likely that their views have directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the 
dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 
The trend in the dominant view regarding security interaction between Russia and China in 
Central Asia identified in this section is related to the trend identified in the previous section that 
China considers the region a reliable strategic rear. It is perceived that Beijing recognizes 
Moscow’s ‘special interests’ in Central Asia in order to avoid conflict that would compromise 
the strategic value of the region in the event of a conflict with the US. The trend also includes the 
view that China respects Russia’s interests in Central Asia to facilitate security cooperation in the 
interest of combatting Uighur separatism and terrorism. Again, the analysis finds confidence 
among Russian experts that China does not have harmful intentions towards Russia and that 
Beijing will avoid unmanageable conflicts of interests with Russia in Central Asia. The 
quantitative aspect of the content analysis shows that a lack of conflict of interests between 
Russia and China is one of the most frequently identified reasons for perceptions of an absence 
of threat from China in the texts analyzed. 
Other Noteworthy Views 
‘Soft power’ 
Another aspect of Russian expert thought on China’s security-related activity in Central Asia and 
its implications for Russian interests worth addressing in this chapter is ‘soft power’. Views on 
the waning of Russia’s soft power and strengthening of China’s soft power in the region tend to 
be nuanced and generally neutral, but occasionally imply some potential positive or negative 




Views likely to have influence 
In a workbook published by the RIAC, Luzyanin et al. address the issue of soft power in Central 
Asia.84 In the third chapter of the workbook, Smirnova explains that the strategic ‘triangle’ in 
Central Asia, i.e. Russia, China, and the West, and their competition for influence in the region 
can be thought of as a struggle between two sides with Russia and China on one side and the US 
on the other.85 In this view, it is logical that as China’s influence increases, so does Russia’s.86 
However, the experts ask whether when considering certain aspects of soft power such as 
language or education, perhaps the opposite may be true: as China’s soft power influence 
increases so does that of the West to the detriment of Russian influence.87 This is because 
English is becoming more popular to learn in Central Asia, and English language capabilities 
bring opportunities for stronger ties with China.88 Smirnova explains that the language barrier 
between China and Central Asian countries is so strong that English may eventually become the 
main lingua franca between the two.89 
One of the strongest ties between Central Asian countries and China is through China’s BRI, 
which includes the construction of transit infrastructure managed by Chinese companies in the 
region. According to Smirnova, the operations of Chinese companies that include foreigners are 
carried out with communication in English.90 The expert also points out that China’s educational 
system is well integrated with the Western system.91 These factors combined with the greater 
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attraction to China as opposed to Russia in terms of economic opportunities will make English 
language education more appealing in Central Asia. Thus, according to Smirnova, it is worth 
considering the potential that China’s increasing soft power in Central Asia may lead to its 
assuming the role of a ‘civilizational bridge’ between Central Asia and the West.92 The expert 
emphasizes that it is not likely that China will do so intentionally and points out that such an 
outcome would be attributed to Russia itself because of its relative international isolation and 
lack of an attractive and innovative economy. Smirnova argues that Russia should not try to 
prevent the development of ties between Central Asia and China or the West because ultimately 
it is in Russia’s interest that Central Asian countries continue to be interested in their 
cooperation.93 The expert points out that if the countries of the post-Soviet space that do not see a 
satisfying rate of development, then they may blame Russia and turn away from it towards China 
or the West, as Ukraine did.94 
In a workbook on cooperation between Russia and China in Central Asia published by the RIAC, 
Luzyanin et al. observe that Russia’s soft power in the form of cultural influence, education, and 
the use of the Russian language in Central Asia is traditionally strong, however, it is waning as 
China’s soft power in the region is growing rapidly.95 The experts do not express a view on 
whether this is harmful for Russian interests, but rather they simply write that ‘there is a need to 
harmonize approaches and tools so that they meet both the interests of Russia and China, and the 
needs of the Central Asian peoples’.96 Luzyanin et al. also point out that China is providing a 
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growing number of Central Asians with secular education at universities in Xinjiang, which is 
good for countering the spread of extremism and radical Islam.97 
In an article published by International Life, Zhigarkov analyzes Russian and Chinese soft power 
initiatives in Central Asia and the countries’ potential for cooperation and competition.98 The 
expert explains that both Russia and China have soft power projects and influence in Central 
Asia: Russia has Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russkiy Mir Foundation as well as continued 
popularity of Russian education, while China has established in the region Confucius Institutes, 
Confucius Classes, and the Union of Universities of China and Central Asia based in Urumqi. 
Russia’s soft power in the region is strong and can potentially be maintained, although it is 
‘based mainly on a common Soviet past’.99 Chinese soft power efforts take advantage of the 
cultural ties between ethnic groups in Central Asia and northwest China in order to spread the 
Chinese language in Central Asia through the Education Office of the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region, an institution whose responsibilities include ‘rendering assistance to the 
universities of the SCO member countries in the creation of Confucius Institutes, development of 
multilingual teaching aids, educational exchanges, and the development of friendly relations with 
the states of the region’.100 Zhigarkov observes that while Russian soft power efforts ‘rely 
primarily on interaction with compatriots’ and target mostly Russian-speaking people in Central 
Asia, ‘Chinese organizations work with wider segments of the population, encouraging their 
interest in the Chinese language and oriental culture, using the interest in cooperation with a 
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promising neighbor’.101 The expert notes that Russia still receives more Central Asian students at 
its universities than China, however, he also observes that ‘education in the PRC is already 
popular among the youth of Central Asia’ and argues that ‘given the narrowing of the range of 
use of the Russian language in Central Asian countries and the significant financial resources 
that China is ready to devote to education, including direct material support to students, this gap 
will tend to narrow in the future’.102 For Zhigarkov, the prospects for Chinese media to 
contribute to the strengthening of Chinese soft power in Central Asia are also promising, as it has 
a ‘single organizing center, extensive financial resources and a consolidated system of foreign 
broadcasting, including a Russian one’.103 
Regarding Russia’s motives for projecting soft power in Central Asia for the purpose of gaining 
influence, Zhigarkov simply explains that the region is strategically important for Russia.104 
According to the expert, China is motivated by its desire to improve its image in the minds of the 
Central Asian public in preparation for the implementation of BRI projects and other initiatives 
such as ‘Big State Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’ and the ‘Community of the United 
Fate of Humanity’.105 Zhigarkov argues that ‘under these conditions, the tendency towards 
competition of the “soft power” strategies of the PRC and other states, including Russia, will 
take on ever more distinct forms’.106 However, from the expert’s point of view, soft power 
competition in Central Asia is not inevitable. According to Zhigarkov, the political trust that has 
been established between Russia and China will allow them to cooperate and create joint projects 










in the ‘soft power spheres of education, culture, and information.107 The expert makes an 
example of the SCO University, which has united many existing universities of the member 
states and observer states of the organization for the purpose of educational, academic, and 
scientific cooperation and integration.108 Nevertheless, Zhigarkov argues that it is in Russia’s 
interest to research further the implications for the possibility of soft power competition between 
Russia and China in Central Asia. The expert notes that, in order to achieve the aim of the SCO, 
the EAEU, and the BRI of the unity of Greater Eurasia, Russia must also work on the image of 
China in its own country. Zhigarkov points out that negative views of China in Russia still exist, 
and that they are ‘quite clearly manifested both in the media and in the statements of the leaders 
of public opinion (the so-called LOMov)’.109 The expert calls on Russia to strive to change this 
perception by working ‘not only and not so much with the elites through expert reports, but 
directly with people in completely different media formats’.110 
Despite the lack of service to the Russian government or military of the experts, except for 
Zhigarkov, given the qualifications of Luzyanin and Bordachev, Matveev, Smirnova, Bordachev, 
Zvyagelskaya, Kazantsev, Kuzmina, and Zhigarkov, and that Luzyanin and Bordachev may be 
considered in close proximity to the Russian government, it is reasonable to argue that it is likely 
that the experts’ views have directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of the 
dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 









The chapter has reported results of the content analysis that have shown expert thought in Russia 
on China’s security activity in Central Asia have tendencies to downplay the potential for a clash 
of interests between Moscow and Beijing, emphasize the compatibility of interests and 
successful coordination, point out reasons why it is not in China’s interest to implement policies 
in the region despite Russia’s disapproval, and give mostly neutral nuanced assessments while 
generally avoiding alarmism. However, the content analysis also revealed concerns and negative 
views regarding China’s security policies in Central Asia and their implications for Russia’s 
interests. 
Views likely to have influence 
In an article published by Russia in Global Politics, Safranchuk analyzes security cooperation in 
Central Asia, and acknowledges that the CSTO and SCO are ‘increasingly drawn into non-public 
and dangerous competition’ as their ‘areas of responsibility … overlap to a large extent both 
functionally and geographically’.111 In 2007, tensions between the organizations were addressed, 
resulting in a ‘memorandum of understanding’ between their secretariats, in which the 
organizations agreed to various forms of cooperation. Safranchuk sees two possible scenarios of 
the implementation of cooperation and its results: one unlikely and one likely. The unlikely 
scenario entails the separation of functional responsibilities, which, according to Safranchuk, will 
be very difficult. The second and more likely scenario the expert gives is that the CSTO and the 
SCO fail to completely separate responsibilities and continue to implement parallel projects, but 
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their secretariats will ‘coordinate action plans and avoid open contradictions’.112 Safranchuk 
points out that in this more likely scenario the CSTO will lose its significance as China will gain 
indirect influence over the workings of the organization.113 The expert compares this loss of 
significance with that of the Western European Union, which became obsolete after the 
establishment of NATO.114 
In an article published by the Bulletin of MGIMO, Chernyavsky addresses problems of water 
supply experienced in Central Asia and China and their potential to cause conflict.115 The expert 
points out that even within the region of Central Asia there is uneven distribution of freshwater 
resources.116 Fresh water in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is plentiful, and the countries are 
depended on for supply in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. However, while the 
freshwater resources of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are great, they may not hold up under 
domestic and foreign supply pressures. Chernyavsky observes two main areas of conflict 
potential: first, with the rate of population growth at the time, annual water consumption at 5-6 
thousand liters per person was unsustainable; second, there was a conflict between the interests 
of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in using its water resources for hydroelectricity, and the interests of 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in using those water resources primarily for 
agricultural purposes.117 
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Chernyavsky argues that China’s water supply needs tie into the potential for conflict over fresh 
water in Central Asia in two main ways.118 First, there is a shortage of fresh water in China due 
partly to river pollution; and second, China’s efforts for the accelerated development of Xinjiang 
include projects that divert water from the rivers Irtysh and Ili.119 These rivers feed Lake 
Balkhash and Lake Zaisan in Kazakhstan, which means a diversion of their flow is a threat to 
Kazakhstan’s already insufficient domestic water supply.120 By extension, such projects may be 
perceived as a threat to stability in Central Asia. 
In the volume that followed, another article addressing freshwater problems was published, this 
time written by a collective of experts led by Chechevishnikov.121 Referring to the same Chinese 
projects, the experts warn that their implementation will lead to shortages in parts of 
Kazakhstan.122 The article was based on a report co-authored by Orlov, Chechevishnikov, 
Chernyavsky.123 
Views not unlikely to have influence 
In the same volume of the Bulletin of MGIMO, Borishpolets also addresses the issue of water 
security in Central Asia.124 Regarding China’s plan to divert water from the Irtysh and Ili rivers 
for the sake of Xinjiang’s industrial development, the expert claims that some other experts 
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believe that the project ‘seriously jeopardizes the ecological and economic interests of Russia 
and Kazakhstan’.125 
In an article cited above, Frolova argues that, as China’s influence in Central Asia grows, it will 
continue to prioritize its interests over those of others, ‘which at some point may conflict with 
Russia's interests in the region’.126 The main areas in which their interests may come into conflict 
are in ‘providing political influence on the leaders of Central Asian states … the formation of 
social groups oriented towards Russia or China’, and ‘influence in the field of culture and 
education’.127 
Frolova perceives Russia’s and China’s activity in Central Asia as a zero-sum game. The expert 
explains how China’s gains in the region mean Russia’s loss in the following way. 
‘The implementation of the Chinese concept of turning China into a global trading power, along 
with the country's production and investment capabilities, leads to a decrease in the importance of 
Russia as a trade and economic partner for the countries of Central Asia. In turn, the economic 
consolidation of China in the region reduces the influence and significance of Russia as a political 
partner and a partner in ensuring regional security’.128 
Frolova argues that ‘in the event of force majeure circumstances in the region, Moscow should 
be ready to use all means available to prevent the strengthening of the positions of both the PRC 
and other large countries in Central Asia’.129 
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In another article cited above, Frolova argues that there are certain ways that China may threaten 
security in Central Asia.130 First, China’s expansion in the oil and gas sectors of the region may 
cause social upheaval that could threaten supply channels. A situation in which China acts to 
ensure the safety of such channels ‘could result in a serious threat to the national security of 
Central Asian states’.131 Second, Chinese canals that divert water from the Irtysh River have 
already caused water shortages in Central Asia and the cessation of shipping on a part of the 
Irtysh between Russia and Kazakhstan.132 Frolova claims that ‘if the Chinese side realizes its 
plans to increase water withdrawal, this will lead to a critical shallowing of the river in the next 
15 years’.133 
Policy 
In general, Russia’s security policy in Central Asia over the period of interest has consisted of a 
sustained and dominant security presence through the maintenance of its military bases in the 
region, supplying arms and military equipment, providing training for Central Asian troops, and 
conducting military exercises both bilaterally and multilaterally within the frameworks of the 
CSTO and the SCO. As discussed above, the main purpose of the policy has been to fight 
terrorism, separatism, extremism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, to support current 
regimes in Central Asia in the interest of stability, and, along with China, to balance against the 
rise of a ‘third force’ in the region, namely the US. Fundamental documents and official rhetoric 
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indicate that Russia considers its partnership with China in addressing such matters to be 
important for regional security.134 
In recent years, China has been increasing its security presence in Tajikistan, calling into 
question how much longer the ‘division of labor’ in which Russia handles security and China 
economic development will last or whether it is already deteriorating. This increased security 
presence mainly refers to the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism China-
Tajikistan-Pakistan-Afghanistan (QCCM) formed in 2016, bilateral Chinese-Tajik military 
exercises conducted most recently in 2015, 2016, and 2019, and the appearance of a Chinese 
outpost on Tajik territory near the border of China and Tajikistan in 2019. 
The outpost has received considerable attention among analysts due to its significance as only 
the second military presence China has abroad. Much of it seems to have been sparked by the 
Washington Post article written by Gerry Shih in February 2019, in which he refers to the 
outpost as a ‘base’.135 The journalist met a Chinese soldier stationed at the outpost who told him 
that they had been there for three or four years. Some scholars and analysts were quick to adopt 
the label ‘military base’ to refer to the outpost and discuss its implications.136 The Chinese 
                                                             
134 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’. 
01/12/2016. Articles 84. Available at https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248. Accessed 20/04/2021; Government of the Russian Federation. 
‘O Strategii Nat͡ sionalʹnoĭ Bezopasnosti Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡ sii (On the National Security Strategy of the Russian 
Federation)’. Article 95. 31/12/2015. Available at https://www.mchs.gov.ru/dokumenty/ukazy-prezidenta-rf/2933. 
Accessed 17/04/2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation’. Article 80. 18/02/2013. Available at 
https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186. 
Accessed 20/04/2021; as explained on page 77, one of the four main themes identified in an analysis of Russia’s 
official rhetoric (detailed analysis in the Appendix) is the role of Russia and China’s coordination in regional and 
global stability. 
135 Shih, Gerry ‘In Central Asia’s Forbidding Highlands, a Quiet Newcomer: Chinese Troops’. Washington Post. 
19/02/2019. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-
a-quiet-newcomer-chinese-troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html. Accessed 
30/12/2020. 
136 See for example Stephen Blank. ‘China's Military Base in Tajikistan: What Does it Mean?’ The Central Asia-




Foreign and Defense Ministries made no comment when requested for one by Shih, and in a 
statement released by the Tajik Foreign Ministry it denied the presence of a Chinese military 
base in Tajikistan or plans for one to be established. An annual report to US Congress titled 
‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020’ from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense corroborates the claim that China does not have a military 
base in Tajikistan, going only so far as to say that China has ‘likely considered’ Tajikistan as a 
location for a military logistics facility.137 
The outpost Shih refers to in the Washington Post article was likely installed as part of an 
agreement signed by Tajikistan and China in 2016, by which China provided a grant for the 
construction of three commandant's offices, four border outposts, four border posts, and one 
training center on the Tajik-Afghan border.138 China was also given the right to build or renovate 
approximately 30-40 security posts on Tajikistan’s side of its border with Afghanistan.139 
The effort to strengthen the border is understandable, given the withdrawal of US forces from 
Afghanistan and that in 2015 the Taliban took control of about 80% of Badakhshan, a province 
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that borders Tajikistan.140 One Tajik border guard told the BBC that the fighting came so close to 
the border that he could hear shooting at night.141 The US, acknowledging the threat of conflict 
spillover into Central Asia, sent Secretary of State John Kerry on a diplomatic trip to the region 
in an effort to reassure its governments that the US shares its concerns on the matter and would 
be maintaining a supporting military presence as it continues its drawdown.142 China views the 
security of the Tajik-Afghan border as vital for its own national security, as China’s Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region borders Tajikistan’s Gorno Badakhshan, an autonomous region that 
borders Badakhshan province Afghanistan. Chinese expert Sheng Xiyu explained to 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta that ‘the activation in Afghan territory of the terrorist group “Islamic 
Movement of East Turkestan,” which has close working relations with the Uyghur diaspora in 
Tajikistan, is a threat that Beijing takes extremely seriously and reacts to quite sharply’.143 Sheng 
Xiyu as well as other experts, including Russian experts, view Tajikistan’s Gorno Badakhshan as 
‘a direct road’ to the Chinese Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region with significant consequences 
for China’s national security.144 
There has been little response from Russian officials regarding China’s increasing security 
presence in Central Asia aside from Special Representative of the President of the Russian 
Federation for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov who, according to Frolova, ‘assessed the creation of 
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the [QCCM] in a positive way’.145 According to Kabulov, the primary purpose of the QCCM is 
‘border control and suppression of the infiltration of terrorists’ and it is not necessary for Russia 
to be involved for two main reasons: first, Russia has ‘its own plans within the CSTO’; and 
second, relevant issues are being discussed between Russia and China within the framework of 
the SCO.146 
A perceived shortage of a clear narrative from Moscow has encouraged claims from some 
analysts that China is acting against Russia’s interest in remaining the dominant security 
provider in Central Asia. The results of the content analysis reported above show that the 
dominant perceptions among Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military 
with regard to security interaction with China in the region include the view that there either are 
no conflicting interests or that the conflicts of interests that do exist are manageable and non-
threatening due to the good state of the countries’ bilateral relations and China’s restraint out of a 
respect for Russia’s ‘privileged interests’ in Central Asia. Regarding the specific issue of China’s 
increased security presence in the region in recent years, Russian experts tend not to express the 
view that the development threatens Russia’s interests. 
For example, in an interview with the Central Asian Analytical Network, Frolova concludes that 
China was ‘forced to intensify counter-terrorism cooperation with its neighbors’ by establishing 
the QCCM because of the threat emanating from Afghanistan.147 According to the expert, China 
is primarily interested in ensuring stability in Xinjiang and security along its western border, and 
points out that ‘China needs a favorable external environment to implement its internal 
                                                             







development programs’.148 In Frolova’s view, Beijing acts with consideration in the region, as it 
‘seeks to find a way to participate in the life of the region that would meet both the country's own 
interests and the interests of its neighbors’.149 When asked whether the establishment of the 
QCCM was evidence that China wishes to expand its military-political influence in Central Asia, 
the expert first differentiates the external build-up of military-political influence as an end in 
itself from extraterritorial actions to meet internal needs by contributing to international efforts to 
ensure regional security.150 Frolova then explains that China is engaged in the latter, contributing 
to regional security alongside the SCO and the CSTO.151 
Frolova shares the view of Tajik Gorno Badakhshan as ‘a direct road to Chinese Xinjiang’, 
which makes Tajikistan ‘one of the key points in ensuring the national security of the PRC’.152 
Regarding the Chinese military ‘base’ reported by the Washington Post in 2019, the expert 
claims that the author of the article ‘mistook one of the border outposts built by the PRC in the 
Murghab region of GBAO’.153 In Frolova’s view, the strategic interests of Russia and China in 
Central Asia continue to coincide, and “‘horror stories” about the rivalry between the Russian 
Federation and the PRC in Central Asia have already lost their relevance’.154 
Regarding China’s security cooperation with Tajikistan, Litovkin explains that, while Tajikistan 
as a sovereign country may conclude military alliances with other countries, including China, ‘as 
a member of the CSTO, Tajikistan must coordinate the conclusion of military alliances with the 











countries of this organization’.155 The retired colonel then points out that Russia shares the 
interest of Tajikistan and China in fighting terrorism and extremism but its means are not 
unlimited: ‘Russia cannot be present everywhere in the form of its troops’.156 Litovkin claims 
that ‘if there is an opportunity [for Tajikistan], together with China, to confront the threat of 
terrorism, then Moscow supports and approves such cooperation’ and stresses that ‘China's 
policy does not contradict Russian interests’.157 
Popov holds a similar view, writing that ‘cooperation between Russia and China in Tajikistan is 
non-confrontational’.158 According to the expert, Russia and China ‘demonstrate their ability to 
resolve controversial issues on the basis of mutual respect and dialogue, and not to succumb to 
attempts by Western diplomacy and the press to bring tension to Russian-Chinese cooperation in 
Central Asia’.159 
Addressing the establishment of the QCCM and the question of whether China ‘does not believe 
in the effectiveness of the SCO’ or is ‘trying to propose its own rules of the game in the field of 
regional security’, Ivanov (ed.) et al. write that ‘given that China has common borders with 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan, and all three countries share borders with Afghanistan, and 
given the similar security challenges these states face due to their geographic proximity, 
consultations in a quadripartite format are absolutely logical’.160 The experts add that ‘there is no 
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need to try to look for a different, hidden meaning in this process’.161 Ivanov (ed.) et al. argue 
that ‘the plurality of institutions and mechanisms in the field of security is not a negative factor’ 
but note that coordination between them in ensuring regional security should be strengthened.162 
The analysis of the work of Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military 
reveals that the dominant view on this issue does not include a perception of threat from China’s 
security activity in Tajikistan in recent years. This is not to say that in Russia the view that such 
activity threatens Russia’s interests does not exist, but rather that it is marginal and less likely to 
contribute to the formation of the dispositional factors (perceptions and values) on which 
Russia’s foreign policy is based. This inference is supported by the absence of any Russian 
policy in Tajikistan since 2016 that could be construed as balancing against China’s expanding 
security presence in the country. 
The ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 outlines a framework for analysis that has been 
followed in this chapter.163 Based on the finding that the dominant expert view on Russia’s 
security policies in Central Asia relevant to China is held by experts with a high level of 
potential influence on average, the chapter concludes that it is likely that the view has been 
successfully communicated directly or indirectly to foreign policy decisionmakers. This is case 1 
in the framework. Given case 1, scenarios 1 or 2 are more likely than scenarios 3 and 4.164 This 
means that it is likely that once the dominant view was successfully communicated to the 
officials, the dispositional factors of the officials either changed to become more aligned with, or 
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less contradictory to, the dominant view (scenario 1), or the officials’ preexisting dispositional 
factors were reinforced by the dominant view (scenario 2). In both scenarios, dispositional 
factors that inform the dominant views are likely shared to the point that policy is consistent with 
the views (in scenario 1, they are shared after the communication, and in scenario 2, they are 
shared before and after the communication). Therefore, the dispositional factors inherent in the 
views would explain the policies. Such factors include the value of protecting Russia’s security-
related interests in Central Asia; the perception that there is no serious clash of security-related 
interests between Russia and China in the region; the perception that China will not act against 
its interests in Central Asia; and the perception that China practices restraint in the region, 
respecting Russia’s ‘special’ or ‘privileged’ interests in order to ensure a ‘reliable rear’ for the 
contingency of conflict with the US. 
Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the aim of the thesis to explain Russia’s foreign policy towards China 
in the context of the drastic shift in the balance of power between the two as a result of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rise of China by addressing the issue of security in 
Central Asia, which is a key area of Russia-China relations. The results of the content analysis 
relevant to security interaction in this region are reported in sections which focus on dominant 
trends in Russian expert thought on the topic from 2000 to 2020. 
The chapter identifies three main trends. The first is the view that conflicts of interest between 
Russia and China regarding security issues in Central Asia are either non-existent or minor. In 
this view, even when the interests of the two countries are not entirely aligned, the contradictions 
are not so serious as to be impossible to overcome through dialogue. The good state of relations 




Central Asia can and should be approached as a positive-sum game, and China’s adherence to 
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states allow Russia and China to 
avoid a major clash in the region. The common interest in preventing the rise of a ‘third force’ in 
the region also has a unifying effect that motivates their efforts to avoid major conflict. Included 
in this dominant trend is the view that claims that a rivalry between Russia and China in Central 
Asia is already in progress or that a clash between the two in the region is inevitable are 
unsubstantiated, misinformed, or exaggerated. This finding supports hypothesis 3 in that it shows 
that conflicts of interest between Russia and China in the security sphere in Central Asia have 
not given rise to dominant perceptions of threat from China among Russian experts, and likely 
decisionmakers, because, as explained above, they are perceived as being either absent or 
minor.165 
The second trend reported by the chapter is the view among Russian experts that China sees 
Central Asia as a ‘reliable rear’ in the context of its rivalry with the US, i.e. a non-hostile area of 
operations as well as a source of energy with overland transit routes that are more secure than sea 
routes, which are vulnerable to disruption by the US Navy. 
The third trend in Russian expert thought identified by the content analysis and reported in this 
chapter is the observation that China understands that Russia has ‘special interests’ in Central 
Asia and exercises restraint in the region so as not to damage relations with Moscow. In the 
views of these experts, this is because, for Beijing, the maintenance of good relations between 
Russia and China takes precedence over unilateral gains in Central Asia. Reasons for this 
prioritization are present at the regional and global level with regard to China’s foreign policy. 
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This finding supports hypothesis 1 in that it provides evidence of a dominant perception among 
Russian experts, and likely decisionmakers, that China does not intend to undermine Russia’s 
security-related interests in Central Asia.166 The finding also supports hypothesis 6 in that it 
shows that among Russian experts, and likely decisionmakers, there is a dominant perception 
that Beijing prioritizes long-term cooperation with Moscow in Central Asia over short-term 
gains, as evidenced by its restraint and respect for Russia’s ‘special interests’ in the region.167 
The chapter also presents findings on Russian expert thought on China’s soft power initiatives in 
Central Asia and their implications for Russia’s interests. China’s growing soft power in the 
region is not explicitly condemned, but there are concerns raised over the potential for soft power 
competition between Russia and China. Some experts point out that the strengthening of 
educational, cultural, and linguistic ties between China and Central Asia as a result of Chinese 
soft power initiatives could be beneficial not only for the region, but for Russia as well. This is 
because such ties may lead to quicker development in Central Asia, which will make it less 
likely that the countries of the region will blame Russia for its problems and turn to the West, as 
Ukraine did. 
The chapter also shares some concerns that were found by the content analysis regarding China’s 
security-related activity in Central Asia. They include perceptions that competition between the 
CSTO and the SCO may ultimately lead to the obsolescence of the former; that China’s 
economic power may be used to reorient Central Asian countries’ military cooperation priorities 
away from Russia and towards China; the destabilizing effects of China’s river diversion projects 
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in the region for the development of Xinjiang; and the potential for China’s expansion in the 
energy sector of the economies of Central Asia to cause social upheaval in which case China 
may use force to protect its supply lines causing further destabilization. 
Finally, the chapter discusses Russia’s security-related policies in Central Asia, China’s 
expanded security role in Tajikistan in recent years, Russia’s response to China’s increased 
security presence, and the implications of the development for Russia’s interests in Central Asia 
in the views of Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military. There has been 
little response from Moscow in the form of official rhetoric, and there have not been any 
developments on Russia’s end in Tajikistan since 2016 that indicate balancing behavior. Among 
Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military, the view that China’s increased 
security role in Tajikistan is logical and non-threatening is apparently dominant. This view 
coupled with the passivity of Russia’s policy on the matter leads the section to conclude that that 
scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 are 
most likely. 
Western literature on security interaction between Russia and China in Central Asia consists of 
some claims that Moscow is put at ease by Beijing’s respect for Russia’s ‘special interests’ in 
Central Asia as demonstrated by its restraint, which are supported by the findings of the 
chapter.168 Some contributors to Western literature have found no severe conflicts of interest 
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between Russia and China in the region in the area of security,169 while others have.170 The work 
of the former is supported by another main conclusion of the chapter that among Russian experts 
with ties to the Russian government or military, and likely among Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers, there is a dominant perception that there are little or no significant conflicts of 
interest regarding security policies in Central Asia. One area that has apparently received little 
attention in the literature is the effect of Russian decisionmakers’ perception of China’s need for 
a ‘reliable’ strategic rear in Central Asia on Russia’s security policy interaction with China in the 
region. The results of the content analysis indicate that this is a serious consideration when 
determining how Russia should interact with China in Central Asia in the security realm. It is 
arguable that Russia’s continued dominance in the security realm provides comfort in the face of 
China’s expanding security presence in the region, as Moscow maintains a considerable amount 
of influence that may be used to hinder Chinese access in the event of a conflict with the US. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to the literature on Russia-China relations a rigorous and systematic 
analysis of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy towards the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) from 2000 to 2020. Chapter 1 explains that the study seeks to provide an answer to the 
question of why Russia is not threatened by the rise of China.1 This question stems from a realist 
outlook of international relations and the context of the relationship between the two states, 
which includes a drastic shift in the balance of power within a few decades that has the potential 
to result in balancing, confrontation, or conflict. Given the rapidity of China’s rise, its proximity 
to Russia, the anarchic international environment, and that Moscow can never be certain of 
Beijing’s intentions, current or future, Russia would be expected by many realists to perceive 
China as a threat. However, Russia has not endeavored to balance against China and the two 
have managed to avoid confrontation and conflict. 
Throughout the period of interest, Russia has consistently pursued the development of 
cooperation with China and has largely been successful. Russian officials have repeatedly stated 
that Russia-China relations are in the best state in their history and that they, with their Chinese 
colleagues, operate in an atmosphere of trust, good neighborliness, friendship, and mutual 
respect. The focus on perceptions of an absence of threat from China to Russia among Russian 
foreign policy decisionmakers is foundational to the approach taken by this thesis to analyze 
Russian foreign policy towards China. Since the foreign policy of a state towards another is often 
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determined to a large extent by whether the other state is considered a threat, much of the policy 
can be explained by the rationale behind the view of the other as threatening or non-threatening. 
The study does not claim to explain every element of Russia’s foreign policy towards China 
from 2000 to 2020. However, it does offer an explanation of the policy during this period, 
specifically with regard to the way it has managed to avoid confrontation and conflict and 
continued to develop cooperation despite the shift in the bilateral balance of power. 
Chapter 2 formulates six hypotheses based on prominent theories and concepts in the field of IR 
that have both the potential to explain why Russia is not threatened by the rise of China and are 
sufficiently testable. Such theories and concepts include balance of threat theory, offense-defense 
balance theory, balance of interests theory, neoliberal institutionalism, a constructivist and 
psychological understanding of the interaction between shared identity and threat perception, and 
a politico-psychological notion of trust between states. 
The thesis provides a multilevel multicausal explanation of Russia’s foreign policy towards 
China under Putin by employing an analytical framework that integrates agency and structure. 
First, the intentions of foreign policy decisionmakers are identified. This is done with an analysis 
of Russian official rhetoric in the Appendix, the results of which are summarized in the 
‘Intentional factors’ section of chapter 2. Second, dispositional factors (perceptions and values) 
of the decisionmakers are identified. In accordance with the framework, dispositional factors do 
most of the causal work in the explanation of a foreign policy. Therefore, most of the empirical 
work is focused on the identification of dispositional factors. This is done in chapters 3-7. The 
analysis allows the study to draw conclusions based on the likelihood that direct or indirect 
communication of the dominant views of the experts to foreign policy decisionmakers has been 




are shared by decisionmakers to a significant extent. This part of the framework is explained in 
the ‘Dispositional factors’ section of chapter 2.2 Third, structural constraints on foreign policy 
behavior are identified and used to elaborate the explanations that are based on the dispositional 
factors identified by the content analysis here in the concluding chapter. 
The method chosen to identify the dispositional factors of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers 
is a crowdsourced content analysis of Russian expert texts. Expert texts as a source of 
dispositional factors were chosen for three main reasons. First, Russian decisionmakers are 
difficult to access for interviews, and even if interviews were granted, the answers to questions 
would likely resemble official rhetoric. Second, as explained in chapter 3, the connections 
between knowledge production in Russia on international affairs, foreign policy, and security 
and the Russian government, while not absolute, are nevertheless strong. Several of the 
publishing institutions themselves are directly or indirectly connected to, or even legally owned 
and operated by, the government. Many of the experts who wrote the texts analyzed have held or 
currently hold positions in the government or military or are in close proximity to high-ranking 
officials. And third, experts provide more detailed analysis in their work than officials do in their 
rhetoric, which can lead to deeper insight into the reasons behind Russia’s behavior towards 
China over the period of interest. 
As explained in chapter 2, the texts of 19 publishing institutions on international affairs, foreign 
policy, and security were selected for analysis. 42,445 paragraphs, all of which mention China at 
least once and were published by the institutions from 2000 to 2018 were gathered from various 
sources, including the databases Integrum and East View and from the websites of the 
                                                             




institutions. The paragraphs were uploaded to the crowdsourcing platform Appen (formerly 
Crowdflower and Figure-8) for them to be analyzed by coders. For each of the paragraphs, 
coders answered questions about the text designed to test the hypotheses. Each paragraph 
received at least five codes (sets of answers to the questions), which resulted in over 210,000 
trusted codes used to identify trends in Russian expert thought on China. The results of the 
analysis also provided a guide for the qualitative aspect of the content analysis, which targeted 
texts that contained paragraphs that received certain codes and includes texts published from 
2000 to early 2020. This qualitative aspect allowed for more detailed insights into Russian expert 
thought on China that the quantitative aspect could not provide. 
Finally, chapter 3 reports five main findings of the quantitative aspect of the content analysis. 
First, when coders identified a perception of threat or absence of threat from China to Russia in 
the texts analyzed, ‘non-conflicting interests’ and ‘lack of harmful intentions’ were by far the 
most frequently selected reasons why, according to the texts, there was such a perception. 
Second, ‘economy/trade’ and ‘military’ are by far the most frequently addressed topics in the 
texts analyzed. Third, ‘economic/trade’ and ‘military’ are the types of perceptions of threat and 
absence of threat identified most in the texts analyzed. Fourth, direct discussions on the question 
of whether China poses a threat to Russia are rare. And fifth, the correlation coefficients 
calculated for 20 pairs of variables of shared identity and threat perception (overall and specific 
types) do not offer support for hypothesis 5, which is based on a social constructivist and 
psychological understanding of the interaction between shared identity and threat perception. Out 
of the 20 correlation coefficients calculated, none met theoretically based expectations. 





Chapter 4 contributes to the explanation of Russia’s foreign policy towards China offered by this 
thesis by analyzing the policy through the prism of Russia’s efforts to develop its easternmost 
territories so that it may be acknowledged as a great power in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) and 
reap the benefits of maintaining such a status. The first section of the chapter provides regional 
and ideational context to Russia’s interaction with China in the Russian Far East (RFE). One of 
the main features of Russia’s foreign policy is the pursuit or maintenance of great power status. 
An analysis of the idea of great power-ness in Russia among experts and officials reveals that its 
meaning consists of more than economic and military power: a country must also be attributed 
the status by others. The center of global wealth and power has been shifting from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific. In order to maintain recognition as a great power globally, Russia must develop the 
RFE so that it may serve as a base from which it can project power and influence and be 
acknowledged by other states as occupying an important role in regional processes of the APR, 
including economic integration and security dynamics. China inevitably becomes a major factor 
in this undertaking. 
The second section reports the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis that was 
performed for this thesis, specifically those relevant to the economic relations of the RFE and 
China. The section concludes that the dominant view among Russian experts with ties to the 
Russian government or military is that, while there are problems with the structure of the RFE’s 
trade relations with China that make the region’s exports dependent on raw materials, economic 
relations between the RFE and China are mutually beneficial, and there are ways that Russia and 
China can address the problems so that the development of economic cooperation with China 
and the development of the RFE can be facilitated. Included in this dominant view is that the 




external actors, including the PRC, but rather to domestic factors. This finding supports 
hypothesis 1 in that, in this view, Beijing does not intend to harm Russia or its interests by 
ensuring that the economy of the RFE becomes or remains a ‘raw materials appendage’ of 
China.3 
The final section discusses Russia’s policy regarding economic relations between the RFE and 
China in an effort to determine the extent to which such policy is consistent with the dominant 
expert view identified in the second section of the chapter. There are two main policies that 
demonstrate a lack of a perception of a serious threat from the rise of China to the RFE: the 
policy of authorizing Chinese investments in projects in the RFE in which the PRC controls large 
if not majority stakes; and the policy of selling or leasing land in the RFE to China for 
agricultural purposes. If the dominant perception among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers 
included the view that by allowing China to make large investments with controlling stakes and 
by leasing or selling land to China Russia risks losing effective sovereignty over parts of the 
RFE, then it is unlikely that such policies would be adopted. Therefore, the section argues that 
Russia’s policies have a high degree of consistency with the dominant view held by potentially 
influential experts identified in the second section. Based on this argument, the chapter 
concludes that scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section 
in chapter 2 are most likely. 
Structural constraints on Russia’s foreign policy towards China regarding the economic 
relationship between the RFE and the PRC include China’s great economic power, the 
dependence of the population of the RFE on Chinese finished goods, the absence of viable 
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alternative import markets for such goods, the RFE’s dependence on raw materials exports to 
China, and the lack of strong economic ties between the RFE with the European core of Russia. 
Given these circumstances, Russia is constrained by the need to ensure that the demands of the 
population of the RFE are met in terms of access to affordable finished goods and employment, a 
large portion of which is in the raw materials sector. In this view, Russia has few options other 
than to continue the status quo and gradually undertake efforts for the diversification of the 
exports of the RFE and development of the economy of the region in a direction that will 
eventually allow it to become one based on innovation, services, and high technology, which is 
what Russia has been attempting to do. Despite these structural constraints, as explained above, 
the dominant view among Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military, and 
likely among foreign policy decisionmakers, is that economic relations between the RFE and 
China throughout the period of interest have been mutually beneficial and that China does not 
have harmful intentions towards the region. 
The findings of chapter 4 are at odds with those contributors to Western literature on Russia-
China relations who identify Russian decisionmakers’ fear of the rise of China as a significant 
variable affecting the pace (often considered slow) at which economic relations between the RFE 
and China are being developed and Chinese investments and projects are being accepted and 
implemented in the RFE.4 As the chapter shows, concerns are not entirely absent, however they 
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are marginal relative to the view that economic relations between the RFE and China are 
essential, mutually beneficial, and should be continued in their current state while solutions to 
problems are pursued. Included in the dominant view are concerns about several domestic factors 
hindering the development of cooperation, such as complicated licensing procedures in Russia; 
high tariffs on Russia’s side; a weak business and investment climate that fails to attract 
investment to sectors of the economy outside of raw materials; the inability to create standard 
living conditions in the RFE; the poor state of cross-border infrastructure; a lack of accessible 
information for Russian exporters and importers; an inadequate number of border checkpoints 
and the inefficiency of those that exist; an inadequate promotion of tourism; and a stifling 
legislative framework for bilateral cooperation which has consisted of administrative and legal 
barriers impeding foreign entrepreneurial and investment activity in Russia. Rather than 
apprehension on the Russian side, hinderance caused by domestic factors is argued to be the 
main variable affecting the pace of the development of economic relations. 
Chapter 5 approaches the research question of the thesis with an examination of the perceptions 
of Russian experts on the demographic and military security of the RFE vis-à-vis China. The first 
section begins by examining expert texts that focus on the demographic imbalance between the 
RFE and neighboring Chinese provinces and include discussions on the implications of such 
imbalance from a security perspective. The section reveals that the dominant view among 
Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military throughout the period of interest 
is that there is no threat of mass immigration from China. For reasons that remain unclear, the 
experts rarely explain why there is an absence of such a threat. This may be because they view 
the lack of an immigration threat from China as self-evident. This explanation seems more likely 




presenting an argument supporting the view that there is no threat of mass immigration from 
China to the RFE, explains that there is no such threat because there is a lack of economic 
incentives for the Chinese to move to the region, and that it is not uncommon for those who do to 
experience harassment and beatings.5 Kamynin offers similar reasoning.6 The question of which 
hypothesis this finding supports depends on the nature of the threat of mass immigration from 
China to the RFE. If the threat of mass immigration to the RFE is thought to be due to incentives 
created by Beijing, then the findings support hypothesis 1 because the perception of an absence 
of threat stems from China’s lack of harmful intentions towards Russia.7 If the threat of mass 
immigration is thought to be due to the interests of Chinese immigrants without an incentive 
created by Beijing, and the interests of the immigrants are included in the definition of ‘China’s 
interests’, then the finding supports hypothesis 3 because the perception of an absence of threat 
stems from the non-conflictual nature of the interests of Russia and China.8 
The second section analyzes texts that address the question of whether China poses a military 
threat to the RFE. The content analysis finds that the dominant view among Russian experts with 
ties to the Russian government or military is that, although there is significant disparity in 
conventional military power in favor of China in northeast Asia, there is no direct military threat. 
Reasons for this conclusion hinge on four themes identified in the experts’ arguments: (1) the 
socio-economic fragility or vulnerability of the PRC, (2) China’s interests, (3) the cost of 
aggression against Russia (which is strongly related to the first two themes), and (4) the idea that 
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a military threat may exist from China, but it is only hypothetical or potential, not direct. This 
finding supports hypothesis 1 in that, in this view, Beijing does not intend to harm Russia by 
means of military aggression.9 The finding supports hypothesis 2 in that it consists of the notion 
that China would not risk military aggression against the RFE because of its socio-economic 
vulnerability in the form of its concentrated urban centers driving nearly all of the country’s 
development progress.10 Finally, the finding supports hypothesis 3 in that, as it is not in China’s 
interest to forcefully expand into the RFE, the interests of the countries in this sense are non-
conflictual.11 
The final section examines Russia’s policies relevant to the security of the RFE vis-à-vis China 
with the aim of determining the extent to which they are consistent with the dominant views of 
experts identified by the content analysis. Three main policies indicate a lack of a perception of 
threat from the rise of China among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. First, Russian forces 
on the Chinese border have remained at a minimum level and the Chinese have been allowed to 
inspect such forces annually in accordance with the 1996-1997 agreements on the 
demilitarization of the border. Second, despite the PLA’s conventional superiority over the 
Russian military in northeast Asia since the 1990s, Russia has not built up its forces in the region 
in response. Third, Russia has been making improvements to cross-border transit infrastructure 
that allow for quicker and easier access to the RFE in the form of bridges over the Amur River 
(Nizheleninskoye-Tongjiang and Blagoveshchensk-Heihe), the addition of 1435mm railway 
gauges (Grodekovo-Suifenhe and Makhalino-Hunchun), and the installation of a new narrow-
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gauge sorting system that will allow for quicker transition from the 1435mm gauge to the 
Russian 1520mm gauge (Zabaikalsk-Manzhouli). It is unlikely that such policies would be 
authorized and implemented if there were a dominant perception among Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers of a military threat from a rising China. Given that the dominant views held by 
potentially influential experts identified in the chapter are consistent with the policies, the 
chapter concludes that scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ 
section in chapter 2 are most likely. 
In relation to other arguments in Western literature on Russia-China relations, the findings of this 
chapter are partly contradictory and partly supportive. It has become less common in recent years 
to argue or imply that fear of mass immigration from China to the RFE significantly influences 
Russian foreign policy towards China, but such work is found throughout most of the period of 
interest.12 The results of the analysis presented in this chapter do not provide evidence that 
perceptions of a demographic threat in the form of mass immigration from China to the RFE are 
prevalent among Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military or Russian 
foreign policy decisionmakers. 
Literature that refers to various Chinese interests and the way they would be negatively affected 
by an aggressive policy towards Russia in arguments that China does not pose a direct military 
threat to the RFE is supported by the findings of this chapter.13 One main finding of the chapter 
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that is not commonly found in Western literature on Russia-China relations is that Russia’s 
security policy in the RFE is significantly affected by the perceived socio-economic vulnerability 
of China in the form of its concentrated urban centers driving nearly all of the country’s 
development progress. The vulnerability contributes (along with a perceived lack of harmful 
intentions) to Moscow’s confidence that it is highly unlikely that China would risk military 
aggression towards the RFE, and therefore frees Russia from the burden of balancing against 
China’s superior conventional military power in northeast Asia. 
Chapter 6 reports the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis of Russian expert 
views on China’s economic activity in Central Asia from 2000 to 2020 and its implications for 
Russian interests. The first section identifies two main trends in Russian expert thought on 
China’s general economic activity in Central Asia. The first is that China’s economic interests in 
Central Asia are ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’ because of certain global developments 
or processes, most of which are related to China’s rivalry with the US. While uncommon, the 
claim that Russia mostly views China’s economic expansion in Central Asia as a natural 
outgrowth of its power does exist in Western literature on the subject and is supported by the 
findings of this chapter.14 
The second trend consists of an acknowledgement of economic competition between Russia and 
China in Central Asia along with an argument that such competition should not be perceived as 
being out of control and a threat to Russia-China relations. This is because the negative effects of 
the competition are mitigated by processes at both the bilateral level and multilateral level within 
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the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This finding contradicts much of what is found 
in Western literature on the subject. However, some in the West have recognized that these 
‘relationship management efforts’, which include ‘mutual accommodation and compromise’ 
have allowed Russia and China to avoid significantly harmful discord in Central Asia.15 
The second section identifies two main trends in Russian expert views of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) and its linking with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). First, the BRI is 
beneficial for both Russia and the rest of the EAEU members for various reasons. Second, the 
BRI and the EAEU are complementary and have a synergetic effect on one another. The section 
also reports the results of the qualitative aspect of the content analysis relevant to perceptions of 
China’s establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The analysis finds a 
dominant view of benefits and an absence of loss for Russia, which are indicative of positive-
sum thinking among Russian experts with connections to the Russian government or military and 
likely among foreign policy decisionmakers. It also finds that the AIIB is widely viewed as a 
challenge to ‘traditional’ Western-led international financial institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The bank’s establishment is also viewed as 
considerably divisive for the West, as it prompted a US campaign to dissuade its allies from 
joining the AIIB, which largely failed as such countries as the UK, France, and Germany became 
shareholders in the bank. These findings support hypothesis 3 in that they provide evidence of 
dominant perceptions among Russian experts, and likely decisionmakers, that the interests that 
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drive China’s BRI and AIIB do not conflict with Russia’s interests to the point of causing 
perceptions of threat.16 
The final section discusses Russia’s policies in Central Asia relevant to its economic interaction 
with China in the region. For some Western analysts, Russia’s policy of hindering the 
development of multilateral economic cooperation under the auspices of the SCO and its 
hesitation to lower or remove tariffs or trade barriers for goods imported from China to the 
countries of the EAEU are signs that Russia is threatened by China’s economic expansion in 
Central Asia.17 The section argues that this is not necessarily the case and proposes considering 
such policies in the context of Russia and China’s mutual interest in stability in the region. 
The main structural constraint on Russia’s foreign policy regarding its economic interaction with 
China in Central Asia is China’s economic power. While Russia may prefer to be the primary 
driver of economic development in the region, it is simply not capable of doing so. From the 
perspective of both sides, economic development in Central Asia serves a stabilizing function, 
and this has primarily been driven by China over the period of interest. In this sense, China’s 
economic expansion serves not so much as a loss as a gain for Russia in the form of more 
stability on its southern border. Russia’s policy of hindering the development of multilateral 
economic cooperation in the SCO and its hesitation to lower or remove EAEU tariffs on 
imported Chinese goods may also be viewed as serving a stabilizing function by protecting 
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17 See for example Alexander Cooley. ‘Tending the Eurasian Garden: Russia, China and the Dynamics of Regional 
Integration and Order’. In Jo Bekkevold, and Bobo Lo, eds. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century. Palgrave 
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lasting influence in Central Asia’. Survival 59, no. 6 (2017): 134; and Bobo Lo. Russia and the New World 




domestic industry in Central Asia. As shown by the content analysis, economic competition 
between Russia and China in Central Asia is acknowledged by experts but is also viewed as 
being not so severe as to be unmanageable through processes developed at the bilateral level and 
multilateral level within the SCO. In this context, Russia’s policies have a balancing effect that 
serves the interests of both Russia and China in regional stability and are not as much a response 
to a direct threat from China as they are a response to a potential threat in the form of socio-
economic upheaval in Central Asia prompted by the failure of domestic businesses due to an 
influx of inexpensive Chinese consumer goods and the growth of anti-Chinese sentiments. This 
perspective of Russia’s economic balancing policies combined with two other main policies—
the linking of the EAEU and BRI beginning in 2015 and the 2018 EAEU-China trade 
agreement—creates a picture of economic interaction between Russia and China in Central Asia 
characterized less by confrontation and rivalry moving towards conflict and more by manageable 
competition moving with caution towards a higher degree of cooperation and coordination in the 
mutual interest of regional stability. Given that the dominant views of potentially influential 
experts identified in the chapter are consistent with Russia’s policies, the chapter concludes that 
scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 are 
most likely. 
It is generally not acknowledged in Western literature on Russia-China relations that an 
understanding of China’s interests in Central Asia as ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’ 
exists in Moscow and that the understanding is important for explaining Russia’s economic 
interaction with China in the region.18 Explanations of such interaction that include a dominant 
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perception among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers that Russia benefits from the BRI and 
that the initiative and the EAEU are mutually complementary, producing a synergistic effect, are 
uncommon in Western literature. The chapter offers support for arguments that the negative 
effects of economic competition between Russia and China in Central Asia are mitigated by 
diplomatic efforts on both sides consisting of mutual accommodation and compromise and 
restraint on China’s side.19 
Chapter 7 identifies three main trends in Russian expert thought on Russia and China’s security 
interaction in Central Asia. The first is the view that conflicts of interest between the countries 
regarding security issues in the region are either non-existent or minor. In this view, even when 
the interests of Russia and China are not entirely aligned, the contradictions are not so serious as 
to be impossible to overcome through dialogue. The good state of Russia-China relations, the 
realization on both sides that the security challenges posed by Central Asia can and should be 
approached as a positive-sum game, and China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of other states allow Russia and China to avoid a major clash in the region. 
The common interest in preventing the rise of a ‘third force’ in the region also has a unifying 
effect that motivates their efforts to avoid major conflict. Included in this dominant trend is the 
view that claims that a rivalry between Russia and China in Central Asia is already in progress or 
that a clash between the two in the region is inevitable are unsubstantiated, misinformed, or 
exaggerated. This finding supports hypothesis 3 in that it shows that conflicts of interest between 
Russia and China in the security sphere in Central Asia have not given rise to dominant 
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(2017): 25-27, 33-34; Marcin Kaczmarski. ‘The Asymmetric Partnership? Russia’s Turn to China’. International 
Politics 53, no. 3 (2016): 415-434; and Marcin Kaczmarski. Russia-China Relations in the Post-Crisis International 




perceptions of threat from China among Russian experts, and likely decisionmakers, because, as 
explained above, they are perceived as being either absent or minor.20 
The second trend reported by the chapter is the view among Russian experts that China sees 
Central Asia as a ‘reliable rear’ in the context of its rivalry with the US, i.e. a non-hostile area of 
operations as well as a source of energy with overland transit routes that are more secure than sea 
routes, which are vulnerable to disruption by the US Navy. 
The third trend in Russian expert thought identified by the content analysis and reported in 
chapter 7 is the observation that China understands that Russia has ‘special interests’ in Central 
Asia and exercises restraint in the region so as not to damage relations with Moscow. In the 
views of these experts, this is because, for Beijing, the maintenance of good relations between 
Russia and China takes precedence over unilateral gains in Central Asia. Reasons for this 
prioritization are present at the regional and global level with regard to China’s foreign policy. 
This finding supports hypothesis 1 in that it provides evidence of a dominant perception among 
Russian experts, and likely decisionmakers, that China does not intend to undermine Russia’s 
security-related interests in Central Asia.21 The finding also supports hypothesis 6 in that it 
shows that among Russian experts, and likely decisionmakers, there is a dominant perception 
that Beijing prioritizes long-term cooperation with Moscow in Central Asia over short-term 
gains, as evidenced by its restraint and respect for Russia’s ‘special interests’ in the region.22 
                                                             
20 The hypothesis states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider the compatibility or non-conflictual 
nature of the interests of Russia and China to be one of the main reasons why China’s rise does not threaten Russia. 
21 The hypothesis states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers do not perceive the rise of China as a threat 
because they believe China has harmless or benign intentions towards Russia. 
22 The hypothesis states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers do not perceive the rise of China as a threat 
because they believe that China ‘values the prospects of long-run cooperation between the two countries more than 




The main structural constraint Russia experiences in its foreign policy in the region in the 
security sphere is the US’ military presence. Russian security policy in Central Asia does not 
experience significant constraints that are directly related to China, this is because Russia’s 
security presence is much greater in the region than that of the PRC, and China has been mostly 
content with Russia being the main security provider of Central Asia while it focuses more on 
economic well-being and development. The constraint of the US’ military presence on Russia’s 
security policy in the region provides an incentive to engage in security cooperation with China. 
The content analysis revealed that a significant number of Russian experts with ties to the 
Russian government or military explicitly claim that Russia and China share an interest in 
preventing the strengthening of the presence of a third power in Central Asia. 
Finally, the chapter discusses Russia’s security-related policies in Central Asia, China’s 
expanded security role in Tajikistan in recent years, Russia’s response to China’s increased 
security presence, and the implications of the development for Russia’s interests in Central Asia 
in the views of Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military. There has been 
little response from Moscow in the form of official rhetoric, and there have not been any 
developments on Russia’s end in Tajikistan since 2016 that indicate balancing behavior. Among 
Russian experts with ties to the Russian government or military, the view that China’s increased 
security role in Tajikistan is logical and non-threatening is apparently dominant. This view 
coupled with the passivity of Russia’s policy on the matter leads the section to conclude that that 
scenarios 1 or 2 in the framework explained in the ‘Dispositional factors’ section in chapter 2 are 
most likely. 
Western literature on security interaction between Russia and China in Central Asia consists of 




Central Asia as demonstrated by its restraint, which are supported by the findings of the 
chapter.23 Some contributors to Western literature have found no severe conflicts of interest 
between Russia and China in the region in the area of security,24 while others have.25 The work 
of the former is supported by another main conclusion of the chapter that among Russian experts 
with ties to the Russian government or military, and likely among Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers, there is a dominant perception that there are little or no significant conflicts of 
interest regarding security policies in Central Asia. One area that has apparently received little 
attention in the literature is the effect of Russian decisionmakers’ perception of China’s need for 
a ‘reliable’ strategic rear in Central Asia on Russia’s security policy interaction with China in the 
region. The results of the content analysis indicate that this is a serious consideration when 
determining how Russia should interact with China in Central Asia in the security realm. It is 
arguable that Russia’s continued dominance in the security realm provides comfort in the face of 
China’s expanding security presence in the region, as Moscow maintains a considerable amount 
of influence that may be used to hinder Chinese access in the event of a conflict with the US. 
In sum, the results of the content analysis offer the most support to hypotheses 1 and 3, which are 
based on balance of threat theory and balance of interests theory, respectively.26 In only one 
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instance each, evidence in support of hypotheses 2 and 6 was found.27 The hypotheses are based 
on offense-defense balance theory and a politico-psychological notion of trust between states, 
respectively. Regarding hypothesis 2, it should be kept in mind that direct discussions among 
Russian experts on the question of whether China threatens Russia in any way are rare, and 
direct discussions on whether China threatens Russia with military aggression are especially rare. 
The content analysis did not find evidence in support of hypothesis 4, which is based on 
neoliberal institutionalism.28 The correlation coefficients calculated for 20 pairs of variables of 
shared identity and threat perception do not offer support for hypothesis 5, which is based on a 
social constructivist and psychological understanding of the interaction between shared identity 
and threat perception.29 
Currently, there is a great deal of focus in Western literature on whether a Sino-Russian alliance 
is forming or already exists. As explained in the literature review, the alliance literature offers 
valuable insight into the quality of the relationship but falls short of providing an answer to the 
question of why Russia is not threatened by the rise of China. Even allied relations do not 
provide a guarantee that China may at some point take advantage of its superior position at the 
expense of Russia’s interests, at least from a realist perspective. Therefore, this thesis lies outside 
of this debate. This is not to say that the conclusions of the study have no implications for this 
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and China to be one of the main reasons why China’s rise does not threaten Russia. 
27 Hypothesis 2 states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider nuclear deterrence to be one of the main 
reasons why the rise of China does not threaten Russia. Hypothesis 6 states that Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers do not perceive the rise of China as a threat because they believe that China ‘values the prospects of 
long-run cooperation between the two countries more than it values short-run gains that would accrue by exploiting 
its immediate power over [Russia]’. 
28 The hypothesis states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers consider the establishment and maintenance of 
regimes and institutions between Russia and China to be one of the main reasons why China’s rise does not threaten 
Russia. 
29 The hypothesis states that Russian foreign policy decisionmakers believe that for reasons of shared identity the 




area of the literature. The absence of perceptions of threat may facilitate Sino-Russian alliance 
formation or maintenance. But the presence of a dominant perception of an absence of threat 
from China among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers should not be considered a sufficient 
condition for the formation or maintenance of an alliance: the fact that a state does not perceive 
another as a threat does not necessarily mean they will become or remain allies. 
Based on the analysis performed, the explanation of Russia’s foreign policy towards China from 
2000 to 2020 offered by the thesis is as follows. The dominant perception of an absence of threat 
from China to Russia among Russian foreign policy decisionmakers can be explained by the 
view that Russia’s and China’s interests have been at most mutual or complementary and at least 
not in severe or unmanageable conflict. The perception is also attributed to the view that China 
has not had harmful intentions towards Russia and that a good state of relations between the two 
countries is being maintained and continues to develop. 
Regarding its relations with China, the main constraint that Russia’s policy faces in the RFE and 
Central Asia (the two areas of focus in the thesis) is China’s economic power. Throughout the 
period of interest, the trade structure of the RFE and China has been unbalanced in favor of the 
PRC: the RFE exports mostly raw materials and China exports mostly finished goods. Despite 
the unfavorability of the trade structure, China’s economy provides vital import and export 
markets for the RFE. The economic dependence of the RFE on China constrains Russia’s foreign 
policy in a way that makes actions that might severely disrupt the current economic relationship 
between the RFE and China at least unattractive and at most nonoptional. This constraint, 
however, has not given rise to a dominant perception among Russian foreign policy 




structure is generally not attributed to external actors, including the PRC, but rather to domestic 
factors. 
China’s economic power has also constrained Russia’s foreign policy in Central Asia throughout 
the period of interest. Both Russia and China consider economic development linked to stability, 
and both are interested in a stable Central Asia. While Russia may prefer to be the primary driver 
of economic development in the region, it is simply not capable of doing so. Despite this 
limitation, China’s economic activity in Central Asia is not considered particularly threatening 
by Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. There is a dominant perception that China’s economic 
interests in Central Asia are ‘natural’, ‘logical’, or ‘understandable’, and that the competition that 
exists between Russia and China in the region is successfully managed through diplomacy, 
allowing the countries to avoid confrontation and conflict. China’s BRI is generally considered 
beneficial to Russia, complementary to the EAEU, and a development that furthers the countries’ 
shared interest in socio-economic stability in Central Asia. 
In this view, China’s economic expansion serves not so much as a loss as a gain for Russia in the 
form of more stability on its southern border. Russia’s policy of hindering the development of 
multilateral economic cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its 
hesitation to lower or remove EAEU tariffs on imported Chinese goods may also be viewed as 
serving a stabilizing function by protecting domestic industry in Central Asia. Russia’s policies 
have a balancing effect that serves the interests of both Russia and China in regional stability and 
are not as much a response to a direct threat from China as they are a response to a potential 
threat in the form of socio-economic upheaval in Central Asia prompted by the failure of 
domestic businesses due to an influx of inexpensive Chinese consumer goods and the growth of 




with two other main policies—the linking of the EAEU and BRI beginning in 2015 and the 2018 
EAEU-China trade agreement—creates a picture of economic interaction between Russia and 
China in Central Asia characterized less by confrontation and rivalry moving towards conflict 
and more by manageable competition moving with caution towards a higher degree of 
cooperation and coordination in the mutual interest of regional stability. 
In the context of Russia managing its relative decline vis-à-vis China, four factors are considered 
to have likely contributed to the dominant perception among Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers that the rise of China does not pose a threat to Russia. First, despite China’s 
conventional military superiority over Russia in northeast Asia and the countries’ military 
expenditures gap, Russian officials do not perceive China as a challenger to its status as a great 
military power. This is mainly due to Russia’s stable military power relative to that of China in 
Central Asia, China’s recognition of Russia’s ‘privileged’ interests and role as the primary 
security provider in the region, and Russia’s maintenance of a massive nuclear arsenal.  
Second, ideational convergence has contributed to the perception that the rise of China does not 
pose a threat to Russia. The countries have ideationally converged around the fight against the 
‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism and the ‘Shanghai Spirit’, which 
includes mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and 
the pursuit of common development. Russia and China have also ideationally converged around 
the rejection of unipolarity in favor of multipolarity, the foreign policy principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states, and the de-ideologization of their relations in 




Third, Russia, regarding it relations with China, may be seen as engaging in strategic 
retrenchment in the interest of solvency.30 Russian foreign policy decisionmakers likely realize 
that confronting a rising China is beyond Russia’s means, and by retrenching it has an 
opportunity to strengthen in an environment in which it does not have to sacrifice tremendous 
resources for the sake of confrontation or conflict with China. 
And fourth, Russia has managed its decline relative to China by participating in the institutions 
and projects of the PRC, including the SCO, the AIIB, and the BRI for the sake of information 
access. In addition to the leverage Russia gains as a participant in the institutions and projects, its 
participation allows Moscow to better understand China’s activities, particularly in Central Asia, 
and this information strengthens Russia’s ability to protect its interests. This final factor is an 
inductive finding of the content analysis performed for this study that has prompted the 
proposition of a contribution to the literature on managing decline. The thesis offers theoretical 
insight into the management of decline of great powers consisting of the notion that a power in 
decline is motivated to participate in the institutions and projects of a rising power in order to 
gain access to information that allows the declining power to more easily defend its interests. 
Avenues for Further Research 
The analytical framework used by this thesis, which consists of the identification of intentions 
through an analysis of official rhetoric, the identification of dispositional factors by means of a 
crowdsourced content analysis of texts addressing issues of interest and produced by experts and 
institutions with ties to the state of interest, and the identification of structural constraints and 
their use in elaborating the explanation based on the findings of the analysis of dispositional 
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factors can be used to analyze the foreign policy of any state if the data required for the analysis 
are plentiful and accessible. The model may also be used to research Russia’s interaction with 
China in other areas not covered by the thesis to further contribute to the literature on Russia-
China relations, such as the Arctic, South America, Africa, or space. 
This study has confronted the ‘Other Minds’ problem in its pursuit of an explanation of Russia’s 
foreign policy towards China.31 It is not possible to directly observe the dispositional factors of 
high-ranking officials: the factors on which foreign policy decisions are based. Even if a 
researcher manages to arrange interviews with the likes of Vladimir Putin or Sergei Lavrov, 
there would be uncertainty over whether the dispositional factors the officials conveyed in the 
interviews were truly held by the interviewees and formed the basis of their decisions. This 
thesis, for reasons explained above and in chapter 2, chose expert texts as the source of 
dispositional factors held by Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. Uncertainty over the 
contribution of certain expert views to those dispositional factors forces the study to conclude in 
terms of likelihood with a reasonable level of confidence based on the proximity of the experts 
and publishing institutions to the Russian government or military and the qualifications of the 
experts. This confidence may be strengthened with further research aiming to determine what 
information is directly or indirectly communicated to Russian foreign policy decisionmakers. 
Parts of the present research have reached high levels of confidence regarding the sources of 
such information. For example, given that Foreign Minister Lavrov is Chief of the Editorial 
Board of the journal International Life, that the Editorial Board consists of several other high-
ranking government officials, and that the journal is legally a Federal State Budgetary Institution, 
                                                             
31 For a discussion of the problem in the context of international relations research, please see Martin Hollis and 




it is reasonable to be confident that material written by highly qualified and well-connected 
experts published by the journal has a fairly high level of potential to be communicated to the 
officials either directly or indirectly. 
Confidence in the success of communication of certain information to Russian foreign policy 
decisionmakers can nevertheless be strengthened with further investigation. Such research has 
obvious limitations, as it can be assumed that high-ranking government officials regularly 
receive information communicated by intelligence services. However, it would be useful for 
research into dispositional factors for the purpose of foreign policy analysis to determine what 
unclassified information is directly or indirectly communicated to foreign policy decisionmakers, 
i.e. do they or their advisors read expert work or consume media that feature credible experts, 
and if so, how often. Such research could be done by a series of interviews, not necessarily with 
the high-ranking officials themselves, but rather with lower-ranking and more accessible officials 
in relatively close proximity to the high-ranking officials. 
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Russia’s Official Rhetoric on China from 2000 to 2020 
One fundamental official document that mentions China in this period is the Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation adopted in 2000.1 The Foreign Policy Concept places 
Russia’s relationship with China in the context of a ‘dynamically developing’ Asia and describes 
the relationship as one of economic opportunity and of great importance for regional and global 
stability. Developing friendly relations with China is defined as ‘one of the crucial directions in 
Russian foreign policy’.2 The document states that ‘the main task is … bringing the scale of 
economic interaction in conformity with the level of political relations’.3 
President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric on China through the early 2000s is consistent with the 
Foreign Policy Concept, revolving around the major themes of economic opportunity and 
regional and global stability. For example, during a speech in Moscow Putin explained that ‘the 
Asia-Pacific region [APR] is becoming the most dynamic center of world economic 
development, and it is necessary to closely link the foreign policy line to deepening relations 
with the APR with the solution of internal tasks, with the development of potential Russian 
interests in the direction of using these ties to boost the economy of Siberia and the Far East. 
Great opportunities exist here in relations, of course, with India and China’.4 A good example of 
                                                             
1 It is noteworthy that the National Security Concept adopted that same year does not mention China. 
2 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 28/06/2000. Available at 
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. Accessed 06/07/2020. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Putin, Vladimir. ‘Vystuplenie na Plenarnom Zasedanii Soveshchanii͡ a Poslov i Postoi͡ annykh Predstaviteleĭ Rossii 
(Speech at the Plenary Session of the Meeting of Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of Russia)’. Moscow. 





Putin’s rhetoric regarding the role of Russia-China relations in global stability is found in a press 
statement given in 2001, in which he explains that ‘international relations should be stable, 
predictable and ensure progressive development in solving the tasks that are set by states … We 
are absolutely convinced that the special strategic relations between Russia and China will meet 
these challenges, will help solve the problems not only facing Russia and China but also create 
an atmosphere of stability in the world’.5 Putin also frequently claims that the quality of relations 
between Russia and China are at one of the highest levels in the history of their bilateral 
relations. For example, during a speech in Moscow in 2001 he asserted that ‘the relations 
between Russia and China are experiencing one of the most fruitful and successful periods. That 
applies to the entire spectrum of political, economic, cultural and other ties between our 
countries’.6 
The rhetoric of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tends to be consistent with Putin’s rhetoric on 
China, and it reflects The Foreign Policy Concept of 2000. During a Q&A session in 2003, 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov touches on the main themes of economic opportunity and regional 
and global stability.7 He explains that trade and economic cooperation between Russia and China 
are ‘coming onto the road of sustainable and dynamic development, thus strengthening the 
material base of the entire range of bilateral relations and imparting to them a long-term and 
stable character’.8 Regarding Russia and China’s role in regional and global stability, he notes 
                                                             
5 Putin, Vladimir. ‘Zai͡ avlenie Dli͡ a pressy i Otvet na Vopros Zhurnalista po Itogam Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskikh 
Peregovorov (A Statement to the Press and an Answer to a Journalist's Question after the Russian-Chinese Talks)’. 
Beijing. 02/12/2002. Available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21796. Accessed 07/07/2020. 
6 Putin, Vladimir. ‘Speech at the Presentation of Ambassadors’ Credentials’. Moscow. 27/08/2001. Available at 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21309. Accessed 07/07/2020. 
7 Ivanov, Igor. ‘Replies by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov to Readers’ Questions During an 
Online Conference on the Remin Ribao Website’. Beijing. 27/02/2003. Available at http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/cn/-
/asset_publisher/WhKWb5DVBqKA/content/id/530662. Accessed 12/07/2020. 




that ‘the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is becoming an important factor in the maintenance 
of peace, security and stability in the region’, and that ‘the coordinated stand of Russia and China 
on key international problems is an important factor of security and stability in the world’.9 
Ivanov depicts Russia-China relations as harmonious and full of potential, and likens their 
relationship to ‘pine and bamboo growing together, which do not interfere with each other but 
help and support each other’.10 
During a press conference in 2002, Ivanov directly addresses the potential of China to pose a 
threat to Russia in response to the following question: ‘In the Far East processes that are ruinous 
for Russia are taking place - illegal immigration of the Chinese. Shall we revise our relations 
with China? The weapons that we are selling to them now may be eventually used against us’.11 
Ivanov debunks these threats by arguing that ‘there is no Chinese expansion, there are no 
grounds for speaking about it’, citing official figures that state that only about 150,000 – 200,000 
Chinese citizens live in Russia, compared to 6 million in the US, where no one is talking about 
Chinese expansion.12 Regarding the weapons, Ivanov argues that ‘the arms that China buys it 
buys in order to strengthen its defenses’.13 
Deputy Foreign Ministers and Official Representatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs generally follow this trend of positive and optimistic rhetoric on Russia’s relationship 
with China, much of which revolves around the major themes of economic opportunity and 
regional and global stability. For example, in an interview in 2003, Official Spokesman of the 
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11 Ivanov, Igor. ‘Transcript of the Press Conference with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’. Interfax News 
Agency. 18/10/2002. Available at http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/cn/-






Foreign Ministry Alexander Yakovenko said ‘there is hardly an area in which Russia and China 
do not have an intensive, equal and trusting dialogue’.14 Regarding the potential for the 
development of economic ties between Russia and China, the official said that ‘we see that a 
full-fledged relationship is emerging between two rapidly growing economies’, and that ‘there is 
no doubt that the economic trends of the new century influence Russian-Chinese economic 
relations. The task is to harness them to the economic interests of both countries’.15 Yakovenko 
also reports that ‘scientific-technical interaction is unfolding, and that includes the creation of 
joint techno parks, the development of cooperation in the field of communication and 
information technologies, space and civil aircraft building’.16 In line with the major theme of the 
role Russia-China relations plays in regional and global stability, the official states that ‘Russian-
Chinese interaction within the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization] SCO plays a key role in 
strengthening this young regional organization, in developing cooperation in combating 
terrorism, separatism, extremism and the narco danger’, and that ‘the partnership between China 
and Russia is an important factor of maintaining international peace and security, strengthening 
strategic stability and effectively countering new challenges and threats’.17 These rhetorical 
themes are restated by Yakovenko at a press conference later that year.18 
In an interview in 2003, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov reiterates the positive and 
optimistic rhetoric on Russia’s relationship with China containing the major themes of economic 
                                                             
14 Yakovenko, Alexander. ‘Interview by the Russian Foreign Ministry Official Spokesman Alexander Yakovenko 
Granted to RIA Novosti News Agency and the Chinese Newspaper Renmin Ribao in Connection with the 
Forthcoming Visit to China by the Foreign Affairs Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov’. 25/02/2003. Available at 




18 Yakovenko, Alexander. ‘Answer of the Official Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
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opportunity, regional and global stability, and shared interests. The official stated that ‘one of the 
main achievements of bilateral relations in recent years would have been the high degree of 
mutual trust and mutual understanding. The emergence of such a level of communication was 
facilitated by certain objective conditions and, above all, by the alignment of the basic national 
interests of Russia and China’.19 Regarding the major theme of economic opportunity Losyukov 
said that the ‘dynamically developing political relations between Russia and China are gaining 
an ever more solid and reliable trade and economic basis’, and that ‘in the past few years, trade 
between Russia and China is growing at a good pace’.20 Although there is a positive trend in the 
development of economic relations between the two countries, Losyukov points out that such 
development has a long and laborious road ahead, somewhat counterbalancing the more 
idealistic rhetoric on Russian-Chinese economic relations: ‘the qualitative problems of Russian-
Chinese economic relations are particularly clearly manifested. We are not satisfied with the fact 
that the structure of Russian exports is still dominated by commodities (oil, raw timber) and 
primary redistribution (ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical products). We are striving for a 
significant increase in our exports of machine-technical and high-tech products … It is necessary 
to radically expand cooperation in the field of investment and production cooperation, where the 
number of projects to date, frankly, is scanty’.21 Related to the theme of Russia and China’s role 
in regional and global stability Losyukov said that ‘an important role is also played by Russian-
Chinese cooperation in combating terrorism in multilateral forums, primarily within the 
framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’, and that Russia is ‘satisfied with the 
                                                             
19 Losyukov, Alexander. ‘Intervʹi͡ u Zamestiteli͡ a Ministra Inostrannyx Del Rossii A.P. Losi͡ ukova Agenstvu 
“Interfaks” po Voprosam Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskix Otnosheniĭ (Interview of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 








level and dynamics of interaction with China in world affairs. The commonality of Russia's and 
China's approaches to the conceptual issues of world order and key international problems serves 
as a significant factor that has a positive impact on the development of the contemporary 
international situation’.22 
It is worth noting that in a separate interview Losyukov again counterbalances the more idealistic 
rhetoric on China, but this time regarding the harmony of Russia and China’s national interests: 
‘Not implying the conclusion of a union, it [The Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and 
Cooperation of 2001] indicated the mutual desire of very close relations for a long term … This 
does not mean that we have “merged” with China and there will never be contradictions between 
us. Of course, there will be different interests, but the spirit of the treaty itself implies that these 
contradictions must be resolved in a friendly manner’.23 
With Sergei Lavrov’s assuming the office of Foreign Minister of Russia in March 2004, the 
Ministry’s rhetoric remained consistent with that of the early 2000s. Official Representatives 
continued to report on the development of economic relations between Russia and China and 
declare Russia’s determination to further their development, as well as claiming a common 
approach to major issues of international security.24 Upon entering office, Foreign Minister 
Lavrov adopted this habit of reporting on the positive trends of development of the countries’ 
economic relations, albeit not without acknowledging the sobering need ‘to improve the quality 
                                                             
22 Ibid. 
23 Losyukov, Alexander. ‘Intervʹi͡ u Zamestiteli͡ a Ministra Inostrannyx Del Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡ sii A.P. Losi͡ ukova 
(Interview of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, AP Losyukov)’. 24/07/2003. Available at 
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24 For example, see Alexander Yakovenko. ‘Otvety Ofit͡ sialʹnogo Predstaviteli͡ a MID Rossii A. I͡Akovenko na 
Voprosy Rossiĭskikh SMI Otnositelʹno Predstoi͡ ashchego Vizita v Rossii͡ u (Answer from the Official Representative 
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of our trade and economic cooperation so that it has more industrial high-tech projects and joint 
ventures’.25 The official also describes steps taken by Russia and China ‘to strengthening the 
positions of Russia and China in the international arena in the interest of ensuring the security of 
our countries, mutually beneficial cooperation with other states, in order to form a truly 
collective system of international relations’.26 
In the latter half of his first year in office, Lavrov published an article on Russia’s partnership 
with China. In the article, Lavrov describes Russia’s relationship with China as one 
‘incorporating the best of the traditions of friendship and good neighborliness of previous 
generations’ and asserts that ‘Russian-Chinese relations reached a qualitatively new level - 
comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction’.27 Lavrov explains that Russia and China’s 
‘fruitful bilateral partnership in international affairs is based on the similarity of Russia's and 
China's national interests, the alignment of Moscow's and Beijing's approaches to core global 
problems - the future world order, strategic stability, the UN's dominant role, etc.’.28 In addition 
to the major themes of economic opportunity and regional and global stability, Lavrov touches 
on another major theme of Russia’s official rhetoric on its relationship with China—denunciation 
of unilateralism and unipolarity and advocacy for multilateralism and multipolarity: ‘In the 
context of attempts to use the processes of globalization to obtain unilateral economic and 
geopolitical advantages, the assertion by Russia and China of the principles of multilateralism in 
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26 Ibid. 
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international affairs, respect for the sovereignty of states, the right of peoples to choose their own 
way of development is of particular importance’.29 
In a session of the state Duma in 2005, Lavrov was asked about illegal Chinese immigration to 
the Russian Far East and Siberia, and the threat of a ‘creeping quiet expansion’ by China. The 
official responded by explaining that the Foreign Ministry as well as other ministries and 
departments are working on improving the regulation of labor migration and argues that ‘the risk 
that additional territorial claims will be advanced is not serious’ because the legal formalization 
of the Russia-China border ‘reduces such risk to a minimum’.30 
Enthusiasm for the state of Russia-China relations and for the need for further efforts to develop 
the relationship continued to be frequently expressed. For example, in an interview in 2006, 
President Putin said that ‘such a complex and multifaceted task as the strengthening of mutual 
understanding and friendship among peoples is far from being limited to the holding of events 
within the Year of Russia in China. We need constant work aimed at the full expansion of 
scientific, cultural, sports, youth, tourism, and other exchanges. We have experience of such 
interaction, and it is already yielding real results’ and ‘from our point of view, Russian-Chinese 
relations have the most favorable prospects in all areas. And we will continue to make every 
effort to ensure their consistent and progressive development’.31 Putin gave a positive report on 
the progress of Russia and China’s development of economic relations and reasserted Russia and 
                                                             
29 Ibid. 
30 Lavrov, Sergei. ‘Stenogramma Otvetov Ministra Inostrannykh Del S.V. Lavrova na Voprosy Deputatov v KHode 
Zasedanii͡ a v Gosudarstvennoĭ Dume, Moskva (Transcript of Replies by Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov on 
questions of deputies during the Session in the State Duma)’. Moscow. 20/05/2005. Available at 
https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/cn/-/asset_publisher/WhKWb5DVBqKA/content/id/438124. Accessed 
07/07/2020. 
31Putin, Vladimir. ‘Pisʹmennoe Intervʹi͡ u Prezidenta Rossii V.V.Putina Kitaĭskomu Informat͡ sionnomu Agentstvu 
“Sinʹkhua” (Written Interview of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Chinese News Agency Xinhua)’. 





China’s stabilizing role in global politics: ‘With excellent dynamics, trade and economic 
relations are growing, investment cooperation, cooperation in the sphere of high technologies is 
gaining momentum’, ‘the experience of Russian-Chinese cooperation clearly shows that 
coordination and interaction between our countries serves as a stabilizing factor in world 
affairs’.32 Putin also reaffirms Russia’s intention to work with China for a more equitable world 
order: ‘Russia and China are firm supporters of building a genuinely democratic system of 
international relations based on equality of opportunity for both “big” and for “small” countries 
… We seek to consolidate non-discriminatory principles as fundamental to world trade and 
finance’.33 
In 2007, the threat of Chinese expansion in the Russian Far East was again debunked, this time 
by Director of the First Asia Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Konstantin 
Vnukov. Answering a question about the potential for such a threat in an interview, the official 
said ‘to speak about the threat of Chinese expansion is wrong. According to the last census in 
Russia, there are only 35,000 Chinese … I believe that the real range is from 150 to 200 
thousand people. But Russia is not an attractive country for the Chinese - the climate, the way of 
life, the difference between cultures, food, the crime situation. So, according to the latest survey 
in major Chinese cities, only 1.7 percent of respondents expressed a desire to go to Russia for 
employment purposes’.34 
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Positive assessments by Russian government officials of the progress of development of Russia-
China relations continue through the late 2000s along with expressions of a desire to continue 
strengthening ties. For example, in a press statement, President Putin claimed that Russia and 
China’s ‘cooperation in regional and international affairs has significantly increased’,35 and 
during a press conference, Foreign Minister Lavrov reported the following: ‘I assess our strategic 
interaction very, very positively. It is developing dynamically, taking into account the two main 
principles. First, Russia and China have a common vision of the modern world, its development 
trends, a common vision of ways to solve global and regional problems on the basis of 
international law, strengthening the central role of the UN, and also through multilateral 
diplomacy. Secondly, Russia and China, within the framework of the above approaches, always 
support each other on specific issues that directly affect the national interests of Russia and 
China. Such comradely mutual assistance will only be strengthened, today we agreed on this’.36 
The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation adopted in 2008 states that ‘Russia will 
build up the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership in all fields on the basis of common 
fundamental approaches to key issues of world politics as a basic constituent part of regional and 
global stability. Bringing the scope and quality of economic interaction in line with the high-
level of political relations constitutes a major task in the field of bilateral ties’.37 The document 
also states that ‘Russia will make itself more fully engaged in such formats as the Group of Eight 
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and its dialogue with its traditional partners, the Troika (Russia, India and China) and the BRIC 
Four (Brazil, Russia, India and China)’.38 The main difference between this Foreign Policy 
Concept and the previous one adopted in 2000 regarding China is the stated intention to be more 
engaged in the ‘Troika’ and BRIC. 
Despite the 2008 global financial crisis, which turned out to have more of a negative effect on 
Russia’s economy than China’s,39 Russia’s official rhetoric on its economic relations with China 
remained generally positive and optimistic with acknowledgments of the continuing need to 
improve the structure of trade.40 Regarding economic relations in the context of the crisis, 
Lavrov said, ‘under these conditions, the leaders of our two countries maintain close contacts and 
are constantly exchange views on the problems facing the world economy … The approaches of 
Russia and China to the ways of overcoming the crisis are very close … From the point of view 
of Russian-Chinese bilateral relations, we need to try to use the current crisis to find new 
opportunities that have not yet been taken to enhance bilateral economic cooperation and thereby 
turn it to benefit our countries in these difficult times’.41 
In an interview in 2009, Russian Ambassador to China Sergei Razov responded to a question 
about a potential threat from China in the following way. 
‘It is difficult to challenge the fact that the PRC, unlike some other states, does not pursue a 
purposefully anti-Russian policy, does not make territorial claims against us, does not bring the 
infrastructure of military and political blocs closer to our borders, does not impose anti-Russian 
regimes along the perimeter of our borders, on the contrary: it supports us on a number of key 
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issues of domestic and foreign policy … A certain challenge for Russian interests is the growing 
gap in the economic potentials of Northeast China and the Russian Far East. Obviously, the 
backlog of this vast region of Russia from neighboring countries (this applies not only to China) is 
associated with certain risks and, in a certain sense, with threats. But you will agree, these risks and 
threats are rather our internal origin. The task of protecting national security interests in relations 
with China, in my opinion, is quite successfully being resolved by Russia … History showed that 
social and economic disasters in China, due to geographical proximity, had a negative impact on 
our country. And, on the contrary, the peaceful rise of China, its steady progress creates additional 
opportunities for our mutually beneficial, primarily economic, cooperation’.42 
In a speech later that year at the anniversary conference ‘60 Years of Russian-Chinese 
Relations’, Ambassador Razov shares some lessons of Russia’s relations with the PRC from their 
60-year history.43 One important lesson is that the continued successful development of Russia-
China relations was only possible with the de-ideologization of their relations beginning in the 
late 1980s. Another important lesson is that the rejection of mutual deterrence has been good for 
Russia-China relations. In detailing this lesson, Razov rejects the idea of a China threat. 
‘The idea of containing China’s dynamic growth, countering the so-called “Chinese threat” is quite 
common now, especially in the West. It is expressed periodically and in some Russian mass media. 
Is there really a threat to our state interests in the Far East? Yes, if, by threat, we understand, 
unfortunately, the growing difference in the economic potentials of Northeast China and the 
Russian Far East. Such a progressive lagging of this vast region of Russia behind neighboring 
states (this applies not only to China), of course, is associated with certain risks, challenges and, in 
a sense, threats. No, if by the “Chinese threat”, we understand a conscious, purposeful policy, 
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expressed in such actions, which allow themselves in relation to Russia some other states - the 
official declaration of territorial claims, the approach to our borders of the infrastructure of 
military-political blocs, the implantation and support of unfriendly Russia regimes along the 
perimeter of our borders, etc’.44 
The National Security Strategy until 2020 adopted in 2009 mentions China only briefly, stating 
that ‘Russia will enhance cooperation in such multilateral formats as the G8, G20, RIC (Russia, 
India and China), and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China)’.45 
Official rhetoric on the importance of healthy Russia-China relations for the reformation of 
world order continued into the 2010s. For example, in a press conference in 2010, Foreign 
Minister Lavrov said that ‘deepening our partnership and strategic cooperation is one of the most 
important guarantees that the objective process of forming a multipolar, polycentric world order 
will not be artificially inhibited’.46 In an interview, President Dmitri Medvedev claimed that 
‘relations with the People’s Republic of China are one of the key priorities in Russian foreign 
policy … I should note that never before have our relations had such a strong component of 
mutual trust’.47 
In late 2010, at a press conference, Lavrov responds to a question regarding Russian-Chinese 
military-technical cooperation and the perception in the West that China’s relative share in 
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Russia’s arms exports has decreased in recent years due to Russia’s decision to deliberately 
reduce China’s share because of concerns about copying in the following way. ‘I would not rely 
on the opinion of Western analysts here, they always have a desire to create the appearance of 
problems, and there are no problems in this area. In this area, there are very serious promising 
projects in which both sides are interested, today this was also discussed. I am confident that 
these results will be known in the near future. We have no doubt that military-technical 
cooperation is one of the most important spheres of our strategic cooperation and partnership’.48  
In an article published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin directly addresses 
the question of how Russia should behave regarding China’s rapid rise. In doing so, the official 
argues that China does not threaten Russia and touches on the major rhetorical themes of 
economic opportunity and the development of a more equitable world order. 
‘First of all, I am convinced that China's economic growth is by no means a threat, but a challenge 
that carries colossal potential for business cooperation – a chance to catch the Chinese wind in the 
sails of our economy. We should seek to more actively form new cooperative ties … to develop the 
economy of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Second, China's conduct on the world stage gives no 
grounds to talk about its aspirations to dominance. The Chinese voice in the world is indeed 
growing ever more confident, and we welcome that, because Beijing shares our vision of the 
emerging equitable world order … And third, we have settled all the major political issues in our 
relations with China, including the critical border issue … There is an unprecedentedly high level 
of trust between the leaders of our two countries … my main premise is that Russia needs a 
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prosperous and stable China, and I am convinced that China needs a strong and successful 
Russia’.49 
Putin takes a moment in the article to rein in the optimism a bit by pointing out that Russia and 
China occasionally have conflicting commercial interests, and that their trade structure and level 
of mutual investment is still unsatisfactory.50 The official also states that Russia ‘will also closely 
monitor immigration from the People's Republic of China’, but writes no more on the issue, 
having neither confirmed nor denied the existence of a problem in this area.51 
Assessments of Russia’s relations with China continued to be mostly positive and optimistic. In 
an article published just before his official visit to China, President Putin wrote that ‘Russian-
Chinese relations have been deservedly called an example of the new type of relations between 
states. Our relations are free from prejudices and stereotypes, and this makes them stable and not 
subject to short-term considerations, which is valuable indeed in today’s world, where stability 
and mutual trust are so clearly lacking’.52 During a press conference in mid-2012, after Putin’s 
visit to China, Lavrov reported that ‘the visit recorded a new quality of Russian-Chinese strategic 
partnership and interaction. Both sides expressed the highest assessments of the achieved level in 
bilateral relations in all areas without exception’.53 A few weeks later, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Igor Morgulov stated in an interview that ‘the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to China 
really confirmed the strategic nature of our partnership. Negotiations in Beijing were successful, 
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culminating in the achievement of agreements on the development of bilateral relations in all key 
areas’.54 Positive reports on the development of economic relations with China also continued 
through 2012.55 
In early 2013, Ambassador Razov reaffirmed the priorities of developing economic relations 
with China, not least for the sake of developing the Russian Far East (RFE) and Siberia, and 
continuing to cooperate as much as possible in international affairs: ‘I will allocate two priorities. 
In the article “Russia and the Changing World,” Vladimir Putin noted that China's rapid 
economic growth is “a chance to catch the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy,” and 
outlined the need … to engage “Chinese potential for the economic recovery of Siberia and the 
Far East.” Another priority is the cooperation of Russia and China in international affairs’.56 
After Xi Jinping’s assumption of the highest offices of the PRC, Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Igor Morgulov confirmed that the development of the countries’ bilateral relations will 
continue as before, once again claimed that Russia-China relations have reached an 
unprecedented level, and noted the significance of the Chinese leadership’s choice to make its 
first foreign trip to Russia after the change of power.57 
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Positive rhetoric on the development of economic relations of Russia and China continued 
through 2013. For example, in June, Russian Ambassador to China Andrei Denisov reported that 
‘in recent years, trade relations between Russia and China have experienced a period of rapid 
development. At the same time, the dynamics of our trade growth were very high against the 
backdrop of a moderate increase in China's trade with other countries. In some years, out of 
China's 20 largest trading partners, trade with Russia grew at the fastest pace’ and said that he is 
‘convinced that the great potential of Russian-Chinese trade and economic cooperation has not 
yet been revealed’.58 
Officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry persisted in their claims of a significant alignment of 
interests between Russia and China. For example, in early 2014, Ambassador Denisov said in an 
interview that ‘the very wording “positions are close or coincide” gives diplomatic laxity. But in 
the case of China and Russia, this is actually the case. This closeness of positions is not 
artificially built, this is not the result, so to speak, of diplomatic shaping. The positions of our 
countries grow out of our own national interests, and conscious national interests. In other words, 
their coincidence or proximity has an objective character’.59 However, the official also explained 
the reality of occasionally having conflicting interests: ‘Both China and Russia are major powers 
with their own, once again to emphasize, conscious national interests. And it is not at all a fact 
that these interests should always coincide. There is no such thing. It is quite natural that there 
may be gaps in our positions, maybe a different angle of vision of a particular problem’.60 
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Despite China’s non-recognition of the referendum in Crimea in March 2014 and the peninsula’s 
integration with the Russian Federation, and China’s abstention on two UN resolutions that 
month (one on the invalidation of the results of the referendum, and another urging states not to 
recognize any change in Crimea’s status), Russian officials continued to regard the development 
of their country’s relations with China positively and optimistically. For example, in April 2014, 
Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that ‘in recent years, the relations of comprehensive partnership 
and strategic cooperation between Russia and the PRC have reached an unprecedentedly high 
level, which meets the interests of the internal development of our states and contributes to the 
strengthening of their positions in the international arena. A firm basis for further progress in all 
areas without exception is the highest level of trust, primarily in the political sphere, which is 
reflected in regular contacts at the highest levels’.61 Contrary to entertaining the idea that China 
abandoned or betrayed Russia with regard to the events in Crimea and international backlash, 
officials expressed understanding and even appreciation for China’s position on the Crimea 
issue. For example, in that same interview Lavrov said ‘we appreciate the balanced and objective 
position of Beijing on the Ukrainian crisis, the fact that China demonstrates an understanding of 
the whole set of relevant factors, including historical ones’.62 Later that year, Ambassador 
Denisov, regarding China’s position on the Crimea issue, said that ‘the Chinese position on this 
issue is very clear and on the whole very positive. China does not say whether it supports or does 
not support Russia's actions in Ukraine, including, among other things, the return of the Crimea. 
Our Chinese partners at all levels have repeatedly stressed that in the development of the crisis in 
Ukraine there are historical roots that in relations with them we have the right to expect an 
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understanding of the motives and actions of our side. Well, China's official position boils down 
to the need to end the bloodshed as soon as possible, to find ways to solve the problem 
peacefully, diplomatically, using, if necessary, international opportunities. That is, in this case it 
is no different from our position’.63 
In late 2014, President Putin stated that ‘strengthening ties with the PRC is a foreign policy 
priority of Russia. Today, our relations have reached the highest level of comprehensive 
equitable trust-based partnership and strategic interaction in their entire history’.64 In an 
interview in December 2014, after speaking at length about many aspects of Russia-China 
relations, Ambassador Denisov concluded confidently that ‘in the past year “on all fronts and 
directions” we managed not only to prevent the reduction of the turnover in Russian-Chinese 
cooperation, but also to increase it, and in some cases very significantly’.65 
In the context of a fallout of Russia-Western relations as a result of the Ukraine crisis, the fall of 
the ruble, and resulting economic difficulties for Russia, 2015 saw a continuation of positive and 
optimistic rhetoric on China from Russian officials. When asked in an interview whether China 
should help Russia in these difficult times, Ambassador Denisov said ‘I would say not so much 
about help, but about support. China does indeed support Russia on such an important issue as 
countering Western sanctions. China, including at the level of senior management, sharply 
expressed a negative attitude regarding the pressure on the leadership of Russia and refused in 
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any form to join any sanctions. For this support, we are very grateful to our Chinese partners and 
highly appreciate it’.66 Concluding on the state of Russia’s relations with China, the official 
stated, ‘there is political interest, there is material interest, and there is interest purely human. In 
the case of Russian-Chinese relations at the current stage, all three interests coincide. This is the 
basis of our confidence that Russian-Chinese relations will continue to develop’.67 Later that 
year, Foreign Minister Lavrov reaffirmed that ‘expansion of foreign policy cooperation with the 
People's Republic of China is the most important priority of the Russian Federation and meets 
the interests of stability in the world’.68 
Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West as a result of the Ukraine crisis and sanctions 
imposed on Russia coupled with a perceived reinvigoration of Russia’s efforts to strengthen ties 
with China prompted a lot of discussion about a ‘turn to the East’. In answering a question about 
Russia’s ‘turn to the East’, Ambassador Denisov said in an interview in December 2015 that ‘the 
turn to the East is, first of all, a strategic choice of Russia, which, in general, is not connected 
with the policy of sanctions. In any case, it began long before we were hit by a series of 
sanctions. Our government started talking seriously about turning to the East somewhere about 
three years ago, when no one threatened us with sanctions. But if you go deeper, then it started 
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even earlier, at least from the beginning of the 2000s … it cannot be said that the sanctions had a 
decisive influence on the development of economic ties with the Chinese neighbor’.69 
In a speech following talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in March 2016, Foreign 
Minister Lavrov stated that they ‘confirmed the high appreciation of the achieved level of 
Russian-Chinese cooperation, which, according to the general assessment, is the best in the 
history of our relations’.70 The official began a speech in May of that year by saying that 
‘comprehensive promotion of relations with the People's Republic of China is Russia's 
unconditional foreign policy priority’.71 Lavrov went on to claim that in the context of a 
‘fundamentally new historical stage associated with the formation of a polycentric system of 
world order … it is difficult to overestimate the important role of the Russian-Chinese 
partnership, which has acquired a truly strategic character, in maintaining global and regional 
security and stability’.72 In the speech, Lavrov also shared an optimistic view on Russia’s 
economic relations with China, and near the end of the speech the official describes the potential 
of the strategic partnership of Russia and China as ‘truly inexhaustible’.73 
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In an interview in June 2016, Ambassador Denisov reiterated that the state of Russia-China 
relations is a ‘“comprehensive strategic partnership,” the level of which is the best in the history 
of relations between our states’.74 Denisov asserted that the high quality of Russia and China’s 
relations stems from an alignment of national interests.75 Despite a significant downturn in trade 
between Russia and China over the previous year, Denisov remained optimistic, characterizing 
the slump as a natural occurrence in the context of global free market forces.76 In another 
interview in June 2016, Denisov explains that, while Russia’s and China’s interests are not 
exactly the same, their ‘positions on various kinds of problems that overwhelm the modern 
system of world relations, are generally quite close, and in many respects they coincide’, and this 
allows for close cooperation in international organizations, which ‘has a sobering effect’ on other 
members of the organizations.77 The official also claims that Russia-China relations ‘have a 
cooling, stabilizing effect on the overall turbulent international situation’.78 In late 2016, Denisov 
again gave an optimistic report of Russia’s economic relations with China despite the downturn 
of 2015.79 
In an interview in December 2016, President Putin describes Russia’s special, complex 
relationship with China, characterized by a high degree of trust: ‘Now we characterize Russian-
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Chinese relations as a strategic partnership, even a special strategic partnership. We have never 
had such a level of trust with China before’.80 Russia’s official rhetoric frequently use of the 
words ‘trust’ and ‘friend’ and their variations when describing the interaction of Russian and 
Chinese officials.81 After describing many of the areas in which Russia and China are closely 
engaged, including joint projects, the UN, the SCO, and BRICS, the official described Russian-
Chinese ties as ‘diverse, multi-faceted and deep’.82 
In an interview in February 2017, Ambassador Denisov was asked about the unequal structure of 
Russia’s trade with China, wherein Russia exports mostly raw materials and China exports 
mostly finished goods.83 The official first claims that China is not imposing the trade structure on 
Russia, and that the trade between the countries represents ‘a balance of interests’ and ‘a balance 
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of opportunity’.84 Denisov argues that there is no reason to worry about the trade structure and 
expresses optimism regarding trade relations with China. The official explains that, by exporting 
raw materials to China, Russia is simply using an advantage, and that this should not be feared.85 
Denisov then points out that Russia is building on other areas of its exports to China as well as 
finding new niches in the Chinese market.86 
In recent years, Russian officials continued to declare that Russia-China relations are in the best 
state of their history. In April 2017, at a meeting with the head of the Chancellery of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Li Zhanshu, Putin said he thinks that China’s 
efforts to develop regional and global economic cooperation ‘will support the unprecedentedly 
high level of Russian-Chinese relations that has developed in recent years’.87 
During a press conference that followed a speech Lavrov gave in Moscow in January 2017, the 
official began an answer to a question from the press on security cooperation between Russia and 
China by saying that Russia has ‘the best relations with China in the entire history of our 
countries’, adding that ‘bilateral strategic interaction, comprehensive partnership, and 
cooperation on regional and global affairs is on the rise’.88 In a speech given at the Russian State 
Duma that same month, Lavrov said that ‘the course on strengthening Russian-Chinese strategic 
partnership relations remains unchanged’ and that such relations are ‘exemplary for responsible 




87 Putin, Vladimir. ‘Vstrecha s Rukovoditelem Kant͡ seli͡ arii T͡SK Kompartii Kitai͡ a Li CHzhanʹshu (Meeting with the 
head of the Chancellery of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Li Zhanshu)’. Moscow. 
26/04/2017. Available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54381. Accessed 24/04/2020. 
88 Lavrov, Sergei. ‘Vystuplenie i Otvety na Voprosy SMI Ministra Inostrannykh Del Rossii S.V. Lavrova v KHode 
Press-Konferent͡ sii po Itogam Dei͡ atelʹnosti Rossiĭskoĭ Diplomatii v 2016 Godu, Moskva (Speech and Answers to 
Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at A Press Conference on the Results of 
Russian Diplomacy in 2016’. Moscow). 17/01/2017. Available at 
https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-




major powers in the 21st century’.89 During the Q&A that followed the speech, in an answer to a 
question asking what position Russia would take in the event of increased tensions between 
China and the US, Lavrov said that ‘our relations with China are booming, flourishing, they are 
unprecedentedly rich, trusting, friendly and effective both in terms of bilateral cooperation in all 
areas and in terms of our interaction and coordination of our steps in the international arena’.90  
During an opening speech at a joint press conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang in 
May 2017, Lavrov said ‘on both sides, we reaffirmed the high level of Russian-Chinese 
cooperation, which reached an unprecedented level in the history of bilateral relations’.91 At the 
same press conference, in an answer to a question about the state of business cooperation 
between Russia and China, Lavrov said that ‘Russian-Chinese relations are in full bloom. They 
have reached an unprecedented level in the history of our relations and cover all conceivable 
areas of interaction between states and, possibly, interpersonal communication’.92 It was reported 
that ‘a high assessment of the level of Russian-Chinese relations was confirmed’ during 
conversations between Lavrov and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in February and June 
2017.93 
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In an interview with TASS in February 2017, Ambassador Denisov said that ‘the level of 
relations that have now been reached between China and Russia is characterized as the highest in 
history. And this is not just a figure of speech, but a reflection of objective reality. We had allied 
relations in the 50s. They were then based on ideological identity and bloc solidarity. It did not 
lead to anything good. Our current alliance is de-ideologized. This means that it is entirely based 
on mutual interests’.94 
In an interview with the China Media Corporation in 2018, President Putin said that Russia and 
China have built a relationship in recent decades that could hardly be compared with any other at 
the time, noting that they are truly considerate of each other’s interests.95 According to Putin, 
Russia-China relations continue to develop in a positive direction. The official explained that the 
Treaty on Friendship and Good Neighborhood in 2001 ‘is just the foundation, that foundation on 
which we built the current building of our relations, and every year it acquires more and more 
colors, new floors, it grows higher and higher, becomes stronger and stronger’.96 At a meeting 
with Politburo member of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi in August 2018, Putin said 
that relations between Russia and China are developing according to plan.97 In a meeting with 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang in May 2019, Putin reaffirmed that he believes that Russia-
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China relations ‘are developing successfully in the very literal sense of the word’.98 In June 
2019, Putin expressed his view once again that ‘we can confidently say that Russian-Chinese 
relations are at an unprecedentedly high level’.99 
In two speeches and in the opening remarks of a meeting given by Lavrov in 2018, the official 
repeats the claim that Russia-China relations have reached an ‘unprecedentedly high level’.100 In 
a speech and an interview in 2019, Lavrov once again describes Russia’s relationship with China 
as being in an unprecedentedly good state, and in the latter, the official elaborates with the 
description of the frequency of high-level interaction between the two states.101 
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‘The intensity of the political dialogue between Moscow and Beijing is at a record level. Last year, 
there were four meetings between President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of China Xi 
Jinping. They exchanged state visits and met twice on the sidelines of the international BRICS and 
G20 events. Always, when our leaders participate in some kind of multilateral discussions, they 
find an opportunity to devote some time to a bilateral meeting. This allows us to constantly “check 
the clock”, as we say, to feel the nuances in each other’s positions. Thus, it becomes easier to 
develop collective approaches’.102 
In recent years, Russian government officials have also continued to claim that Russia and China 
have very similar interests. At a meeting with First Deputy Premier of the State Council of China 
Zhang Gaoli in April 2017, Putin said that ‘mutual interests’ are ‘at the heart’ of the ‘very good 
relations’ between Russia and China.103 
In an interview with TASS News Agency in February 2017 cited above, Ambassador Denisov 
said that Russia and China have ‘a common foreign policy interest, related to the fact that our 
attitude towards what is happening in the world, our assessments of various international events 
are largely close, and coincide in a number of areas’, and that, because of the similarity of the 
countries’ interests and attitudes towards external events, ‘Russian-Chinese relations are a self-
valuable and self-sufficient sphere that is resistant to all kinds of external fluctuations’.104 
In an interview with the China Media Corporation in June 2018 cited earlier, President Putin 
explains that at the heart of all of Russia’s and China’s interests is the ‘desire to improve 
people’s lives’, and that, ‘based on this, [Russia and China] are thinking about how to build 
Russian-Chinese relations in order to achieve these goals both to ensure our external security and 
to add up efforts in building a new type of economy based on modern innovations, on a digital 
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economy, on the achievements of genetics, on modern, competent ways of managing society, the 
state and the economy itself’.105 Regarding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its 
implications for Russia’s interests, Putin said that Russia has ‘always supported this idea’ and it 
is viewed as a ‘useful, important, and promising initiative’ that is ‘complemented by [Russia’s] 
efforts to build the Eurasian Economic Union’.106 
During a press conference in April 2019, in response to a question on whether the BRI benefits 
Russia, Putin explains that China is ‘just like Russia, just like any country, [it] proceed[s] from 
[its] national interests. This is normal’.107 Nevertheless, the official continues, ‘China is doing 
this in a fairly civilized, gentle manner and in such a way that the proposed solutions for 
common development are in the interests of the vast majority of participants in international 
communication, if not all’.108 Putin also observes that ‘in [its] practical activities, in politics, 
[China does] everything to take into account the interests of its partners’.109 The official explains 
that the BRI is aligned with Russia’s interests because it will allow Russia to increase the use of 
its transit routes, such as the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Mainline. 
At a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang in May 2019, President Putin said that the 
BRI ‘fully fits’ into Russia’s continued integration efforts within the Eurasian Economic 
Community.110 At a gala celebrating the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties 
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between Russia and China in June 2019, Putin said that the countries are united by certain 
principles, including the ‘consideration of each other's interests’.111 
In two pieces of Russian Press Department commentary on visits between Foreign Minister 
Lavrov and Foreign Minister Wang in February and May 2019, it was stated that ‘Russia and 
China adhere to close or coinciding approaches to most international problems’ and that the 
linking of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and BRI serves as ‘the basis for promoting 
integration processes throughout Eurasia and building the Greater Eurasian Partnership as a 
common development space based on equality, openness, and mutual consideration of 
interests’.112 
After negotiations between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Foreign Minister Wang in May 2019, 
Lavrov gave a speech in which he said that the combination of the EAEU and BRI as well as 
other Eurasian integration initiatives ‘will allow us to enter the formation of a Greater Eurasian 
Partnership based on the principles of openness, transparency, and taking into account each 
other's interests’.113 
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In recent years Russian officials have continued another trend in their rhetoric by claiming that 
relations between Russia and China are crucial for the maintenance of regional and global 
stability. In Lavrov’s opening remarks at talks with Foreign Minister Wang in April 2017, the 
official used the example of the US’ blocking of investigations by the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of a gas attack in Syria to demonstrate the need for Russia and 
China to continue to take responsibility in maintaining regional and global security.114 Lavrov 
reaffirmed several more times in 2018 and 2019 that Russia and China together play an 
important role in maintaining stability in the world.115 In an interview with Interfax News in 
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January 2019, Ambassador Denisov claimed this as well.116 In June 2019, President Putin 
explained that Russia and China ‘make a great contribution to solving acute global problems, 
countering new challenges and threats, and jointly advocate the formation of a new, fair world 
order based on multipolarity, strict observance of international law, the Charter of the United 
Nations, equality, and mutually beneficial cooperation’.117 
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